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ABSTRACT 
 This Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort 12 (SEA-12) report applies a 
systems engineering process to the largely qualitative Global Fleet Station (GFS) 
Concept, and its role in ensuring stability in the regions of the world.  We apply a slightly 
modified JCIDS process, with a focus on providing “value-based” results.  A regional 
focus on the Gulf of Guinea is selected.  Measures are derived in the form of attributes – 
or specific capabilities – desired of GFS based on the needs and issues of the region.  
Vessels from the Navy’s current inventory are evaluated for their performance and cost, 
and two, an LPD and HSV, are selected as the most cost-effective proposals for 
employment as a GFS in the Gulf of Guinea in 2012.  Other solutions are evaluated as 
well: a future-concept ship, improvements to existing platform alternatives, and 
considerations for improving integration and interaction with agencies outside the 
Department of the Navy. 
 vi




 The authors would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Systems Engineering 
curriculum and the Wayne E. Meyer Institute for their commitment to our academic 
development and achievements as System Engineers.   
 First and foremost, we thank our advisors, Captain Wayne Hughes, USN (RET), 
Captain Jeffrey Kline, USN (RET), and Dr. Eugene Paulo for their guidance through our 
writing, briefing, and engineering and analysis endeavors.  We return to our Navy and 
Air Force communities better equipped to address broad challenges from a systematic 
approach, not only as a result of our academic experience and project study at NPS, but 
also as a direct result of the positive mentorship that they provided.   
 We thank RADM Paul Shebalin (USNR, RET), Dr. Francis Shoup and the Meyer 
Institute for their guidance and support throughout this project.  Both RADM Shebalin 
and Dr. Shoup provided us with an invaluable and unique opportunity to be active 
participants in two separate GFS conferences. 
 Professor Ronald Fricker, through his experience and keen interest in helping his 
students, offered valuable advice in helping our team transition from the qualitative 
nature of our Functional Area Analysis into the quantitative analysis demanded by our 
Functional Needs Analysis.  His suggestion of using attributes to help derive measures 
and requirements out of needs, became the basis from which all further analysis 
emanated.  We are grateful for his tutelage and valuable contribution to our development 
as System Engineers. 
 We also would like to recognize our military advisor and teacher, LTC Mark 
Stevens, USA (RET), for his caring, interest, and actions taken in ensuring a positive 
academic, professional, and personal experience at NPS.  
 Ms. Wanda McGuffin and Ms. Trinh Hoang, through their efforts in addressing 
all non-academic matters associated with SEA-12’s briefs, lab requirements, and 
administration, they allowed the team to focus solely on their academic development and 
requirements.  For that, we are truly grateful. 
 viii
 The authors would also like to acknowledge their NPS instructors, who were 
instrumental in providing a superb educational experience: 
 
Professor Doyle Daughtry 
Professor David Olwell 
LCDR Dan Widdis, USN 
Professor Matthew Boensel 
Professor Mitch Brown 
Professor Ralucca Gera 
COL Andy Hernandez, USA 
Professor Gary Langford 
Professor Bard Mansager 
Professor Michael McMaster 
Professor David Meyer 
Professor Gregory Miller 
Professor Greg Mislick 
Professor Rene Rendon 
Professor Donald Stoker 
 
 Our cross-campus, integrated study benefited greatly from the research and 
knowledge of fellow NPS students in other curriculums, and their contributions are 
appreciated.  Their names follow: 
 
LCDR Sarah Dachos, USN (NSA) 
LT Christi Montgomery, USN (METOC) 
COL Ibrahim Sani, Nigerian Army (DA) 
LT Greta Spitz (OR) 
LCDR Peter Ward (OR) 
 
 The authors also recognize the following individuals for their contributions to our 
project (names followed by parent commands): 
 
Ted Andreadis, MSC Port Engineer 
Mr. Keith Bauer, MSC HQ 
LCDR Chris Barrows, USCG, USCG HQ 
CDR Doug Burton, USN, NPS  
Mr. Jeremy Cairl, USCG HQ 
Mr. Mark Campbell, NAVSEA 
CAPT Chuck Calvano, USN (RET), NPS 
Mr. Mike Carey, VAMOSC 
Ms. Virginie Collin-Banerji, VAMOSC 
 ix
COL Fred Gerber, Project Hope 
Mr. Matthew Hawkins, NSWG 4 
LCDR Tom Kait, USN, USS FORT MCHENRY  
Mr. John Krempasky, NAVSEA 
Dr. Letitia Lawson, NPS (NSA Dep.) 
Mr. Mike Mazzacco, NSWC Dahlgren 
Mr. Scott Moreland, Center for Civil-Military Relations 
CAPT Doug Otte, NPS (Warfare Innovation) 
Dr. Peter Pham, James Madison University 
CAPT Fernandez Ponds, USN, State Department  
CAPT Wayne Porter, USN, (COMUSNAVCENT N2 / Director, ONA) 
LCDR Mark Thompson, USN, CNE-C6F 
Mr. Jed Snyder, CNE-C6F 
Professor Brian Steckler, NPS 
LCDR Eric Williams, OPNAV N81 
 
 Last but certainly not least, we must thank our families for their love and 









 In applying a systems engineering approach to Global Fleet Station (GFS), the 
Systems Engineering Analysis students in Cohort 12 (SEA-12) confront what many 
might consider a non-engineering subject: influencing stability and security in the 
world’s regions.  Although similar to Policy Analyses, this particular application is 
pioneering, as it offers a deliberate, systematic means by which to determine solutions to 
social, political, natural, military and economic issues that threaten peace - as opposed to 
reactions based solely on human intuition, experience and bias.  As one might expect, the 
solutions are not simple system outcomes.  Although we do endeavor to make GFS the 
solution to regional issues in the Gulf of Guinea, the outcomes of our study involve not 
only system proposals, but process solutions as well.  
 
Integrated Study 
System Engineering Analysis Cohort 12's (SEA-12) capstone, integrated project 
includes personal, e-mail, and phone interactions with various academic institutions, 
system commands, and operational organizations.  Some of the schools, agencies, and 
organizations conferred with are represented below. 
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Figure 1:  SEA-12 Interaction Across Campus and Beyond 
 
 The Method 
 Our particular method is a modification of the Joint Capabilities Integrated 
Development System (JCIDS), chosen for its wide use throughout the Department of 
Defense, as well as its reflection of fundamental characteristics of Systems Engineering.  
Consisting of Strategic Guidance, Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs 
Analysis (FNA), and Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA), it identifies the desires of our 
senior leadership, discovers the needs of our region of interest, determines the ability of 
the naval services to address those needs, and offers solutions to close any “gaps” 
between what we have and what we hope to achieve, respectively.  Value Engineering, 
decision theory, and cost and risk analysis comprise adaptations to JCIDS that we deem 
important to providing realistic system solutions for GFS, truly suited to the environment 
in which they will operate.   
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 GFS Definition  
 From general literature research, and gaining greater understanding of why GFS is 
being called for through a detailed review of strategic guidance issued by the President, 
the Secretary of Defense, and the naval service chiefs, we define GFS as the following: 
 
A sea base of operations from which to coordinate and launch a 
variety of missions within a regional area of interest, focusing 
primarily on Phase 0/Shaping and Stability operations, to include 
Theater Security Cooperation, Maritime Domain Awareness, and 
tasks associated with the war on terror. 
 
It is important to recognize the importance of specific terms.  “Sea base” is meant to 
imply the location from which GFS will operate - from the sea - and is not intended to 
infer that it shall be part of the Sea basing program.  This maritime orientation obviously 
impacts what type of system solutions may comprise GFS, and in the case of our study, 
results in the consideration of ship platforms, only.  “Phase 0/Shaping and Stability” 
provides the operational “umbrella” under which GFS will seek to work within, and 
enforces its role as one related to peaceful and cooperative engagements with host nations 
- not as a staging base for hostile employment.  Our opinion is that should hostilities 
commence and call for a need above self-defense, or active participation with host-nation 
forces (at their request), the GFS will be augmented or replaced by other combatant 
forces.   
 
 Problem Statement and Regional Focus 
 SEA-12's problem statement also emanates from strategic guidance, as well as 
from the desire to provide boundaries within which to work. 
 
Evaluate Global Fleet Station system alternatives to provide the most 
effective solution to execute Maritime Security and Influence 
Operations in the Gulf of Guinea, projected to 2012. 
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Of note is the term “most effective:” though the “best” system alternatives may be the 
most desirable, factors of cost and risk must be considered.  “Maritime Security” denotes 
a need to enhance regional stability and security through cooperative interaction between 
our naval forces and those of the host nations.  “Influence” highlights a humanitarian 
element to regional stability.   
 The problem statement also reflects our desire to attain quality, detailed 
information about these needs with a scoped, regional focus, rather than with a broad 
“brush-stroke” synopsis of stability issues worldwide.  The Gulf of Guinea region, 
representing 13 countries from Liberia in the Northwest to Angola in the South, presents 
a host of challenges to stability, and is the perfect venue in which to test and evaluate the 
GFS concept on a regional scale.  The lack of maritime capability to combat piracy and 
poaching, the epidemics, the floods, and the lack of infrastructure - among other issues - 
offer needs that may be translated into system requirements.  Finally, though the year 
2012 influences decisions in proposals for GFS system alternatives (obviously, new 
construction ventures are eliminated), it is intended as an aide to predicting the operating 




Figure 2:  Gulf of Guinea Region 
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 Functional Area Analysis 
 FAA provides the first result of this study: a “GFS Process Model.”  Value 
Engineering concepts emphasize creative application of functional hierarchies while 
considering requirements set by the user - in this case, the people, governments, and 
naval forces of the Gulf of Guinea nations.  We start by breaking the study into three 
separate study initiatives: Peacetime Engagement, Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster 
Relief (HA/DR), and Interagency & Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) 
Coordination.  These sub-efforts address issues in the region via functional, mission, and 
capability hierarchies within their own respective missions.  A “Country Team” - focused 
on detailed research into each country in the region - verifies these hierarchies, while 
providing the value base we desire.   Out of these hierarchies, specific GFS capabilities 
are determined.  We call these specific capabilities attributes. 
 
 
Figure 3:  Functional Area Analysis 
 
 Viewing the mid-level hierarchies in Figure 3, one realizes that many of the 
capabilities and functions outlined for the Gulf of Guinea are endemic to the rest of the 
world.  With some future study, other hierarchal elements specific to other regions may 
be added to our list; for example, perhaps a canal security function for Latin America (see 
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Figure 4).  With such a comprehensive collection of mission hierarchies, a combatant 
commander could apply his or her own expertise of the regional geo-socio-political-
economic environment (or employ a “country team” to do so) to this base model in order 
to determine their own region-specific attributes.  This “GFS Process Model” possesses 
the potential to provide regional commanders with a process by which to determine what 
available assets might serve best as GFS in their geographical area of influence, and it 
represents the first result of our study.  
 
 
Figure 4:  Global Process Model, with Regional Application 
 
 Attributes: Tying Non-Engineering Issues to Quantitative Methods 
 Our attributes warrant special attention, as they form the foundation for our next 
JCIDS phase, and they provide a means to derive quantitative and/or subjective measures 
by which to evaluate possible system alternatives. For example, in Peacetime 
Engagement, the requirement of a mid-level communication capability demands a more 
specific integration piece (attribute).  Out of this attribute, one might logically assess 
scoring criteria such as whether or not a proposed GFS platform has a Local Area 
Network.  Our attributes provide the means by which to gain specific, quantitative 
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requirements for GFS.  They enable us to transfer from the qualitative world of regional 
stability into the quantitative world of engineering and analysis. Over 200 GFS attributes 
(including supporting attributes) are generated to help select the “best” alternative. 
 
 
Figure 5:  Attribute Definition and Example 
 
 Functional Needs Analysis  
 Having identified the needs, and converting them to measurable quantities via our 
attributes, we next seek to determine our current capability in meeting those requirements 
via FNA.  Considering the maritime orientation of our definition, current capability 
consists of one type of asset: ships.  A number of ships across a broad spectrum of 
categories might conceivably be called into service: Military Sealift Command (MSC) 
vessels, amphibious ships, Cruiser-Destroyer (CRU-DES) classes, or combinations of any 
of those.  Testing those vessels’ ability to fulfill the attributes via decision theory and a 
system of weighting and scoring within a scenario context for each mission comprise the 
major portion of our analysis in FNA, and in our study as a whole.  Applying a decision 
matrix for “decisions made under assumed risk,” we determine relative “expected value 
performance” (EVP) scores for each of our alternatives as a GFS in the Gulf of Guinea. 
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Our scenarios for each mission area offer a realistic context by which to evaluate GFS 
system alternatives, and are pertinent to stability in the region: a counter-piracy scenario 
for Peacetime Engagement, a flooding disaster for HA/DR, and a scenario centered 
around logistical support for NGOs combating the West African AIDS epidemic for our 
Interagency & NGO Coordination mission.  Against these backdrops, the resulting top-
performance ship alternatives include an LHD & FFG (large-deck amphibious/small 
CRU-DES) combination, an LPD-17 (San Antonio class), and a High Speed Vessel 
(HSV).  These are our best assets out of current inventory; however, applying the 
mitigating factor of cost eliminates the LHD & FFG combination as a viable option, and 
maintains the LPD-17 and HSV as the top two cost-effective solutions, as they fall within 
the “bend in the knee” highlighted in the following figure.   
 
Cost and Weighted Benefit        
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Figure 6:  Cost Benefit Analysis 
 
This conclusion is the second result of our study. 
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 Risk Analysis 
 Cost is not the only mitigating factor in ship employment: risk must also be 
considered.  Our first step in assessing risk associated with GFS is to identify potential 
issues, focusing on answering the question, “What IF something happens?”   
Understanding that many types of risk lie within categories such as cost, funding, 
management, political, production, and schedule, we may apply the expertise gained from 
our country studies - as well as from our own collective operational experience - in 
determining a set of risks to GFS in the Gulf of Guinea.  One example of risk follows: 
 
Operational Availability:  What if the operational availability of USN and 
USNS assets preclude use of the desired platform for the GFS mission for 
any number of reasons (Fleet Response Plan, number of desired class of 
platform limited in number, platforms called to respond to other 
operational requirements)? 
 
 After this is completed, the probability and impact of the risks can be combined 
and categorized into risk ratings (low, medium, and high) and prioritized.  Our rankings 




Figure 7:  GFS Risk Matrix 
 
Here, the risk of our operational availability example is among those that demand the 
greatest attention, as it comprises a high risk - or greater likelihood and/or impact.  Such 
ratings may effect how we decide to handle the risk involved, whether it is to control it, 
avoid it, assume (accept) it, or transfer it.  This decision culminates in a contingency 
action.  In the case of our example, the preferred action is to transfer the mission to 
another ship platform - even if that vessel is less capable. 
 Our risk analysis does not shape or influence our rankings of GFS alternatives in 
this study; rather, it simply serves as a reminder that all decisions must be made with 
risks considered.  Doing so leads to contingency actions to mitigate the risks involved 
with GFS in a variable environment.  
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 This is not the end of our study, as the performance “gap” between the ship assets 
in our current inventory, and what is desired of them in their role as GFS, must be 
considered.  In our study, our gap in attribute fulfillment is as great as 32% in the case of 
the AS.  We must ask, “How can we close this gap for all ships that might be called to be 
the GFS?”  In addition, the cost gap must also be considered. 
 
 Functional Solution Analysis 
 Performance and cost comprise the two variables upon which we may close “the 
gap” between current-capability and attribute requirements.  Cost is addressed by simply 
considering maintenance and manning practices currently utilized by MSC ships, but 
specific details are not available in quantitative measures for this study.  Regarding 
performance, two options are apparent: 1) design and produce a new GFS class of ship, 
or 2) make improvements to existing designs. 
 Though designing a new class of ship remains beyond the scope of this project, a 
study by the NAVSEA 05D1/NACT GFS Team provides some insights into notional 
specs.  Evaluating this conceptual design under our system of scoring attributes, with the 
same weights assigned as for the alternatives tested in our FNA, yields respectable total 
value performance scores in each mission area.  Overall performance ranks at 85% - 
ranked between the HSV (83%) and LPD-17 (88%) – our two most cost-effective 
choices.  Considering that the NAVSEA team proposes complementing their “GFS 
Station Ship” with a Patrol Craft, their concept’s EVP score increases to 87% - just one 
percentage point below that of our top cost-effective platform.  Differences in opinion 
regarding certain attribute weights and scores between the SEA-12 and NAVSEA teams 
afford some perspective on why their notional design did not score even higher, as well 
as other considerations.  Determining cost for the notional design, unfortunately, remains 





Figure 8:  One of the CISD Notional Designs Developed for the NAVSEA GFS Team 
 
 Making materiel alterations, changing operating doctrines, or adjusting personnel 
assignments may also improve performance.  Sometimes simple changes can influence 
performance scores greatly.  We believe this to be the case with the AS alternative: by 
removing stanchions currently placed around its flight deck (thus enabling helicopter 
landing certification and use), as well as incorporating some communications 
improvements, its value as a GFS asset increases from 68% to 84%. Employing similar 





Figure 9:  Results of Doctrine, Materiel, and Personnel Changes 
 
 This assessment complements our risk analysis nicely, considering our risk 
example of operational availability.  Should the LPD-17 and HSV not be available as 
GFS in the Gulf of Guinea, the AS suddenly becomes a viable alternative to transfer the 
role to. 
 Finally, we take the liberty to identify “scenario gaps,” recognizing that the 
scenario focus of our FNA does not adequately address all possible GFS missions, such 
as fisheries enforcement.  Exploring possibilities in U.S. Coast Guard integration and 
interaction, we realize that implementing such considerations will be important steps 
toward addressing roles that the Navy maritime component of our GFS is unfamiliar 
with.  In addition, we recognize the value added by including coalition partners in the 
GFS mission - adding an element of persistence while also helping mitigate our multi-
ship risk; however, we must approach such integration with caution, as political 
sensitivities exist in many Gulf of Guinea nations concerning former colonial rule by 
potential coalition partners. 
 
 Summary 
 Considering the desires of our leaders, understanding the needs of the people and 
governments of the Gulf of Guinea nations, quantifying those needs with measures called 
attributes, analyzing our Navy’s current capability to fulfill these attributes in order to 
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determine the “gap” between what we can do and what we hope to achieve, and then 
closing that “gap” with cost and performance proposals summarizes our process.  Though 
not the traditional approach to natural, social, political and economic threats to the 
stability and security of regions of the world, the analysis and organized process provided 
by our modified JCIDS engineering model offers tangible solutions and alternatives, and 
- perhaps even more importantly - a systematic, logical means of attaining solutions to 
complex regional issues.  
 xxv
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A. PROJECT ASSIGNMENT  
In January of 2007, OPNAV N-81, Rear Admiral Dan Davenport, and his Deputy, 
Mr. Trip Barber, along with OPNAV N52, Rear Admiral Phil Greene, requested that NPS 
consider Global Fleet Station concepts, and design one as an integrated study within the 
larger umbrella of theater and security operations.1  In February of 2007, the Wayne E. 
Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering assigned a study of the Global Fleet Station 
(GFS) to Systems Engineering and Analysis Cohort Twelve (SEA-12) as a campus-wide 
integrated project, with the following objectives: 
 
Design a system of systems and a concept of operations to implement the 
“Global Fleet Station” concept and to execute the missions of forward 
naval presence, crisis response, maritime security operations, security 
cooperation, civil military operations, counterinsurgency, 
counterterrorism, and counter-proliferation in a coalition, interagency and 
joint environment.  Specifically, design a theater concept of operations for 
the Global Fleet Station for Commander, Naval Forces Southern 
Command focusing on the Caribbean, and [or] for Commander, Naval 
Forces Europe focusing on the Gulf of Guinea region.  Consider current 
fleet structure and funded programs as the baseline system of systems to 
execute security and shaping missions in developing these concept of 
operations, then develop alternative architectures for platforms, manning, 
command and control, communication, and operational procedures to 
evaluate against the current program.2 
 
 Broad enough in its guidance, this assignment would lead SEA-12 on a journey 
not only to provide possible solutions to a concept, but also to try to define and scope the 
concept itself.  Though promising a rewarding experience in the end, the road ahead to 
meeting the assignment requirements contained many challenges unique to the nature of 
_____________________ 
1.  Jeffrey Kline, personal meeting with Dan Davenport and Phil Greene, January 17, 2007. 
2.  Frank Shoup, Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering Director (Ret.), memorandum to 
Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 12, February 6, 2007, SEA-12 Capstone Project Objectives.  
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GFS.  Realizing this nature, and determining a systems approach in which to properly 
address it, constituted a significant portion of the overall project in itself. 
 
B. FIRST IMPRESSIONS AND INITIAL APPROACH 
With such a vast array of missions, and spread beyond the familiar realm of our 
naval service across joint, interagency and coalition lines, we first considered our 
assignment as broad … and daunting.  The break-down of our project assignment by the 
Wayne E. Meyer Institute of Systems Engineering, though providing clues on possible 
avenues of research with terms such as “civil military operations” and “theater concept of 
operations,” did not point directly to a detailed definition of a GFS, nor did it present a 
specific requirement to be solved.   Though “alternative architectures” provided guidance 
as to what might become our end-product, its inclusion of manning, communications, and 
operational procedures did little to provide us with a scaled view of the end product.  
GFS, at this initial stage, seemed like an immense “black box” which would be required 
to do a lot of things … and our job was to “solve” it.   
SEA-12’s first approach toward the Institute’s challenge touched only lightly on 
the “basics” of engineering and analysis, and might best be described as the BOGSAT 
method:  a Bunch of Guys/Gals Sitting Around a Table.  Following a generic research of 
literature concerning GFS, our group developed a general idea of concept trends and 
initial thinking on the topic, from the Department of the Navy to external agencies and 
entities.  Following this immersion into the topic, we developed a “first look” list of 
needs and capabilities that a GFS should address.  It follows: 
 
 Justify Navy's role in Phase 0 operations 
 Cooperation: joint, allied, coalition, interagency integration.  high 
number of countries in a small area working closely together to 
enhance regional relationships.  joint, coalition, civilian 
multinational participants in security operations worldwide.  
 Expediency: A direct, succinct command chain required to 
efficiently and rapidly respond to crises anywhere in the world 
within a specified amount of time. 
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 Adaptability: to sustain and deploy flexible expeditionary force 
team packages with tailored teams and mission support modules.  
distributed operations offshore.  to address a variety of 
developmental deficiencies regional Phase 0 operations... 
 Theatre security cooperation 
 Maritime interdiction of illegal transnational activities: counter 
piracy, law enforcement global maritime intelligence integration, 
regional maritime domain awareness leveraging international 
partners direct support of GWOT (surveillance, MIO, combat 
insertion) diplomacy, host NGOs and interagency reps crisis 
response 
 Persistence: to sustain presence through a network of sea-based 
Fleet Stations worldwide.  to establish a dependable forward 
presence through a steady-state self-sustaining sea station or sea 
base.  to deploy expeditionary teams capable of addressing specific 
developmental deficiencies. 
 Response to regional-specific disasters 




o Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) enforcement 
o civil-military relations 
o maritime security 
 Provide regional node for information sharing 
 Provide stability in unstable regions 
 1000 ship Navy; unified maritime operations 
 complement/balance presence of peer competitors (China) 
 Part of Global Maritime network 
 Medical Outreach/Community Relations 
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 NEO 
 Develop future CONOPS, optimal fleet organization and political  
 interactions (ex: FAO) of the Navy. 
 Secure strategic access and retain global freedom of actions 
 Strengthen alliances and partnerships 
 Establish favorable security positions 
 Increase global maritime awareness 
 Provide adaptable force packaging 
 Inshore/riverine operations 
 Forward Naval Presence 
 Security Cooperation 
 Counterinsurgency (COIN) 
 Counterterrorism 
 Civil-Military Operations 
 Counter-proliferation 
 Maritime Security Operations 
 Crisis Response 
 Deterrence 
 Sea Control 
 Air and Missile Defense 
 Expeditionary Power Projection 
 Reduce footprint ashore 
 Address reduction of forward operating bases 
 
This list, though long, redundant, and perhaps unfocused, represented a very important 
phase to our project:  it was a start.  It offered ideas about possible avenues of research 
focus.  In addition, for such a broadly-based project assignment, our broad tactic of 
conducting general research was probably the best initial response.  However, it still left 
us with only a vague idea of what GFS should be, as the list was very large.   
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With our first stab at the project came re-enforcement of our initial feelings about 
the unique nature of the GFS concept:  namely, that the concept not only demanded 
answers as to what it should be, but also required that the right questions for those 
answers be developed.  Indeed, some of these questions and guiding principles inherent 
to other systems challenges – such as specific definitions and problem statements – were 
vague or non-existent in the case of GFS.  Not only would we have to “solve” GFS, we’d 
have to produce our own problem statement of what needed to be solved … in addition to 
our definition. To accomplish this, we needed to discover more about the background of 
GFS, who was asking for it, and why it was being called for.  We had to “dig” deeper 
than our original literature search had taken us. 
 
C. UNDERSTANDING THE BACKGROUND OF GFS 
 
1. Globalization 
Increased connectivity between the economies, social and cultural ideologies, and 
government regimes of the world’s nations and peoples shape the environment in which 
they may prosper.  Potential prosperity is threatened when this “global network” – or 
Globalization – is interrupted by instability in a region.  The intensifying global 
competition for increasingly scarce energy resources, and instability in the traditional oil 
and gas supplier regions, is forcing consumer nations to look elsewhere for more reliable 
sources of energy. This search is creating new potential for conflict or cooperation in 
many parts of the world. As an important source of energy supplies, these regions may 
stand to benefit – or lose. Within these nations, economic disparities increase the 
potential for conflict and instability both within and across borders. The gap between the 
“haves” and the “have-nots,” both within and between nations, invites the “have-nots” to 
resort to violence, corruption and crime. Unless the issues of the economic have-nots are 
addressed, the consequences will include greater global energy insecurity. Additionally, 
non-state threats are intensifying as increased global linkages among terrorism, 
transnational crime and militancy provide each with growing strength, while making it 
more difficult to isolate and attack individual targets. Conditions in various regions of the 
world are conducive to such interdependencies. In addition, as criminal elements 
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infiltrate legitimate political and economic society and blur the lines of distinction, it 
becomes necessary to counter this threat to stability through increased security and 
attention to the underlying social conditions.  
 
2. New Challenges, and Calls for a More Distributed Navy 
 The world’s increased connectivity presents new challenges, and potential 
missions, to our Navy.  Indeed, our armed forces have already been thrown into some of 
them by the changing world dichotomy before they were entirely ready.  Reconstruction 
and conflict prevention, disaster relief, and protecting the globalized economy, all address 
threats to regional stability and the global environment.  Though not necessarily new 
missions in themselves, they are becoming increasingly important as functions of our 
nation’s naval component.   
The war in Iraq demonstrated the modern-world need to address social and civil 
issues in a campaign plan, beyond the realm of armed conflict.  Referred to as 
reconstruction, this aspect of conducting a successful campaign has garnered much 
attention from our executive, legislative, department, and service branches as a necessary 
means for winning wars.  More recently, some of the techniques of reconstruction are 
being considered for applicability toward regions susceptible to war, in order to prevent 
it.  General Anthony Zinni (USMC – ret.) is one of the most outspoken proponents of 
such strategy:   
 
[he] highlighted the need to take a more holistic view of planning for 
conflict, particularly regarding the need for investment in conflict 
prevention. It’s not enough to think only about stopping war or rebuilding 
after conflict, he argued. Preventing deadly violence from occurring 




3. Craig Cohen, Susanne Martike, and Anita Sharma, “Civil-Military Cooperation in a Time of 




The U.S. Navy is one element of, and a means by which, reconstruction/conflict 
prevention may be executed. 
The magnitude and number of catastrophic natural events in the past five years 
highlighted demands on our navy beyond the traditional scope of water supply or 
evacuation.  At home, Hurricane Katrina’s aftermath exposed a disparity in coordination 
between civil and military, federal and state, and government and non-government 
organizations.  The 2004 Tsunami in the Indian Ocean revealed similar problems, but on 
an international scale.  In each, the U.S. Navy responded admirably; however, operating 
in such austere environments - devoid of power and communications - naval vessels and 
aircraft found themselves as completely functional nodes of operation providing help, 
rather than as part of a complete, coherent response.   Out this realm of disaster-relief, 
non-traditional capabilities were called for, such as inter-agency coordination and initial 
response preparedness. 
Though the U.S. Navy has protected threats to trade since its inception, new 
threats to economic stability provide new challenges.  Environmental threats such as 
fisheries depletion threaten the welfare of nation’s people, who depend on their fish 
stocks as a source of protein, as well as to the export potential for the nations whose 
waters are exploited.  Pirates, though a threat since the days of Blackbeard and the early 
19th Century scuffles off of the Barbary Coast, now threaten the economic infrastructures 
of states – such as oil depots - in addition to their continuing threats to trade.  Our nation 
and navy are now expected to answer the call of service to such threats, given their 
potential impact on the globalized economy.  
 
3. The White Paper 
 Working as part of the CNO’s staff, Captain Wayne Porter (USN) answered this 
call, and in so doing, coined the term “Global Fleet Station.”  Addressing the new global 
environment, as well as the need for something (a concept at that point) named GFS to 
“service” its regions, he went on to identify specific regions of interest.  In his white 
paper to the CNO, he stated: 
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The GFS concept is based on the establishment of a network of Fleet 
Stations worldwide, each one servicing a specific region and AOR ...  
Possible locations for these initial Global Fleet Stations include Guam or 
Singapore (GFS - SE Asia); Bahrain or UAE (GFS - East Africa, Arabian 
Gulf); Diego Garcia (GFS – South Asia); Rota (GFS - West Africa); and, 
Key West (GFS – South and Central America).4  
 
Though never officially endorsed by the CNO himself (a second draft eventually was 
endorsed by the CNO’s N3N5), Captain Porter’s concept was not lost upon listening ears 
in Washington. 
 
4. Differing Views 
Admiral Mike Mullen, the CNO, did seize upon the GFS White Paper’s initial 
concept, and adopted it within the strategic vision for his service.  At the Naval War 
College in June of 2006, he referred to GFS as “a hub where all manner of joint, 
interagency, international organizations, navies, coast guards and non-governmental 
organizations could partner together as a force for good.”5 His description of bridging the 
gap between organizations certainly rang true to the calls of strategy reformists such as 
General Zinni, as well as to the realizations of the changing nature of the way in which 
our Navy needs to meet its new challenges.  Indeed, in his 2006 Naval Operations 
Concept (NOC) and in a 2007 CNO’s Guidance Letter, he refers to changes brought on 
by a globalized world. These documents discuss GFS in greater detail, as well, but the 
above quote seemed symbolic of his manner in describing what he hoped to achieve. 
What he meant by “force for good,” our group believed an open-ended terminology to 
indicate his desire to receive multiple contributions to the concept, and to allow for 
competition among them.   
The U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) described the CNO’s desire for a 
GFS as “a highly visible, positively engaged, reassuring, and self-sustaining sea-base 
_____________________ 
4. Wayne Porter, “White Paper on Global Fleet Station,” March 20, 2006. 
5.  Mike Mullen, “Current Strategy Forum,” remarks, Naval War College, Newport, RI, June 14, 2006. 
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from which to conduct regional operations, through tailored and adaptive packages.”6  
One can identify the influence from Captain Porter’s original White Paper, with its 
regional reference, but SOUTHCOM’s inclusion of “tailored and adaptive packages” 
represents another possible aspect of what a GFS should be (this aspect is also covered in 
the NOC, signed by the CNO).  SOUTHCOM put words into action with their 
implementation of the first pilot program under the GFS moniker, deploying HSV 
SWIFT just over a year after GFS was initially conceived.    
Though the previous versions of GFS may seem sacred (given the source of the 
first, and given the timeliness of the second), others emerged.  Commentators proposed 
that GFS take the form of small, autonomous land-based nodes of operation, citing 
facilities in Djibouti and Singapore as prime examples.  Others went so far as to propose 
specific platforms and modes of operation in their description of what GFS should 
encompass.  One analyst, in his report to Congress, suggested that GFS “might be built 
around a single amphibious ship or high-speed sealift ship,”7 while a defense writer cited 
that GFS may consist of “…shallow draft Navy ships and support vessels to operate 
around rivers and littoral waters in key regions of the world.”8  
Discovering such varied concepts within a concept – from the CNO to operational 
commanders to reporters “on the beat” - our group realized that there was no specific, 
concrete, detailed requirement for GFS:  nothing immediate for us to “sink our teeth into” 
as systems engineers.  In addition, the CNO would not define the direction of our project, 
and given the challenge we interpreted from his quotes and documents, presume he 
wouldn’t have it any other way.  We would have to define GFS, determine our own 
requirements, and apply our systems knowledge as we knew how.  
  
_____________________ 
6.  U.S. Southern Command Partnerships for the Americas, “Global Fleet Station Pilot Deployment 
April - September 2007,” U.S. Southern Command. http://www.southcom.mil/appssc/factFiles.php”id=9. 
7.  Ronald O’Rourke, “Navy Role in Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) - Background. 
and Issues for Congress,”  CRS Report for Congress, (April 16, 2007): CRS-5. 
8. Christopher J. Castelli, “Navy Admirals and Marine Generals Prepare for Annual Summit,” Inside 





5. Pilot Programs 
We then decided to look for guidance from some programs already addressing it, 
identifying two GFS pilot deployments, along with three ship deployments closely 
affiliated through their “good will” nature.  Some of these were fleet commander 
responses to the CNO’s desire to “try a Global Fleet Station experiment in ‘the next year 
or two.’”9  One took place before the term “Global Fleet Station” was coined, performing 
many of the exact missions called for by the concept.  Together, they further highlighted 
the various interpretations of GFS, spanning a broad platform and employment spectrum.  
One GFS pilot took place during the process of researching and writing this 
report:  Second Fleet’s and SOUTHCOM’s deployment of HSV SWIFT to Central 
American and Caribbean ports-of-call (April to September 2007).  This deployment 
focused on port visits utilizing a high-speed, small-draft vessel which does not closely 
resemble what most would perceive as a U.S. Navy warship.  SWIFT’s visits to Panama, 
Nicaragua, Belize, Honduras, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic fostered regional 
goodwill and cooperative engagement through training, teaching “courses ranging from 
vehicle and container inspection to small boat driving and basic seamanship skills.”10 
The next GFS pilot utilized a new type of platform vessel, along with an extended 
deployment schedule, to the Gulf of Guinea beginning in October of 2007.    USS FORT 
MCHENRY, an amphibious Landing Ship Dock (LSD), affords greater storage capacity 
and greater ability to deploy smaller vessels from offshore, even if more limited by draft 
to enter ports than HSV SWIFT.  Her eight months at sea and in West African ports were 
(are) intended to push the “persistent” nature of GFS referred to by the CNO.  In addition, 
the inclusion of inter-agency, state-department, coast guard, non-government 
organization and host nation representatives in the planning of FORT MCHENRY’s 
deployment at GFS Planning Conference in Washington D.C., distinguished this GFS 
pilot as the most credentialed in accordance with senior Navy guidance to date. 
_____________________ 
9. Christopher P. Cavas, “U.S. Navy Chief Calls for New ‘Maritime Strategy’,” Defense News (June 
15, 2006): 2. 
10. Roxana Tiron, “Reaching Out: The U.S. Navy’s global fleet station gets a trial run,” Sea Power, 
(August 2007): 46. 
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The USS EMORY S. LAND – a submarine tender - deployed to West Africa in 
both 2005 and 2006.  It has been touted retrospectively as the first GFS. Visiting 
countries in the Gulf of Guinea including Ghana, Sao Tome and Principe, Nigeria, 
Gabon, Angola, Togo, and Cameroon, EMORY S. LAND’s mission in the GoG was to 
help African nations boost their maritime security, as well as to forge stronger alliances 
with them.  Her mission encompassed many tasks now referred to as GFS attributes:  
performing humanitarian aid, training West African forces in security and anti-terrorism 
techniques, HIV-AIDs prevention and awareness efforts, and search-and-rescue training.  
Other deployments, by the nature of their missions, affiliate closely with the pilot 
programs.  USNS COMFORT and USS PELELIU both conducted four-month regional 
visits in 2007, with focuses on “humanitarian assistance, training and community 
relations activities.”11  COMFORT visited twelve Central American nations, while 
PELELIU deployed to the Western Pacific.  Both embarked representatives “from 
various non-governmental and aid agencies,”12 with a heavy emphasis on medical 
professionals in the case of COMFORT.  
 
_____________________ 
11. U.S. Office of Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs, “Humanitarian Missions Essential to 
Relationships, Global War on Terrorism,” Navy.mil (2007), 
http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=30119. 
12.  U.S. Office of Chief of Naval Operations Public Affairs, “Humanitarian Missions Essential to 





Figure 10:  GFS "Pilots" 
 
These pilot programs, whether operating as a GFS pilot or in loose affiliation with 
it due to their missions, re-enforced for our group the realization that GFS had no single 
direction:  large deck amphibious ship vs. hospital ship vs. small and fast, shallow draft 
vessel; persistence vs. short stay; or emphases on medical aid vs. military training.  
However, we did recognize common threads:  good will, engagement, inter-agency 
involvement, and regional scopes.  Perhaps the largest realization for us with these 
programs was that they were reactions by fleet commanders to the CNO’s desire for a 
GFS - offering the promise of providing lessons-learned and regional insights to us - but 
not necessarily providing us with a template to follow in our own struggle to determine 
what a GFS should be. 
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II. TAKING CHARGE:  A DELIBERATE APPROACH TO GFS 
“Leaders are those who know what to do next, know why that is 
important, and know what appropriate resources to bring to bear on the 
problem at hand. Then, through effective communication they influence 
others to follow.” 13        
- Barry Bowater 
 
 SEA-12’s literature research and efforts to address GFS led us to a general 
understanding of what GFS should be, but that there was no single, specific solution. A 
changing, globalized world confronted our navy with new missions.  The GFS concept is 
a response to this change.  Senior Navy leadership often described GFS in broad terms.  
Fleet Commanders and analysts responded with their own ad hoc solutions, experimental 
in nature.  They are so varied that we realized that they were also struggling with the 
same dilemma that we faced:  grasping onto what GFS should be and finding a solution 
to what it was attempting to address.   
We were on our own. 
 We decided to take charge, and produce a deliberate approach to GFS.  This 
would consist of defining GFS based on our research to date and on a more thorough 
review of our strategic guidance, scoping it as a workable project in the time we had, 
determining a problem statement, and then selecting a systems engineering process that 
would yield GFS solutions as the product of orderly and systematic deliberations as the 
first GFS proposal based off of a systems engineering approach.   
_____________________ 
13. John Ben Shepperd Public Leadership Institute, “Quotes: Leadership,” 
http://www.utpb.edu/JBS/quotes.htm. 
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A. DEFINING GFS 
 Based on our general understanding of GFS, and borrowing heavily from two 
documents that we considered as pivotal to its direction – the GFS White Paper and the 
NOC – we defined GFS as follows: 
 
A sea base of operations from which to coordinate and launch 
a variety of missions within a regional area of interest, 
focusing primarily on Phase 0/Shaping and Stability 
operations, to include Theater Security Cooperation, 
Maritime Domain Awareness, and tasks associated with the 
war on terror. 
 
 The following expand on the definition’s key phrases: 
 
 Sea Base: This is meant partly as a means of scoping, as well as to 
demonstrate our understanding of the GFS program as part of a 
broader strategy.  By “sea base,” we clearly desire to scope it to 
concepts or platforms which emanate from the sea.  With limited 
exception, our research led us to conclude that those who best 
articulated and understood the needs for a GFS clearly envisioned 
it as being sea-borne.  Though land-borne stations should not be 
excluded, necessarily, focusing on a maritime base helped us scope 
our project to workable size, and it seemed like a logical choice.   
In addition, the term “sea base” is not intended to infer that GFS is 
the answer to the Navy’s larger Sea Basing concept; however, it 
does infer that it may fall under it. 
 Regional Area of Interest: From initial concept to the pilot 
programs, a regional aspect to GFS remains a common thread.  
Focusing on a specific region would help us do two things:  scope 
and attain a value base.  Obviously, by scoping to one region of the 
world vice the entire globe, we again scaled our project to a more 
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manageable task.  Perhaps more important, however, was our 
desire to offer genuine solutions to the particular needs of specific 
regions, rather than merely offering a world-generic brush-stroke 
of cooperation and engagement that may not apply at the regional 
level.  Beyond scoping, this regional aspect would afford a value-
base to our systems engineering approach. 
 “Phase 0/Shaping and Stability operations, to include Theater Security 
Cooperation, Maritime Domain Awareness, and tasks associated with the 
war on terror:” The traditional four phases of a military campaign 
identified in joint publications are deter/engage, seize initiative, decisive 
operations, and transition.  Phase Zero encompasses all activities prior to 
the beginning of Phase I – that is, everything that can be done to prevent 
conflicts from developing in the first place. Executed properly, Phase Zero 
consists of shaping operations that are continuous and adaptive. Its goal is 
to promote stability and peace by building capacity in partner nations to be 
cooperative, trained, and prepared to help prevent or limit conflicts. For 
the United States, this approach is typically non-kinetic and places heavy 
emphasis on interagency support and coordination. In many instances, 
Phase Zero involves a strategy in which the Department of Defense (DoD) 
is not the lead agency and its programs are only one part of the larger U.S. 
Government effort. The exact origin of the Phase Zero reference is 
unclear, making it difficult to give credit for its coining.14  This section of 
our definition is intended to express the need to give ourselves enough 
leeway to scope further through a true systems process, rather than by 
jumping to conclusions early without thorough research. 
 
_____________________ 
14.  Charles F. Wald, “New Thinking at USEUCOM: The Phase Zero Campaign,” Joint Forces 
Quarterly (2006): 48. 
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 This definition has served as general guidance and has provided some boundaries, 
while not eliminating possibilities.  It was our first concrete milestone toward achieving a 
GFS solution. 
 
B. SELECTING A REGION:  THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 Selecting a region for focused study may seem strange given the “global” label of 
the system alternative we intended to propose; however, we believed a regional (vice 
global) focus would allow us to address core socio-political-economic engagement issues 
through real understanding of individual country needs.  A global approach simply would 
not afford such intimate knowledge and understanding, and we feared that such an 
approach would only offer “brush-stroke” solutions to broad global issues.  Our regional 
focus received validation via the release October 2007 release of A Cooperative Strategy 
for 21st Century Seapower – a joint document signed by all naval service chiefs – which 
stated the following: “Our maritime forces will be tailored to meet the unique and 
evolving requirements particular to each geographic region.”15  In addition, a regional 
approach afforded a means by which to scope our project, providing another set of 
boundaries within to work. 
 The Gulf of Guinea is the best regional focus for GFS, as it possesses a broad 
array of socio-economic, socio-political, political-economic, security, and general 
stability issues among diverse nations.  We specified 13 countries, starting from Liberia 
in the Northwest to Angola in the South.  Some of these nations are in transitional phases 
as they attempt to control and manage the intertwining web of immense resource profits, 
changing governments, securing their borders and maritime domains, and taking care of 
their people:  issues that can rapidly devolve to war, instability and insecurity, or possibly 
terror, if they spin out of control.  The United States also has a vested interest in the 
region, as its vast oceans encompass trade routes, and it relies more heavily on it as a 
trading partner.   
 
_____________________ 
15. U.S. Department of the Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): 10. 
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Figure 11:  Gulf of Guinea Region 
 
 We also selected the Gulf of Guinea region due to the experience already attained 
in the region by our Navy through its pilot programs (EMORY S. LAND and FORT 
MCHENRY), and also due to access to resources on Africa within our own campus, 
consisting primarily of research efforts underway in the NPS National Security Affairs 




C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 We then constructed the following problem statement: 
 
Evaluate Global Fleet Station system alternatives to provide 
the most effective solution to execute Maritime Security and 
Influence Operations in the Gulf of Guinea, projected to 
2012. 
 
 Again, we expand on certain phrases: 
 
 System Alternatives: This is meant to emphasize our systems 
engineering approach to GFS – a holistic approach, and the first of 
its kind attempted.  It is also indicates what we have provided.  A 
system might be a single platform, or several platforms with 
“systems of systems” involved, to include the means of integrating 
forces.   
 Most Effective:  In an ideal world where mitigating factors such as 
cost and risk did not influence decision making, we would strive to 
develop or propose the “best” system alternatives to complete the 
GFS mission.  By the same token, to select a platform or concept 
for GFS based purely on “efficiency” might endanger our focus on 
providing value to shaping and stability in the region by 
minimizing – or how well we accomplish the mission.  We used 
the term “most effective” to delineate an acceptable value 
somewhere between our best capability, and our cheapest. 
 Maritime Security: “Maritime security is required to ensure 
freedom of the seas; facilitate freedom of navigation and 
commerce; advance prosperity and freedom; and protect the 
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resources of the ocean.”16 This term was intended to convey the 
need for a military aspect to GFS: an ability to work with host 
nations’ service components to help them achieve stability within 
their borders. 
 Influence: “The power of producing effects without obvious 
exertion of force or direct exercise of command. It requires the 
creation of secure and stable environments that nurture enduring 
relationships and interdependencies.”17  This term was intended to 
convey the need for a civilian counterpart to the military aspect of 
GFS, which would address shaping and stability considerations 
beyond the realm of host nations’ military forces, but to the heart 
of issues – whether it be aid to the governments, populations, or 
businesses of West Africa. 
 2012:  Setting a timeframe had more to due with our ability to 
specify the operating environment of the Gulf of Guinea, rather 
than with a desire to limit options.  By projecting five years out, 
we can use today’s conditions for our scenarios and simulations.  
By contrast, projecting the state of Gulf of Guinea socio-economic-
political affairs twenty years out is a dilemma.  We know that a 
five year timeline implies limited solutions, negating future-
concept solutions; however, this is not our intention. We will 
consider all system alternatives in the end, whether future or 
current … but they will be based on the current operating 
environment. 
_____________________ 
16.  U.S. Department of Defense and Homeland Security, The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2005): 2. 
17.  U.S. Office of Chief of Naval Operations Strategic Studies Group XXIV, “Beyond Maritime 
Supremacy: Balancing Maritime Capabilities for the Age of Unrestricted Warfare,” (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006): 4-3. 
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D. OUR SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
The means by which SEA-12 decided to discover these system alternatives – and 
the means by which we intended to tie a largely strategic and policy-related topic to 
systems engineering and analysis – led to our adoption of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process.  As a systems process, it was 
initially predicated on insuring that war-fighters receive the capabilities to successfully 
execute their mission, and in that sense, is often referred to as a Capabilities Based 
Approach (CBA).  We selected it for two primary reasons:  a basic framework and easy 
flow within which we could apply our systems engineering knowledge, and the fact that 
it is an understood method within the Department of Defense. 
Figure 12 outlines the JCIDS process, and provides great reference for detailed 
insights into its steps: 
 
 
Figure 12:  JCIDS Process18 
 
_____________________ 
18. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (CJCSM 3170.01C) (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): A-3. 
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A more basic model offered three simple steps by which to apportion our project 
(see Figure 13):  Functional Area Analysis (FAA), Functional Needs Analysis (FNA), 
and Functional Solutions Analysis (FSA). 
 
 
Figure 13:  Three Steps of a CBA19 
 
 Step 1: Functional Area Analysis – Identify relevant strategic guidance, 
and then “synthesize existing guidance to specify the military problems to 
be studied.”20 
 Step 2: Functional Needs Analysis – often referred to as Gap Analysis – 
“examines that problem, assesses how well the DoD can address the 
problem given its current program, and recommends needs the navy 
should address.”21 
_____________________ 
19 U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) User’s 
Guide (Version 2).  Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), (Washington, DC: 
GPO: 2006): 7. 
20. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) User’s 
Guide (Version 2).  Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), (Washington, DC: 
GPO: 2006): 7-11. 
21. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) User’s 
Guide (Version 2).  Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), (Washington, DC: 
GPO: 2006): 7. 
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 Step 3: Functional Solutions Analysis – what we sometimes refer to as our 
Analysis of Alternatives – takes the FNA “assessment as input, and 
generates recommendations for solutions to the needs.”22 
 
 SEA-12 modified this process slightly to produce our own guidance from the 
JCIDS construct, summarized in Figure 14. 
 
 
Figure 14:  SEA-12 JCIDS Approach 
 
_____________________ 
22. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) User’s 
Guide (Version 2).  Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), (Washington, DC: 
GPO: 2006): 7. 
 23
Included are three primary steps to a CBA:  FAA, FNA, and FSA.  Our outcome 
consisted of this report, rather than a Joint Capabilities Document (JCD).  In addition, 
determined not to restrict ourselves by following the strict guidelines of any single 
process, or feeling obligated to hit every minute detail of a JCIDS template such as that 
of Figure 12, we had already realized the importance of avoiding such constraints due to 
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III. STRATEGIC GUIDANCE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Though falling within FAA under the CBA User’s Guide construct, Strategic 
Guidance serves as a reference throughout all phases of the JCIDS process; therefore, we 
applied it to our project as its own distinct phase as part of our modified process.  This 
phase of our research actually commenced on “day one” of our project assignment with 
our initial literature search, so our major task included attaining better depth-of-
understanding of the strategic documents we had already researched, as well as some that 
we may have missed.  The intent of re-focusing on senior guidance was to verify the 
legitimacy of our definition and problem statement, and apply changes where 
appropriate.  In addition, this phase helped us better understand why GFS was being 
called for, even if some of the documents had not, as of yet, mentioned the concept 
directly.   
 
B. LEVELS OF GUIDANCE 
 Following a framework set forth by the CBA User’s Guide (see Figure 15), we 




Figure 15:  Levels of Strategic Guidance23 
 
1. National  
 Beyond specific directives issued by the President, two documents comprise the 
over-arching framework for executive level guidance to naval forces:  the National 
Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS). 
 
a. The National Security Strategy 
  The NSS outlines the executive strategic vision.  Of note were several 
references to the ideals of freedom of people and of trade, providing the foundations for 
democracy via economic prosperity – and vice versa – and strengthening alliances.  “The 
goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that 
can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the 
_____________________ 
23. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) User’s 
Guide (Version 2).  Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), (Washington, DC: 
GPO: 2006): 12. 
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international system.”24  Though such statements may seem broad in nature, they 
certainly set a vision for the over-arching goals that our executive intends to achieve 
globally – region by region - and for which GFS will work to enable. 
  The 2006 NSS does not, however, merely proclaim glorious and inspiring 
ideals; it does, in fact, provide more specific direction.  Some of its chapters deal directly 
with defusing regional conflicts, fighting terrorism, confronting the challenges of 
globalization, and spurring free-markets and infrastructures which will, in turn, enable 
democracy to flourish.   Such topics are applicable to GFS.  For instance, in describing 
the challenges in Africa, the NSS states the following: 
 
Africa’s potential has in the past been held hostage by the bitter legacy of 
colonial misrule and bad choices by some African leaders.  The United 
States recognizes that our security depends on partnering with Africans to 
strengthen fragile and failing states and bring ungoverned areas under the 
control of effective democracies … overcoming [these challenges] 
requires partnership, not paternalism.25 
 
This certainly does seem a more specific – and relevant – to our regional application of 
GFS.  “Partnership, not paternalism” – the strength of this statement alone might 
influence what we would determine as the most effective system alternative, perhaps 
steering us toward a system with non-imposing characteristics.  At the very least, it set 
the stage for an emphasis on the topic of cooperative engagements in the department and 
service documents that followed. 
 
b. National Strategy for Maritime Security 
  The President’s NSMS links these ideals that associate freedom with 
stable economies to the maritime domain.  It fully recognizes that extending stability 
beyond nations’ shores remains vital to fostering regional and world stability:  “The 
_____________________ 
24. Executive Office of the President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 1. 
25. Executive Office of the President of the United States, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 37. 
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safety and economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the 
secure use of the world’s oceans.”26  Two of three of the NSMS’s broad principles 
reinforce this link, stating that “preserving the freedom of the seas is a top national 
priority … [and that] the United States government must facilitate and defend commerce 
to ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping.”27 Out of this document, we deciphered 
several influences and characteristics for what we would define and choose for GFS:  an 
orientation toward the sea, security of sea-lanes and territorial waters, international 
engagement, and enhancing Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). 
 
2. Department 
 Exceptional guidance was gleaned from the direction, recommendations to 
Congress, and philosophy promulgated by the Secretary of Defense’s Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) of 2006.  It continues several of the dominant themes from the 
NSS, and offers more detailed direction in their implementation. 
 Some of the themes included within the QDR, along with commentary on 
possible applications to GFS, follow: 
 
 Humanitarian Assistance:  Citing lessons and achievements from the 2004 
tsunami, and crisis responses in Liberia and Haiti, the QDR identifies two 
direct benefits of military involvement in humanitarian efforts:  “By 
alleviating the suffering and dealing with crises in their early stages, U.S. 
forces help prevent disorder from spiraling into wider conflict or crisis.  
They also demonstrate the goodwill and compassion of the United 
States.”28  The former benefit applies directly to stabilization of a 
globalized world, in an effort to dissuade war.  Some might contend that 
this is in fact the primary role of GFS:  to prevent conflict. 
_____________________ 
26. Executive Office of the President of the United States, The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2005): 1. 
27. Executive Office of the President of the United States, The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2005): 7. 
28. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006): 12. 
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 Regional Focus:  Though broad capabilities of our military are not 
necessarily discouraged in the QDR, great emphasis is placed on the 
details of regions.  “Highly distributed global operations over the past 
several years … make manifest the importance of small teams conducting 
missions uniquely tailored to local conditions.”29  Indeed, to address the 
very interactive nature of humanitarian missions, GFS may need to be 
regionally – vice globally – tailored in order to provide genuine assistance. 
 Shaping:  Four pages of the QDR are dedicated to the topic of “shaping 
the choices of countries at strategic crossroads,” and it proposes doing so 
by shaping “these choices in ways that foster cooperation and mutual 
security interests.”30  This topic dovetails nicely with the President’s 
emphasis on partnership, vice paternalism, in working with nations to 
foster regional stability.  It offers capability requirements to meet the 
challenges of shaping nations’ decisions, such as demanding improved 
language skills and cultural awareness, persistent surveillance, rapid 
deployment, and secure communications – all of which might play into 
specific platform requirements for GFS.  Perhaps more importantly, 
however, this QDR topic provides a strategic role under which to 
determine GFS missions. 
 Joint, Interagency, NGO, and International Integration:  Regarding more 
traditional joint efforts in the maritime domain, the QDR demands a fully 
integrated Coast Guard and Navy.31 It also proclaims a new joint aspect 
toward supporting the NSS:  “Interagency and international combined 
operations truly are the new Joint operations.”32  As part of this new focus, 
_____________________ 
29. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006): 14. 
30. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006): 28. 
31.  U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006): 47. 
32. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006): 83. 
 30
the QDR emphasizes working with NGOs and non-military entities, 
including the Department of State’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and 
Stability (S/CRS).  Such an approach marks not only a “continuing shift 
… from Department-centric approaches to interagency solutions,”33 but 
also highlights a major paradigm shift in the Department’s view of the 
missions that these interagency entities specialize in, issuing guidance “in 
2005 to place stability operations on par with major combat operations 
within the department.”34 Consideration of this latter point is critical 
guidance.  When attempting to determine missions and capabilities for 
GFS, one concern is that naval officers and decision-makers involved in 
the process will find the temptation to return to the traditional methods of 
meeting challenges with the “business end” of a 5-inch gun.  The QDR’s 
guidance dissuades such temptation, serving as a reminder of what was 
important, and what we were attempting to achieve with GFS. 
 
Placing stability operations on par with combat operations, the QDR solidifies our 
nation’s need for a military response – coordinated with non-military entities and 
specialists – to non-traditional missions with emphases on partnerships and cooperative 
engagements with the populations and governments of nations.  The hope is that such a 
coordinated effort will prevent conflict. 
 
3. Service 
 Taking the maritime influence of national guidance as set forth by the NSMS into 
consideration, as well as the interagency emphasis of the QDR, we sought guidance from 
all three maritime services.  The two primary documents outlining each service’s strategy 
are the Naval Operations Concept (NOC), signed by the CNO and the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps, and the U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and 
_____________________ 
33. U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006): 84. 
34. U.S. Office fo the Secretary of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2006): 86. 
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Stewardship, signed by the Commandant of the Coast Guard.  We also sought direction 
from the CNO’s Guidance Letter of February, 2007. 
  
a. Naval Operations Concept 
  The NOC makes specific reference to GFS, offering what we considered 
to be solid direction into what we should consider as important in our definition of it. 
 
GFS is a persistent sea base of operations from which to coordinate and 
employ adaptive force packages within a regional area of interest. 
Focusing primarily on Phase 0 (shaping) operations … GFS offers a 
means to increase regional maritime security through the cooperative 
efforts of joint, inter-agency, and multinational partners, as well as Non-
Governmental Organizations.35 
 
This quote affirmed several themes from our national and department level guidance:  sea 
base, regional focus, shaping operations, and joint/interagency/international cooperation.  
Beyond the direct reference to GFS, the NOC recognizes the impact of regional stability 
on global systems.  It also outlines thirteen naval missions, most of which have direct or 
indirect applicability to GFS missions, to include Crisis Response, Civil-Military 
Operations, and Maritime Security Operations.  This important document not only 
provided affirmation of the role of GFS in naval endeavors around the world, but with its 
mission focus, it also provided our group with an insight into a possible method by which 
to approach our project (I.E. by missions). 
  
b. U.S. Coast Guard Strategy 
  The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy provides enlightening insights into a host 
of non-traditional missions and ways of conducting business on the high seas, as these 
non-combat roles have been relegated to the Coast Guard in the past.  Suddenly, these 
missions are now gaining importance with the Coast Guards sister service, as the Navy 
now confronts challenges such as fisheries enforcement, EEZ resource management, 
_____________________ 
35. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operations Concept (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 30. 
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regime building, and maritime governance with its GFS.  Indeed, the Coast Guard seems 
well ahead of the Navy in several of the roles GFS is intended to fill: 
 
The Coast Guard’s military, law enforcement, and humanitarian functions 
– all blended into a single maritime force – closely resemble those of the 
vast majority of the world’s navies and coast guards in terms of structure, 
capabilities, and missions … [In addition] the Coast Guard has a long 
history of providing international training to maritime forces around the 
world, improving the capabilities of partner nations and promoting 
operations that support common interests.36 
 
Ideally, we hoped that by incorporating elements of the Coast Guard into GFS – whether 
it be personnel and/or procedures – we might ensure a more a capable asset by utilizing 
the existing expertise that they provide in non-traditional naval missions.  At the very 
least, we could derive applications for GFS from the Coast Guard’s expertise in non-
traditional roles – roles both endemic and important to the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
c. CNO’s Guidance Letter 
  One other service document deserves mention, as it re-iterates GFS as a 
component of a Navy dedicated to influencing the stability of an increasingly inter-
dependent world, and offers a slight twist to the nature of how it conducts business: the 
CNO’s Guidance Letter of February, 2007.  It states that “GFS offers a means to increase 
regional maritime security through the cooperative efforts of joint, interagency, and 
multinational partners, as well as nongovernmental organizations without imposing a 
footprint ashore.”37  This latter point marks a deviation from making the traditional naval 
mission of presence operations an inherent aspect of all Navy deployments.  Though 
persistence remains a desired characteristic of GFS, the CNO clearly communicated a 
desire for GFS to be able to “tread lightly” when operating in politically sensitive regions 
of the world … without losing the capability to respond.  Indeed, this might prove a vital 
_____________________ 
36. U.S. Department of Homeland Security and Coast Guard, The U.S. Coast Guard Strategy for 
Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship (Washington, DC GPO, 2007): 16. 
37. Michael G. Mullen, GPO Guidance for 2007: Focus on Execution, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): 
6. 
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characteristic to empowering international partnerships in regions where suspicion can 
easily undermine them, and where overt presence may fuel those suspicions. 
 
C. PLACING OUR STRATEGIC GUIDANCE IN CONTEXT 
 As was stated, the intent of reviewing our strategic guidance in greater detail was 
primarily intended as a step considered fundamental to any systems engineering process:  
refinement.  We did not find anything in our strategic guidance to counter the 
terminology of our definition of GFS, or the problem statement for our project; in fact, 
our studies of the NSS, NSMS, QDR, NOC, Coast Guard Strategy, and CNO’s Guidance 
Letter bolstered the legitimacy of each.  Beyond the direct influence of the NOC on our 
definition, the emphasis placed on working with civilian and non-military counterparts, 
as well as on shaping and stability operations, by the QDR re-enforced the use of 
“Shaping and Stability” in our definition and “Influence Operations” in our problem 
statement.  The NSMS’s address of defending commerce on the high seas lent credibility 
to our inclusion of “Theater Security Cooperation” and “Maritime Domain Awareness” 
in our definition, as well as to the importance of maintaining a military component of 
GFS - as we conveyed in our problem statement with the term “Maritime Security.”  Both 
the NSS and QDR substantiated the importance of a regional focus. 
 In addition to verifying our own definition of GFS, and the problem statement of 
our project, we gained other tangible results from our Strategic Guidance phase.  The 
Coast Guard Strategy provided insights into non-traditional maritime tasks that GFS 
would find itself trying to address in the Gulf of Guinea. The “minimal footprint” aspect 
of the CNO’s Guidance Letter helped us realize that our Strategic Guidance served not 
only as general guidance, but that specific system requirements might be gained by 
looking at these documents more closely.  Finally, we understood that this guidance 
existed not only as a distinct phase with a succinct conclusion within our study, but in 
continuing with our theme of constant refinement, these documents would serve as a 
constant reference – and guide - throughout our studies. 
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IV. FUNCTIONAL AREA ANALYSIS 
 To revisit what this phase entails, the FAA synthesizes the information gained 
from strategic guidance and general literature research, and breaks it down into smaller, 
manageable pieces.  In the end, we hoped to identify quantifiable values in the form of 
objectives, capabilities, and/or requirements, from which measures would be derived to 
evaluate performance of current systems in the FNA. 
 We conducted our initial break-down by mission areas, identifying three that the 
group considered most important: Peacetime Engagement, Humanitarian 
Assistance/Disaster Relief (HA/DR), and Interagency & NGO Coordination.  These 
selections were also influenced by strategic guidance, as they closely mirrored the NOC’s 
mission breakdown of Maritime Security Operations, Crisis Response, and Civil-Military 
Operations, respectively.  The former addressed the military-to-military aspect of shaping 
and stability operations, while we attempted to address the short-term/immediate-impact 
and the long-term/deliberate humanitarian aspects with the HA/DR and Interagency & 
NGO Coordination missions, respectively.  In each of these, we attempted to decipher 
needs that, once pulled together as a group in the end of the FAA, would determine a set 
of capabilities from which to analyze current systems. 
Descriptions relevant to our mission areas follow:  
 
 Peacetime Engagement:  This mission mostly encompasses military to 
military interaction.  According to former Secretary of Defense William S. 
Cohen, Peacetime Engagements are those operations that “create an 
environment that encourages peace, discourages violence and instability, 
and builds confidence.  At the same time, we also use resources to help 
diminish threats, counteract factors that lead to instability, and lessen the 
potential severity of conflicts that may arise.”38  
_____________________ 
38. W. S. Cohen, “Creating an Environment for Peace, Stability, Confidence,” U.S. Foreign Policy 
Agenda, http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1299/ijpe/cohen.htm. 
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 Humanitarian Assistance: Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the 
results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such 
as human pain, disease, hunger or privation that might present a serious 
threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. The 
foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the 
efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have primary 
responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance.  Humanitarian 
Assistance operations are those conducted outside the US, its territories 
and possessions.39  
 Disaster Relief:  Response to and preparation for “an act of nature (such as 
a flood, drought, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or 
an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire or 
epidemic), which is, or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude 
to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, 
foreign persons, or to an international organization.”40 
 Interagency Coordination: Within the context of Department of  Defense 
involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of 
Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the 
purpose of achieving an objective.41  
 NGO Coordination:  Supporting non-military interagency, NGO and IGO 
entities that will serve as “extensions” of GFS capability in influence 
operations.  
 
 In addition to studying the three mission areas, we concurrently conducted a 
country study of each Gulf of Guinea nation.  The plan for this portion of our study was 
_____________________ 
39. U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval Warfare Development Command. TACMEMO 3-07.6-05 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations Planning (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005): Glossary-3. 
40. U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval Warfare Development Command. TACMEMO 3-07.6-05 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations Planning (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005): Glossary-2. 
41. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): GL-18. 
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to provide two outcomes:  1) providing a value base to our study by factoring in “the 
voice” of the African nations and people as we developed a system alternative intended to 
assist them - and in the process truly understand their issues, and 2) verify that the needs 
and functions discovered by mission groups were, in fact, pertinent to the Gulf of Guinea 
region before proceeding further.  The first outcome added another element to our JCIDS 
process, known as value engineering: 
 
Value engineering is an organized way of defining a problem and 
creatively solving it. It requires a job plan. The job plan provides a system 
for the solution of the problem. The value specialist utilizes this system to 
understand, define, and determine a way to achieve good value. The use of 
functions to clearly define the purpose of the project and allocation of cost 
by function are unique techniques of value engineering.42 
 
Though cost would be addressed later in our study, this certainly applied to our study.  
We considered our approach creative, as we sought an engineering solution to a largely 
non-engineering subject of providing regional stability, the JCIDS process was our plan, 
and our use of functional and mission hierarchies would provide the system by which to 
help define our project.  In addition, we also considered our approach as value based in 
the following sense, as well: 
 
In the value analysis process, a major player who was often forgotten at 
crucial times in the past, the user has surfaced. The voice of the 
user/owner/customer is now heard in all public and private owners’ 
planning sessions. Larry Miles emphasizes that a product must meet the 
customer's expectations in order to be acceptable.43 
 
We believed that by studying country needs, we needed to consider the needs of the governments 
and the people:  in other words, the true “end users” of GFS.  In our opinion, this approach 
_____________________ 
42.  Muthiah Kasi, “An Introduction to Value Analysis and Value Engineering for Architects, 
Engineers, and Builders” (Course Guide, 1994): vi. 
43. Muthiah Kasi, “An Introduction to Value Analysis and Value Engineering for Architects, 
Engineers, and Builders” (Course Guide, 1994): 2. 
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marked a deviation from many other engineering endeavors conducted for the Department of 
Defense, as systems are often built with senior leadership in mind as the customer.  We believed 
that to truly offer solutions to regional socio-political-economic issues, they could best be 
understood from the perspective of the Nigerian fisherman whose fish stocks are being illegally 
depleted by foreign trawlers, for example – not by Naval Forces Europe, or even the CNO.  All 
stakeholders have to be considered … in order to achieve a result of value. 
 
A. PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT 
 
1. Background 
We expanded the definition of Peacetime Engagement from the 1997 Navy 
Operational Concept44 to encompass myriad operations beyond “meet and greet” visits 
and interoperability exercises to unified security operations and the building of foreign 
navy capabilities in fulfillment of the Global Maritime Partnership concept: 
 
Peacetime Engagements are those operations requiring the use of military 
forces to create a safe, secure environment by preventing, neutralizing, or 
eliminating hostile actions and influences of adversaries, criminal 
elements, or other illicit actors.45 
 
Considering the Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) initiative as a cross-
functional concept that spans the breadth of many GFS missions and for which GFS is an 
enabler, we also considered that concept before proceeding further with peacetime 
engagement: 
 
The GFS is an enabler of the Global Maritime Partnership initiative, which 
seeks a cooperative approach to maritime security, promoting the rule of 
_____________________ 
44. U.S. Department of the Navy, Forward…From the Sea, (Washington, DC: GPO, 1997). 
45. U.S. Department of Defense, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations Joint Operating Concept Version 2.0 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 58. 
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law by countering piracy, terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug 
trafficking, and other illicit activities.46 
 
GFS supports the COCOM’s demand for theater security cooperation in 
the littoral regions of the world.  Essential to the GMP concept is 
enhancing national sovereignty and joint, combined, inter-agency, 
multinational, and NGO cooperation.  GFS, as part of GMP, maintains a 
persistent sea base of operations while minimizing our footprint ashore.  
This revolutionary concept leverages the core competencies of the USCG 
and will be non-threatening, focused on shaping and stability operations.47 
 
To that extent, it was necessary to break Peacetime Engagement down into four primary 
sub-missions: Expanded Maritime Interception Operations (EMIO), Maritime Security 
Operations & Cooperation (MSOC), Counter Piracy, and Foreign Navy Capability 
Building (FNCB): 
 
2. Functional Breakdown 
We expand upon the following terms, relevant to Peacetime Engagement: 
 
 Expanded Maritime Interception Operations (EMIO):  Efforts to monitor, 
query, and board merchant vessels in international waters to enforce 
sanctions against other nations such as those in support of United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions and/or prevent the transport of restricted 
goods, WMD, or illegal seaborne immigration (counter trafficking).48  
EMIO includes counter-terrorism operations to deny use of the maritime 
environment by terrorists, counter state and non-state support to terrorism, 
and enable partner nations to counter terrorists and their infrastructure in 
_____________________ 
46. U.S. Department of the Navy and U.S. Coast Guard, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007). 
47. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operations Concept (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006). 
48. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Interdiction, Joint Publication (JP) 3-03 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): II-6. 
 40
the maritime environment.  EMIO is characterized by directed 
engagement of non-hostile, compliant vessels. 
 Maritime Security Operations and Cooperation (MSOC): both sovereign 
inter-agency and multi-national partnering to ensure freedom of 
navigation, the flow of commerce, and the protection of ocean resources.  
Operations may include the enforcement of maritime regulations, 
embargoes, or blockades; protection of sea lines of communication; 
interoperability exercises with foreign navies and partner nations at sea 
when political considerations may preclude interaction on land (including 
UNITAS).  The U.S. Coast Guard is a key partner.  Characterized by 
planned activities with maritime partners (foreign or domestic) and 
routine engagement of seaborne traffic. 
 Counter Piracy encompasses operations and campaigns to halt 
transnational crime (indirectly supporting HA/DR and Infrastructure 
Revitalization).  Counter Piracy is characterized by directed engagement 
of non-compliant vessels.  Maritime piracy, according to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, consists 
of any criminal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship (or aircraft) 
that is directed on the high seas against another ship, aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board a ship (or aircraft.) Piracy can also be 
committed against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State. 
 Foreign Navy Capability Building: operations, exercises, training, and 
material assistance intended to directly enhance the naval capabilities of 
partner nations.   
 
3. Determining Capabilities 
From the primary mission needs of GFS, the team decomposed the functional 
capabilities required to accomplish those missions based on existing guidance in 
accordance with the FAA process.  The five essential capabilities were identified as 
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Command, Control and Coordination, Regional Maritime Situational Awareness, 
“Ordnance on Target,” Visit, Board, Search and Seizure VBSS), and Training Ability, 
defined as follows: 
 
 Command, Control and Coordination - The ability to exercise authority 
and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and 
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. A commander 
performs command and control functions through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures to plan, 
direct, coordinate, and control forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of the mission.49  
 Regional Maritime Situational Awareness is the effective understanding of 
anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the 
security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.  In a 
regional-specific environment the key is actionable intelligence.  Maritime 
Domain is all areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or 
bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all 
Maritime related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and 
other conveyances.50 
 "Ordnance on Target" actions are those requiring the direct use of force, 
either by shipboard weapons systems or force projection (such as riverine 
or special forces). 
 Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) are maritime boarding actions 
and tactics, designed to capture enemy vessels, to combat terrorism, piracy 
and smuggling, and to conduct customs, safety and other inspections, as 
_____________________ 
49. U.S. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 & 2 Lexicon 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 30. 
50. Executive Office of the President of the United States, The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2005): 1. 
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employed by modern navies, marine and maritime services, military and 
police forces.51 
 Training Ability – The ability to conduct training in any of the Peacetime 
Engagement mission areas and capabilities; ideally by the same personnel 
assigned to those mission areas.  Training ability is the core capability that 
when combined with training capacity (the physical space and materials 
needed) comprises the capability to conduct training. 
 
4. Summary 
 Figure 16 depicts the Peacetime Engagement hierarchy of interacting missions 
and capabilities. 
 




51. U.S. Department of Navy, Navy Maritime Domain Awareness Concept (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2007). 
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B. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF 
 
1. Background 
Disasters are a part of life in all regions of the world, whether caused by acts of 
nature or acts of man.  These events become humanitarian emergencies when their effects 
impact a society or population whose inherent resources are insufficient to absorb the 
impact and deal with the event’s consequences.  Many humanitarian emergencies and 
disasters are prolonged; therefore their impact is routinely felt beyond the immediate 
vicinity of the disaster.  These effects can be mitigated through the use of external - but 
regionally located - relief sources to address the immediate needs of a stricken population 
and build a capacity to better cope and plan for humanitarian emergency/disaster relief 
(HA/DR) situations in the future. 
 
a. Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Defined 
 Prior to discussing specific actions and requirements involved with 
responding to HA/DR events, it is important to provide a baseline understanding of what 
humanitarian assistance and disaster relief are.  Joint Publication 1-02 defines 
humanitarian assistance as “those programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of 
natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, 
hunger or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great 
damage to or loss of property.”52  The foreign assistance provided by U.S. military forces 
is limited in scope and duration, and primarily designed to supplement or complement the 
efforts of host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have primary responsibility 
for providing humanitarian assistance.   
 Disaster relief is similar in definition to humanitarian assistance, but 
requires prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the immediate suffering of disaster 
victims.  Joint Publication 1-02 defines disaster relief as “any act of nature (such as a 
flood, drought, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man 
(such as a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire or epidemic), which is (or threatens to 
_____________________ 
52 U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007). 
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be) of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to 
a foreign country, foreign persons, or to an international organization.”53  Such relief 
typically includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of food, 
clothing, medicine, beds, and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing of 
medical materiel and medical and technical personnel; and repairs to essential services. 
 HA/DR operations historically focus on the victims of natural disasters (or 
acts of nature) and destructive conflicts.  An act of nature is defined as an unpreventable 
natural catastrophe such as an earthquake, a tidal wave, a volcanic eruption, a hurricane 
or a tornado.54  Types of natural disasters and acts of nature include floods, droughts, 
hurricanes/typhoons, earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, and epidemics.   
 The following are definitions for what each “acts of nature” disaster 
entails, according to the Emergency Event Database55: 
 
 Flood: A significant rise of water level in a stream, lake, reservoir or 
coastal region.   
 Droughts: Periods of deficiency of moisture in the soil such that there is 
inadequate water required for plants, animals and human beings.   
 Hurricanes: Large-scale closed circulation system in the atmosphere 
above the western Atlantic with low barometric pressure and strong winds 
that rotate clockwise in the southern hemisphere and counter-clockwise in 
the northern hemisphere.   
 Typhoons: Same as a hurricane except that they occur in the Western 
Pacific.   
 Earthquake: A sudden break within the upper layers of the Earth’s crust, 
sometimes breaking the surface, resulting in the vibration of the ground; if 
_____________________ 
53. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007). 
54. Law Dictionary Online, “Act of God,” 
.http://dictionary.law.com/default2.asp?selected=2318&bold=act||god||of||. 
55. EM-DAT: the International Disaster Database. http://www.em-dat.net. 
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strong enough will cause the collapse of buildings and destruction of life 
and property.   
 Tsunami: A series of large waves generated by sudden displacement of 
seawater (caused by earthquake, volcanic eruption or submarine 
landslide), capable of propagation over large distances and causing a 
destructive surge upon reaching land.  
 Volcanic Eruption: A discharge (aerially explosive) of fragmentary 
ejected, lava and gases from a volcanic vent.   
 Epidemic: An unusual increase in the number of cases of an infectious 
disease, which already exists in the region or population, concerned.  
Types of epidemics include HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis.56 
  
 Destructive conflicts are usually man-made events and include war, 
political upheaval or revolution, religious or political persecution, chemical or toxic 
spills, or nuclear incidents.  These man-made disasters - or acts of man - are catastrophic 
events caused directly and principally by one or more identifiable, deliberate, or negligent 
human actions.57  There are two main categories of man-made disasters: terrorist and 
accidental. 
 
 Terrorist Disaster:  The unlawful use of force against persons or property 
to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any 
segment thereof, in the furtherance of political or social objects.58  A 
terrorist event can be an aircraft assault; assassination; nuclear, chemical, 
biological, radiological or cyber attack; bombing or the result of civil 
strife. 
_____________________ 
56. Maryann C. Mattonen, “The Use of Hospital Ships for Joint, Interagency, and Multinational 
Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” (final report, Naval War College (2006): 3. 
57. Baltimore County, Maryland. “Welcome to…Emergency Preparedness,”  
http://www.baltimorecountymd.gov/news/emergency_prep/manmadedisasters.html. 
58. Baltimore County, Maryland. “Welcome to…Emergency Preparedness,”  
http://www.baltimorecountymd.gov/news/emergency_prep/manmadedisasters.html. 
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 Accidental Disaster:  An unforeseen and unintentional act that occurs 
randomly, is caused by humans, and occurs in civilized regions.  There are 
three main subcategories of accidental acts: industrial, transportation and 
miscellaneous. Accidental industrial disasters include chemical explosions 
and hazardous material spills. Transportation disasters include various 
types of water, air, railway or roadway accidents or catastrophes.  A 
miscellaneous disaster may occur due to food poisoning, fires, building 
collapse or riots.  Each of these events may result in vast fatalities and 
massive property damage.59  
 
b. Increased Demand 
 During the past decade, humanitarian relief organizations have faced 
increasing demand for relief around the world, resulting in a tremendous expansion of 
financial, human, and material investment in the ability of these organizations to 
effectively intervene in disasters.  Major participants of HA/DR operations include 
United Nations organizations, governmental organizations, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), private industry, consulting 
firms, and academic institutions, and the military.  This global expansion of HA/DR 
operations can be attributed to one of several factors, including increased regional ethnic 
conflicts, urbanization and increasingly vulnerable populations, changes in the conduct of 
war, increased numbers of NGOs, increased military involvement in conflict settings, and 
the role of the media in influencing organization or governmental actions.60  In addition, 
the sheer magnitude of the natural disasters during this period may also be a factor, as 
witnessed in the 2005 Indonesia tsunami and Hurricane Katrina:  in both of these cases, 
the overwhelming damage extended to the infrastructure meant to provide the first-
response, thus providing a great demand for assistance from external sources. 
 
_____________________ 
59. EM-DAT: the International Disaster Database. http://www.em-dat.net. 
60. Maryann C. Mattonen, “The Use of Hospital Ships for Joint, Interagency, and Multinational 
Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” (final report, Naval War College, 2006): 3. 
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2. DOD Role in HA/DR Relief 
“One of the reasons we have been able to respond effectively is because 
we have established these habits of cooperation together over many years 
... we have built strong partnerships and standard operating procedures 
and when this disaster occurred we were able to reach back and put those 
into effect.” 
- Admiral Thomas B. Fargo, USN (ret)61 
 
As scientists debate the impacts of changing global climates and their potential to 
increase the occurrences of droughts, floods and famine, there is no doubt of the 
increased need to respond given the modern world’s increased capability to do so.  In 
addition, an ever-increasing demand for HA/DR resources – exacerbated by world media 
interest and mounting public concern - make it likely that U.S. military forces will be 
called upon to support humanitarian and disaster relief efforts more frequently in the 
future.  In fact, the DoD is no stranger to disaster relief operations. They have conducted 
HA/DR operations for decades, labeling these particular types of operations under the 
category of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW).  MOOTW is defined in 
Joint Publication 3-07 as encompassing “the use of military capabilities across the range 
of military operations short of war.”62   
Numerous factors have increased the U.S. military’s involvement in international 
HA/DR operations.  The governments of stricken nations are routinely overwhelmed by 
the effects of the disaster and paralyzed by the scale of the necessary response.  This is 
where the U.S. military steps in to support.  The engagement of U.S. military forces in 
HA/DR operations will primarily be out of the necessity for speed of reaction.  These 
forces have the expeditionary capability and skill-specific training to efficiently transport 
and distribute essential resources throughout the disaster area.  These assets become even 
more important considering each HA/DR operation will take place in a unique and 
unpredictable environment.  U.S. forces deployed in response to HA/DR situations must 
_____________________ 
61 . Cossa, Ralph A., “South Asian Tsunami: U.S. Military Provides ‘Logistical Backbone” for Relief 
Operation.” Foreign Policy Agenda (November 2004). 
62. Maryann C. Mattonen, “The Use of Hospital Ships for Joint, Interagency, and Multinational 
Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” (final report, Naval War College (2006): 3. 
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ensure they are adequately prepared to address the natural consequences that result from 
a disaster.63   
HA/DR operations remain an important element within the U.S. Navy’s mission 
repertoire.   The ability to conduct a naval humanitarian mission requires surface ships, 
fixed-wing airplanes, and helicopters; joint or combined operations among naval, land, 
and, increasingly, air assets; as well as delivery of humanitarian supplies directly into the 
affected country.  The duration of the humanitarian mission also has an impact on force 
levels, since protraction can either deplete a fixed force or require reinforcements. In the 
past, humanitarian missions conducted from the sea in the absence of major land 
operations were rare, usually involving simple air drops. Many recent naval humanitarian 
missions have entailed joint and combined operations coordinating sea, land, and air 
operations. As fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters have become more available and 
dependable, they have been used in place of naval or land forces to deliver needed 
supplies.  As a result, history has clearly shown that the effectiveness of sea-based 
humanitarian relief missions are impacted by size of the affected area, the rate of 
implementation, and the level of cooperation of the local populations.  The smaller the 
region and the less interconnected it is by land, the greater the impact.  Thus, the most 
successful naval humanitarian relief missions involve sea powers assisting islands or 
isolated areas, where the operation had the dual effect of replacing basic infrastructure 
and communications while assisting people in need.64  
Coordination between the military and relief organizations through the exchange 
of information and joint coordination is important to prevent duplication-of-effort, 
maximize response efficiency, avoid counterproductive efforts, and ensure that military 
support to the affected population remains a positive and effective influence.  From a 
DoD perspective, responding military commanders must ensure their efforts are 
coordinated and in-line with identified relief requirements, possess and maintain relief 
strategies and plans, provide support effectively and efficiently, and constantly gather 
_____________________ 
63. Ralph A Cossa. “South Asian Tsunami: U.S. Military Provides ‘Logistical Backbone’ for Relief 
Operation.” Foreign Policy Agenda (2004), http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/1104/ijpe/update.pdf. 
64. Bruce A. Elleman, “Waves of Hope. The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern 
Indonesia,” (monograph, Naval War College Newport Papers, 2007): 111-114. 
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information to ensure that the ever-changing needs of the affected populace are both 
identified and response measures are coordinated.  
International HA/DR requires a broad range of services which the U.S. military is 
capable of providing.  These services include providing security, especially for aid 
workers who have become targets of aggression or abduction and have experienced 
increased mortality.  The U.S. military has air-lift and sea-lift capability to handle 
logistics and enable distribution of food, medicine, and supplies.  Due to its advanced 
technology and communications systems, the DoD is capable of providing a highly 
organized response for large-scale operations. 65  The end result is that due to 
international instability, U.S. forces have and will continue to support the international 
relief effort in the country or region in which the emergency or disaster has occurred.  
“Future relief efforts from the sea will most likely be conducted by multinational 
coalitions.”66  
 
3. A Historical Perspective of DoD Support for HA/DR Operations 
Over the centuries, militaries have provided assistance for the purposes of training 
for and responding to humanitarian crises, as well as in the interest of enhancing political 
interests.  Early in the history of the United States, military officers were involved in 
humanitarian operations.  The Lewis and Clark Expedition (1804-06), for example, 
conducted health and demographic surveys, practiced disease prevention, and provided 
patient care to Native Americans.  During the Civil War healthcare and medications were 
provided to families of indigent volunteers, displaced civilians, and refugees.67   
 Humanitarian assistance has emerged as a priority of deployed U.S. military 
forces throughout the 20th century.  The “Armed Forces Aid to Korea” program collected 
over $3.5 million, while volunteer Army physicians and nurses performed 320,000 
_____________________ 
65. Maryann C. Mattonen, “The Use of Hospital Ships for Joint, Interagency, and Multinational 
Humanitarian Assistance Operations,” (final report, Naval War College (2006): 5. 
66. Bruce A. Elleman, “Waves of Hope. The U.S. Navy’s Response to the Tsunami in Northern 
Indonesia.” (monograph, Naval War College Newport Papers, 2007): 114. 
67. Jeffrey E. Drifmeyer and Craig H. Llewellyn, Overview of Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Excess Property Programs, Report #02-01 (Bethesda, MD: Center 
for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), Uniformed Services University of the 
Health Sciences (USUHS), 2002): 17. 
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medical procedures.68  In Vietnam, Navy and Vietnamese medical personnel provided 
daily care for an average of 250 patients, admitting approximately 100 children monthly 
from the local medically-underserved population.69 
 Since the fall of the Berlin wall, the number of military humanitarian assistance 
missions has increased dramatically.  The following is a list of significant U.S. military 
involvement in HA/DR operations over the past two decades:  
 
 Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (1991-96) involved providing security 
and humanitarian aid to Kurdish refugees in Northern Iraq.  
 Operation SEA ANGEL (1991), in which Marine forces responded to a 
devastating flood in Bangladesh. 
 Operations RESTORE HOPE (1992) and SUPPORT HOPE (1994-97), 
involving humanitarian intervention in Somalia and Rwanda, respectively. 
 Operations UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994-95) and RESTORE 
DEMOCRACY (1995-96) in Haiti. 
 Reconstructive humanitarian assistance following the horrors of “ethnic 
cleansing” in the Balkins (1991-2001). 
 Operation STRONG SUPPORT (1998-99): hurricane disaster relief in 
Central America. 
 Operation AVID RESPONSE (1999): humanitarian aid to Turkey. 
 Operation FUNDAMENTAL RESPONSE (2000): humanitarian aid to 
Venezuela. 
 Operation ATLAS RESPONSE (2000), providing humanitarian aid to 
Mozambique. 
_____________________ 
68. Jeffrey E. Drifmeyer and Craig H. Llewellyn, Overview of Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Excess Property Programs, Report #02-01 (Bethesda, MD: Center 
for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), Uniformed Services University of the 
Health Sciences (USUHS), 2002): 17. 
69. Jeffrey E. Drifmeyer and Craig H. Llewellyn, Overview of Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Excess Property Programs, Report #02-01 (Bethesda, MD: Center 
for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), Uniformed Services University of the 
Health Sciences (USUHS), 2002): 17. 
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 Operation ENDURING FREEDOM – HORN OF AFRICA (2002): 
combined military and civic assistance operations based in Djibouti. 
 Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE (2005): tsunami relief to Indonesia.  
 TASK FORCE WRIGHT (2005): earthquake relief to Pakistan. 
 
In terms of number of projects, countries, affected population, or U.S. personnel 
involved, deliberately planned humanitarian assistance projects rival the more publicized 
contingency operations.  These operations have been and will likely continue to be 
overwhelmingly successful in changing the hearts and minds of both foreign populations 
and their governments. 
 
4. GFS Concept of Operations for Conducting HA/DR Operations 
If a disaster occurs and GFS were operating in the area, ideally it would provide 
the means to effectively coordinate relief efforts due to inherent capabilities associated 
with HA/DR.  The GFS will provide an immediate command and control infrastructure to 
coordinate disaster relief efforts.  GFS will have various NGOs and interagency 
representatives embarked which allows for quicker and more effective interaction 
between relief providers.  Depending upon the platform selected, GFS may be capable of 
transporting (either via embarked helicopters, LCACs, or boats) specialized personnel 
(i.e. medical) to directly assist in disaster relief efforts.  Because of the logistical and 
manpower limitations associated with most potential GFS platforms, any assistance 
provided ashore would most likely be directed in response to an immediate and short 
term requirement.  Large scale HA/DR efforts typically require the allocation of several 
additional and large assets (i.e. hospital ships, military sealift transport, etc) – the 
combined total of which may not be likely to maintain a persistent presence given our 
fleet’s limited resources.  
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5. Functional Breakdown 
 The HA/DR mission for the GFS can be broken down into four functional areas, 
as the HA/DR Operations Planning TACMEMO suggests: infrastructure, medical 
assistance, logistical support, and communication.70  
 
 
Figure 17:  Top-Level Functional Hierarchy for HA/DR 
 
a. Infrastructure 
  Joint Publication, 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms defines infrastructure as “all building and permanent installations 
necessary for the support, redeployment, and military forces operations (e.g., barracks, 
headquarters, airfields, communications, facilities, stores, port installations, and 
maintenance stations.)”71  There are two categories of infrastructure: physical and 
resource.  Each are interdependent and provide GFS with the ability to maintain a 
sustainable presence in regions requiring humanitarian assistance.  Resource networks are 
associated with personnel, organizations, materiel, and equipment essential in the 
deployment and distribution of the physical network.  These networks include aircraft, 
ships, trucks/rail equipment, host-nation support, contractors, materials handling, civilian, 
government and military personnel, and automation.72 
_____________________ 
70 U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval Warfare Development Command. TACMEMO 3-07.6-05 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations Planning (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005). 
71. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): 260. 
72. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-35 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): III-8, III-9. 
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 To maximize the assets provided by resource networks, command and 
control must be evaluated and integrated into the activity.  Command and control is 
defined as “the exercise of authority and direction by the properly designated commander 
over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.  Command and 
control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, 
communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, 
directing, coordinating and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of 
the mission.”73 
   The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is the 
primary agency in charge of foreign humanitarian assistance for the U.S.  All foreign 
humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by the United States is jointly coordinated by 
USAID’s Bureau for Humanitarian Response and the Office of US Foreign Disaster 
Assistance (OFDA) (see Figure 18 and Figure 19). The responsibilities of these two 
agencies include organizing and coordinating the US government response, performing 
needs assessments and initiating procurement of supplies, services and transportation.  
FHA activities must be coordinated and cooperative relationships between military 
forces, government, and NGOs must be defined so a common goal is established.  The 
United States Ambassador to the country receiving assistance establishes the 
Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC), provides the relief strategy, identifies logistic 
requirements for NGOs, and identifies, prioritizes, and submits requests for military 
support to the Joint Task Force (JTF) through the civil-military operations center 
(CMOC).  A coordination center may be established by the combatant commander to aid 
in the coordination and planning efforts with outside agencies.  A CMOC will be 




73. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): 101. 
74. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): ix, IV-8. 
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Figure 18: Interagency Coordination for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance75 
 
  The combatant commander will provide support and assets to sustain 
transportation, communications and special operations as deemed necessary to 
accomplish the mission.  A Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST) will also be 
assembled to gather information for operational planning.  The HAST is able to “assess 
the nature and extent of (1) available food, water, and sanitation; (2) casualties and loss 
of life; (3) injury, illness, and the outbreak of disease; (4) displaced civilian population 
and location; (5) status of the government of the affected country; (6) degree of 
destruction to property and infrastructure; (7) available logistic facilities for air and 
_____________________ 
75. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): ix, II-12. 
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sealift, roads, and bridges; and (8) significant actors, the span and depth of their control 
over territory, resources and individuals, and their objectives.”76   
 
 
Figure 19: Coordination at the Joint Task Force Level77 
 
_____________________ 
76. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): II-9. 
77. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07.6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): ix, III-6. 
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  The ability to provide an initial assessment of food, water, and sanitation 
available in a disaster relief area will provide the GFS with the information necessary to 
deliver supplies and construct temporary facilities to allow for the affected population to 
remain healthy and maintain a minimal standard of living.  Through the analysis of 
casualties and loss of life, as well as injury, illness, and the outbreak of disease, GFS will 
be able to provide medical supplies, facilities and treatment, to include mortuary facilities 
and grief counseling for the victims.  An initial displaced population assessment will 
allow for temporary facilities to be constructed throughout the region.  The temporary 
facilities could include housing, medical facilities, schools, airports, seaports, and 
roadways.  While the military, government organizations, and non-government 
organizations are providing humanitarian assistance to the disaster relief zones, the status 
of the local and national government must be monitored for possible hostilities and 
instability.  Establishment of significant actors will be evaluated to aid provide 
intelligence on control, resources, customs and objectives.  The HAST assessment will 
overview the severity of property and infrastructure damage, again allowing for 
temporary facilities and provisions to be established until a long-term solution is enacted.  
HAST assessments will enable GFS to coordinate, provide, and sustain the facilities, 
personnel, and equipment necessary to aid the government and non-governmental 
agencies in providing humanitarian assistance.   
 The other infrastructure category, physical networks, are characterized by 
the type, number and condition of facilities, transportation networks, real estate, and 
modes of transportation available in the region of activity.  The transportation network is 
the most vital in the physical infrastructure of a country requiring humanitarian 
assistance.  If there are modernized and/or undamaged facilities available, insertion of 
military assistance, government and non-government agencies, and logistics support will 
be conducted more expediently and efficiently.  The combatant command will establish 
an engineering support plan (ESP) to identify facilities, materiel and civil engineering 
capabilities in support of military forces.  Examples of physical networks include 
airports, seaports, highways, railroads, bridges, tunnels, terminals, inland waterways, 
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storage facilities, pipelines and communication systems. 78  GFS will be capable of 
providing short-term physical network assistance to disaster relief zones and populations.  
This aid will be turned over to government and non-government organizations when 
properly established. 
 
b. Medical Assistance 
 This functional component addresses the Navy’s medical assistance and 
support capabilities in response to an overseas HA/DR missions.  Humanitarian missions 
rely heavily on the ability to deliver primary medical assistance to those affected.  This 
response capability makes the Navy an ideal HA/DR responder.  The Navy’s wide array 
of medical teams, hospitals, ships, and medical evacuation systems has provided them the 
capability to hastily deploy personnel, supplies and equipment to the most adverse and 
austere locations with little or no supporting medical infrastructure.79  With the release of 
the Navy’s new Maritime Strategy and identification of Humanitarian Assistance and 
Disaster Response as a core capability of the Navy, medical assistance will now have a 
dedicated focus on providing humanitarian care.  Although a new core competency for 
the Navy, the DoD (under Title 10 U.S. Code Section 401) as a whole has annually 
conducted dozens of these humanitarian and civic assistance projects around the world.   
 Prior to deploying medical assets to a disaster area, careful consideration 
must be given to the environmental health risks.  HA/DR operations are often conducted 
in areas where social services have been disrupted, resulting in poor sanitation, and 
inadequate food and water distribution.  Significant health threats are likely, with the high 
prevalence of diseases that are endemic and/or can become epidemic, uncontrolled 
distribution of hazardous wastes and hazardous materials, and environmental extremes.  
These health threats impact both military first responders and local disaster victims.  
Beyond injuries caused by the disaster, it is anticipated that any HA/DR operational area 
will have disrupted social services, poor sanitation, and inadequate food distribution.  
_____________________ 
78. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-35 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): III-7, III-9. 
79. Sean W. Kelley, “An Analysis of the Use of Medical Applications Required for Complex 
Humanitarian Disasters or Emergencies via Hastily Formed Networks in the Field” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, September 2005): 19. 
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Medical threats include naturally occurring infectious diseases, environmental extremes 
(flood waters, high/low temperatures, etc.) and potential injuries as a result of lawlessness 
and civil disturbances—presenting a potential threat to first responders.  The degree of 
cultural and social interaction required to support the HA/DR mission, as well as the 
potential sharing of food and quarters with local nationals, will undoubtedly increase 
exposure of personnel to diseases endemic to the affected country.   
 Besides the environment, it is also important to understand the different 
medical support requirements of first responders and disaster victims.  Historically, 
medical assistance has been provided by military medical personnel and units that are 
designed, equipped, staffed, and trained to provide combat casualty care, not 
humanitarian care, in support of military operations.  One of the first differences in these 
types of care is that many of the people affected by a HA/DR crisis routinely suffer from 
varying combinations of malnutrition, chronic diseases, and microbial and parasitic 
infections.  Often they have had little or infrequent access to even rudimentary health 
care services even prior to the crisis.  The difficulties of medical humanitarian assistance 
are exacerbated not only by the austere, post-disaster, or sometimes hostile situations, but 
also by the absence of some support functions normally associated with military 
medicine.  Of course, language barriers, societal norms, apprehension to the presence of 
uniformed military personnel, and differing cultural views on Western medicine 
introduce even further complications for military first responders.80 
 Secondly, disasters, whether manmade or natural, usually result in the loss 
or destruction of the public health infrastructure, which can lead to outbreaks of 
preventable diseases.  Disasters, such as flooding, compromise the safety of water 
supplies and the integrity of sewage disposal, leading to threats of food and waterborne 
illness.  Power line damage and power outages increase the risk of food borne illness and 
electrocution, not to mention hinder the ability of first responders to establish and operate 
medical treatment facilities.  Animal bites, whether from dogs, venomous snakes, or 
_____________________ 
80. Jeffrey E. Drifmeyer and Craig H. Llewellyn, Overview of Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Excess Property Programs, Report #02-01 (Bethesda, MD: Center 
for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), Uniformed Services University of the 
Health Sciences (USUHS), 2002): 3. 
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insects are also seen in the aftermath of these natural disasters.  Although combat 
operations provide a challenging environment for medical professionals, the ones 
described for HA/DR environments offer vastly different and unique challenges all unto 
their own. 
 The final distinction is that although the military and governmental 
agencies have the capability to provide basic medical assistance in these austere overseas 
environments, time and distance typically prevents them from participating as first 
responders.  In combat operations the medical support assets are within relative close 
proximity of the participants, and thus there is typically little or no delay in care for 
injured personnel.  The unpredictability in disaster locations and timing prevents the 
military from pre-positioning assets to serve as first responders throughout the world, 
although GFS could be considered the first attempt at resolving this discrepancy.  And 
even if assets are within close proximity of a HA/DR crisis, they may not be adequately 
equipped (manpower or resources) to meet the immediate needs of the affected populace.   
 Regardless of the environment, the primary goal of medical personnel 
responding to a HA/DR crisis remains to deliver the best medical care to as many patients 
as possible.  Among the military assets that are currently employed for HA/DR 
operations are the units and personnel of the DoD Military Health System (MHS).  The 
MHS provides humanitarian assistance in response to situations ranging from 
contingency operations, disaster relief, and complex human emergencies to deliberately 
planned theater engagement activities.  While military medical humanitarian assistance 
often includes patient care, it may also involve a wide variety of other projects, including 
construction or renovation of clinics and hospitals, or donations of medical supplies and 
equipment that is excess to the needs of the DoD.81 
 Using available lessons learned and research documents available from 
past DoD HA/DR response efforts, we were able to identify four key medical attributes.  
As illustrated in Figure 20, these attributes are Health Services, Plans and Operations, 
_____________________ 
81. Jeffrey E. Drifmeyer and Craig H. Llewellyn, Overview of Overseas Humanitarian Assistance, 
Humanitarian and Civic Assistance, and Excess Property Programs, Report #02-01 (Bethesda, MD: Center 
for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine (CDHAM), Uniformed Services University of the 
Health Sciences (USUHS), 2002): 9.  
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Medical Logistics, and Administrative.  These specific attributes provide a GFS platform 
the capability to provide immediate medical assistance and coordinate follow-on health 
service support activities.   
 
 
Figure 20:  Functional Decomposition of Medical Assistance 
 
 The first attribute identified, health services, is designed to preserve, 
promote, improve, conserve, and restore the medical and physical well being of both the 
responding forces and affected population.  This attribute includes providing emergency 
and routine dental, medical, preventive, and veterinarian services throughout an HA/DR 
environment.   
 Dental services are designed to provide routine, acute, and emergent 
dental services and care to individuals.  Although dental care is preventive in nature, 
these services and resources must be included in the early planning stages because of the 
likelihood that an affected population will have had inadequate oral health facilities.  
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Besides treating, restoring, and maintaining oral health, dental officers also provide 
advice and assistance to operational commanders as required.82   
 Medical services are designed to provide routine, acute and emergent 
health services to individuals.  Medical care in a HA/DR environment will focus on 
essential care, emergency surgery, and essential postoperative management to prevent 
death. 
 Preventive medicine is the anticipation, communication, prediction, 
identification, prevention, education, risk assessment, and control of communicable 
diseases, illnesses, and exposure to endemic, occupational, and environmental threats.  
These threats include non-battle injuries, environmental and occupational exposures, 
combat stress responses, weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the health and 
readiness of military personnel.  Because inhabitants of a post disaster environment are 
particularly susceptible to exposure, poor sanitation, overcrowding, and vector-borne 
diseases, an effective preventive medicine program can significantly impact the success 
of HA/DR missions by decreasing the risk of epidemic disease outbreaks through vector 
control, good sanitation, and education.  Preventive medicine measures will typically 
include field sanitation, medical surveillance, pest and vector control, disease risk 
assessment, environmental and occupational monitoring and health surveillance, medical 
countermeasures, health threat controls for waste (human, hazardous, and medical) 
disposal, food safety inspection, and potable water surveillance.  Preventive medicine 
programs should be established for both relief forces involved in the HA/DR mission as 
well as the affected population.83   
 Finally, veterinary services provide food inspection services, assuring food 
wholesomeness, safety, and security.  The potential of food-borne disease, the threat of 
contamination of subsistence, the need to assess any endemic disease threats, and the 
need to provide health care all require an early veterinary presence throughout a disaster 
area.  Services provided by veterinary units include sanitary surveillance of food source 
_____________________ 
82. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Health Service Support, Joint Publication 
(JP) 4-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): III-8. 
83. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Health Service Support, Joint Publication 
(JP) 4-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): III-4-III-5. 
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and storage facilities, and surveillance of foodstuffs to ensure a safe and wholesome food 
supply.  Procurement of fresh foods, bottled water, ice, and beverages is supported by 
veterinary personnel through sanitation audits performed on local food establishments in 
the operational area.84 
 The next attribute, plans and operations, involves the coordination and 
cooperation of inter-agency, military, and non-governmental assets required to effectively 
respond to a HA/DR crisis.  Following a natural or man-made disaster, medical 
requirements will range from emergency/trauma care to preventive medicine, to delivery 
of water, food, shelter and security.  Thus, the coordination and execution of medical 
operations among the various respondents is multifaceted in a HA/DR environment.  This 
plans and operations attribute includes medical staff support, level II/III medical support, 
medical liaison, host nation support, mass casualty (MASCAL) and evacuation, medical 
intelligence, patient movement, and training personnel.   
 Medical staff support is the advice and recommendations that operational 
commanders receive on matters relating to the state of health, sanitation, and medical 
readiness.  Level II/III medical support provides large scale resuscitation, initial wound 
surgery, and postoperative treatment medical care for injured personnel.  Medical liaison 
is the coordination that military assets conduct with outside relief agencies (i.e. Red 
Cross, NGOs, and IGOs) that provides a common understanding of the overall medical 
situation and requirements.  Having this shared common operational picture aids in the 
effective coordination of response resources to the most critical needs.   
 Host nation support is the cooperative relationship developed with the host 
nation governmental authorities and civilian organizations to ensure complete support for 
medical assistance to an affected populace.  Host nation support is important during a 
HA/DR operation because it serves as a force multiplier by reducing the lift requirements 
necessary to deploy military medical assistance to an affected area.   
 Beneath every seemingly routine HA/DR medical response plan is the 
possibility of a MASCAL episode during which the medical system establish by first 
_____________________ 
84. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Health Service Support, Joint Publication 
(JP) 4-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): III-6-III-7. 
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responders may become overwhelmed with a large number of casualties, stretching 
routine healthcare assets to the limits.  Successful management of a MASCAL and 
evacuation situations are complex tasks where success relies as much on well-practiced 
logistics and communications as it does on skilled medical treatment.   
 As described in Joint Pub 1-02, medical intelligence is that category of 
intelligence resulting from collection, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of foreign 
medical, bio-scientific, and environmental information which is of interest to strategic 
planning and to military medical planning and operations for the conservation of the 
fighting strength of friendly forces and the formation of assessments of foreign medical 
capabilities in both military and civilian sectors.  Thus, medical intelligence reports can 
provide valuable information to operational commanders regarding communicable 
diseases, epidemiological data, and chemical and biological agents that may become an 
issue in an affected area.  This becomes even more important when planning for and 
conducting a HA/DR mission because first responders must consider the health threat to 
the affected population and responding military forces.85   
 Patient movement is an element that focuses on providing a continuum of 
care and coordinates the movement of patients from site of injury or onset of disease, 
through successive levels of medical care, to a medical treatment facility that can meet 
the needs of the patient.86  This process for selecting and moving patients is based on 
consideration of medical condition, locating available beds, route planning, and the 
selection of movement platforms and movement control.   
 The final element within the plans and operations attribute is the training 
of medical and non-medical personnel in first aid, preventive medicine, and advanced 
skills to support medical response to mass causality situations and HA/DR specific 
response threats.  This training is important because it provides individuals within an 
affected population with the knowledge and skills to provide medical assistance to their 
neighbors long after the responding forces and agencies have left. 
_____________________ 
85. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Health Service Support, Joint Publication 
(JP) 4-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): III-1. 
86. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Health Service Support, Joint Publication 
(JP) 4-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): III-2. 
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 The next attribute, medical logistics, involves the holding, issuing, and 
accounting for all medical, dental, and veterinary supplies (equipment, pharmaceutical, 
and consumables).  Within this attribute are the elements of clinical capabilities and 
health service logistic support and blood management.  Clinical capabilities and health 
service logistic support are the specific clinical capabilities, location, health service 
logistic supportability, and bed requirements.  Blood management involves coordinating 
blood requirements and distribution of blood and blood products to support all 
operational requirements.  The availability of blood and blood products is essential for 
management of the seriously injured and sick.    
 The final attribute, administrative services, involves maintaining and 
managing the health and dental records, and other documentation relating to the provision 
of health care to first responding and an affected population.   
 
c. Logistics 
 Logistic principles are both fundamental and inter-related, and form a 
synergy that contributes to the successful conduct of logistics operations.  Identifying 
those principles that have priority in a specific situation is essential to establishing 
effective support.  All logistical efforts must first ensure effectiveness and strive for 
efficiency to best utilize scarce resources and successfully complete tasks and missions.  
Logistics principles include responsiveness, simplicity, flexibility, economy, attainability, 
sustainability, and survivability 
 Responsiveness is the right support in the right quantity in the right place 
at the right time. Among the logistics principles responsiveness is the keystone.  
Simplicity reflects the need to avoid complexity and often fosters efficiency in planning 
and execution.  Flexibility is the ability to adapt logistics structures and procedures to 
changing situations, missions and concept of operations.  Logistic economy is achieved 
when effective support is provided using the fewest resources at the least cost, and within 
the acceptable levels of risk.  Attainability (or adequacy) is the ability to provide the 
minimum essential supplies and services required to begin operations.  Sustainability is 
the measure of the ability to maintain logistic support to all users throughout the theatre 
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for the duration of the operation. Survivability is the capacity of the organization to 
prevail in the face of potential destruction.87 
 Logistics is the art and science of managing and controlling the flow of 
goods, energy, information and other resources like products, services, and people, from 
the source of production to the marketplace.  It involves the integration of information, 
transportation, inventory, warehousing, material handling, and packaging.  The operating 
responsibility of logistics is the geographical repositioning of raw materials, work in 
process, and finished inventories where required at the lowest cost possible.88 
  “Logistics is the process of planning and executing the projection, 
movement and sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment of operating forces in the 
execution of national security policy”.89 Logistic functions include supply, maintenance, 
transportation, civil engineering, health services and other services.  
 
 
Figure 21:  Functional Decomposition of Logistics 
 
  Supply is the function of acquiring, managing, and receiving, storing and 
issuing the material required by forces. Maintenance includes actions taken to keep 
material in a serviceable condition or to upgrade its capability. Transportation is the 
movement of units, personnel, equipment and supplies from the point of origin to the 
final destination. Civil engineering provides the construction, operation, maintenance, 
damage repair, and reconstitution of facilities, roads, utilities and logistic infrastructure. 
Health services include medical evacuation, hospitalization and, medical logistics, 
_____________________ 
87. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint 
Operations, Joint Publication (JP)4-0 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000): II-3.   
88. Wikipedia, “Logistics,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistics. 
89. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint 
Operations, Joint Publication (JP)4-0 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000): V.   
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medical laboratory services, blood management, vector control, preventative medicine 
services, veterinary services and dental services. Other services are nonmaterial support 
activities provided by service personnel and the logistics community that are essential to 
force support.90   
  In HA/DR missions, logistics elements may be employed in quantities 
disproportionate to normal military roles, and in non-standard tasks.  Logistical forces 
may have continuing responsibility after the departure of combat forces in support of 
multinational forces, or PVOs and NGOs.  Logistics planners should analyze the 
capability of the host nation economy to accommodate logistics support required by the 
US and multi-national forces and take care to limit adverse effects on the host nation 
economy.  Any logistical analysis in support of HA/DR relief efforts must consider 
transportation requirements involved with these operations.  Airfields and ports must be 
assessed, particularly those in underdeveloped countries where their current status will be 
in question.  Delay in completing this assessment will directly impact the flow of 
strategic lift capability into the affected region.  Additional forces may be required to 
build supporting infrastructure.  This directly impacts the delivery of humanitarian cargo. 
Also, procedures must be established to coordinate movement requirements and airfield 
slot times with other participants in the operation.  Availability of fuel and other key 
support items may impinge on transportation support.91 
 If a disaster occurs, GFS is likely to be tasked to provide logistical support 
to any HA/DR relief effort.  When tasked, GFS would intervene in a disaster situation to 
provide all the required supplies, transportation, and services. GFS becomes an ideal 
logistic platform in this situation because land infrastructure becomes a secondary 
concern. GFS will require a port with off-load capability and land transportation for 
dispersion of the relief supplies, however air lift and air port facilities will likely not be a 
requirement as long as the port facilities in the affected nation remain relatively in tact.  
_____________________ 
90. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Doctrine for Logistics Support of Joint 
Operations, Joint Publication (JP)4-0 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2000): V.   
91. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other 
than War, Joint Publication (JP) 3-07 (Washington, DC: GPO, 1995): IV-10. 
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 The GFS platform will be required to have storage room for adequate 
relief supplies to include water and sanitation, food and nutrition, shelter, 
communications capability, Search and Rescue (SAR) capability, first aid and medical 
supplies, clothing, infant requirements, and provide for electricity and fuel requirements.  
In addition to storage for relief supplies the GFS will have to provide personnel including 
medical personnel, civil engineers, and logistics personnel as well as provide force 
protection for all personnel sent ashore with the HA/DR team. The GFS should have the 
ability to off-load the relief supplies onto shore. To do this will require manpower, crane 
lift and possibly an air or sealift capability.  
  Land transportation may be provided by existing host nation sources, 
however in the event that it is unavailable, GFS will have to be capable of transporting 
relief supplies to affected regions. Because we cannot predict the terrain, condition of 
roads and infrastructure, or the distance supplies will have to be carried we cannot 
possible predict what type, or how many vehicles will be necessary to complete an 
HA/DR mission.  This requirement will have to be assessed on site and assets brought in 
as required.  
  Logistics is the cornerstone of any operation, if we do not have adequate 
logistical planning, support, and execution GFS will be unable to support any HA/DR 
response effort.  Ultimately this could mean the difference between life and death for 
thousands of people affected by a disaster.  GFS must be prepared to provide relief of any 
magnitude to people suffering due to a natural or man made disaster. While planning for 
all contingencies may be a logistical impossibility GFS can and should be prepared to be 
first responders in the event of a major disaster within its AOR.  Maintaining basic relief 
supplies in quantities sufficient enough to provide relief to a large displaced population 
should be a major priority for any GFS platform.  
 
d. Communications  
 This functional component addresses the means whereby appropriate 
technologies could be employed by Naval platforms to enable effective communications 
in a HA/DR environment.  Successful HA/DR operations in the past have shown that the 
free dissemination of timely and pertinent information is essential to the prevention of 
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avoidable loss of life and property.  During these situations, it is the timely and accurate 
processing of crisis information and effective communication that are the critical 
elements in successful disaster relief operations and, ultimately, have an influence on the 
long-term development of the affected area.92 
 HA/DR first responders face two major communication obstacles during 
any catastrophic event.  First, heavily damaged or destroyed terrestrial networks often 
throw entire regions into a complete communications blackout.  Second, even if a part of 
the existing infrastructure is operational, available lines quickly become oversubscribed 
by heavy traffic volume, making communications through them cumbersome or 
impossible.  Communications networks must be set up quickly to enable responders to 
establish command and control of the overall relief effort.  They must be capable of 
overcoming hardware, software, and bandwidth interoperability issues between military 
and civilian participants.  This is of particular importance since international aid workers, 
military personnel, volunteers, and governmental officials are all competing for access 
into the affected area.  This obstacle becomes even more significant for responding DoD 
assets because communication requirements for a HA/DR mission are uniquely different 
from traditional combat operations.  The principle difference is that military commanders 
require a more unclassified, information sharing architecture for HA/DR operations in 
order to establish unity of effort and effectively collaborate and coordinate with the 
civilian agencies and non-governmental organizations involved in such an operation.93  
Ideally this architecture provides the ability to coordinate communications amongst the 
various responding resources, which is essential to operational success. 
 The vast majority of DoD's communication architectures, to include 
command and control traffic, voice conferencing, intelligence dissemination, and combat 
support traffic ride over the joint networks, are provided by Defense Information Systems 
Agency (DISA).  DISA provides global classified and unclassified voice, data, video, and 
_____________________ 
92. Tung Bui, Sungwon Cho, Siva Sankaran, and Michael Sovereign, “A Framework for Designing a 
Global Information Network for Multinational Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief,” Information 
Systems Frontiers (2000): 430. 
93. Charles Daly, “Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Communications for the 21st 
Century,” (research paper, Newport, RI: Joint Military Operations Department, Naval War College, May 
2007): 2. 
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transport services today through a combination of terrestrial and satellite assets.  These 
assets are predominantly commercial, though acquired and supplemented with military 
value-added features.  They also include military satellite and a limited amount of 
military terrestrial infrastructure outside the continental United States.  Military value-
added features provide global reach and tactical extension, a defensive information 
operations capability, robust encryption, personnel and physical security, diversity of 
route and media, precedence, interoperability, and visible and controllable assets.  These 
features are critical to insuring military forces, and for the purposes of this study a Global 
Fleet Station, are not denied access to information, geography, or space.   
 Using available lessons learned and research documents available from 
past DoD HA/DR response efforts, we were able to identify seven key communication 
attributes.  As illustrated in Figure 22, these attributes include access services, voice, data 
services, applications, video services, satellite communication services, and 
communication security.  These specific attributes provide a GFS platform with the 
capability to serve in a command and control capacity and/or as a first responder, 




Figure 22:  Functional Decomposition of Communication 
 
 The first attribute identified, Access Services, provides the foundation for 
all DoD communication assets in order to provide the required connectivity and promote 
the timely free flow of information.  Access services are comprised of three specific 
Global Information Grid (GIG) Services: Defense Information Systems Network 
Interface (DISN), Standardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP), and DoD Teleport.  DISN is 
the DoD’s worldwide enterprise-level telecommunications infrastructure providing end-
to-end information transfer for supporting military operations.  It provides GIG network 
services to DoD installations and deployed forces.  Those services include voice, data, 
and video, as well as ancillary enterprise services such as directories and messaging.  
STEP is the primary interface point between the sustaining base and deployed forces.  
The STEP program enhances the ability of the DISN to respond to the needs of the joint 
force.  STEP provides predefined (tailored) support packages on a predefined timeline.  
This support is extended via common user transports and includes voice, data, and video 
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services.  Finally, DoD Teleport provides commercial and military satellite access at 
selected STEP sites to improve DISN service access to the deployed joint force.94 
 The next key attribute is Voice communications.  At the early stages of a 
HA/DR response, voice communications are the primary means of garnering an overall 
situational awareness and thus provide first responders with the capability to most 
effectively and efficiently employ and distribute essential personnel and resources.  Non-
voice communications can become an important requirement (narrowband, wideband and 
broadband data applications), dependent on the nature of the disaster, however, the need 
for voice communications will always be a major requirement.  Voice communications 
includes Defense Switched Network (DSN), Mobile, and Tactical Voice. 
 The DISN provides global voice services through the DSN, a worldwide 
private-line telephone network.  Multilevel precedence and preemption (MLPP) 
capabilities on the DSN ensures that the highest-priority calls achieve connection quickly, 
especially during HA/DR situations.  DSN also provides global data and video services 
using dial-up switched 56 kbps or 64 kbps Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN) 
services.  Secure voice services are provided by the Secure Telephone Unit, Third-
Generation/ Secure Terminal Equipment (STU-III/STE) family of equipment that 
provides end-to-end encryption over non-secure DSN circuits.  Most importantly, DSN is 
available to all military services, governmental agencies, allies and DoD contractors.  The 
availability and interoperability of this network can significantly improve overall 
situational awareness and the sharing of information and resources for responding forces 
operating in a HA/DR environment.95    
 Mobile voice communications are commercial, portable satellite systems 
capable of voice and data transmission.  These Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services 
(EMSS) are provided via satellite-based telephone and data communication services, 
primarily utilizing existing commercial satellite resources (i.e. International Maritime 
Satellite or Iridium Satellite).   
_____________________ 
94. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07-6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): II-3. 
95. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07-6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): II-5. 
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 Tactical Voice is comprised of military specific switching systems capable 
of operating in austere areas.  The U.S. Navy’s current shipboard tactical voice 
communications system is an audio frequency distribution system that is required to 
satisfy operational requirements for both tactical and administrative voice 
communications on twenty-four hour a day seven days a week basis. 
 The next key attribute is Data Services.  Data Services are the various 
networks that distribute a broad range of data and/or information (ranging from tactical, 
classified, to unclassified).  Data Services are comprised of the Joint Data Network 
(JDN), Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), SECRET Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), Wide-Area Network (WAN)/ Local-Area Network 
(LAN), and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). 
 The Defense Information System Network (DISN) provides interoperable, 
secure Internet Protocol (IP) data communications services.  The most prominent of these 
is the Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), which provides 
seamless interoperability for unclassified support applications, as well as controlled 
access to the Internet.  This is important because during recent HA/DR operations, many 
responding organizations utilized the internet to disseminate information because it is an 
inexpensive means of communicating to the masses.  The internet remains an inexpensive 
and efficient tool for disseminating information during a HA/DR crisis, provided the 
communication infrastructure in an affected area supports internet connectivity.  
However, utilization of the internet in these crisis situations is not always easy.   Some 
issues involved with utilizing the internet as a communication tool during a HA/DR 
operation include channel over-load, reliability, and security.  During a HA/DR response 
effort, the communication and IP networks are chaotic, overloaded, and subject to periods 
of unreliability and security vulnerabilities.  In fact, any available internet connectivity in 
an affected area will likely be over a low-quality, narrow-bandwidth communications link 
at best.  And even if the internet is available, taking the time and energy disseminating 
information over the internet is only useful if responders can quickly locate, comprehend, 
and effectively employ the information.  Finally, should first responders arrive in an area 
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where network accessibility is an issue, they may be forced to first build or repair the 
infrastructure network in order for it to be available for the initial relief effort.96   
 SIPRNET is DoD’s largest interoperable command and control data 
network, supporting the Global Command and Control System (GCCS), the Defense 
Message System (DMS), collaborative planning and numerous other classified war 
fighter applications.  The LAN is a network of computers that are physically linked 
together on a single site without the use of telephone lines of any sort.  The WAN is a 
network that has at least two parts (i.e. LANs) separated by a distance requiring the use of 
a data communications infrastructure.  Important to the HA/DR mission is that the 
LAN/WAN would provide the underlying computer network support in any combined, 
multinational relief operation.  Finally, JWICS is a computer network for classified 
information (up to and including SCI).  Although communicating at the highest of 
classification levels is not a necessity, it does provide key decision-makers with an 
additional capability.  This could be important should the need arise to discuss potential 
courses of actions or situations that may be politically sensitive or have strategic 
importance.97  
 The next key attribute is applications.  Although there are literally 
thousands of computer network applications currently utilized on DoD networks, we 
chose to identify those that were essential in supporting HA/DR relief efforts.  These 
applications included Global Command and Control System (GCCS), Defense Message 
System (DMS), and Defense Collaboration Tool Suite (DCTS). 
 GCCS is a suite of software applications and hardware designed for 
planning, execution, C2 of forces, data, information and multi-discipline intelligence 
processing.  This application is valuable in that it directly supports decision-maker 
contingency and crisis planning requirements.  DMS is a multi-level secure system for 
transmission of record message traffic in support of DoD.  Message traffic enables the 
first responders with a means of communicating their situational assessment, logistical 
_____________________ 
96. Tung Bui, Sungwon Cho, Siva Sankaran, and Michael Sovereign, “A Framework for Designing a 
Global Information Network for Multinational Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief,” Information 
Systems Frontiers (2000): 436. 
97. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07-6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): II-5-II-7. 
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requirements, and recommendations to decision-makers outside of the affected area.  
DCTS is a DoD tool suite for interoperable collaboration.  DCTS provides combatant 
commands, services, and agencies with an interoperable, real time asynchronous 
collaboration capability that includes voice and video conferencing, document and 
application sharing, instant messaging, virtual meeting, and whiteboard capability in 
support of DoD planning.98  
 The next key attribute is Video Services.  Video Services involves the 
capability to transmit and receive video communication signals to and from the 
operational area.  The importance of these video services, particularly Video 
Teleconferencing (VTC), can not be understated.  In fact, assessments of the Indonesian 
tsunami relief efforts have noted that VTCs were critical in “driving the daily rhythm.”99  
In its simplest form video services would include commercial news feeds, but it can also 
include classified or unclassified Video Teleconferencing (VTC).   
 The Defense Video Teleconferencing (VTC) System is a classified, closed 
global video network capable of voice, image, and data exchange supporting C2 
functions of DoD.  SCI-Level VTC is a classified, closed video network capable of voice, 
image, and data exchange supporting intelligence, and C2 functions of DoD.  
Commercial news feeds may be rebroadcast over DoD communications system or 
received via a commercially leased terminal.  These commercial news feeds are 
important because they can provide decision-makers with valuable information regarding 
affected areas that first responders have yet to arrive in.  As with all information provided 
there must be some caution in employing all news feeds because the media can tend to 
over-dramatize and skew their description of the situation based on the images presented.  
The fact remains that responders only have a limited amount of resources and therefore 
_____________________ 
98. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for 
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07-6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): II-7. 
99. Emerald Express 06-1 (EE 06-1) Military Support in Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief: 
Assessment Report, (Quantico, VA: Small Wars Center of Excellence (SWCOE), Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) Wargaming Division, 14-15 Feb 2006): 17. 
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decision-makers must evaluate all available information when formulating their response 
plan.100   
 The next key attribute is Satellite Communication Services.  Satellite-
based communication services have become the backbone of many critical operations and 
disaster recovery plans.  Satellites are the best and most reliable communication platform 
in these situations because fiber and terrestrial wireless networks can be disrupted by 
tsunamis, earthquakes, and hurricanes.  Satellite communications are highly survivable 
(physical survivability and robustness) and independent of terrestrial infrastructure.  They 
provide interoperability between disparate systems and networks, broadcast services over 
very wide areas, provide mobile wideband and narrow-band communications, and 
perform most effectively when terrestrial infrastructure is damaged, destroyed, or 
overloaded.  Simply put, satellites provide individuals with an instant communication 
infrastructure.  For this study, the Satellite Communication Services attribute is 
comprised of Wideband Services, Protected and Survivable Services, and Narrowband 
and Mobile Services. 
 Communications between responding assets is a major problem and is 
inevitably handled in informal ways.  Another problem with communications concerns 
bandwidth allocation.  Communication equipment is not typically designed to allow 
operators to change the bandwidth.  Thus, too much bandwidth is traditionally allocated 
to equipment that remains unused throughout a HA/DR operation.  Wideband Services 
provide high-capacity and broadcast communications coverage to meet increasing 
demands for information from military-owned and commercially-leased satellite 
systems.101  
 Protected and Survivable Services are those satellite assets that are anti-
jam, nuclear-survivable, intercept, and exploitation capable.   The key satellite system 
within this category with regards to this study is MILSTAR.  MILSTAR is the core DoD 
_____________________ 
100. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07-6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): II-8. 
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for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance. Joint Publication (JP) 3-07-6 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2001): II-10. 
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C2 communications system that supports strategic and tactical missions through secure 
global communications.102   
 Finally, Narrowband and Mobile Services provide phone and data transfer 
capability for netted, mobile, hand-held, paging, and low speed broadcast.  Satellite 
phones and terminals include a range of options, from high mobility/low data rate devices 
all the way up to fixed installations with higher bandwidth.  Mobile satellite phones are 
similar in appearance and function to terrestrial cellular phones. They need direct, line-of 
sight access to the satellite, but because they use omni-directional antennas, they do not 
need to be aligned perfectly. Two satellite systems provide service for these types of 
phones in the Gulf of Guinea operational area. The first is Thuraya, which is a single, 
geostationary satellite that provides limited coverage for about 100 countries (the 
coverage area includes Europe; North, Central, and parts of southern Africa; the Middle 
East; Central and South Asia, plus oceans in these regions).  The other is Iridium, which 
is a constellation of 66 low-earth-orbiting (LEO) satellites that provides secure and non-
secure voice and data services to DoD tactical and non-tactical users.103 
 A key provider of mobile, low-to-medium bit-rate global coverage is 
International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT), which provides the bulk use and pay-per-
use alternatives that support information transfer requirements during both normal 
operations and periods of contingency or crisis.  A recently privatized consortium, 
INMARSAT operates four geostationary satellites covering the entire surface of the 
earth, except for the Polar Regions.  INMARSAT’s terminals must be operated in 
outdoor locations, within the line-of-sight of an INMARSAT satellite.104 
 Communication Security is the final attribute.  Communication Security 
ensures the availability, integrity, identification, authentication, confidentiality, and non-
repudiation of friendly communication systems while denying adversaries access to the 
_____________________ 
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same communication systems. It also incorporates those actions taken to protect, monitor, 
analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD communication systems 
and networks.  This attribute is comprised of Physical Security, Personnel Security, and 
Operational Security. 
 Physical Security involves the security policies and procedures in place 
with regards to the communications system components and facilities.  Personnel 
Security are the security policies and procedures in place with regards to individuals 
authorized access to the communications system.  Operational Security includes the 
procedures and techniques for protecting operational employment of the communications 
system components. 
 
C. INTERAGENCY AND NGO COORDINATION 
 
The military is not the best answer for providing humanitarian support, 
[General Zinni] said, but if there is a gap, the military will fill it. 
Increasingly, the military is asked to fulfill nation-building roles best 
suited by NGOs with humanitarian or capacity building skills. Yet, at the 
end of the day, the military is not in the NGO business.105 
 – Summary by Craig Cohen on Lecture by General (ret) Anthony Zinni, 
USMC  
 
We considered that this facet of GFS – though not a mission per se – deserved 
special attention on par with that of the Peacetime Engagement and HA/DR missions.  In 
large part this was due to a general trend noticed in strategic guidance, recognizing what 
“outside” agencies provide to an overall campaign for regional stability, as well as a 
historical perspective on lessons learned out of the changing nature of war and how to 
prevent it.  We also determined limitations of what to address within this unfamiliar 
realm, understanding that civil-military relations – though under much scrutiny for 
improvement – have a long way to go before a truly integrated “Total Force” will evolve.  
_____________________ 
105. Craig Cohen, Susanne Martike, and Anita Sharma, “Civil-Military Cooperation in a Time of 
Turmoil,” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 
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This may involve further study beyond this one; still, we did glean some baseline 
capability requirements to foster and enhance inter-agency and NGO coordination and 
cooperation.  In addition, we sought to offer a longer-term, more deliberate humanitarian 
solutions as a complement to reactive nature of the HA/DR mission. 
 
1. Clear Guidance 
 In our strategic guidance, the emphasis on interagency and NGO coordination and 
cooperation is unmistakable: 
From the Executive’s NSS:  “In the cause of ending tyranny and promoting 
effective democracy, we will employ the full array of political, economic, diplomatic, and 
other tools at our disposal, including … forming creative partnerships with 
nongovernmental organizations and other civil-society voices to support and reinforce 
their work.”106 
From the Secretary of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review on inter-agency 
coordination:  “Increasing unity of effort to achieve the nation’s security policy priorities 
across the agencies of the Federal Government is essential.  Only with coherent, 
leveraged U.S. Government action can the nation achieve true unity of effort with 
international partners … The Department [of Defense] is continuing to shift its emphasis 
from department-centric approaches toward inter-agency solutions.”107  In addition: “The 
Department issued guidance … to place stability operations on par with major combat 
operations … [and in implementing this] calls for improving the Department’s ability of 
work with interagency partners, international organizations, and non-governmental 
organizations to increase capacities to participate in complex operations abroad.  When 
implemented, the Department will be able to provide better support to civilian-led 
missions, or to lead stabilization operations when appropriate.”108 
_____________________ 
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United States of America (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 6. 
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From the CNO and CUSMC’s NOC:  “We must … proactively seek to integrate 
the unique capabilities resident in the other services as well as other governmental 
agencies, partner nations, non-governmental agencies and private-venture 
organizations.”109  More specific to our project:  “GFS offers a means to increase 
regional maritime security through the cooperative efforts of joint, inter-agency and 
multi-national partners, as well as Non-Governmental Organizations.”110 
 
2. The Need to Incorporate Governmental and Non-Governmental 
Agencies 
The best entities to carry out missions relating to a Phase 0 environment may not 
always be the U.S. Navy and other military forces; rather, it might consist of a hybrid 
force incorporating State Department and/or NGO personnel into GFS.  There are 
numerous NGOs, each with a detailed focus on a specific issue, making them inherently 
more prepared to deal with the host of country needs that West Africa may present than 
our multi-purpose fleet is prepared to do.  Doctors Without Borders, for example, may 
have more human resources to deliver care to those affected by malaria in the country of 
Benin – especially as Navy corpsmen are consumed by Phase 2 conflicts elsewhere.  In 
order for our Navy to conduct exercises with Nigeria’s riverine forces, State Department 
officials will need to lay the groundwork for that interaction to occur.  Indeed, some of 
these efforts and coordination points may occur separate from the GFS, but in the case of 
an austere environment, also may require it.  In the end, the nature of our operational 
requirements for GFS will demand the integration of civilian counter-parts to the war-
fighters deployed aboard it.  If operating in an austere disaster relief environment, the 
requirement to coordinate and cooperate with these entities will be exponential.  In 
addition, just as General Zinni alluded to, beyond the expertise that non-military forces 
offer, persistence and long-term solutions once ashore comprise another of their key 
attributes.   
 
3. A Historical Perspective 
_____________________ 
109. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operations Concept , (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 26. 
110. U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Operations Concept , (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 30. 
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The need for civil participation in conflict-ridden or potentially explosive regions 
is not new or untested:  The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) 
participated in a rather successful “oil spot” tactic of reconstruction in protected villages 
of Vietnam, and continues to promote foreign economic and humanitarian assistance in 
the hopes of providing stability, and providing alluring prospects for international 
investment and business for regions in need of it.  Their mission thirty years ago remains 
strong today, and it addresses one of the key operational concepts of regional stability 
today and in the future:  to promote security by enhancing economic growth (and vice 
versa).  This is only example of a mission vital to shaping a stable environment in a 
region such as the Gulf of Guinea, but one which the Navy, on its own, is unsuited to 
address.   
 
4. Struggling With A Paradigm Shift and Limits to What We Can 
Achieve … For Now 
A struggle for each side – both by the Navy and by “outside” agencies – is to cope 
with departing their comfort-zones, and it may pose the greatest single challenge to 
achieving true coordination and cooperation between military, inter-agency, and non-
governmental entities.  “Hippies”, sailors, and pretentious subject matter experts from 
inside the beltway are now being called upon to work together in a united effort to 
confront the challenges of stabilization in troubled, pre-conflict regions.  Is this 
achievable?  One wants to “do good” irrespective of politics, the other wants to solve 
politics with “steel on target,” while the other promotes the academic ideals of 
“capitalization spawning democracy” – none of which seem outwardly conducive to each 
other.   
Though some might try to categorize the military as the primary stumbling block 
to interaction, NGOs and non-DoD agencies are equally or more reticent.  For example, 
not all NGOs will be cooperative.  Catherine Dumait-Harper, of Doctors Without 
Borders, encapsulated a common sentiment among many NGOs, remarking that “when 
humanitarian action is co-opted or subsumed into broader military and political 
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intervention, it may be perceived as interference.”111  Some NGOs, operating with 
complete neglect to political sensitivities in a region, may even subvert any united 
coordination for shaping and stability operations.  Obviously, we will need to be selective 
regarding which NGOs we receive delegates from to deploy aboard GFS.  Such 
selectivity must occur prior to their arrival aboard GFS. 
The reality is that conflicted regions of the earth deserve the attention of the 
Hippies, the sailors, and the beltway bandits.  Achieving the stability in those regions 
requires coordination between them.  How we do that remains the challenge ahead. 
 
5. First Steps  
The first step to such coordination has been made by the Bush administration with 
the advent of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization within 
the State Department (S/CRS).  Their mission is to “lead, coordinate, and institutionalize 
U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and 
to help stabilize and reconstruct societies … so they can [achieve] peace, democracy and 
a market economy.”112  One way in which S/CRS intends to conduct these missions is by 
deploying “Humanitarian, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Teams (HSRT) to Regional 
Combatant Commands (RCC) ... [and] desires to rehearse its response capabilities 
through active participation in military training exercises.”113  Though such proposals are 
being made with post-conflict planning as the primary driving force, it is hard to imagine 
that they are not – and should be – considered for pre-conflict operations.   
 
6. Functional Breakdown: Working With What We Have 
Understanding the strategic guidance and historical context under which we must 
address Interagency and NGO Coordination, and recognizing the limitations placed on it 
_____________________ 
111. Catherine Dumait-Harper, “Regarding ‘The Responsibility to Protect,” Global Policy Forum 
(2002): 1. 
112. U.S. Department of State and Agency for International Development, FY 2007 Joint Performance 
Summary Volume 1, (Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 13. 
113. John C. Buss, “The State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and its 
Interaction With the Department of Defense”, (master’s thesis, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army 
War College, 2005): 3. 
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by the nature of the groups we are trying to integrate, we forged ahead with possible 
solutions … or our own first steps.  Realizing the importance of bringing outside agencies 
to GFS for their expertise and for their long-term solutions as part of a stabilization 
campaign, we determined it would be desirable to attract the right ones, and support 
getting them to shore. 
Catherine Dumait-Harper’s fear of “militarizing” their peaceful mission 
demonstrates a limitation that must be addressed.  She is not alone, as we discovered 
similar feeling by other NGO representatives at the GFS Planning Conference in 
Washington D.C.   One way to attract these NGOs to a unified stabilization campaign 
may be to avoid the military perception of the campaign.  Perhaps that may be 
accomplished by the appearance of the vessel we use itself, or by limiting our interaction 
with them ashore.  Simply providing them with a means of transportation to the country 
of need, and taking care of their own basic needs on the way, may be the initial extent of 
interagency coordination – at least with some NGOs.  In addition, we envisioned that in 
an austere environment, GFS may be called upon to act as a secondary embassy, or node 
for inter-agency and NGO coordination. 
Our functional breakdown of GFS follows: 
 
 
Figure 23:  Interagency & NGO Functional Hierarchy 
 
In summary, State Department and NGO interaction appear as a necessity in 
regional stabilization operations.  Though military presence may provide a stop-gap to 
socio-political environmental issues that threaten this stability, it will be NGOs and 
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civilian government agencies such as USAID that provide the real cures inside the 
protected borders of West African countries in need.  Though much of this integration 
will be policy vice system related, we must consider that civilian organizations will be a 
primary extension of GFS ashore as we seek to meet our operational requirements amidst 
the challenges of the Gulf of Guinea environment.  In other words, we must design a 
system that includes the support of them in it. 
 
D. COUNTRY STUDY 
As delineated in the FAA introduction, we conducted our own research into the 
needs and attributes of the African nations which we intend to help.  Many of the 
problems that face the military stem from a lack of understanding of the places we wish 
to aid.  Our objective was to determine the needs of the countries at stake, and ensure that 
the missions for GFS were in-line with those needs, and thereby establishing a value base 
to our study.  For example, it matters not that the U.S can provide Theater Ballistic 
Missile Defense for stability in the Gulf of Guinea.  It matters far more that GFS is able 
to provide HIV/AIDS awareness, military-to-military training, and an HA/DR response.   
 Our country analysis focuses on the Gulf of Guinea countries of Liberia, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Republic 
of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, and Sao Tome & Principe.  Utilizing 
a thorough literature research, and through conversations with NPS students from the 
region, we were able to garner a much better insight into the actual needs and 
perspectives of the West African coastal nations.  The majority of the needs of the region 
fall under three categories: Political Unrest, Infectious Disease, and Economic Disparity.  
In the area of political unrest, we hope that the presence of GFS, and the spirit of 
cooperative engagement that it fosters, might help alleviate some problems – particularly 
if that unrest lies in relations between the country and the United States.  GFS may more 
substantially influence the other two areas - Infectious Disease and Economic disparity – 
both of which influence stability in the region. 
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1. Political Unrest  
 Tyrannical leaders have emerged in the Gulf of Guinea region from time to time.  
The majority of the countries in our study are recovering from years of civil war.  These 
internal conflicts, in many cases, have wrecked the countries’ infrastructures completely.  
The lack of a solid infrastructure has hindered economic, political, and social progress 
significantly.  In addition to destroying the country internally, civil wars have the added 
effect of diminishing foreign interests as well.  Very few countries are willing to invest, 
in any means, in a country that is frequently involved in civil war.  This lack of 
international aid only further fuels a countries decline.  Liberia, Cote d’Ivoire, and 
Angola are examples of countries that are recovering from recent civil war.   
 Civil wars in these regions are most often started when the country is attempting 
to transition from a tyrannical, dictatorial, or oppressive regimes, to one of democracy.  
That is the sole reason why GFS will not aid significantly in deterring civil unrest:  GFS 
is focused on Phase 0 operations with minimal footprint ashore.  It would require a major 
military presence ashore to quell and rectify these situations, and intervention by force is 
not the purpose of GFS.  On a positive note, many of these countries are making the 
transition to a more democratic political system, with relative peace in the coastal nations 
over the past few years. 
 
2. Infectious Disease 
 It is well documented that HIV/AIDS in Africa is a wide spread epidemic and, 
therefore, is no surprise that it leads the list of medical issues in the region.  However, the 
AIDS epidemic is not as severe in the Gulf of Guinea region as it is in other regions.  The 
adult HIV/AIDS rate in the Gulf of Guinea is around 5 – 6 % in each country.  This is 
well below the 18% adult AIDS rate in South Africa and even further below the 33% 
adult AIDS rate in Swaziland.114  With that being said, it is also important that GFS has 
the ability to not only provide treatment, awareness, and prevention methods for 
HIV/AIDS but additionally provide medical care for other diseases (i.e., Malaria and 
_____________________ 
114. United Nations Agency for International Development. Joint United Nations Programme on 
HIV/AIDS, 2006 Report on the global AIDS epidemic, A UNAIDS 10th anniversary special edition (World 
Health Organization: 2006): 18. 
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water borne diseases such as cholera, typhoid, and dysentery).  These diseases are 
causing nearly as much damage to the population as HIV/AIDS but not receiving the 
same attention.  The lack of clean water is a function of a lack of infrastructure to 
provide, process, and distribute clean water to everybody.  GFS by means of a NGO or 
IGO could potentially help save many lives by providing this medical/environmental aid. 
 One of the less mentioned side effects of these diseases, especially HIV/AIDS, is 
that as the adults die from the disease their children are left as orphans.  The children are 
more susceptible to turn to a life of crime and degenerate behavior just to survive.  This is 
a major contributor to instability in the region.  
 
3. Economic Disparity 
 The basis of any strong country is its economy.  A strong economy is necessary to 
support a nation effort to move from a 3rd world nation to a modern nation.  The GoG 
region is full of countries that wish to move up the ladder, but do not have the economy 
to do so.  However, this lack of economy is not due to a lack of resources.  The GoG 
countries are host to an abundance of natural resources. From the obvious resource of oil, 
to other resources such as timber, fish, minerals, and agricultural products, the Gulf of 
Guinea has plenty of resources to make a strong economy work.  The problem lies within 
the management and enforcement of economic policies.  Corruption is widespread in the 
region.  The rich get richer and the poor get poorer.  The economic divide is causing 
much chaos.  In Nigeria for example, MEND (a militant group focused on oil) terrorizes 
oil platforms in part because Nigeria’s abundant oil revenues, do not reach the local 
population.  In their minds, the only method to get their share is to steal oil themselves 
and sell it on the black market.   Another prime example of resources being mismanaged 
is the fishing industry.  Over fishing by large foreign ships is a major problem, as the vast 
majority of people in the region rely on fish for some reason.  Either they are fisherman 
who can not catch anything, or the people who rely of the fish for food.  Either way the 
over fishing is a significant problem.  Yet, the countries do not have the means to enforce 
fishing laws and agreements in place to regulate the industry.  Illegal fishing costs the 
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region in excess of $1 billion a year. 115  Imagine what improvements could be 
accomplished if only a percentage of that revenue was able to be recovered and properly 
dispersed in the region.   
 
4. Conclusions 
 Overall, the need for security both internal and maritime is paramount for the 
success of any Gulf of Guinea initiative.  GFS can positively contribute to the maritime 
security aspect by providing ships, training, and NGO / IGO support in the Gulf of 
Guinea.  There are significant pitfalls and obstacles in the way of progress.  However, 
with the support and cooperation of both African countries and the United States it is not 
a complete lost cause to think that a positive improvement can be made.  It will take a 
long term commitment from the U.S. to achieve the goals and state of security desired.  
The inability of the U.S to follow up on planned promises has left some African countries 
wary of our renewed interests in the region.  They see the U.S as a country that promises 
big ideas, but does not follow up.  The standing up of AFRICOM is being met with some 
resistance for that very reason.  GFS has the ability to be the positive persistent presence 
necessary to obtain and maintain maritime awareness and security in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
E. ATTRIBUTES:  DETERMINING SPECIFIC CAPABILITY 
REQUIREMENTS FROM MID-LEVEL HIERARCHIES 
 One may determine from the preceding findings that each of our teams - assigned 
top-level missions of Peacetime Engagement, HA/DR, and Interagency and NGO 
Coordination - developed their own sets of mid-level hierarchies to support those 
missions.  Though unintended, these hierarchies differed from one another not only in 
content, but also in their approach.  Out of Peacetime Engagement, we discovered that a 
mission and capability oriented hierarchy best described how to support the top-level 
mission of military-to-military interaction.  For both the HA/DR and Interagency/NGO 
Coordination top-level missions, supporting hierarchies developed out of a functional 
_____________________ 




approach - not surprising, considering the similarities and mission-overlap between 
humanitarian assistance and NGO efforts.  
We simultaneously determined region-specific needs with a team dedicated to 
defining the environment - also referred to as our “Country Team” – which worked not 
only to understand the regional needs country-by-country, but to check those needs 
against the hierarchal trees of our top-level missions.  This “check” insured that our FAA 
process remained applicable to the region, and that all major regional needs would be 
addressed by one of our mission areas.  This was a two way process:  mission teams 
remained aware of regional needs via updates from the country team as they developed 
their hierarchies, and the country team checked the mission teams’ mid-level hierarchies 
for regional applicability.  Any remaining needs not addressed by the mission areas were 
saved for future incorporation. 
With these varied approaches – mission/capabilities hierarchy versus functional 
hierarchies versus regional needs – we discovered a common method by which to tie all 
of our findings together, and by which to conclude our FAA process:  attributes.  
Defined, “attributes are the properties or discernable manifestations of the components of 
a system … [they] characterize the system.”116  Applying this definition liberally, we 
preferred to describe the term “attribute” as a specific capability, in large part to maintain 
the capabilities based characteristic of the JCIDS process.  In more general terms, we 
simply wanted to summarize, in more specific detail, what we wanted GFS to do. 
_____________________ 
116. Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis 4th Ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2006), 3. 
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Figure 24:  Conclusion of FAA Functions 
 
 89
 As a starting point toward determining our attributes, we reviewed the Joint 
Capability Areas Lexicon for tier 1 and tier 2 capabilities.  Some of these, such as the 
“Networked” attribute, led our Peacetime Engagement Group to adopt a similar one of 
their own:  “Command, Control and Coordination (C3) Integration” (see Figure 25)  
Other approaches to determining attributes were more obvious given their mid-level 
hierarchy origins.  For example, though not contained in the Joint Lexicon, a 
“Construction Services” capability seemed like a logical attribute to fall under the 
HA/DR function of providing infrastructure.  We derived all attributes out of our mid-
level functions, capabilities, missions, and needs.   
 
 
Figure 25:  An example of deriving attributes within mission teams 
 
One special case developed out of our Country Team’s efforts, as they determined 
their own set of attributes from needs not met by the mid-level functions of the mission 
groups.  One example included a specific capability for “Fisheries Protection” and 
[building] “Fishing Regimes.”  Recognizing that we had an attribute which currently did 
not fit under any top level mission, we developed a “Fisheries Enforcement” military-to-
military function under our Peacetime Engagement mission to incorporate it.  Other 
regional-specific attributes not met by our mission sets – usually due to their shore-side 
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or long term nature – were placed under the top-level mission of Interagency/NGO 
Coordination, and we made an assumption that they would be handled indirectly as 
extensions of our function of supporting interagency and NGO entities.  Though these 
latter attributes would eventually help develop our scenarios, they were not included in 
the common set of GFS attributes, as they would be considered “handled” by the 
attributes falling under the function of “Interagency/NGO Support.”  These examples of 
“reverse engineering” further highlighted the value of truly understanding regional needs 
before applying general systems solutions to overarching global issues. 
With a solid set of attributes in place, we were able to derive scenarios which 
encompassed a majority of regional issues.  Perhaps even more important to our systems 
process, our attributes also provided the metrics by which to measure the performance of 
potential system alternatives.  In other words, our attributes served as a conduit from 
qualitative and specific capabilities to quantitative and/or subjective methods of 
measuring performance of potential system alternatives.  These attributes provided our 
project team with the perfect segue into FNA.  They were the common piece – though 
still derived from mission areas – that would comprise our GFS.  Indeed, they would 
characterize it. 
  
F. A REGIONAL FAA PROCESS, WITH GLOBAL APPLICABILITY 
 Throughout our FAA process, region-specific considerations are evident; indeed, 
this was our intention after we decided to focus on the Gulf of Guinea.  What we did not 
anticipate was a potential global application to our regional process. 
 Though regional attributes were considered in determining top level missions, 
mid level hierarchies, and the resulting attributes, a closer look reveals that these mission 
sets could be applied globally – with some minor modifications.  The top level missions 
address the military-to-military, short term disaster response, and the long term socio-
economic issues encompassed by shaping and stability operations world-wide.  Adopting 
these specific top level missions of Peacetime Engagement, HA/DR, and 
Interagency/NGO Coordination provides the beginnings to an FAA process framework 
from which to derive GFS solutions for any region of the world.  At the mid level, our 
functions, capabilities and mission sub-sets are not strictly applicable to the Gulf of 
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Guinea.  For example, supporting embarked agencies and NGOs – a function of the 
Interagency/NGO Coordination mission – would be applicable to any region.  Indeed, 
which NGOs are employed would be a regional consideration, but the ability to employ 
NGOs would not be.  Perhaps, with future research on other regions, others may add to 
our mid-level hierarchies in order to provide a complete, global base.  With this, it could 
be tailored using a Country Team to select the functions and capabilities – along with 
their attribute sub-sets – applicable to their specific region.  For example, perhaps a 
function of “Provide Canal Security” might be added to the base list.  A regional process 
applied to Latin America may find this function useful as it develops a GFS system 
alternative, with Panama Canal security as one of its primary considerations, whereas a 
GFS system alternative designed for a strictly oceanic environment would eliminate that 
function from its FAA process considerations.   
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  The key concept gleaned from this is a truly global process for determining a 
GFS platform for a specific region (or a GFS “Process Model” application to regions:  
see Figure 26).  The process is global, but the product is regional.  In essence, all that 
would be required for any regional GFS proposal would be a country-by-country study of 
needs before applying them to our model.  All of the FAA process legwork of identifying 
top level and mid level hierarchies would already be complete ... or as some might say, 
“Just add water!” 
 
 
Figure 26:  Global “Process Model” with Regional Application 
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V. FUNCTIONAL NEEDS ANALYSIS 
 To revisit what this phase entails, the FNA identifies the “gap” between what is 
desired of our system alternative – as described by the attributes determined in FAA – 
and what currently exists from U.S. Navy inventory and doctrine.  We started by 
identifying “current capability” for GFS as a whole.  Up to this point, we resisted the 
temptation to label possible system alternatives by simple qualifications such as “ships,” 
“airplanes,” or “mission doctrine.”  Indeed, we recognized that in our FSA, combinations 
of all might compose a GFS system alternative proposal; in FNA, however, we limited 
“current capability” to ship platforms.  We then continued our process with a “stove-
piped” theme, maintaining the integrity of our Peacetime Engagement, HA/DR, and 
Interagency/NGO mission groups.  Each group then generated scenarios emblematic of 
major issues in the Gulf of Guinea, relevant to their respective missions.  These scenarios 
provided the means by which to measure and quantify the performance of our “current 
capability” in shaping and stability operations – by GFS mission areas.   Weights – or 
measures of importance – were applied to attributes with scenarios in mind (whether 
directly, or via weights applied to mid-level missions and functions).  Mission teams then 
determined value scores, measuring how well each “current capability” asset fulfilled the 
weighted attributes.  Once each asset was graded within the context of each mission area, 
we then synthesized those results into a single list of “best” alternatives for GFS, via 
maxi-min, maxi-max, least-regret, and expected value matrices.  This marked the end of 
our stove-piped approach, and the beginning of a comprehensive look at GFS system 
alternatives.  We then factored in cost, which yielded a “most effective” list of 
alternatives out of our “current capability” inventory.  Having determined these lists, we 
also determined the inefficiencies and performance gaps of each system alternative along 
the way; in other words, we identified our gap. 
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A. DETERMINING CURRENT CAPABILITY  
 
1. System Alternatives (Current Capability) Narrowed to Ship 
Platforms 
“Current capability,” as applied to GFS, proved a relative term as we considered 
the possible implications of the pilot programs, the sea-based focus of our problem 
statement, and current system inventories.  Without a single modus operandi (or concept 
of operations) in place regarding GFS employment or capability requirements, we had to 
decide what constituted our baseline for current capability.  The pilot programs seemed a 
convenient choice, given their status as the only existing Navy application of the GFS 
concept to this point; however, we still considered these pilots as reactionary in nature – 
not something to base a major phase of a deliberate systems process on.  The sea-based 
focus of our project, as implied in our problem statement, eliminated air and land-based 
options for current capability.  Though we still realized that future system alternatives 
may involve operational, command and control, doctrinal and even land-based systems 
architectures, we determined that a sea-based GFS must be platform oriented: without a 
platform, seaborne system architectures simply do not exist.  Platforms at sea also take 
the form of vessels … or ships.  This point received further emphasis from Admiral 
Henry Ulrich, Commander of Naval Forces Europe, as his command considered options 
for the APS:  “We came to the conclusion that the way to do this is to use a delivery 
vehicle. We use a ship -- go figure -- as we talk about maritime safety and security.”117  
In addition, ships intrinsically provide most basic physical and technological frameworks 
– as well as operational employment characteristics – from which future GFS constructs 
may develop.  Indeed, ships would provide a great baseline by which to determine current 
capability.  The question did remain, however, “Which ones?” 
_____________________ 
117. Henry Ulrich, “Special Department of Defense Briefing with Gen. Ward and Admiral Ulrich from 
the Pentagon, Arlington, Va,” http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4059. 
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2. Criteria for Determining Possible Platforms 
In determining what specific ships, or combinations thereof, should constitute our 
“current capability,” we considered the attributes that would need to be met, and applied 
our collective expertise on the topic of naval vessels (nine of us are Surface Warfare 
Officers).   In addition, we determined that ships must be drawn from current inventory, 
but not necessarily out of current doctrine (I.E. how a vessel is typically employed).  In 
other words, a cruiser could be considered “current capability,” as it exists and is 
available out of inventory – even if the current Fleet Response Plan (FRP) currently does 
not account for dedicating a ship to the Gulf of Guinea (much less in the role of GFS).  
We dared such liberal application of doctrine due to the fact that no current concept of 
operations accounts for a GFS role or mission for its assets. 
Some of our attributes were converted to more common ship characteristics as we 
sought platforms to address them.  For example, Attribute 3.4.1 (Transportation), was 
conveyed by helicopter and well-deck characteristics in choosing possible platforms from 
current inventory.  Other ship characteristic “conversions,” along with their associated 
attributes, follow: 
 
 Communications Suite (and capability thereof), as well as CO 
seniority characteristics:  1.0.1 Command, Control, 
Coordination (C3); 2.1.1 Resource Network (Command and 
Control); 3.1.1 Coordination Center [in addition: 2.4.1-7]. 
 Surface-search radar characteristics: 1.0.2 Regional Maritime 
Situational Awareness (RMSA).   
 Well deck, davit and crane characteristics: 1.1.1 Small Boat 
Operations Support; 1.2.4 Riverine Operations; 2.2.3 Medical 
Logistics; 2.3.3 Transportation; 3.4.1 Transportation. 
 Messing/berthing (beyond ship’s force) characteristics: 
1.1.3/1.1.4 VBSS/SEAL Team (Personnel) Support; 2.1.1 
Resource Network (Personnel); 3.3.2 Berthing.   
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 Medical facility (and size of) characteristics:  1.1.6  Medical 
Support and Transport; 2.2.1 Health Services; 2.2.2 Plans and 
Operations.  
 Helicopter-hanger, helicopter-landing characteristics:  1.1.8 
Helicopter Operations; 2.2.2 Plans and Operations (Patient 
Movement); 2.3.3 Transportation; 3.4.1 Transportation. 
 Topside crew-served weapons characteristics, as well as 
crew’s experience and training in:  1.2.1  Force Protection.  
 Crew/platform experience in peacetime-engagement 
functions and missions (ex: EMIO experience) characteristic:  
1.4.1  Training Ability (for Peacetime Engagement related 
functions).   
 Storage capacity, on-load/off-load (pier-side and offshore), 
as well as ship’s draft characteristics: 2.3.1 Supply; 3.2.1 
Storage; 3.4.1 Transportation. 
 Machine shop, services characteristic:  2.3.4  Civil 
Engineering; 2.3.5 other Services. 
 Hull color (black/white versus gray), presence of conspicuous 
weapons systems:  3.5.1  Force Posture. 
 
This particular use of our attributes should not be confused with their primary purpose: to 
eventually quantify and qualify our mid-level hierarchies via measures, to result in 
evaluations of our current capability platforms.  However, their use in identifying 
commonly known ship characteristics did help us identify likely assets to be used as GFS 
systems out of current inventory, and provided a simple method of doing so. 
 
3. Selecting the Platforms, and Their Categories 
Brainstorming platform ideas, we developed a list of ship alternatives, along with 
“pros and cons” for each of them with regard to our desired characteristics (complete list 
of ship platforms provided in Appendix B).  In order to break these options up, we 
assigned them to group categories that would span a wide variety of system alternatives, 
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from traditional to non-traditional, from big to small, from single-ship to multi-ship.  
Selecting one or two alternatives from each category, we hoped to provide a set of ship 
assets that would account for a broad range of current capability – assets that would 
stretch our simulation and analysis in all directions, thereby leaving fewer considerations 
for GFS capability unaccounted for.  These categories followed:  Cruiser-destroyer 
(CRU-DES), Amphibious, Military Sealift Command (MSC), Littoral, and Multi-
Vessel/Combination.  They also effectively addressed our desire to analyze more 
traditional responses to unfamiliar missions (CRU-DES), non-traditional (MSC), big 
ships (Amphibious), small ships (Littoral), and multi-ship combinations thereof (Multi-
Vessel/Combination). 
 Figure 27 highlights our list of platforms from which to choose: 
 
 
Figure 27:  Current Alternatives- Single Ship Proposals 
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Of note, we included all of the platforms affiliated with pilot programs and associated 
humanitarian assistance programs among our lists of possible “current capability” 
options.  We used our collective expertise, along with our set of criteria, to determine 
others. 
 
a. CRU-DES and Amphibious Categories 
  Our first two categories – CRU-DES and Amphibious – represented 
traditional Navy response to operational missions, whether those missions are planned as 
part of the FRP, or in response to crises.  Often considered more traditional simply from 
the aspect that the means by which they achieve their ends often stem via the use or threat 
of force, they are also the most commonly utilized by combatant commanders when 
quick responses are required.  These are the platforms most equally dispersed across the 
globe, and for which Operational Control (OPCON) readily lies with those commanders.  
Speed, mission (land focus for amphibious ships versus maritime focus of CRU-DES), 
size, and capacity characteristics exclusive to both categories suggested that we keep 
them separate. 
  In the CRU-DES category, we included a Nimitz Class (CVN-68) aircraft 
carrier, a Ticonderoga Class (CG-47) cruiser, Arleigh Burke Class (DDG-51) destroyer, 
and an Oliver Hazard Perry (FFG-7) class frigate.  The CVN represented the ultimate in a 
sustained and large capability for shaping and stability operations.  Though not 
considered a true CRU-DES platform in the fleet, we included it as part of this category 
due to its maritime emphasis (vice land – or amphibious - focus). The CG, DDG, and 
FFG represented a more scaled response, with the cruiser representing the more capable 
platform with regard to communications, seniority, and surface search capabilities, and 
the frigate representing the lower end of the spectrum.   Force Protection and training 
ability characteristics were strong points of each platform in this category, as was a 
helicopter capability.   
  We incorporated a Wasp Class (LSD-1) multi-purpose amphibious assault 
ship, a Tarawa Class (LHA-1) multi-purpose amphibious assault ship, a San Antonio 
Class (LPD-17) amphibious transport dock ship, and a Whidbey Island Class (LSD-41) 
dock landing ship into the amphibious category.  The LHA/LHD platforms offered a 
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large-scale response capability, with several of the same characteristics as those platforms 
in the CRU-DES category; in addition, they offered well deck, davit and crane 
characteristics.  We drew the LSD option from one of the pilot programs (FORT 
MCHENRY), and selected the LPD-17 over other LPD and LSD options due to its 
modern communications suite. 
 
b. MSC Category 
  The MSC category represents a non-traditional response to shaping and 
stability operations.  We considered it as such due mainly to operational commander’s 
misunderstanding or narrow view of MSC’s scope of capabilities – many Surface 
Warfare Officer’s regard MSC simply as “the folks that refuel our ships-of-the-line at 
sea.”  We included it as a category, however, since it offers a wide spectrum of capability 
that might best address the non-traditional nature of GFS.  Beyond the oilers of MSC’s 
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force (NFAF), a myriad of USNS and commercially leased ships 
comprise Pre-positioning, Sealift, and Special Mission programs, and may be used in 
operational and tactical roles by operational commanders.  Whether the desired 
characteristic be the capacity offered by the Sealift and Pre-positioning programs’ Long-
Range, Medium-Speed, Roll-on/Roll-off (LMSR) vessels, or the speed and shallow draft 
of the Special Mission program’s High Speed Vessel (HSV), MSC affords GFS options.  
In addition, the lack of conspicuous weaponry, as well as the commercial/non-combatant 
appearance of all MSC ships, appealed to us as a non-threatening option in a region 
where political sensitivities may determine the extent of cooperative engagement. 
  Since MSC vessels span a wide array of appearance and capability 
characteristics, we attempted to select platforms that represented that variety well.  Out of 
the NFAF program we selected the white-hulled, medically oriented, Mercy Class (T-AH 
19) hospital ship.  We included a black-hulled ship with a high cargo capacity and RORO 
off-load (pier-side) capability, the USNS 1st LT Harry L. Martin (T-AK 3015), out of 
MSC’s Prepositioning program.  This ship is part of a group of three ships in MSC 
inventory known as Maritime Prepositioning Force-Enhanced (MPF(E)) vessels.  The 
MPF(E) ships’ capabilities exceed those of standard sealift vessels, and may be tailored 
to include (if outfitted) an expeditionary airfield, Navy Construction Battalion, and fleet 
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hospital.118  We did not assume that USNS 1st LT Harry L. Martin had each of these 
capabilities, and based our quantitative specs for that ship on its current capabilities; 
however, we did understand that she could be outfitted with these capabilities, which 
might prove beneficial in our FSA.  In addition, though separated within MSC’s 
Prepositioning Program as an MPF(E), and recognized as such by us in our studies, we 
would continue to refer to this ship by the more generic term of RORO.  Planned for 
transition to MSC prior to 2012, we also included the grey-hulled submarine tender, the 
USS Emory S. Land (AS 39), primarily for its multi-service and cargo capacity 
capabilities.  Crane off-load (pier-side and offshore) characteristics of the latter two also 
influenced our decision to include them in the MSC category.  In addition, the former two 
represented options with history, given their affiliation with what we considered to be the 
pilot programs.  HSV Swift, though an MSC vessel, was included in our next category 
due to characteristics common to that group. 
 
c. Littoral Category 
  All of our platform options to this point were rather large ships, with the 
smallest in excess of 500 feet in length; therefore, we included a Littoral category in 
order to provide platform options to address the berthing and access constraints to several 
West African ports.  In addition, without addressing cost as an independent variable pre-
maturely, we also wanted to provide options to avoid “wasting” capacity out of our 
current naval inventory.  Inherent characteristics to this category of ships included draft, 
peacetime engagement experience, and force protection. 
  In the Littoral category, we included a Coast Guard vessel, a Cyclone 
Class (PC-1) patrol craft, a Freedom Class (LCS-1) littoral combat ship, and the HSV 
Swift.  Regarding the Coast Guard option, we considered it as a basic cutter platform, 
realizing that its distinguishing characteristics (draft, hull color, peacetime engagement 
experience, force protection) would pertain regardless of specific hull selection, whether 
it be a Reliance Class (WMEC 615) medium-endurance cutter or an Balsam Class (WLB-
62) buoy tender; if selected, however, we would specify hull type.  This particular option 
_____________________ 
118. Keith Bauer, The Military Sealift Command’s Prepositioning Program, power-point presentation, 
September 2007. 
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appealed especially for the experience in maritime security and law enforcement inherent 
to Coast Guard ships and their crews, as well as to the opportunity to flex an interagency 
aspect of GFS directly out of platform selection.  The PC represented the most common 
small - but ocean capable – platform that we were familiar with.  LCS offered a modular 
aspect to our GFS system:  a means to address a dynamic and changing operational 
environment with tailored packages.  The HSV, one of the pilot programs, offered unique 
cargo capacity and off-loading characteristics not inherent to the other alternatives in this 
category. 
 
4. Selection Based on Nominal Group Technique 
 The decisions regarding which single platform to select out of each category 
varied in nature from “obvious and simple” to “hotly contested.”  Each ship platform we 
proposed possessed positive characteristics that we considered important of GFS; but 
only one would be selected.  One of the “easy” selection choices, for example, was the 
decision to eliminate the aircraft carrier, based on a realization that it was “overkill” with 
regards to its size and capability, and that its offensive firepower would simply be 
“wasted” – from a national security sense - in a peacetime role.  An example of a 
contested decision developed out of the discussion regarding the decision between the 
cruiser and frigate for the CRU-DES category.  Advocates of the AEGIS cruiser voiced 
their concerns about maximizing surface search and communications capabilities in favor 
of better MDA, whereas the frigate advocates refuted that similar to the aircraft carrier, 
the cruiser is a national asset and would most likely not be selected for GFS 
responsibilities.   The cruiser advocates highlighted the value-added with its command 
seniority over that of a frigate – a characteristic considered important due to the relative 
influence the commanding officer might garner in relations with host-nation and State 
Department representatives.  The FFG advocates highlighted their ship’s 
interchangeability with several foreign navies (as most do not have AEGIS inventories), 
which would help foster international partnerships to GFS. 
Employing the Nominal Group Technique of decision-making, we overcame our 
debates on ship selection and narrowed our “current capability” alternatives to one 
platform per category.  This technique is one of two expert judgment techniques for 
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decision-making identified by Dr. Harold Kerzner, and “allows for face-to-face contact 
and direct communication,”119 and seemed perfectly suited to our group, as we 
considered ourselves subject-matter experts given our research, and most of our decisions 
as a group occurred in the presence of one another.  These decisions culminated out of 
informed votes by our project team, following a brief re-capture of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each platform (see Appendix B for summary).  Our application was 
liberal, as we did not follow the anonymous voting called for by the technique; however, 
our briefings of specific platform characteristics did provide for informed decisions. 
The votes were simple in nature.  Figure 28 depicts how many votes each 
platform received, as well as the winners of each category (highlighted in green): 
 
 
Figure 28:  Current Alternatives – Single Ship Selections 
_____________________ 
119. Harold Kerzner, Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling, and 
Controlling (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 724. 
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5. Accounting for a Multiple-Ship Alternative: the Combination 
Category 
 We also included a multi-ship category.   This category addressed a realization 
that a system alternative – though constrained to ship platforms in our FNA – might 
consist of more than one vessel.  In determining which combinations to utilize, we pulled 
candidates from the set of single ships already considered.  In a few cases, we discovered 
that using multiple platforms with lesser single-ship capabilities to complement each 
other resulted in potentially strong combinations.  For instance, perhaps the low-
maintenance, high capacity RORO, combined with the shallow-drafted and high-speed 
HSV, might provide the perfect HA/DR combination to get supplies into constrained 
harbors.  Some of these combinations seemed to take on themes, as well:  three of them 
consisted of grey-hulled ships, another just the opposite, and another was consisted 
strictly of MSC owned hulls.  The proposed combinations follow: 
 
 
Figure 29:  Current Alternatives- Ship Combination Proposals 
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 Following a similar Nominal Group Technique, but this time with weighted, 
anonymous votes, we selected two alternatives out of this category.  Each voter ranked 
their selections on a scale from one to six, which were then tallied by points (I.E. 
individual’s top choice was weighted with 6 points, bottom choice with 1).  Figure 30 
details the breakouts: 
 
 
Figure 30:  Nominal Group Technique Voting Scores to Select Ship Combinations 
 
The top choices included the grey-hull themed LHD/FFG combination, and the MSC 
themed RORO/HSV combination.  For the former, the combination of communications, 
capacity, transportation and command characteristics of the LHD, combined with the 
peacetime-engagement strengths of the FFG proved appealing.  For the latter, the MSC 
combination of a large capacity RORO and ferrying HSV - along with its inherent 
training, force protection and helicopter characteristics – also faired well, while appealing 
to the sense that we needed to include a more non-traditional alternative to our study.  Of 
interesting note, the USCG options faired poorly; however, it is apparent that two of the 
voters felt strongly about the concept of employing a cutter as part of a tandem package 
(see Voter 6 and Voter 8 votes in Figure 30).  Whether service affiliation, designator, or 
experience of each voter may have influenced such variation remains unknown, as the 
votes were conducted anonymously.   
 
Figure 31 further highlights our decision. 
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Figure 31:  Current Alternatives – Combination Ship Selections 
 
 
6. Summary of Current Capability Selection 
 We realized that our platform selections would not satisfy all stakeholders.  
Indeed, proposing any set of system alternatives often proves to be the most contentious 
phase of any project.  When the decision must be made, it is done so with the baggage of 
varying human experience, bias and perception.  Our group was no different, yet we 
attempted to make the best decisions possible by utilizing a basic process known as the 
Nominal Group Technique.   Our execution of it varied slightly between our single-ship 
and multi-ship categorical decisions; but we believe that our results were sound products. 
Figure 32 highlights what we determined as “current capability” with regard to 




Figure 32:  Final Proposals for GFS Platform Alternatives from Current Capability 
 
Our selections – as is obvious from the above visual depiction – span the possibilities of 
ship platforms:  from traditional to non-traditional, from grey-hull to black-hull, from big 
to small, new to old, single-vessel to multi-vessel, and fast to slow.  We believed that 
such variety of platforms (and the associated characteristics of each), when simulated or 
analyzed under the microscope of our three scenarios, would provide a comprehensive 
measure of the gap between current capability and what is desired from our GFS. 
 Finally, understanding that these ships embark airborne and water-borne 
“connectors,” such as helicopters and Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC) vessels, which 
might impact further simulation and analysis outcomes in our FNA, we provided a 
standardized list of ship complements (see Figure 33).  
 
 
Figure 33:  Connector Complements Aboard Ship Alternatives 
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B. STOVE-PIPED PROCESS BY MISSION – FOR A REASON 
 Having commenced our FNA process as a group, we determined that returning to 
a “stove-piped” approach would help facilitate the progress of our project.  As we 
discovered during our FAA, “traction” – or the ability to make decisions and progress 
through our studies – proved inherent to working in smaller groups.  More importantly, 
we believed that results of higher quality were achievable by maintaining the expertise 
accumulated within each top-level mission group:  Peacetime Engagement, HA/DR, and 
Interagency/NGO Coordination.  For these reasons, we continued with this theme. 
 We also developed a plan to combat the primary shortcomings of stove-piped 
processes.  One criticism is that “information may be presented without proper 
context.”120  Indeed, we recognized this issue soon after developing scenarios.  A 
Peacetime Engagement scenario, with emphasis on counter-piracy, for example, might 
fail to account for attributes contained within their fisheries enforcement function to the 
level of recognition that this very important, revenue-impacting, regional issue deserves.  
To address such concerns, sensitivity analysis was conducted in some cases to determine 
if a shift in scenario emphasis would significantly impact the grading outcomes of our 
ship platform alternatives.  In addition, our two project managers acted as a common 
“sounding board” to each group throughout their weighting and scoring processes, 
assuring that each group maintained similar dispositions toward each endeavor (I.E. none 
too optimistic, none too conservative, etc…), thus offering a horizontal quality assurance 
across the vertical stove-pipes of mission scenarios and attributes.  We also ensured 
consistency in attribute and mid-level hierarchy weighting through the use of a standard 
table (Figure 34).  
 
_____________________ 
120. Wikipedia, “Stove-piping,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stovepiping. 
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Figure 34:  Weighting Criteria 
 
 In cases not adequately addressed by our sensitivity analyses or quality assurance 
efforts, we simply had to acknowledge that our stove-piped FNA process, with 
limitations on how complex we could make our scenarios, did have limitations; however, 
we believed that such shortcomings could be resolved simply by using more 
comprehensive scenarios and future studies (see Figure 35) .  We believed that our 
process – in itself – remained a sound one. 
 
 
Figure 35:  FNA “Game Plan” 
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C. PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT 
 
1. Scenario Overview 
The purpose of the scenario was to provide a realistic context by which to 
evaluate GFS system alternatives within the specific mission area of Peacetime 
Engagement.  For this reason, the scope of the scenario was limited to “testing” GFS-only 
capabilities and not those of partner agencies or nations; although it is assumed that the 
Interagency & NGO Coordination role is intrinsic and will be fulfilled to some extent.  
Our scenario is set in Nigeria, and we had the distinct privilege of being able to consult 
Nigerian Military Officer Ibrahim Sani during the development of our scenario.  Many 
assumptions had to be made for which we felt it was important to establish a mutual 
understanding with our Nigerian counterpart in order to progress with our study; these 
assumptions will be discussed both here and in Appendix C.  It’s no secret that the 
security of Nigeria’s petroleum infrastructure, in particular, is important to both of our 
countries, as well as the political and economic stability of the region as a whole.   
 
a. Scenario Context 
 That being said, a brief summary of our scenario follows, and is presented 
in the context of “current day” in the year 2012: 
 
 The GFS is midway through her second deployment to the Gulf of Guinea 
Area of Operations (AO).  She has been conducting multinational 
exercises with partner nations in the region, and is currently training with 
a Nigerian Navy vessel in the littoral region of the Niger Delta.  Training 
topics may include small ship and engine maintenance, security of 
offshore and inshore petroleum infrastructure, conduct of EMIO and 
Counter Piracy Operations, fisheries protection, or border dispute 
resolution.  
 The threat level has increased in the AO due to recent actions of the 
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).  A small 
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MEND militia has boarded a Nigerian Shell Oil platform 25 Nautical 
Miles off the Niger Delta near Bonny Island and stolen hundreds of barrels 
of petroleum with a small coastal tanker (200-300 ft) and a swarm of 5 fast 
boats with small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).  The militia 
has also kidnapped 3 of the Shell workers.  It is uncertain whether the 
hostages are onboard the pirate tanker or one or more of the fast boats. 
 It is our assumption that the Nigerian Government, acting through the 
Minister of Defense, welcomes the cooperative role of GFS and has 
extended an invitation to train and operate with the Nigerian Navy in 
territorial waters.  Where the capabilities of host nation navies stop, GFS 
is tasked by AFRICOM to lead the ensuing operation in support of the 
Nigerian Navy’s constitutional role.  Nigerian naval officers may be 
present during the operation for training purposes.  
 
b. Scenario Background, Considerations and Assumptions 
 The scenarios are not created in a vacuum; they must meet the criteria of 
realism and likelihood and be intrinsically tailored to the GFS capabilities one wishes to 
test.  In our case, we wished to evaluate the Peacetime Engagement – or military-to-
military – mission area.  However, to truly flex our system alternatives in order to 
measure their capabilities, we decided to limit the availability of host nation forces.  We 
did not consider this assumption as adverse to our scenario’s realism.  Though Nigeria 
does possess an offshore patrol capability, we believed it important to consider the 
negligible capability endemic of the region as a whole:  Angola, Republic of Congo, 
Liberia, and San Tome, for example, currently have no offshore capability, and many 
other nations’ offshore vessels are in need of repair.121  Therefore, for the purposes of the 
scenario, it was assumed that negligible assistance would be provided by the Nigerian 
government beyond explicit cooperation and/or a coordination role.   
 Although U.S. relations with Nigeria do fluctuate with regards to 
cooperative military to military engagements, it is not an unlikely assumption that 
_____________________ 
121. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 8, 163. 
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cooperation is in our future.  The Nigerian government is a Federal Republic that has had 
excellent relations with the U.S. since 1999, sharing many of the same foreign policy 
goals.  United States interest in Nigeria is great, as it is the 5th largest supplier of 
American oil and we are heavily invested in their oil infrastructure (40% of Nigerian oil 
exports go to the US).  Yet, poor corporate relations with indigenous communities, 
vandalism of oil infrastructure, ecological damage, and security problems in the Niger 
Delta region hamper growth and reliability of Nigeria’s oil throughput.122   
  Our Niger Delta scenario reflects similar attacks that are a recurring threat 
to the safety and security of the region.  MEND has waged an effective campaign against 
Nigeria’s oil industry for nearly 2 years, culminating in a surge of attacks leading up to 
Nigeria’s elections in May of 2007 which targeted oil assets, police armories, and even 
the Nigerian Military.123  The newly elected administration took large steps to pacify the 
militias; however a June 2007 cease-fire ended 3 months later.  The most recent attacks at 
the time of this writing occurred in mid-November 2007 and indicate an escalation in 
hostilities.124  The Niger River Delta itself is considerably treacherous as its 20,000 
square miles provide ample room for criminals to operate and hide, while most of the 
3,000 miles of aboveground pipelines crisscrossing the Delta are significantly vulnerable. 
   The combination of a training scenario and a Counter Piracy scenario 
thereby affords an indication of not only which attributes to evaluate with the most 




122. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Nigeria,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm. 
123. Strategic Forecasting, Inc., “Nigeria: MEND Ends the Cease-Fire,” 
http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=295731&selected=Analyses. 
124. Dulue Mbachu, “Shell Says Nigeria Pipeline Attacked,” 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-7080597,00.html. 
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2. Weighting and Scoring of Attributes 
 
a. Overview of Approach 
 
... by tying the capabilities to scenario objectives and a set of CONOPS, 
you eliminate the problem of trying to assess in terms of capabilities de 
nusquam125.  Early writing on JCIDS often referred to “critical 
capabilities,” implying that there are other capabilities that are not 
critical. To save yourself a semantic debate, merely state that in your 
CBA, the critical capabilities are those effects that you have opted to 
assess in your scenarios.126  
 
 For the Peacetime Engagement mission area, we weighted – that is, 
determined the importance of – each of our attributes based directly on scenario 
influence.  Our most important attributes could be considered to be those graded a 6 (out 
of 10) or above, and are depicted in Figure 36: 
 
 
Figure 36:  Most Important Peacetime Engagement Attributes 
_____________________ 
125. Latin, meaning “from nowhere.” 
126. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) 
User’s Guide (Version 2), Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 31. 
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While the modeling, simulation, and scoring effort (see Appendix C) focused primarily 
on these highly weighted attributes, a value score was assigned to every platform for all 
attributes.  This was accomplished by developing criteria or measures for each attribute 
for which a value score (out of 100) could be assigned for how well each system 
alternative (i.e. platform or combo) performed in that attribute.  In some cases there was 
more than one measure of performance for an attribute, but each value score was arrived 
at by way of a value assessment based on the criteria described below.  While a specific 
value function was not defined for each attribute, the assessment was objectively based 
on each alternative’s organic capabilities.  From the Joint Chiefs of Staff Capabilities-
Based Assessment Guide: 
 
Too many DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE analyses get hung up over 
establishing precise, coordinated, acceptable-to-all numbers for such 
things as the probability of kill for a weapon or the survivability of a 
platform. You can either 1) endure endless arguments over what the 
correct estimate should be, or 2) document the range of legitimate 
opinions on the numbers and assess the extremes to see if the estimate 
really matters to your overarching measures.127   
 
“The extremes” that the CBA guide refers to were assessed in our sensitivity analysis and 
documented below. 
 Our assessment did not stop there.  One approach to determining current 
capabilities that the CBA Guide outlines is collecting and documenting doctrinal 
approaches by way of a working group: 
 
You should give your group the set of scenarios and the capabilities 
you’ve derived from those scenarios, and have them tell you how they 
would achieve those effects … 
 
_____________________ 
127. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) 
User’s Guide (Version 2), Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 44. 
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Essentially, you are giving your working group a mission order. You want 
them to tell you how they would do the mission, particularly: 
• What force elements they would use; 
• How long it would take; 
• What the sequencing of tasks and dependencies among tasks would be; 
and 
• What sort of basing, transport, and allied cooperation would be 
required.128  
 
 We were fortunate to have the Commander of Naval Special Warfare 
Group Four (NSWG4) offer his support in this effort.  Teams of requirements analysts 
headed by Mr. Matthew Hawkins were able to broaden our analysis and add validity by 
delivering their approach to our Peacetime Engagement scenario.  The NSWG4 analysis 
acts as a complement to our overall assessment approach and a supplement to our 
evaluation of alternatives in the attributes of Riverine Operations and Equipment Storage 
(see attribute 1.2.4 and 1.1.4 below). 
 
b. Attribute Outcomes 
  The resulting scores of our attributes follow. 
 
1.0.1 Command, Control, Coordination (C3):  The ability to exercise 
authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned 
and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. A commander 
performs command and control functions through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures to plan, 
_____________________ 
128. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) 
User’s Guide (Version 2), Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8) 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 44. 
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direct, coordinate, and control forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of the mission.129 
Overall Weight:  8 
A robust C3 capability is a necessity in order to smoothly control and 
execute multiple mission areas simultaneously, as well as communicates 
with our host countries.  In our scenario the GFS started out conducting 
training with Nigerian forces; this requires C3.  As the scenario progresses 
the GFS must be able to conduct helicopter operations, small boat 
operations, and non-compliant boarding (NCB), all while tracking a 
MEND oil tanker as well as MEND small boats, and coordinating with 
Riverine Forces operating in the Niger Delta.  In order for the mission to 
succeed, many of these functions must occur simultaneously, while others 
must be ensured a seamless transition from one to another; for all of this 
C3 is an inherent necessity. 
1.0.1.1 C3 Connectivity:  GFS shall have joint, interoperable C3 
capability such that it has complete and uninterrupted connectivity 
with appropriate joint forces and Naval Force (NAVFOR) 
maritime force protection networks; the GFS crew and embarked 
personnel will be able to maintain situational awareness and adjust 
planning during transits. 
 Weight within Attribute:  70% 
1.0.1.2 C3 Integration:  GFS shall have computing capabilities that 
integrate sensors, communications, and self-protection weapon 
systems into a single command and control system. 
 Weight within Attribute:  30% 
Value Scoring Criteria: As a forward operating base, the GFS should 
have the following command, control and coordination (C3) 
capabilities:130 
_____________________ 
129. U.S. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 & 2 Lexicon 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 30. 
130. Tactical Bulletin GWOT-06-02 Afloat Forward Staging Base for Maritime Security Operations 
From LSD and LPD Class Ships, March 2006. 
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 Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System 
(CENTRIXS); an essential capability for coalition and 
multinational operations. 
 Automatic Identification System (AIS); necessary to allow for 
greater situational awareness and building of the User-Defined 
Operational Picture (UDOP). All ships assigned MIO/EMIO 
operations are outfitted with AIS. 
 C3 Suite; to accommodate possible embarked staffs or parallel 
operations, the TACLOG space can be converted into a C3 suite, 
by patching additional C2 circuits into the space, establishing 
multiple SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) 
workstations, multiple CENTRIXS workstations, and a Global 
Command and Control System (GCCS) terminal with a C2 
personal computer (PC). 
 Link 16; this capability would allow for faster transmission of data 
between the helicopters, other USN vessels, and many partner 
nations.  A minimum criterion is Link 11. 
 A capability level was assigned to each GFS alternative based on 
its organic C3 systems and capacity for acting as a C3 hub.  A fully 
capable and expansive C3 platform was designated as Level 1 
(100%), Level 2 (80%) if C3 capacity was limited, and Level 3 
(60%) was established as a baseline for limited capability.   
 
Value Scores: 
CG:   Value Score of 100% - Level 1; meets all criteria. 
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LPD-17:  Value Score of 100% - Level 1; meets all criteria and has a 
ship's signals exploitation space (SSES)/joint intelligence 
center (JIC) space onboard. 
HSV: Value Score of 80% - Level 2; HSV is limited in C3 suite 
capability and does not have Link 11 or 16. 
AS: Value Score of 80% - Level 2; similar to HSV. 
LHD/FFG:  Value Score of 100% - Level 1; the LHD/FFG combination 
benefits from the greater capability of the C3 suite on a 
LHD (Level 1). The FFG has an improved Level 2 
capability with Link 11 and SIPRNET. 
HSV/RORO:  Value Score of 80% - Level 2; the HSV/RORO 
combination benefits from the greater capability of the 
HSV, because the RORO scores a 60% (Level 3) with the 
following baseline systems: VHF (bridge-to-bridge), UHF 
(FLTAC), GMDSS/INMARSAT C, INMARSAT B (voice 
& data), Classified Message Transfer System, AIS, and 
Ship Security Automated Systems (SSAS).  The RORO has 
no CENTRIX, SIPRNET, GCCS, Link 11 or 16. 
 
1.0.2 Regional Maritime Situational Awareness (RMSA):  the ability to 
develop awareness and understanding of anything associated with a 
maritime area of concern (AOC) that could impact regional security, 
safety, economy or environment and to produce intelligence through 
persistent and pervasive observation of the AOC.  This includes 
meteorological data and event warning.  Actionable intelligence is key.131 
Overall Weight:  8 
RMSA was given a high weight not only for its importance in the 
scenario, but also for its general applicability to the higher-level missions 
_____________________ 
131. U.S. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 & 2 Lexicon 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 23. 
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and many of the other attributes.  RMSA, as an attribute, pervades all 
mission areas and is a fundamental building block for any operational 
capability. 
1.0.2.1 RMSA Planning:  GFS shall have the ability to develop 
intelligence requirements and build a collection plan for a regional 
area of concern (AOC), and function in accordance with the MHQ 
w/MOC CONOPS. 
 Weight within Attribute:  10% 
1.0.2.2  Monitoring and Tracking:  GFS shall have the ability to 
persistently monitor in the local maritime domain: vessels & craft, 
cargo, crews & passengers, areas of interest. GFS and/or partner 
nations shall determine the number of all vessels underway in a 
specific area of concern (AOC) and track those vessels. 
 Weight within Attribute:  20% 
1.0.2.3  Identification:  GFS and/or partner nations shall have the ability 
to identify all cargo, crew, and passengers on vessels underway in 
a specific AOC. 
 Weight within Attribute:  10% 
1.0.2.4 Threat Detection:  GFS and/or partner nations detect potential 
threats associated with all vessels underway in a specific AOR. 
 Weight within Attribute:  30% 
1.0.2.5 Support UDOP:  GFS shall have the ability to make information 
and intelligence available to support the User-Defined Operational 
Picture (UDOP) in support of the MHQ w/MOC CONOPS. 
 Weight within Attribute:  10% 
1.0.2.6 RMSA Cooperation:  GFS, as a Regional Maritime Situational 
Awareness (RMSA) node, shall have the ability to disseminate 
information to the appropriate members of the interagency 
community and partner nations.  GFS shall have the ability to 
foster cooperation among maritime security providers in host 
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nations and incorporate their contribution to the unclassified 
RMSA network. 
 Weight within Attribute:  10% 
1.0.2.7 Cultural Awareness:  GFS shall have the ability to understand the 
cultural context in which operations take place, including the 
culture of coalition partners, host nations, civilian organizations 
and agencies. 
 Weight within Attribute:  10% 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The RMSA score is based on measuring the 
sub-attributes of threat detection and monitoring and tracking, which 
together account for 50% of the RMSA attribute.  The remaining half is 
accounted for by RMSA planning, identification, UDOP support, 
cooperation, and cultural awareness, which are assumed to be consistent 
across all platforms as they are functions of staff, training, external 
support and computing.  For the threat detection and monitoring and 
tracking measures, we utilized the NSS simulation described in Appendix 
C, and with results listed in Figure 37 and Figure 38.  The results consisted 
of 4 measures: detection time and range for the ships and any organic 
helicopter assets.  That is, the time and range of detection from scenario 
start until the RED tanker was acquired. 
 For each GFS platform, the simulation was run 70 times with a 
specification of less than 5% standard deviation.  70 replications were 
enough to ensure that this requirement was met.  Mean values are reported 
here. 
 Each GFS alternative was graded according to the performance in 
the scenario.  The NSS scenarios produced MOEs of time to detection of 
the MEND Oil tanker and distance the MEND Oil tanker was detected for 
the GFS platform as well as the helicopters utilized, if the platform is 
capable of helicopter operations.  Utilizing the “Scenario MOE” table and 
graph we assigned grades to each GFS platform and helicopter based on 
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performance; the quicker and further away the MEND Oil tanker was 
detected the better.  The final value score was calculated using the 
following formula: 
 
     ( ) ( )2 1Final Value Score = 3 3GFS Platform Score Helicopter Score+  
 
We utilized this formula after determining that we valued the performance 
of the platform twice as much as the value of the helicopter. 
Value Scores: 
CG:   96.7% - based on MOE results and graphical 
representation. 
LPD-17:   76.7% - based on MOE results and graphical   
  representation. 
HSV:    93.3% - based on MOE results and graphical   
  representation. 
AS:    40.0% - based on MOE results and graphical   
  representation. 
LHD/FFG:   91.7% - based on MOE results and graphical   
  representation. 
HSV/RORO:   93.3% - based on MOE results and graphical   




Figure 37:  P.E. Time-Distance Table 
 
 
Figure 38:  Graphical Representation of RMSA Performance 
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1.1.1 Small Boat Operations Support:  GFS shall be able to conduct Small 
Boat Operations, including the ability to embark, disembark, store, 
maintain, and repair small boats (RHIB or required alternative). GFS shall 
be able to maintain communication with Small Boat Operations and other 
expeditionary teams (VBSS and SEALs). 
Overall Weight:  7 
Small Boat Operations for a GFS platform was deemed essential for a 
majority of the attributes including training, fisheries regime enforcement, 
logistics, and others. EMIO and MSOC could not be accomplished 
effectively without the ability to conduct small boat operations. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The scoring for Small Boat Operations Support 
is based on the type and number of small boats that are available on each 
platform.  A minimum of 2 RHIBs are necessary in order for a NCB 
VBSS Team to board a vessel quickly without having to wait for the 
RHIB to make two trips (thus decreasing the safety of the VBSS Team).  
We also determined that due to age, performance, and composition we 
would not consider motor whale boats (MWB) to be as useful for NCB 
VBSS operations as a RHIB.  In the case of the FFG/LHD combo we 
determined that the FFG would be the EMIO platform; and in the case of 
the HSV/RORO the HSV would be the EMIO platform. 
Value Scores: 
CG:   100% - has a minimum of 2 RHIBs embarked. 
LPD-17:  100% - has a minimum of 2 RHIBs embarked. 
HSV:   100% - has a minimum of 2 RHIBs embarked. 
AS:   40% - has 2 motor whaleboats embarked. 
LHD/FFG:  80% - has 1 RHIB embarked on the FFG as the EMIO  
  asset. 
HSV/RORO:  100% - has a minimum of 2 RHIBs embarked. 
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1.1.2 Visit, Board, Search, Seizure (VBSS) Team Support:  GFS shall be 
able to transport, house, and sustain VBSS Team members. 
Overall Weight:  8 
Piracy and smuggling by armed militants are two major causes of 
instability in the Gulf of Guinea region.  If the GFS were to help eliminate 
or decrease the instances of these crimes, the overall value of the GFS 
platform in the region would increase.  The ability of the GFS to support 
VBSS Teams is instrumental in combating these problems.   
Value Scoring Criteria:  VBSS Team Support was scored by determining 
if the platform was capable of transporting, housing, and sustaining VBSS 
personnel based on current configurations and operations procedures. 
Value Scores: 
CG:   100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17: 100% - fully capable. 
HSV:   100% - fully capable. 
AS:   100% - fully capable. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:  100% - fully capable. 
 
1.1.3 Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Team Support:  GFS shall be able to transport, 
house, and sustain SEAL Team members. 
Overall Weight:  5 
Piracy and smuggling are two causes of instability in the region.  If the 
GFS were to help eliminate or decrease the instances of these crimes, the 
overall value of the GFS in the region would increase.  SEAL Teams are 
capable of combating these problems when a VBSS Team is not capable 
of doing so. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  SEAL Team Support was scored by determining 
if the platform was capable of transporting, housing, and sustaining SEAL 
personnel based on current configurations and operations procedures. 
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Value Scores: 
CG:   100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV:    100% - fully capable. 
AS:   100% - fully capable. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:  100% - fully capable. 
 
1.1.4 Equipment Storage:  GFS shall be able to securely store EMIO and/or 
SEAL Team armament; GFS shall be able to store associated maintenance 
and support equipment. 
Overall Weight:  4 
VBSS and SEAL teams require a significant compliment of equipment 
and armament that have specific requirements for housing and storage 
onboard the GFS.  Without the ability to store equipment or provide the 
necessary security, the teams would not be able to accomplish their 
missions. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The equipment storage attribute is scored based 
on each platform’s cargo capacity, including storage of small boats and 
associated maintenance and support equipment.  Armament storage has 
specific security requirements that may add additional personnel and 
equipment for ships that are not otherwise outfitted with adequate armory 
capacity. 
Value Scores: 
CG:    100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17:   100% - fully capable. 
HSV:   100% - fully capable. 
AS:   60% - value lowered due to small boat storage issues and  
  lack of RHIBS. 
LHD/FFG:  90% - value lowered due to 1 RHIB storage capability. 
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HSV/RORO:  75% - value lowered due to lack of small boats and armory  
  on RORO. 
 
1.1.5 Medical Support and Transport:  GFS shall be able to provide medical 
treatment to embarked personnel and/or able to transport personnel to 
other facilities for medical treatment. 
Overall Weight:  4 
GFS will be involved in counter piracy, NCB VBSS, and possibly SEAL 
operations.  These types of operations are inherently dangerous.  As a 
result GFS needs the ability to provide medical treatment or the ability to 
transport personnel rapidly by air to other facilities for medical treatment.  
It was not ranked higher because GFS is meant to conduct Phase 0/shaping 
and stability operations and is not expected to be involved in full combat 
operations where significant injuries or casualties would be sustained. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  To determine the grade for Medical Support and 
Transport, the platform’s medical capabilities, as well as their capabilities 
to transport personnel to other facilities, were utilized.  The ideal platform 
has a complete medical compliment onboard capable of conducting the 
full spectrum of medical procedures.  If this is not possible, the ability to 
quickly transport personnel to a capable medical facility is the next best 
alternative. 
Value Scores: 
CG:    50% - 3 Corpsman, limited medical beds (~3), helicopter,  
  and speed. 
LPD-17:   100% - fully capable; 2 operating rooms, no post-op beds, 4 
  bed ISO ward, 24 bed ward, 100 bed surge, doctor &  
  dentist, helicopters. 
HSV:    50% - 1 or 2 Corpsman, limited medical beds (folding  
  operating table), helicopter, and speed. 
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AS:    60% - limited speed but some medical capabilities; no  
  operating rooms, 6 bed ward, x-ray, lab, 3 doctors &  
  dentist, no helicopter. 
LHD/FFG:   100% - LHD fully capable; 6 operating rooms, 18 post-op  
  beds, 6 bed ISO ward, 36 bed ward, 600 bed surge, doctor  
  & dentist, helicopters. 
HSV/RORO:  50% - Corpsman, limited medical beds, helicopter, and  
  speed. 
 
1.1.6 Detainee Coordination:  GFS shall be able to transport, house, sustain 
and/or coordinate the exchange of detainees/suspected terrorists. 
Overall Weight:  6 
While conducting Counter Piracy, Anti-Smuggling, or GWOT operations, 
the ability to coordinate the transport, housing, and sustainment of 
detainees is paramount.   
Value Scoring Criteria:  The platforms were evaluated on their 
suitability for coordinating detainees.  A full brig (naval jail) is not 
necessary as long as the GFS is able to create a suitable detainee holding 
area as well as sustain them until transfer.  Each platform has the 
flexibility to establish a secure, makeshift brig onboard.  For instance, the 
FFG can utilize the area beneath the main mast as a detainee holding area 
and the CG can utilize the port/starboard break as a holding area. 
Value Scores:  
CG:  100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17: 100% - fully capable. 
HSV:  100% - fully capable. 
AS:  100% - fully capable. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:  100% - fully capable. 
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1.1.7 Helicopter Operations:  GFS shall be able to conduct helicopter launch, 
recovery, storage, communication, maintenance, and support operations.  
Helicopter operations also support core competencies such as search and 
rescue operations. 
Overall Weight:  7 
Rapid and seamless helicopter operations are one of the key enablers for 
the GFS platform to accomplish a variety of missions.  Helicopter 
operations are essential tools for VBSS operations, training, fisheries 
regime enforcement, re-supply, and other logistics tasks. Additionally, 
helicopter sensors improve each platform’s detection range and intercept 
time, thereby enhancing the RMSA capability. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  A platform was scored based on the number and 
type of helicopters it was capable of launching, recovering, storing, 
maintaining, and supporting.  Due to the nature of our operations and its 
design, the SH-60B was our ideal asset, while having 2 onboard was the 
ideal configuration (maintenance rates dictate that having 2 helicopters 
ensures a much higher probability that at least one will be operationally 
available at all times).  Though two helicopters was considered ideal, we 
factored that any capability less than that, but greater than zero, was 80% 
capability, out of an assumption that even one aircraft would be 
operational most of the time, or that a CH-46 could perform missions such 
as SAR, but might be slightly less capable as they were not our ideal 
platform. 
Value Scores: 
CG:  100% - fully capable; 2 SH-60 helicopters. 
LPD-17: 80% - capable for 2 CH-46 helicopters. 
HSV:  80% - capable for 1 SH-60 helicopter (no ordnance). 
AS:  0% - cannot launch, recover, store or maintain a helicopter. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable; no additional value obtained from 
extra helicopters. 
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HSV/RORO:  80% - capable for one SH-60 on the HSV; RORO is only 
landing capable. 
 
1.2.1 Force Protection (Underway):  GFS shall use protective positions, 
measures, or equipment to reduce the effects of enemy and friendly 
weapon systems and to enhance force effectiveness.  This activity 
physically protects the GFS against acts designed to impair its 
effectiveness and to retain the unit’s capability to perform its missions and 
tasks.  It includes employing local security and protective positioning of 
equipment.  While moving, GFS will employ a variety of movement 
techniques designed to enhance protection (e.g., the use by maritime 
forces of convoys, circuitous routing, dispersal and defensive formations, 
and zigzag plans; includes the use by naval aircraft of routing and 
formations that enhance self-protection, plus individual aircraft jinking 
techniques).  The task includes providing for passive defense in a 
nuclear/biological/ chemical (NBC) - chemical/biological/radiological 
(CBR) environment.  (JP 1, 3-0, 3-02, 3-03, 3-01.4, 3-11, 3-13, 3-15, 3-51, 
NDP 1, 4, NWP 3 Series, FMFM 13) 
Overall Weight:  5 
A robust Force Protection capability is a necessity in order to smoothly 
control and execute multiple mission areas simultaneously while ensuring 
the safety and defense of the GFS.  The ability of the GFS platform to 
protect itself is a core competency in the USN.  If the GFS was not 
capable of protecting or defending itself it would then become a liability in 
the region it is supposed to be helping.  Force Protection was weighted at a 
five due to the MEND capabilities.  Since MEND is a relatively small 
militant group with limited armament and capability they do not pose a 
significant threat to the GFS platforms.  This is consistent with the larger 
theme that GFS will be faced with at most theater security operations.  
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1.2.1.1 Force Protection In-port (Pier-side):  GFS shall be able to 
employ organic or host nation protective measures pier-side for the 
protection of the unit. This task includes protecting friendly forces 
within a designated geographic area; harbors, approaches, or 
anchorages against external threats, sabotage, subversive acts, 
accidents, theft, negligence, civil disturbance, and disasters.  (JP 3-
0, 3-10, 4-0, 4 01.5, 4-04, MCWP 3-41.1, NDP 1, NWP 3-10 Rev 
A, 3-10.3, NTTP 3-07.12) 
 Weight within Attribute:  20% 
1.2.1.2 Force Protection at Anchor:  GFS shall be able to employ 
organic or host nation protective measures while at anchor or 
moored to a buoy to protect against external threats, sabotage, 
subversive acts, accidents, theft, negligence, civil disturbance, and 
disasters.  (JP 3-0, 3-10, 4-0, 4 01.5, 4-04, MCWP 3-41.1, NDP 1, 
NWP 3-10 Rev A, 3-10.3, NTTP 3-07.12) 
 Weight within Attribute:  20% 
1.2.1.3 Active Defense:  GFS shall have a capability to defend itself 
against air, surface, and missile attack. The ability to track and 
destroy low slow flyers will be a priority capability. Self-defensive 
capabilities should be tailored to the threat environment so as not 
to require additional assets from a strike group. (NSDM - NSP 11-
4/12-6) 
 Weight within Attribute:  30% 
1.2.1.4 Passive Defense:  GFS shall employ measures to minimize 
vulnerability and/or negate the effects of WMD or NBC employed 
against the unit. 
 Weight within Attribute:  30% 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The scenario does not dictate a need for Force 
Protection while in port or at anchor.  However, we wish to evaluate each 
platform’s Force Protection capability independent of the scenario.  This 
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poses a problem in that any measure of Survivability must take into 
account the operating environment, the threat, and the mission.   
Measuring Survivability can be as complex or as simple as required; it’s a 
function of many factors and can be decomposed into unlimited 
probabilities.  For Naval vessels, we distill the various components into 
three broad categories:  susceptibility, vulnerability, and recoverability.  
Organic weapons systems, maneuverability, hull composition, ship type 
(warship vs. auxiliary ship), and threat capability (systems and training) 
was also taken into account while conducting our grading.   
 While additional small boat capability adds to force protection 
capability, we are not presuming to measure that capability in our 
modeling and simulation.  For instance, the Africa Partnership Station 
(GFS pilot program) USS Fort McHenry (LSD 43) is taking on two 25’ 
Boston Whalers and two 25’ catamaran security boats, one LCU, and two 
MIKE 8 boats.132  The range of possible uses for these craft precludes all 
but a general assumption that FTM would have an enhanced force 
protection capability. 
Value Scores: 
CG:    100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17:   100% - fully capable. 
HSV:   90% - lacks firepower of a CRUDES platform but is highly 
maneuverable. 
AS:    80% - lacks firepower of a CRUDES platform but is still  
  capable. 
LHD/FFG:   100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:   65% - the RORO is not capable for protection itself and is  
  not maneuverable; as a result the overall score is lowered. 
 
_____________________ 
132. Gejuan Sweat, email message to the authors, October 19, 2007. 
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1.2.2 Ordnance on Target (Surface Warfare):  The ability for GFS to use the 
environment, geography, disposition of forces, passive or active sensors, 
maneuvering, and coordination of weapons to damage or destroy an 
enemies capability before the enemy is in a position to harm the GFS or 
mission.133 
Overall Weight:  6 
GFS has been envisioned and defined as a platform or system of platforms 
that will operate in phase 0 environments. The reality of modern naval 
operations and cooperative maritime security within the global community 
has called for an increased vigilance and action by military ships and 
aircraft in the fight against piracy and armed robbery in various parts of 
the world.  Though intended for a different part of the continent, a 
statement by the U.N.’s International Maritime Organization "encourages 
member States whose naval vessels and military aircraft operate in 
international waters and airspace adjacent to the coast of Somalia to be 
vigilant to any incident of piracy therein and to take appropriate action to 
protect merchant shipping, in particular the transportation of humanitarian 
aid, against any such act, in line with relevant international law."134  With 
a growing trend toward active participation by surface assets against 
pirates, we believed that a ready component for force – if called upon and 
if requested by host nations – remained an essential component of GFS. 
 The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) reported that piracy and 
armed robbery attacks against ships rose 14% in the first nine months of 
2007 compared to the same period in 2006, the second consecutive 
quarterly increase in attacks, as the coastal waters off Nigeria and Somalia 
became ever more dangerous.135 
_____________________ 
133. U.S. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 & 2 Lexicon 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 3. 
134. International Maritime Organization, “Security Council urges action over piracy off the coast of 
Somalia in line with IMO Assembly resolution,” http://www.imo.org/TCD/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1347. 
135. ICC Commercial Crime Services, “Piracy attacks rise 14% as Nigerian and Somalian coasts 
become more dangerous,” http://www.icc-ccs.org/main/news.php?newsid=95. 
 132
 In keeping with the spirit of the U.N.’s statement, the USN had 
responded with an increased presence off Somalia to counter piracy and 
armed robbery attacks on distressed merchant vessels.  Recent operations 
against suspected pirates and hijackers have resulted in warning shots and 
surface engagements by USN combatants.  These engagements against 
suspected pirate vessels require robust firepower and armament.  The 
Navy’s ability to conduct surface warfare and engage enemy maritime 
targets in the world’s troubled waters remains a key war-fighting 
capability that a GFS platform must retain to remain effective in the Gulf 
of Guinea. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The capability of the platform to conduct 
surface warfare when confronted with an enemy was utilized here.  
Armament, maneuverability, as well as if the ship was designed to conduct 
this mission was taken into consideration. 
Value Scores:    
CG:  100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17: 95% - fully capable, less maneuverable. 
HSV: 90% - lacks firepower of a CRUDES platform but is highly 
maneuverable. 
AS: 80% - lacks firepower of a CRUDES platform but is still 
capable. 
LHD/FFG:  95% - fully capable, maneuverability of LHD lowers score. 
HSV/RORO:  50% - the RORO is not capable to conduct this mission and 




1.2.3 Protection of Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC):  The ability to 
conduct activities or operations to protect sea routes that connect the GFS 
with its sources of sustainment.136 
Overall Weight:  3 
A core competency for any USN combatant is the ability to protect the sea 
base’s re-supply routes. The GFS must be able to protect the SLOC in 
order to remain on station and ensure vessel access to port facilities and 
waterways, to maintain projection of assets, and ultimately protect U.S. 
national interests.  Without the ability to protect its own SLOC the on-
station time of the GFS degrades and as a result the GFS becomes 
ineffective. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The protection of SLOC for re-supply routes 
over water to the GFS in the Gulf of Guinea region is limited to deterring 
and preventing small boat attacks by pirates and militants on 
replenishment assets in the AO.  The GFS alternatives have been scored 
objectively according to their weapons systems and ability to respond in a 
timely manner to protect regional SLOC. 
Value Scores:   
CG:  100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17: 100% - fully capable. 
HSV:  100% - fully capable 
AS: 70% - slow speed, poor maneuverability, and lacks the 
firepower of a CRUDES platform. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:  70% - the RORO is not capable to conduct this mission and 
  is not maneuverable or fast; as a result the overall score is  
  lowered. 
 
_____________________ 
136. U.S. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 & 2 Lexicon 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 4. 
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1.2.4 Riverine Operations:  GFS shall have the ability to support and/or 
coordinate operations that cope with and exploit the unique characteristics 
of a riverine area, to include locating/destroying hostile forces and 
achieving/maintaining control of the riverine areas. These operations will 
suit the nature of the specific riverine area in which operations are to be 
conducted.137 
Overall Weight:  8 
In Riverine Operations we considered not only the scenario but also the 
state of the Gulf of Guinea, specifically Nigeria.  For the scenario several 
MEND fast boats that have kidnapped oil works are able to escape into the 
Niger Delta.  Having a riverine force with which the GFS is capable of 
coordinating is essential for dealing with the pirate threat.  The Niger 
Delta is an area of instability as a result of pirate activity and MEND being 
able to operate nearly unopposed. 
 Any emphasis on the need for riverine forces should be interpreted 
as a recommendation only.  For the purposes of the scenario, it should be 
assumed that a Nigerian riverine capability is the most appropriate 
response.  Alternatively, we considered that the implications of U.S. 
Riverine Forces supported by GFS are beyond the scope of our study.  
Whether or not it is directly supported by GFS, riverine units will require 
coordination from GFS during counter piracy operations, assuming her 
draft is too deep to enter the smaller Delta tributaries.  However, use of 
U.S. riverine forces may imply an escalation in conflict level beyond the 
scope of GFS regional objectives. 
Value Scoring Criteria:    For GFS to be a viable instrument in regional 
shaping and stability operations a robust Riverine force is a necessity; 
however, GFS can contribute by acting as a C3 hub for the Riverine forces 
and help keep them supplied with stores, parts, and other resources they 
_____________________ 
19. U.S. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 & 2 Lexicon 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 5. 
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may need in order to perform their mission; as a result these value scores 
are the same as those of C3. 
Value Scores: 
CG:  100% - Level 1. 
LPD-17: 100% - Level 1. 
HSV:             80%   - Level 2. 
AS:             80%   - Level 2. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - Level 1. 
HSV/RORO:  80%   - Level 2. 
Attribute Summary: Based on our scenario, the following list of required 
assets for a Special Operations/Riverine Force came from Naval Special 
Warfare Group Four (NSWG4).  These requirements are presented in 




Figure 39:  NSWG4 Recommended Capabilities138 
_____________________ 
138. SeaPower Magazine, “Surface Craft,” http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P3-1234487911.html. 
 136
 
The requirements analysts at NSWG4 were aware of the difficulty of 
employing or coordinating these assets from GFS, and acknowledged that 
it “would not be ideal for SOF forces to be embarked on a vessel just 
waiting to be called into action. There are options to consider: 
 
 MCADS drop (Maritime Craft Aerial Deployment System) 
– Special Forces and boats airdropped out of C-130 (or 
other aircraft) into Area of Operations (AO). 
 Boats deploy from Forward Operating Base (FOB) and 
rendezvous with GFS at sea. 
 Helicopters pick up boats from a nearby FOB and drop 
boats into AO. 
 GFS picks up Special Forces and equipment pier-side and 
proceeds to AO.139 
 
1.2.5 Ocean/Hydro/River Survey & Support Operations:  The ability to 
conduct and/or support surface and subsurface operations that collect, or 
enable the collection of, unique environmental conditions in support of 
real time and future operations. This capability will be inherently linked 
with NOAA, MCM, and Intel gathering assets.140 
Overall Weight:  1 
This mission area may have significant benefits for coalition, interagency, 
amphibious, and riverine operations in or near the littorals. The overall 
weight would be considerably higher if the scenario suggested prolonged 
operations in a specific region.  For our scenario, this attribute was not 
necessary to complete the assigned GFS mission. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The grading for this attribute was based on the 
_____________________ 
139. Matthew Hawkins, email message to the authors, November 1, 2007. 
140. U.S. Joint Requirements Oversight Council, Joint Capability Areas Tier 1 & 2 Lexicon 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006): 5. 
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platform’s ability to coordinate and conduct pre-landing surveys of 
planned beaches/landing sites/ports to determine ability to support 
amphibious operations with organic and embarked forces. We assumed 
that these functions could be accomplished via small boat operations.  
Additionally, the ability to embark NOAA personnel and associated gear 
for regional oceanographic studies was evaluated.  
Value Scores: 
CG:  100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17: 100% - fully capable. 
HSV:  100% - fully capable. 
AS:  100% - fully capable. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:  100% - fully capable. 
 
1.2.6 Fisheries Protection:  GFS shall employ experts in the field of fisheries 
enforcement, along with associated equipment needs, to train Gulf of 
Guinea navies, coast guards, and civil authorities in protecting their fish 
stocks.  
Overall Weight:  1 
Our scenario – with its emphasis on counter-piracy and EMIO - resulted in 
this low weight to an otherwise important maritime issue in the Gulf of 
Guinea.  Fisheries protection is not a core competency of the USN.  
Realizing that this important capability may be attained through 
cooperation with Gulf of Guinea nations and Department of Defense 
partners, the GFS platform would require dedicated fisheries officers 
onboard to aid in fisheries regime enforcement, regulation, and protection. 
1.2.6.1 Fishing Regimes:  GFS shall employ experts in the field of 
articulating enforceable laws with regard to illegal fishing.  
 Weight within Attribute:  100% 
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Value Scoring Criteria:  Platforms were scored on the ability to conduct 
or support patrolling and interception of vessels for possible boarding, 
inspection and search or seizure in order to enforce applicable foreign 
fisheries laws from the GFS platform. This ability is inherently linked with 
the ability to leverage USCG and NOAA capabilities and expertise. 
Value Scores: 
CG:  100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17: 100% - fully capable. 
HSV:  100% - fully capable. 
AS:  100% - fully capable. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:  100% - fully capable. 
 
1.3.X  Counter Piracy encompasses operations and campaigns to halt 
transnational crime, and is characterized by directed engagement of non-
compliant or hostile vessels.  Maritime piracy, according to the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 1982, consists 
of any criminal acts of violence, detention, or depredation committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship (or aircraft) 
that are directed on the high seas against another ship, aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board a ship (or aircraft).  Piracy can also be 
committed against a ship, aircraft, persons, or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State.   
 The mission area of Counter Piracy is indirectly linked to the 
mission areas of HA/DR and Interagency/NGO Coordination, because 
actions that fall under those areas of responsibility inherently aid in 
deterring criminal activity in host nations at a fundamental level.  From a 
military-to-military perspective, the capabilities and attributes required to 
support Counter Piracy overlap with those of EMIO, MSOC, and Foreign 
Navy Capability Building, hence the absence of attributes with the 1.3 
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prefix.  For further delineation, one should refer to the Functional Area 
Analysis section. 
 
1.4.1 Training Ability:  The ability to conduct training in any of the Peacetime 
Engagement mission areas and capabilities by embarked training teams or 
the same personnel assigned to those mission areas. 
Overall Weight:  6 
In the Gulf of Guinea, our country team identified the needs of Cameroon, 
Equatorial Guinea, and Nigeria (among others) for Coast Guard, Navy, 
and/or maritime police training for the purposes of maritime security, 
countering illegal trafficking and piracy, and border dispute resolution. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The grading criteria for a GFS platform was 
based on its ability to embark, transport, berth, and sustain various training 
teams. These training teams can either be Department of Defense, USCG, 
NOAA, or various NGO teams. 
Value Scores: 
CG:  100% - fully capable. 
LPD-17: 100% - fully capable. 
HSV:  100% - fully capable. 
AS:  100% - fully capable. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:  100% - fully capable. 
 
1.4.2 Training Capacity:  GFS shall provide the materials and have (or have 
the ability to establish) the physical space needed to conduct training in 
any of the Peacetime Engagement mission areas and capabilities. 
Overall Weight:  4 
The relatively high weighting of this attribute is inherently linked with the 
ability of the GFS to conduct mil-to-mil training of foreign navies and 
coast guards.  A platform’s capacity to conduct training enhances the 
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overall training ability of the GFS.  Increased training capacity leads to 
more productive and valuable training. 
Value Scoring Criteria:  The criterion for a GFS platform to conduct 
training is based on its physical capacity to conduct training. This includes 
the platform’s classroom space and capacity to carry additional training 
aids and materiel. 
Value Scores: 
CG:  80% - with only the crew’s mess, wardroom, and the  
  Library Resource Center (LRC) for training space, all of  
  which are limited in size and/or dedication to other   
  commitments such as meals, and mandatory briefs. 
LPD-17: 100% - fully capable. 
HSV:  100% - fully capable. 
AS:  100% - fully capable. 
LHD/FFG:  100% - fully capable. 
HSV/RORO:  100% - fully capable. 
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c. Platform Performance Calculations 
  Figure 40 encapsulates the weights and scores of each platform with 
regards to the attributes of Peacetime Engagement.  As can be seen in the final summary 
role, the more traditional grey-hull combinations outperform the HSV, AS, and 




  Platforms         Missions     
Attributes Weight CG LPD-17 HSV AS 
LHD/FF
G 
HSV/RORO 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
                
EMI
O 
MSOC CP FNCB 




100.00% 100.00% 80.00% 80.00% 100.00% 80.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 8 8.79% 8.79% 7.03% 7.03% 8.79% 7.03%         
1.0.2  Regional Maritime
Situational Awareness (RMSA) 
Value 
Score: 
96.67% 76.67% 93.33% 40.00% 91.67% 93.33% x x x x 
Weighted: 8 8.50% 6.74% 8.21% 3.52% 8.06% 8.21%         




100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 40.00% 80.00% 100.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 7 7.69% 7.69% 7.69% 3.08% 6.15% 7.69%         
1.1.2  Visit, Board, Search,
Seizure (VBSS) Team Support 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% x   x x 
Weighted: 8 8.79% 8.79% 8.79% 8.79% 8.79% 8.79%         




100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% x   x   
Weighted: 5 5.49% 5.49% 5.49% 5.49% 5.49% 5.49%         
1.1.4  Equipment Storage 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 60.00% 90.00% 75.00% x   x   
Weighted: 4 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 2.64% 3.96% 3.30%         




50.00% 100.00% 50.00% 60.00% 100.00% 50.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 4 2.20% 4.40% 2.20% 2.64% 4.40% 2.20%         
1.1.6  Detainee Coordination 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% x   x x 
Weighted: 6 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59%         
1.1.7  Helicopter Operations 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 80.00% 80.00% 0.00% 100.00% 80.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 7 7.69% 6.15% 6.15% 0.00% 7.69% 6.15%         
1.2.1  Force Protection 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 90.00% 80.00% 100.00% 65.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 5 5.49% 5.49% 4.95% 4.40% 5.49% 3.57%         
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1.2.2  Ordnance on Target
(Surface Warfare)  
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 95.00% 90.00% 80.00% 95.00% 50.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 6 6.59% 6.26% 5.93% 5.27% 6.26% 3.30%         
1.2.3  Protection of SLOCs  
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 70.00% 100.00% 70.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 3 3.30% 3.30% 3.30% 2.31% 3.30% 2.31%         
1.2.4  Riverine Operations 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 80.00% 80.00% 100.00% 80.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 8 8.79% 8.79% 7.03% 7.03% 8.79% 7.03%         
1.2.5  Ocean/Hydro/River
Survey & Support Operations  
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   x   x 
Weighted: 1 1.10% 1.10% 1.10% 1.10% 1.10% 1.10%         
1.2.6  Fisheries Protection 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   x   x 
Weighted: 1 1.10% 1.10% 1.10% 1.10% 1.10% 1.10%         
1.4.1  Training Ability 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   x x x 
Weighted: 6 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59% 6.59%         
1.4.2  Training Capacity 
Value 
Score: 
80.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   x x x 
Weighted: 4 3.52% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40% 4.40%         
    CG LPD-17 HSV AS 
LHD/FF
G 
HSV/RORO     
Total Weighted Score: 91 96.63% 96.08% 90.95% 71.98% 96.96% 84.85%     
Figure 40:  P.E. Total Value Calculations and Results 
  
d. Sensitivity Analysis of Key Attributes 
  It can be seen from each of the following sensitivity charts that by 
changing the weights of key attributes (those with high weights or a wide range of scores 
amongst alternatives), the affect on the total score of each alternative is small.  For 
instance, RMSA does not necessarily play a key role in determining the best alternative, 
as it is only one of many attributes, despite its high weighting in our scenario.  Clearly, 
traditional “grey hull” platforms outperformed their non-traditional counterparts, with the 
CG, LPD, and LHD/FFG scoring higher due primarily to their modern and expansive 
sensor systems and helicopter assets.  However, there is a point of indifference – where 
the total score for the LPD rises to cross over that of the CG.  The most dramatic change 
occurs in the AS score, but even that is not enough to raise its position from the bottom of 




Figure 41:  Sensitivity Analysis for RMSA 
 
 




Figure 43:  Sensitivity Analysis for Helicopter Operations 
 
 
Figure 44:  Sensitivity Analysis for Force Protection 
  
 Another consideration we needed to address was the uncertainty in our 
scoring process.  The most prevalent sources of error include differences within ship 
classes, overlap in some attributes (i.e. surge medical capability vs. flexible space for 
equipment storage), and broad measurement error when some degree of subjectivity was 
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involved.  For these reasons we estimated an uncertainty in our results between 5% and 
10%.  We ascribe this margin of error to the inherent difficulty in creating non-linear 
quantitative value functions based on qualitative criteria for attributes that are capability-
based. 
 To further challenge the uncertainty in our analysis, we looked at a 
completely different scenario – in essence, we conducted a sensitivity analysis on the 
scenario-based weight of our attributes.  One of our key assumptions in the Peacetime 
Engagement Mission area is that the GFS will be conducting or coordinating EMIO and 
Riverine Operations.  To challenge that assumption we now assumed that the GFS is 
operating in an environment with increased stability, where Counter Piracy and Riverine 
Operations are no longer vital or viable missions.  In this new scenario, Training, 
Fisheries Enforcement and Survey & Support Operations are weighted as the most 
important attributes, with a decreased emphasis on a majority of the key attributes from 
our previous scenario.  The results of this new scenario weighting showed us that while 
the gap between the best and worst alternatives narrowed slightly, the same system 
alternatives (CG, LPD-17, and LHD/FFG) maintained their place as our best options (see 




  Platforms         Missions     
Attributes Weight CG LPD-17 HSV AS LHD/FFG HSV/RORO 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
                EMIO MSOC CP FNCB




100.00% 100.00% 80.00% 80.00% 100.00% 80.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 1 1.56% 1.56% 1.25% 1.25% 1.56% 1.25%         





96.67% 76.67% 93.33% 40.00% 91.67% 93.33% x x x x 
Weighted: 1 1.51% 1.20% 1.46% 0.63% 1.43% 1.46%         




100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 40.00% 80.00% 100.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 4 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 2.50% 5.00% 6.25%         





100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% x   x x 
Weighted: 4 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 6.25%         
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100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% x   x   
Weighted: 1 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56%         
1.1.4  Equipment Storage 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 60.00% 90.00% 75.00% x   x   
Weighted: 4 6.25% 6.25% 6.25% 3.75% 5.63% 4.69%         




50.00% 100.00% 50.00% 60.00% 100.00% 50.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 4 3.13% 6.25% 3.13% 3.75% 6.25% 3.13%         
1.1.6  Detainee Coordination 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% x   x x 
Weighted: 1 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.56%         
1.1.7  Helicopter Operations 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 80.00% 80.00% 0.00% 100.00% 80.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 4 6.25% 5.00% 5.00% 0.00% 6.25% 5.00%         
1.2.1  Force Protection 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 90.00% 80.00% 100.00% 65.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 3 4.69% 4.69% 4.22% 3.75% 4.69% 3.05%         
1.2.2  Ordnance on Target
(Surface Warfare)  
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 95.00% 90.00% 80.00% 95.00% 50.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 1 1.56% 1.48% 1.41% 1.25% 1.48% 0.78%         
1.2.3  Protection of SLOCs  
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 70.00% 100.00% 70.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 1 1.56% 1.56% 1.56% 1.09% 1.56% 1.09%         
1.2.4  Riverine Operations 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 80.00% 80.00% 100.00% 80.00% x x x x 
Weighted: 1 1.56% 1.56% 1.25% 1.25% 1.56% 1.25%         
1.2.5  Ocean/Hydro/River
Survey & Support Operations 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   x   x 
Weighted: 8 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50%         
1.2.6  Fisheries Protection 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   x   x 
Weighted: 8 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50% 12.50%         
1.4.1  Training Ability 
Value 
Score: 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   x x x 
Weighted: 9 14.06% 14.06% 14.06% 14.06% 14.06% 14.06%         
1.4.2  Training Capacity 
Value 
Score: 
80.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%   x x x 
Weighted: 9 11.25% 14.06% 14.06% 14.06% 14.06% 14.06%         
    CG LPD-17 HSV AS LHD/FFG HSV/RORO     
Total Weighted Score: 64 94.01% 98.31% 94.27% 81.72% 97.92% 90.44%     
Figure 45:  P.E. Total Value Calculations and Results Based on Alternate Data 
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3. Narrative Summary of Ship Scores and Comments on Results 
 Incorporating our original scenario-based weighting into each platform’s attribute 
score gave us a total weighted score for each system alternative: 
 
 
Figure 46:  Platform Alternative's Result in P.E. 
 
From these results we can see that the CG, LPD-17, and LHD/FFG combination’s scores 
were extremely similar given the estimated uncertainty in these results.  The other system 
alternatives’ scores showed them to perform below these three options, with the AS 
scoring significantly behind the other system alternatives.  This was significant by 
showing that in the geopolitical context of the Gulf of Guinea there were several system 
alternatives that were essentially equally capable of conducting the Peacetime 
Engagement mission.  The sensitivity analysis that we conducted – including our 
alternative scenario – yielded some equally interesting and powerful results.  For our 
mission area the CG, LPD-17, and LHD/FFG combo scored similarly for both scenarios 
and remained our best options throughout the sensitivity analysis.  Given the defined 
need for GFS and our evaluation of the selected platforms and platform combinations, the 
CG, LPD-17, and LHD/FFG alternatives are our lead choices for executing the Peacetime 
Engagement mission of the Global Fleet Station. 
 
D. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE / DISASTER RELIEF FNA 
  
1. Scenario Overview 
A list of attributes and measures of effectiveness was developed for GFS HA/DR 
missions.  As subject matter experts in HA/DR based on our studies, we prioritized each 
attribute by weighting them – or determining their relative importance to the HA/DR 
mission.  Each platform was scored for it’s effectiveness in each attribute with respect to 
this study’s HA/DR scenario. 
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In developing the HA/DR scenario, background research was conducted to 
identify specific climate and physical characteristics for the Gulf of Guinea region using 
the EM-DAT database website.141  For the 13 Gulf of Guinea countries, disaster data 
from 2002 to 2007 was compiled to better understand the various types of natural 
disasters that occur in the region.  Figure 47 summarizes our findings: 
 
 
Figure 47:  Natural Occurrences in Gulf of Guinea, 2002-2007 
 
As shown, the most common natural disasters for this region include epidemics and 
floods.  The epidemic scenario was not chosen, however, as this example of an act of 
nature often is characterized as an enduring issue – not something requiring an immediate 
response.  For example, tackling the HIV/AIDS epidemic would be better suited to the 
deliberate and sustained response offered under our NGO & Interagency mission.   We 
selected a flooding scenario due to the immediate response required with such a disaster, 
to evaluate the GFS with a demanding mission set, and because of the frequency with 
which this type of disaster occurs in the region. 
 
a. Scenario Context 
_____________________ 
141 EM-DAT: the International Disaster Database, http://www.em-dat.net. 
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  The following scenario is hypothetical, but based on actual past 
occurrences in the region; it is presented in the context of “current day” in the year 2012: 
 
 Situation:  In recent weeks, northern Ghana and Ashanti have experienced 
unusually vast amounts of rainfall resulting in severe flooding throughout 
the region.   
 Impact:  The ramifications of this flooding have left 250,000 Ashanti 
people affected, 250 killed and 45,000 homeless.  Many of the homeless 
have relocated to the coastal region to escape the floods, creating refugee 
and security concerns in the port cities.  Approximately 40 percent of 
urban and 70 percent of rural potable water resources have been 
contaminated and an outbreak of cholera and/or malaria is imminent 
throughout the region.   
 Request:  Ghana’s President and Ashanti’s Regional Minister have 
requested emergency assistance from the United States.   
 Response:  Global Fleet Station is conducting operations in the vicinity of 
the Gulf of Guinea and has been tasked by AFRICOM to provide relief in 
response to this disaster. 
 
 
Figure 48:  Map of Ghana 
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b. Scenario Considerations and Assumptions 
 To generate mission requirements to compare GFS alternatives, we roll-
played an AFRICOM staff, and considered the following factors – based on a Navy 
tactical memorandum - before deciding how to employ GFS for this particular HA/DR 
scenario142: 
 
 Geography/topography of the region 
 Current meteorological conditions in the region 
 Oceanography/hydrographic nature of the region 
 Cultures affected in the region 
 Status of existing communication capabilities in the region 
 Available host nation support and potential restrictions (physical, political, 
etc) 
 
 The geography of Northern Ghana and Ashanti is primarily a flat plain 
region.  The region’s populated areas can be reached by one main road from Accra to 
Kumasi, but airlifts are normally required to transport large quantities of supplies into the 
area.  The current meteorological conditions were assumed to be stable and all rains that 
caused the flooding have subsided.  GFS will base its operation in the vicinity of the port 
city of Tema.  Vessels can moor pier-side in Tema; however, AFRICOM has ordered the 
ship to remain at anchorage within the harbor until sufficient security is provided for the 
ship go pier-side (AFRICOM is concerned that the host nation may not have enough 
personnel to prevent the disaster victims from rioting or rushing the ship for supplies and 
other goods).  All cultural information available regarding the Ghana and Ashanti 
societies was disseminated to embarked GFS personnel by FAOs and NGOs already 
established locally.  The region’s communications infrastructure is assumed to be 
disabled, and requires extensive assistance.  AFRICOM has coordinated with the State 
Department to acquire access to all air space, and gained permission and assurances for 
uninhibited ground transportation. 
_____________________ 
142. U.S. Department of the Navy, U.S. Naval Warfare Development Command TACMEMO 3-07.6-05 
Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief Operations Planning (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005). 
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  The staff determined that GFS will provide initial command and control 
(C2) of the operations, and will be prepared to maintain that role for an indefinite period 
of time.  It will also coordinate the transport of supplies and equipment between different 
shore locations. GFS must be ready to incorporate and utilize available international 
assets that are either currently located in, or enroute to, the effected area.  Assuming that 
GFS will be the first U.S. military asset on scene, it will have to sustain C2 and logistical 
operations for 30 days.  This expectation is based on an assumption that other maritime 
assets will be deployed to support any relief beyond that period. 
 
2. Weighting and Scoring of HA/DR Attributes 
 
a. Overview of Approach 
 The attributes were generated from the four mid-level functions 
comprising the HA/DR mission area: Infrastructure, Medical Assistance, Logistics, and 
Communications.  For the HA/DR mission, we determined the significance of our 
attributes based on the overall importance of HA/DR functions, regardless of scenario.  
However, the scoring of each alternative platform was based on consideration of the 
scenario.  Some attributes contained several sub-attributes, each of whose scores factored 
into a score for each platform in each attribute.  These calculations then resulted in a total 
value performance score for each alternative for each function, and ultimately for the 
HA/DR mission as a whole. 
 
b. Attribute Outcomes 
  The weighting and scoring results of our HA/DR functions and attributes 
follow. 
 
 2.1 Infrastructure - Joint Publication, 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary 
of Military and Associated Terms defines infrastructure as “all building and 
permanent installations necessary for the support, redeployment, and military 
forces operations (e.g., barracks, headquarters, airfields, communications, 
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facilities, stores, port installations, and maintenance stations.)”143  There are two 
main attributes of infrastructure, resource and physical networking, which will 
provide Global Fleet Station the ability to maintain a sustainable presence in 
regions requiring humanitarian assistance.  Figure 49 depicts platform 
characteristics important to examining Infrastructure attributes. 
 
 
Figure 49:  Summary of Platform Characteristics for Analysis of Infrastructure 
 
2.1.1 Resource Network - Resource networks are personnel, organizations, 
materiel, and equipment essential in the deployment and distribution of the 
physical network.144 
Overall Weight: 8 
The establishment of civil affairs and NGO coordination are critical to HA/DR; 
hence without either it is difficult to move forward with construction and 
restoration operations.  A functional civil-military relationship provides the 
_____________________ 
143 U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication (JP) 1-02 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): 260. 
144 U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-35 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): III-8, III-9. 
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information requests, support and sustainment required to accomplish a pre-
determined common goals, set forth prior to the initiation of physical networking. 
Scoring Criteria:  There are two main attributes in employing a successful 
resource network:  1) the ability to provide command and control, and 2) and the 
ability to provide the personnel necessary for HA/DR operations.  The following 
are the sub-attribute considerations for scoring this attribute: 
2.1.1.1 Command and Control 
2.1.1.1.1  Provide support staff: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to advise the commander on 
all matters. 
2.1.1.1.2  Provide interagency coordination: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to coordinate all civil 
affairs with the appropriate US agencies.  
2.1.1.1.3  Coordinate with NGOs: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to coordinate civil affairs 
with appropriate NGOs. 
2.1.1.2 Personnel 
2.1.1.2.1  Provide personnel and personnel support: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to provide 
support to units and individual service members, as 
well as providing units with trained, healthy, fit 
personnel. 
2.1.1.2.1  Distribute personnel and support: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide support and 
replacements to military units. 
 Each of the sub-attributes is considered to be equally important. 
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CG: score of 80%.  The full complement capacity of a cruiser is 24 officers and 
358 enlisted crew, with space available for an additional 23 personnel.145  There 
is not enough available space to embark the non-governmental organizational 
representatives or additional military personnel to coordinate and support the full 
capacity of the operation; however, the officers and crew can provide advice to 
the commander and limited civil affairs support to the NGOs.  The personnel 
limitations prevent the support and replacement of personnel ashore participating 
in relief efforts.  The score of 80% reflects the CG’s capability to support C2 
operations due to the superb C2 architecture that is designed for area air defense 
coordination and considered the best out of all the platform alternatives; however, 
due to its inability to provide spaces for additional personnel it did not score as 
well as either the LPD or LHD. 
LPD: score of 85%. This platform has a crew of 360 with 34 additional spaces, 
and embarkation space of 720.  LPD-17 is capable of advising the commander 
and supporting civil affairs and coordinating with NGOs through the availability 
of ship’s company and those embarked, as well as supporting and replacing 
personnel ashore.  There are no flag-level staff facilities onboard which are not 
essential to mission accomplishment, but would provide a workspace for NGO 
personnel to utilize.  The score of 85% is slightly higher than the CG’s score due 
to LPD-17s ability to embark additional personnel for HA/DR operations.  Its C2 
capability is not as robust as the CG’s, but is sufficient to conduct HA/DR 
operations. 
HSV: score of 90%.  This platform has a crew complement of 42 and is capable 
of transporting 250 additional personnel to support interagency coordination, civil 
affairs and personnel distribution and replacement.  HSV is also able to advise the 
commander on all matters utilizing the communications and combat systems 
_____________________ 







suites.  The only drawback to utilizing this platform is that the crew cannot 
supplement personnel ashore; however this is overcome by the number of 
personnel that can embark - hence a score of 90%.  Overall, the HSV is able to 
accomplish a majority of the attribute measures for resource networks. 
AS: score of 75%.  A submarine tender has a crew of more than 1,400 and is 
comprised of specialized technicians and repair personnel to support the primary 
mission.  This platform can provide support staff to the commander, but due to 
communications and intelligence gathering limitations is not recommended to use 
this platform as a base of operations.  The AS crew is highly specialized, making 
it difficult to provide support and replacement of personnel ashore or provide 
optimal support in regions that do not have modern hotel services, i.e. electricity, 
water, telephones, etc.  Even with the personnel complement, it does not have a 
strong enough C2 capability to support HA/DR operations, therefore it was only 
given a score of 75%. 
LHD/FFG: score of 90%. The LHD’s large crew also makes it a viable option to 
supplement and sustain the ashore presence at the relief location.  A FFG has a 
crew of 200 and no available space for additional personnel, thus, this platform 
provides little support to civil affairs and NGO coordination. When deploying a 
FFG with a LHD the C2 capability improves by a minimal amount, and the FFG 
does not provide any extra available spaces for additional personnel therefore a 
score of 90% was given. 
HSV/RORO: score of 90%.  The RORO requires a crew of 23 non-military 
personnel, and the additional 100 embarked personnel the ability to provide 
support of civil affairs and coordination with NGOs.  However; this platform is 
only able to provide minimal advice to the commander and will rely heavily on 
HSV for these matters.  Combining the RORO with the HSV does not add enough 
C2 improvement to improve the score of the HSV. 
Attribute Summary: The HSV, LHD/FFG, and HSV/ RORO were the best 
platforms for the resource network attributes.  The HSV’s ability to embark 
additional personnel makes it a strong alternative.   Both of the combination 
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platforms have unique characteristics that fully meet the requirements of resource 
networks. 
 
2.1.2 Physical Network - The type, number and condition of facilities, 
transportation networks, real estate, and modes of transportation available in the 
region of activity characterize physical networks.  The transportation network is 
the most vital in the physical infrastructure of a country requiring humanitarian 
assistance.  If there are modernized and/or undamaged facilities available, 
insertion of military assistance, government and non-government agencies, and 
logistics support will be conducted more expediently and efficiently.  The 
combatant command will establish an engineering support plan (ESP) to identify 
facilities, materiel and civil engineering capabilities in support of military 
forces.146 
Overall Weight: 7 
Physical networking is very important; however, without resource networking, it 
is difficult to establish and maintain.  Civil engineering and transportation support 
and establishment are the core of the infrastructure function; however, without a 
functional resource network this attribute is difficult to establish. 
Scoring Criteria:  There are two main attributes in employing a successful 
physical network.  They are the platform’s ability to provide elements to construct 
facilities, and the capability to transport necessary materials or equipment for 
HA/DR operations.  The following are the sub-attribute considerations when 
scoring the attributes: 
2.1.2.1 Facilities 
2.1.2.1.1  Perform civil-military engineering support: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to repair and 
construct facilities and lines of communications, 
_____________________ 
146. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, 
Joint Publication (JP) 3-35 (Washington, DC: GPO, 2007): III-7, III-9. 
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and provide water, utilities, and other related 
infrastructure. 
2.1.2.1.2  Perform construction engineering services: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to construct or 
renovate temporary and/or permanent facilities. 
2.1.2.1.3  Provide or obtain construction material: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to acquire or 
obtain material needed to construct or repair 
facilities or lines of communication. 
2.1.2.1.4  Perform area restoration: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to repair area facilities 
damaged by natural disaster or other causes. 
2.1.2.2 Transportation 
2.1.2.2.1  Perform LOC sustainment: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to maintain land, water and 
air routes that connect an operating military force 
with one or more bases of operations and along 
which supplies and reinforcements move. 
2.1.2.2.2  Provide humanitarian support: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide engineering 
and construction support and repair for 
humanitarian assistance to include repair of local 
facilities and distribution of relief supplies. 
CG: score of 40%.  Ticonderoga Class Cruisers are not able to provide the civil-
military engineering support to successfully conduct HA/DR operations.  This 
platform’s inability to transport construction equipment and supplies due to 
available space limitations, in addition to trained personnel, prevents the 
establishment of physical networking in support of the infrastructure function.  
The score of 40% represents that the CG has some ability to transport materials 
once on-scene through the use of its helicopter assets, but has a deficiency in 
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delivering the materials and personnel to the region in order to establish necessary 
facilities in support of HA/DR operations. 
LPD: score of 85%.  San Antonio Class LPDs have the ability to transport 2 
LCACs, and to accommodate 2 CH-46E Sea Knights, in addition to a 24,000 
square foot vehicle space and 34,000 cubic foot of cargo space.147  These 
capabilities, along with personnel embarkation, allow this platform to support the 
civil-military engineering measures required by the physical networking attribute.  
A score 85% was awarded based on the platform’s available transportation assets 
and its cargo storage capacity. 
HSV: score of 90%.  HSV has a 4,000 square foot flight deck and hangar capable 
of accommodating a SH-60B Seahawk helicopter which provides a means to 
transport cargo and personnel to relief sites.  In addition to the vertical 
cargo/personnel transfer capabilities, HSV has the ability to launch/recover small 
craft or unmanned vehicles up to 13-tons underway, and transfer as much as 11-
tons of cargo from the flight deck to adjacent ships or pier-side utilizing the 
shipboard crane.148  These options allow for better on-load/off-load management 
of equipment, supplies and personnel essential to the rapid establishment of the 
physical network.  HSV has a cargo capacity of 680 tons (comparable to 17 C-17 
aircraft) and a draft of approximately 12 feet (comparable to a Cyclone-class 
patrol craft).149  This platform meets the requirements to store, transport, provide 
and sustain construction equipment, personnel, and supplies to establish facilities, 
as well as routes and modes of transportation.  A score of 90% was given because 
the platforms transportation assets do not allow for maximum flow of equipment 
_____________________ 






148. Harold Kennedy’ “Navy’s High Speed Vessel Aids Relief Effort,” NationalDefenseMagazine, 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Nov/Navys_High.htm. 
149. Bobby Northnagle, “Swift Delivery Showcases Versatility,”Navy.mil, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=24698. 
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and supplies from the sea (scenario has the GFS initially anchored).  Once pier 
side this score would improve to 100%. 
AS: score of 60%.  Submarine tenders are able to provide civil-military 
engineering support to the HA/DR operation through the use of diversified 
facilities and cargo capacity.  A helicopter platform is available; however it is not 
possible to embark aviation assets onboard, making it difficult to transport 
equipment and supplies without being pier-side or having a helicopter available 
ashore or on another vessel.  Even with the amount of storage space available, the 
lack of transportation assets affected the overall scoring of the AS. 
LHD/FFG: score of 95%.  A LHD has the capability to transport 3 LCACs and 
multiple combinations of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft.  The aviation 
detachment for this thesis is 12 CH-46E Sea Knights and 9 CH-53E Super 
Stallion.  The Super Stallion has a personnel capacity of 55 and external cargo 
capacity of 36,000 pounds.150  In addition to the air assets onboard the LHD, an 
FFG is able to embark two SH-60B Seahawk helicopters. A frigate does not 
provide adequate cargo space; however the LHD has 125,000 cubic foot cargo 
capability and an additional 20,000 square foot for vehicle storage.  The civil-
engineering materials and equipment requirements can be stored and transported 
onboard, as well as additional HA/DR cargo.  This combination makes it possible 
to accomplish all the measures set forth by the physical networking attribute.  The 
LHD and FFG platforms are able to establish and sustain facilities, as well as 
provide and maintain routes and modes of transportation utilizing the embarked 
assets. 
HSV/RORO: score of 95%.  As stated before, the HSV is capable of fulfilling 
the physical network attribute.  For example, the 1ST LT HARRY L MARTIN, is 
capable of providing 168,547 square feet of cargo space in addition to the HSV.  
_____________________ 







Although this platform is unable to embark aircraft, there is a helicopter platform 
available for vertical cargo/personnel transport.  As with the HSV, the RORO is 
able to provide civil-military engineering support to conduct HA/DR 
operations.151  This combination received a score of 95% because the extra 
capacity that the RORO brings however, the RORO does not have the necessary 
transportation assets.  Again the scenario starts at sea, but once the platforms can 
go pier-side this number will increase to 100%. 
Attribute Summary: The LHD/FFG and HSV/ RORO were the best platforms 
for the physical network attributes.  Both of the combination platforms have 
enough cargo space to support the attributes of physical networks. 
 
2.2 Medical Assistance - To fully understand and compare the GFS alternatives’ medical 
capabilities it is important to first understand the echelons (or levels) of medical 
care that military assets are classified by.  Today’s military medical system 
incorporates five echelons (Figure 50) of care that begin with the wounding, 
injury or illness and extend through the eventual evacuation and treatment in the 
continental United States (CONUS) 152.  Each succeeding echelon builds upon the 
abilities of preceding levels by adding a new increment of treatment capability.  
Within a theater of operations, the first four echelons of medical support are 
characterized not only by increasing levels of medical sophistication but also by 
distance and access to evacuation assets. 
_____________________ 
151. GlobalSecurity.org, “TAK 3015 1st Lt Harry L. Martin, Maritime Pre-positioning Force 
(Enhanced) MPF(E),” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/tak-3015-specs.htm. 
 
152. Lois M. Davis, Susan D. Hosek, Michael G. Tate, Mark Perry, Gerard Hepler, Paul Steinberg, 
“Army Medical Support for Peace Operations and Humanitarian Assistance,” RAND Monograph/Reports 
(1996): 183. 
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Echelons of Medical Care
Echelon I:  Immediate lifesaving measures, disease and non-battle injury 
prevention, combat stress control preventive measures, casualty 
collection, evacuation from supported units to supporting medical 
treatment, treatment provided by designated individuals or 
treatment squad.
Echelon II:  Care is administered by a team of physicians or physician 
assistants, supported by appropriate medical technical or nursing 
staff.
Echelon III:  Care administered requires clinical capabilities normally found in a 
medical treatment facility.
Echelon IV:  Care is not only a surgical capability as provided in Echelon III, but 
also further definitive therapy for patients in the recovery phase.
Echelon V:  Care is convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative and is normally 
provided by military, Department of Veterans Affairs, or civilian 
hospitals in CONUS.
 
Figure 50:  Echelons of Military Medical Care 
 
First echelon care is the first medical care a soldier receives and begins at 
the non-medical unit level, incorporating self-aid, buddy-aid, on-site medic or 
corpsman assistance.  Care focuses upon casualty examination, lifesaving 
measures (airway, bleeding, shock), and preparation for further evacuation.  
Treatment examples include surgical airway restoration, intravenous (IV) 
administration of-fluids, use of antibiotics, and application of bandages and 
splints.  A typical first echelon medical facility would be a Marine Corps battalion 
aid station or a Navy surface combatant (i.e. Frigate, Destroyer, or Cruiser). 
Second echelon care is division-level health service support and is 
provided at a medical facility by a team of physicians and supporting technical 
staff.  It always includes the ability to perform resuscitation and stabilization and 
may include surgery, basic laboratory, pharmacy, radiology, and dental 
capabilities as well.  Often, second echelon units are able to hold patients for up to 
72 hours and may be able to administer blood transfusions.  Care focuses upon 
emergency procedures to prevent probable death or loss of limb or body 
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functions; however, treatment does not exceed measures dictated by immediate 
need.  Typical second echelon facilities are Marine Corps medical companies 
and/or large deck Navy surface combatants (i.e. Aircraft Carrier or Amphibious 
Assault Ship). 
Third echelon care facilities are the first places capable of providing in-
patient medical care.  Third echelon care is corps-level health service support and 
includes the ability to hold patients for extended periods of time.  These facilities 
provide the first step toward restoration of functional health and always include 
the ability to perform preoperative diagnostic procedures, intensive surgical 
preparation, general anesthesia, and postoperative care.  Typical third echelon 
facilities are the deployable medical system hospitals used by all services and 
Navy’s hospital ships (i.e. USNS COMFORT and USNS MERCY). 
Fourth echelon care is usually provided at a fixed medical treatment 
facility located outside the operating area, but probably within the theater of 
operations.  Here, patients receive further treatment to stabilize them for their 
evacuation to CONUS.  Fourth echelon hospitals are staffed and equipped to 
provide definitive, rehabilitative care to return casualties to duty.  These medical 
treatment facilities are the final in-theater hospitals. 
Fifth echelon care is also provided by fixed medical treatment facilities.  
Fifth echelon hospitals are located within the continental United States and are 
staffed and equipped to provide convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative 
services in addition to definitive and specialized medical care.  This is the most 
definitive care provided to all categories of patients in CONUS and OCONUS 
military personnel. 
The following is a brief overview of the medical capabilities of the 
platforms evaluated for this functional needs analysis.  These medical 
characteristics and capabilities provide the foundation for which each platform 
was graded in the context of the specific HA/DR scenario. 
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Figure 51:  LHD and LPD-17 Medical Capabilities 
 
LHDs have the largest medical capability of any amphibious ship 
currently in use.  The medical manning and facilities available (Figure 51) on a 
LHD enable it to provide an effective, but limited, amount of short-term (less than 
30 days) medical assistance in response to HA/DR disaster.  A LHD is classified 
as an echelon II asset. 
 LPDs have the medical facilities to provide an adequate amount of short-
term medical assistance, however, medical manpower limitations would likely 
cause it to be overwhelmed by the immediate medical requirements in a HA/DR 
environment (Figure 51).  A LPD-17 is classified as an echelon II asset. 
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Figure 52:  CG and FFG Medical Capabilities 
 
CGs do not have the medical manning or facilities (Figure 52) to provide 
medical assistance in a HA/DR disaster.  The independent duty corpsman (IDC) 
and junior hospital corps assigned to this platform could provide some minor 
medical support to a limited number of evacuees; however, major injuries would 
require medical evacuation to more robust facilities.  A CG is classified as an 
echelon I asset. 
FFGs do not have the medical manning or facilities (Figure 52) to provide 
medical assistance in a HA/DR disaster.  Here again, the independent duty 
corpsman (IDC) and junior hospital corps assigned to this platform could provide 
some minor medical support to a limited number of evacuees; however, major 
injuries would require medical evacuation to more robust facilities.  A FFG is 




Figure 53:  AS and HSV Medical Capabilities 
 
The AS has the medical manning and facilities (Figure 53) to provide an 
effective, but limited, amount of short-term medical assistance in response to 
HA/DR disaster.  An AS is classified as an echelon II asset. 
HSVs do not have the medical manning or facilities (Figure 53) to provide 
medical assistance in a HA/DR disaster.  The independent duty corpsman (IDC) 
and junior hospital corps assigned to this platform could provide some minor 
medical support to a limited number of evacuees; however, major injuries would 
require medical evacuation to more robust facilities.  A HSV is classified as an 




Figure 54:  RORO Medical Capabilities 
 
MPF(E) ships do not have the medical manning or facilities (Figure 54) to 
provide medical assistance in a HA/DR disaster.  The chief mate or second mate 
assigned to this platform is the designated medical representative and typically 
only has a limited amount of medical training (i.e. Emergency Medical 
Technician).  Given this minimal training, this individual would only be capable 
of providing minor medical support to a limited number of evacuees.  Major 
injuries would require medical evacuation to more robust facilities.  A MPF(E) is 
classified as an echelon I asset. 
 
2.2.1 Health Services - Services designed to preserve, promote, improve, 
conserve, and restore the medical and physical well being of both the responding 
forces and affected population.  This attribute includes providing emergency and 
routine dental, medical, preventive, and veterinarian care. 
Overall Weight: 6 
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A weighting of 6 indicates that the capability of HA/DR first responders to 
provide health services effectively to an affected population are very important.  
The deployment of medical care resources following a disaster remains one of the 
primary actions taken by responding forces. 
Scoring Criteria: Scoring was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
provide dental, medical, preventive, and veterinarian services to both an affected 
population and any responding forces.  This evaluation was primarily based on 
existing asset and manpower capabilities designed for each individual platform.  
The following sub-attributes were considered in the scoring of each platform: 
2.2.2.1 Medical Staff Support: GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to advise the commander on matters relating to the state 
of health, sanitation, and medical readiness. 
2.2.2.2 Medical Support: GFS shall have the capability and capacity to 
provide and support large-scale medical care for forces ashore. 
2.2.2.3 Medical Liaison: GFS shall have the capability and capacity to 
coordinate support with outside relief agencies (Red Cross, NGOs, 
and IGOs) in theater to ensure complete visibility for overall 
medical situation and requirements, including integrated transfer of 
responsibilities for policies and procedures. 
2.2.2.4 Host Nation Support: GFS shall have the capability and capacity 
to liaison with host nation governmental authorities and civilian 
organizations, where and when applicable, to ensure complete 
support for health service support. 
2.2.2.5 Provide for Mass Casualty (MASCAL) and Evacuation 
Situations: GFS shall have the capability and capacity for 
handling, to include casualty management. 
2.2.2.6 Medical Intelligence 
2.2.2.6.1 Obtain and Analyze Medical Information: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to review, catalog, and 
report information obtained in the course of current 
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operations to include communicable diseases, 
epidemiological data, chemical and biological agents, and 
other useful information. 
2.2.2.7 Patient Movement 
2.2.2.7.1 Coordinate Patient Movement: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to coordinate the evacuation of 
the sick and wounded and to obtain consultation and 
assistance from remote sources. 
2.2.2.7.2 Patient Movement Items (PMI): GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to provide specific medical 
equipment and durable supplies to support the patient. 
2.2.2.8 Train Medical and Non-medical Personnel: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to provide training in first aid, preventive 
medicine, and in advanced skills to support medical response to 
mass causality situations and operation specific threats 
 2.2.1.1 Dental Services 
2.2.1.1.1 Provide Emergency Dental Care: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to provide care for the relief of 
oral pain; diagnosis and treatment of infections; control 
of life-threatening oral conditions; and treatment of 
trauma to teeth, jaws, and associated facial structures, 
2.2.1.1.2 Provide Essential Non-Emergency Dental Care: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to provide care 
necessary to intercept potential emergencies.  This care 
is intended to maintain the overall oral fitness of 
personnel at a level consistent with combat readiness. 
2.2.1.1.3 Provide Comprehensive Care: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to provide dental treatment to 
restore and/or maintain optimal oral health, function, 
and esthetics is comprehensive dental care. 
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 2.2.1.2 Medical Services 
2.2.1.2.1 Provide Ambulatory Health Care: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to provide routine, acute and 
emergent health services to individuals. 
2.2.1.2.2 Provide Laboratory and Pharmaceutical Services: 
GFS shall have the capacity to provide diagnostic and 
clinical laboratory capabilities; manage and procure 
medical, dental, and veterinary supplies; provide for 
prescription refill; and provide procedures for the 
distribution and documentation of any pharmaceuticals. 
2.2.1.2.3 Support of HA/DR Operations: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to provide health services to 
local populace in support of humanitarian assistance, to 
include disaster relief and civil action programs. 
2.2.1.2.4 Provide Surgical and Inpatient Care: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide resuscitative and 
surgical care and inpatient services. 
2.2.1.2.5 Provide Triage: GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to classify incoming casualties by level of 
treatment required. 
 2.2.1.3 Preventive Medicine and Health Surveillance 
2.2.1.3.1 Provide Industrial and Environmental Health 
Services: GFS shall have the capability and capacity to 
implement and monitor occupational and environmental 
hazard abatement measures.  This includes hazardous 
material (HAZMAT) management, storage, and 
disposal. 
2.2.1.3.2 Conduct Vector Control and Management: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to advise and 
coordinate the prevention and/or eradication of vector 
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born diseases (i.e. viruses or parasites transmitted by 
mammals, birds, or insects). 
2.2.1.3.3 Conduct Waste Control and Management: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to dispose of regulated 
medical waste (blood and blood products, infectious, 
pathological, sharps, isolation, and microbiological 
cultures) and radiological waste. 
2.2.1.4 Veterinary Services: GFS shall have the capability and capacity 
to provide support for animal health care, veterinary preventive 
medicine, and food safety and security programs. 
CG: Score of 30% is based on the small number of medically trained personnel 
assigned to this platform and the lack of physical resources (rooms and lab 
facilities) available onboard to support anticipated medical response requirements 
resulting from a disaster.  This platform is capable of meeting the medical 
requirements of its crew, but significantly limited in its ability to provide any 
dental and veterinarian support care ashore. 
LPD-17: Score of 75%.  The personnel and resources available on the LPD can 
provide effective medical, dental, and preventive medicine and health surveillance 
support to a HA/DR response. The LPD-17 score is lower than the LHD because 
it has fewer medical personnel and resources available to support relief 
requirements. 
HSV: Score of 30% is based on the small number of medically trained personnel 
assigned to this platform and the lack of physical resources (rooms and lab 
facilities) available onboard to support anticipated medical response requirements 
resulting from a disaster.  This platform is capable of meeting the medical 
requirements of its crew, but significantly limited in its ability to provide any 
dental and veterinarian support care ashore. 
AS: Score of 80%.  The personnel and resources available on the AS can provide 
effective medical, dental, and preventive medicine and health surveillance support 
to a HA/DR response.  The AS scored lower than the LHD because it has fewer 
 171
medical personnel and resources available to support relief requirements, but 
slightly more than the LPD possesses. 
LHD/FFG: Score of 90% is largely based on the medical capabilities of the 
LHD.  The personnel and resources available on the LHD can provide effective 
medical, dental, and preventive medicine and health surveillance support to a 
HA/DR response.  The lack of manpower and facilities limits the amount of 
support that the FFG could provide to the overall response effort. 
HSV/RORO: Score of 30% is based on the small number of medically trained 
personnel assigned to this alternative and the lack of physical resources (rooms 
and lab facilities) available onboard to support anticipated medical response 
requirements resulting from a disaster.  Both of these platforms are capable of 
meeting the medical requirements of its crew, but significantly limited in its 
ability to provide any dental and veterinarian support care ashore.  Pairing them 
together provides no extra benefit because of the lack of medical capabilities and 
resources each platform possess. 
Attribute Summary: The amphibious platforms (LHD and LPD-17) are 
significantly more capable at meeting the HA/DR health services requirements 
based on their inherent medical capacities.  These platforms have the medical 
expertise, equipment, facilities, and personnel to support the quantity and range of 
medical care needs associated with these disasters.  None of the platforms 
evaluated, however, has the capability to provide adequate veterinary services to 
an affected population.  This deficiency could be resolved by embarking Army or 
civilian veterinarians as part of the embarked crew.  These individuals would 
prove valuable in building enduring relationships with regional populations 
through interaction and the rendering of veterinarian services during port visits. 
 
2.2.2 Plans and Operations - The coordination and cooperation of inter-
agency, military, and non-governmental assets required to effectively respond to a 
HA/DR crisis.  Following a natural or man-made disaster, medical requirements 
will range from emergency/trauma care to preventive medicine, to delivery of 
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water, food, shelter and security.  Thus, the coordination and execution of medical 
operations among the various respondents is multifaceted in a HA/DR 
environment.  This plans and operations attribute includes medical staff support, 
level II/III medical support, medical liaison, host nation support, mass casualty 
(MASCAL) and evacuation, medical intelligence, patient movement, and training 
personnel. 
Overall Weight: 5 
The capability of deployed Navy assets to effectively plan and execute a HA/DR 
relief operation is important.  As with most operational planning activities, the 
amount of coordination and preparation conducted prior to execution will 
typically correlate to a successful relief operation. 
Scoring Criteria: Scoring was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
effective coordinate medical assistance and relief support amongst all responding 
forces (i.e. military, NGO, and host nation).  This evaluation was primarily based 
on existing asset and manpower capabilities designed for each individual 
platform.  The following attributes were considered in the scoring of each 
platform: 
2.2.2.1 Medical Staff Support: GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to advise the commander on matters relating to the 
state of health, sanitation, and medical readiness. 
2.2.2.2 Medical Support: GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to provide and support large scale medical care for 
forces ashore. 
2.2.2.3 Medical Liaison: GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to coordinate support with outside relief agencies 
(Red Cross, NGOs, and IGOs) in theater to ensure 
complete visibility for overall medical situation and 
requirements, including integrated transfer of 
responsibilities for policies and procedures. 
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2.2.2.4 Host Nation Support: GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to liaison with host nation governmental 
authorities and civilian organizations, where and when 
applicable, to ensure complete support for health service 
support. 
2.2.2.5 Provide for Mass Casualty (MASCAL) and Evacuation 
Situations: GFS shall have the capability and capacity for 
handling, to include casualty management. 
2.2.2.6 Medical Intelligence 
2.2.2.6.1 Obtain and Analyze Medical Information: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to review, catalog, and 
report information obtained in the course of current 
operations to include communicable diseases, 
epidemiological data, chemical and biological agents, and 
other useful information. 
2.2.2.7 Patient Movement 
2.2.2.7.1 Coordinate Patient Movement: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to coordinate the evacuation of 
the sick and wounded and to obtain consultation and 
assistance from remote sources. 
2.2.2.7.2 Patient Movement Items (PMI): GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to provide specific medical 
equipment and durable supplies to support the patient. 
2.2.2.8 Train Medical and Non-medical Personnel: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide training in first aid, 
preventive medicine, and in advanced skills to support medical 
response to mass causality situations and operation specific 
threats 
CG: A score of 10% is based on the small number of medically trained personnel 
assigned to this platform and the lack of physical resources (medical facilities) 
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available onboard to support anticipated medical response requirements resulting 
from a disaster.  As an echelon I platform, a CG does not have the necessary 
assets to support the medical requirements of higher echelons (II or III).  The lack 
of medical personnel also significantly inhibits its ability to provide host nation 
support, conduct adequate medical training, or coordinate patient movement. 
LPD-17: A score of 80%.  As an echelon II platform, the LPD-17 has some of 
the necessary expertise and facilities to support medical assistance planning 
efforts, but has fewer personnel, spaces, and organic air assets than a LHD to 
support MASCAL and evacuation efforts. 
HSV: A score of 10% is based on the small number of medically trained 
personnel assigned to this platform and the lack of physical resources (medical 
facilities) available onboard to support anticipated medical response requirements 
resulting from a disaster.  As an echelon I platform, a HSV does not have the 
necessary assets to support the medical requirements of higher echelons (II or III).  
The lack of medical personnel also significantly inhibits its ability to provide host 
nation support, conduct adequate medical training, or coordinate patient 
movement. 
AS: A score of 80%.  As an echelon II platform, the AS has some of the 
necessary expertise and facilities to support medical assistance planning efforts, 
but lacks organic air assets to support MASCAL and evacuation efforts. 
LHD/FFG: A score of 90% is largely based on the medical capabilities of the 
LHD.  The personnel and resources available on the LHD can effectively 
coordinate and plan all medical support requirements prior to a disaster.  The 
LHD has the experienced medical personnel required to effectively liaison with 
all parties involved in the relief effort.  It also has the required medical facilities 
and evacuation assets to support any potential MASCAL or evacuation 
requirements.  The lack of manpower and facilities limits the amount of support 
that the FFG could provide to the overall response effort. 
HSV/RORO: A score of 10% is based on the small number of medically trained 
personnel assigned to this alternative, and the lack of physical resources (medical 
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facilities) available onboard to support anticipated medical response requirements.  
As echelon I platforms, neither of these have the necessary organic assets to 
support the medical requirements of higher echelons (II or III).  Pairing them 
together provides no extra benefit because of the lack of medical capabilities and 
resources each platform possess.  The lack of medical personnel also significantly 
inhibits its ability to provide host nation support, conduct adequate medical 
training, or coordinate patient movement. 
Attribute Summary: The LHD, LPD-17, and AS are significantly more capable 
at supporting HA/DR planning and operational requirements based on their 
organic medical expertise, equipment, facilities, and personnel to support the 
range of disaster medical coordination and planning requirements.  It should be 
noted that none of the platforms evaluated, has the capability to provide echelon 
III medical support to an affected population.  This deficiency can be resolved 
through the assignment of a hospital ship (USNS MERCY or COMFORT) or 
allocating the space for field/fleet hospitals (Figure 55) onboard the LHD, LPD-
17, HSV, or the MFP(E). 
 
 
Figure 55: Navy Field Hospital 
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2.2.3 Medical Logistics – This is the holding, issuing, and accounting for all 
medical, dental, and veterinary supplies (equipment, pharmaceutical, and 
consumables).  Disaster supplies, in particular, should include bottled water (until 
a potable water production, storage and distribution system is restored), blankets, 
lumber and plastic sheeting for shelters and palletizing supplies, food, water 
bladders or potable water pillow tanks, reverse osmosis water purification units, 
and empty water containers.  Within this attribute are the elements of clinical 
capabilities and health service logistic support and blood management.  This 
attribute includes clinical capabilities/health service logistical support and blood 
management. 
Overall Weight: 6 
The capability of to provide medical logistical support to HA/DR first responders 
is very important.  It does no good for first responders to arrive in a disaster area 
without the necessary medical supplies, equipment, and skills.  These responders 
must arrive with the capacity to effectively prioritize and distribute essential 
medical relief assets in a timely manner that reflects the need of the disaster area. 
Scoring Criteria: Scoring was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
effectively coordinate and deliver medical logistical support as required by first 
responders, based primarily on each individual platform’s existing logistical 
support capability.  The following sub-attributes were considered in the scoring: 
2.2.3.1 Clinical Capabilities and Health Service Logistic Support: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to provide for specific 
clinical capabilities, location, health service logistic supportability, 
and bed requirements. 
2.2.3.2 Blood Management: GFS shall have the capability and capacity 
to coordinate blood requirements and distribution of blood and 
blood products to support all operational requirements. 
CG: A score of 15% is based on the lack of physical resources (medical 
facilities) available onboard to support these logistical requirements.  A CG 
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simply does not have the blood management capability, personnel, or storage 
space to meet disaster requirements. 
LPD-17: A score of 70% is based on the LPD-17s ability to store, transport, and 
deliver medical equipment, personnel, and supplies in a disaster area as required.  
The embarked LCACs provide the LPD-17 with a capability to deliver up to 72 
tons of supplies ashore in situations where mooring pier-side are unavailable.  The 
LPD-17 also has the medical facilities to support clinical and blood management 
requirements. 
HSV: A score of 30%.  The HSV has the ability to store some medical 
equipment and supplies.  With no embarked air or maritime assets, however, the 
HSV lacks the ability to transport and deliver large quantities of medical 
equipment, personnel, and supplies in a disaster area.  In addition, the HSV lacks 
the personnel and facilities to support clinical and blood management 
requirements. 
AS: A score of 65% is based on some ability of the AS to support clinical 
services, blood management, and store medical equipment and supplies.  With no 
embarked air or maritime assets, however, the AS lacks the ability to transport 
and deliver large quantities of medical equipment, personnel, and supplies in a 
disaster area. 
LHD/FFG: A score of 85% is based on the LHDs ability to store, transport, and 
deliver medical equipment, personnel, and supplies in a disaster area as required.  
And considering that the ship may not be pier-side, the LHD also has embarked 
LCACs, which provide it with a significant heavy lift capability (up to 72 tons of 
supplies).  The LHD also has the medical facilities to support clinical and blood 
management requirements.  The FFG does not have the blood management 
capability, personnel, or storage space to meet disaster requirements, and thus 
does not provide to the overall logistical support effort. 
HSV/RORO A score of 50% is based on the ability of these platforms to store 
medical equipment and supplies.  With no embarked air or maritime assets, 
however, both of these platforms lack the ability to transport and deliver large 
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quantities of medical equipment, personnel, and supplies in a disaster area.  In 
addition, neither has the personnel or facilities to support clinical and blood 
management requirements. 
Attribute Summary: The LHD and LPD-17 are more capable of supporting 
logistical requirements based on their organic facilities and embarked craft.  Both 
platforms have sufficient storage capacity and the necessary personnel and 
air/maritime assets to effectively deliver and distribute medical support 
equipment, personnel, and supplies to an affected population. 
 
2.2.4 Administrative Services – This attribute involves the maintaining and 
managing the health and dental records, and other documentation relating to the 
provision of health care to first responding and an affected population. 
Overall Weight: 1 
Accurate documentation of medical services provided are important, however, in 
a disaster environment the materials and/or personnel may not be possible or even 
available to support this requirement.  As a consequence, this task may be 
relegated to non-medically trained support personnel. 
Scoring Criteria: Scoring was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
effectively manage and maintain medical documents relating to medical 
assistance renders in a disaster area.  This evaluation was primarily based on the 
availability of personnel onboard each individual platform to support this 
administrative requirement.  Although medically trained personnel may not be 
available, there are sufficient numbers of professionally trained sailors onboard 
these platforms to adequately support this requirement.  The following sub-
attribute was considered: 
2.2.4.1 Records: GFS shall have the capability and capacity to maintain 
health and dental records, and other documentation relating to the 
provision of health care. 
A Score of 100% was assigned for all platforms based on their adequate crew 
sizes and administrative services.   
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Attribute Summary: All platforms were equally capable of meeting the 
requirements of this attribute.  It should be noted that the grading will change 
based on the severity of the disaster.  Should the situation change where the 
number of casualties or injuries increased significantly, there would be a variation 
in the platform grading. 
 
2.3 Logistics - Logistics is the art and science of managing and controlling the 
flow of goods, energy, information and other resources like products, services, 
and people, from the source of production to the marketplace.  It involves the 
integration of information, transportation, inventory, warehousing, material 
handling, and packaging.  The operating responsibility of logistics is the 
geographical repositioning of raw materials, work in process, and finished 
inventories where required at the lowest cost possible.153  There are five attributes 
for logistics: supply, maintenance, transportation, civil engineering, and other 
services.  Figure 56 highlights platform characteristics important to examining the 
attributes of the infrastructure function: 
 
 
Figure 56:  Summary of Platform Characteristics for Analysis of Logistics 
 
2.3.1 Supply:  Supply is the capability of the platform to acquire, manage, 
receive, store and issue the materials required by forces. 
Overall Weight:  6 
_____________________ 
153. Wikipedia, “Logistics,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logistics. 
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The supply portion of logistics is weighted at 6 because of its importance to the 
 entire logistical chain.  If we cannot provide the supplies, the other attributes 
 become null and void.  If we do not have the supplies, and equipment to provide 
 shelter, fresh water, food and other essentials to the host nation affected, the 
 HA/DR relief effort becomes futile. 
Scoring Criteria: There are five sub-attributes in employing a successful supply 
capability.  In scoring, the main consideration is cargo capacity for each platform.  
However, each platform inherently has a supply capability, which allows for ships 
to acquire, manage, receive, store, and issue supplies.   This inherent capability is 
accounted for so none of the platforms will score a 0% because of that.  The 
following are the sub-attribute considerations when scoring the attributes: 
2.3.1.1 Acquisition: GFS shall have the ability to attain required 
supplies for HA/DR missions as required.   
2.3.1.2 Management: GFS shall be able to manage the required 
resources properly in order to respond to a HA/DR mission 
as necessary.  
2.3.1.3 Receiving: GFS will utilize the supply system in place to 
receive required HA/DR materials prior to deployment.  The 
ship must be able to order and on-load the necessary HA/DR 
equipment. 
2.3.1.4 Storing: GFS will provide adequate storage facilities for 
necessary HA/DR equipment.  Storage room for adequate 
relief supplies will include water, food and nutrition, shelter, 
communications capability, Search and Rescue (SAR) 
capability, first aid and medical supplies, clothing, infant 
requirements, and provide for electricity and fuel 
requirements. 
2.3.1.5  Issuing: GFS will provide an adequate system for issuing 
and tracking all HA/DR materials used.  The ship must have 
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the ability to track the dispersion of HA/DR supplies and 
equipment. 
CG: Score of 30% due to the lack of available storage space for equipment and 
supplies on the CG.  Even with the lack of available storage space the CG has 
supplies that it is deployed with and therefore meet some of the supply attribute. 
LPD: Score of 90% because the LPD has adequate storage space for the required 
supplies and equipment but it does not have as much as the HSV/RORO. 
HSV: Score of 85% because it has more than adequate storage capability for the 
required supplies and equipment. 
AS: Score of 95% because the AS has more than 45 storerooms, most of which 
are designated for submarine supply storage. As her mission would no longer be 
to tend Los Angeles Class Attack Submarines, these store rooms could be utilized 
for the storage of HA/DR supplies and equipment 
LHD/FFG: Score of 90% because of the inherent storage capability of the large 
deck amphibious ship, and the added capability of the FFG does not bring any 
extra storage capability. 
HSV/RORO: Score of 100% because this combination is the only option 
analyzed that can easily carry all the HA/DR supplies and equipment and not be 
at, or close to maximum storage capacity. 
Attribute Summary: The HSV/RORO alternative scored the highest because this 
attributes main consideration was storage space. 
 
2.3.2 Maintenance:  Maintenance includes actions taken to keep material              
in a serviceable condition or to upgrade its capability. 
Overall Weight:  4 
Maintenance was weighted low because it is not a key aspect of the mission. Most 
 of the supplies and equipment GFS will be providing to the affected nation will be 
 self-sufficient and not require maintenance. Ships crew will only be required to 
 check expiration dates and perhaps be capable of making basic repairs to 
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 generators and water purification systems.  Overall, the HA/DR mission can be 
 adequately performed with little to no maintenance capability. 
Scoring Criteria: There are two sub-attributes in employing a successful 
maintenance capability.  In scoring, the main consideration is cargo capacity for 
each platform.  However, each platform inherently has a capability to perform 
maintenance on some of the required HA/DR equipment because of the personnel 
aboard.   The following are the sub-attribute considerations when scoring the 
attributes: 
2.3.2.1 Keep material in a serviceable condition: GFS will be 
responsible for the condition of all HA/DR equipment and 
stores to include tracking expiration dates and performing 
necessary PMS.  The ship must be able to perform minor 
repairs and maintenance actions on the HA/DR equipment. 
2.3.2.2 Upgrade its capability: GFS shall track published upgrades 
to HA/DR equipment and furnish the HA/DR  supplies with 
upgrades as they become available.  The ship should be able 
to perform and required upgrades to embarked HA/DR 
equipment. 
CG: Score of 85% due to the crew’s capability to perform basic maintenance on 
HA/DR equipment and supplies.  The crew can be trained to complete most 
maintenance requirements, but will not have the training or expertise to perform 
complicated repairs on unfamiliar equipment. 
LPD: Score of 85% due to the crew’s capability to perform basic maintenance on 
HA/DR equipment and supplies.  The crew can be trained to complete most 
maintenance requirements, but will not have the training or expertise to perform 
complicated repairs on unfamiliar equipment. 
HSV: Score of 85% due to the crew’s capability to perform basic maintenance 
on HA/DR equipment and supplies.  The crew can be trained to complete most 
maintenance requirements, but will not have the training or expertise to perform 
complicated repairs on unfamiliar equipment. 
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AS: Score of 95% due to exceptional inherent repair capability. An AS is capable 
of maintenance, repairs, and performing any required upgrades to the HA/DR 
equipment.  Because of the extra facilities, the AS can perform complicated 
repairs; however, it did not score 100% because the personnel on board may not 
be qualified to perform maintenance on more complicated HA/DR equipment. 
LHD/FFG: Score of 85% due to the crew’s capability to perform basic 
maintenance on HA/DR equipment and supplies.  The crew can be trained to 
complete most maintenance requirements, but will not have the training or 
expertise to perform complicated repairs on unfamiliar equipment. 
HSV/RORO: Score of 85% due to the crew’s capability to perform basic 
maintenance on HA/DR equipment and supplies.  The crew can be trained to 
complete most maintenance requirements, but will not have the training or 
expertise to perform complicated repairs on unfamiliar equipment.  Due to the 
small size and civilian component of the RORO crew, they do not add any 
additional capability. 
Attribute Summary: The AS scored the highest for the maintenance attribute 
because the specialized facilities it contains onboard.  The specialized facilities 
would give more flexibility in conducting maintenance or repairs to the HA/DR 
equipment. 
 
2.3.3 Transportation:  Transportation is the movement of units, personnel, 
equipment and supplies from the point of origin to the final destination. 
Overall Weight:  8 
Transportation is necessary in moving supplies and equipment to affected 
areas. 
Scoring Criteria: There are three sub-attributes to consider when 
examining the transportation attribute.  The main consideration while 
scoring the transportation attribute is the platforms ability to move units, 
personnel and HA/DR equipment/supplies.  As previously mentioned, the 
scenario begins with the platform at anchorage therefore the platform’s 
 184
organic transportation assets play an important role in any relief effort.   
The following are the sub-attribute considerations when scoring the 
attributes: 
2.3.3.1 Movement of units: GFS shall be responsible for moving 
HA/DR units (to include force protection and medical units 
to the disaster relief site as necessary.  Ships should be able 
to transport units ashore and then to the affected region once 
ashore. 
2.3.3.2 Movement of personnel: GFS shall be responsible for the 
transportation of personnel during an HA/DR operation to 
include evacuations if necessary.  Ships should be able to 
transport personnel ashore and then to the affected region 
once ashore to include medical and NGO personnel as 
necessary. 
2.3.3.3 Movement of equipment and supplies: GFS shall be 
responsible for the coordination of movement of equipment 
and supplies to the affected region.  The ship must be able to 
off-load supplies and equipment both pier-side and at anchor, 
then transport the supplies and equipment to the affected 
region. 
CG: Score of 30% due to the platform’s inability to transport equipment ashore.  
The CG has the capability to carry two SH-60B helicopters.  This provides it with 
some capability to transport supplies and equipment to shore; however, it is not 
capable of carrying land vehicles for transportation.  This capability is limited 
even if the CG were to moor pier-side. 
LPD: Score of 85%. The LPD-17 can embark two LCACs and 2 CH-46E and is 
capable for off-loading HA/DR equipment and supplies efficiently.  LPD-17 also 
has the ability to carry land vehicles onboard to assist in the transportation of the 
supplies and equipment once off-loaded.  This platform would score 100% once 
pier-side. 
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HSV: Score of 85% due to the ability to off-load the equipment both pier-side 
and at anchor with helicopters, crane and stern ramp capabilities.  This platform 
would score 100% once it is pier-side. 
AS: Score of 85% due to the ability to off-load supplies and equipment pier-side.  
The AS would not be able to off-load at anchor without the assistance of air 
maritime assets to transport supplies.  This platform would score 100% pier-side. 
LHD/FFG: Score of 90% because the LHD has many organic assets which 
enable to off-load equipment rapidly.  The FFG lends little to this attribute with 
the exception of two additional helicopters.  This combination of platforms would 
score 100% once the platforms are pier side. 
HSV/RORO: Score of 95% due to the exceptional off-load capabilities of both 
the HSV and the RORO and the shallow draft of the HSV allowing for more 
opportunity to go pier-side.  These platforms score slightly better than the 
LHD/FFG combination because of the shallow of the HSV. 
Attribute Summary: The HSV/RORO alternative scored the best for this 
attribute because the combination of its off-load capabilities and shallow draft. 
 
2.3.4 Civil Engineering:  Civil engineering provides the construction, operation, 
maintenance, damage repair, and reconstitution of facilities, roads, utilities and 
logistic infrastructure. 
Overall Weight:  4 
Civil engineering will not necessarily be the primary mission of GFS in an 
HA/DR situation.  Civil engineering, while important to rebuilding the 
infrastructure, after a disaster this requirement will likely fall on the shoulders of 
other agencies once a more permanent footprint is made in the affected nation.  
Civil engineering on the part of the GFS will only be to ensure that roadways, 
airports and seaports are safe for relief personnel and able to provide the means to 
supply the nation with first response supplies and equipment. 
Scoring Criteria: There are five sub-attributes to consider when examining the 
civil engineering attribute.  The main consideration while scoring the civil 
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engineering attribute is the platforms ability to store supplies to support 
construction efforts ashore.  The following are the sub-attribute considerations 
when scoring the attributes: 
2.3.4.1  Construction: GFS shall provide equipment, coordination 
and personnel necessary to assist in infrastructure rebuilding 
as necessary.  The ship may be required to assist the host 
nation in reconstructing key buildings. 
2.3.4.2  Operation: GFS shall be responsible for the proper 
operation of required civil engineering equipment embarked 
onboard.  Ships crew should be able to operate any 
construction equipment stored onboard the platform, or 
provide berthing for the necessary personnel to do so. 
2.3.4.3  Maintenance: GFS shall be responsible for all maintenance 
that is required to be performed on all equipment onboard 
GFS.  Ships crew should be able to perform maintenance on 
any construction equipment stored onboard the platform, or 
provide berthing for the necessary personnel to do so. 
2.3.4.4 Damage repair: GFS shall be responsible for all repairs 
necessary on civil engineering equipment due to use in an 
HA/DR environment.  Ships crew should be able to repair 
any construction equipment stored onboard the platform, or 
provide berthing for the necessary personnel to do so. 
2.3.4.5  Reconstitution of facilities, roads, utilities and logistic 
infrastructure: GFS shall be responsible to assist host 
nations in basic infrastructure repair following a disaster to 
which GFS responded.  The ship should have the capability 
to assist the HN and NGOs in basic infrastructure rebuilding, 
especially if the infrastructure is to be repaired to assist in 
the transportation of supplies and equipment to the affected 
region 
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CG: score of 40%.  Ticonderoga Class Cruisers are not able to provide the civil-
military engineering support to successfully conduct HA/DR operations.  This 
platform’s inability to transport construction equipment and supplies due to 
available space limitations, in addition to trained personnel, prevents the 
establishment of physical networking in support of the infrastructure function.  
The score of 40% represents that the CG has some ability to transport materials 
once on-scene through the use of its helicopter assets, but has a deficiency in 
delivering the materials and personnel to the region in order to establish necessary 
facilities in support of HA/DR operations. 
LPD: score of 85%.  San Antonio Class LPDs have the ability to transport 2 
Landing Craft, Air Cushions (LCAC) and accommodate 2 CH-46E Sea Knights, 
in addition to 24,000 square foot vehicle space and 34,000 cubic foot of cargo 
space.154  These capabilities, along with personnel embarkation, allow this 
platform to support the civil-military engineering measures required by the 
physical networking attribute.  A score 85% was awarded based on the platform’s 
available transportation assets and its cargo storage capacity. 
HSV: score of 90%.  HSV has a 4,000 square foot flight deck and hangar capable 
of accommodating a SH-60B Seahawk helicopter which provides a means to 
transport cargo and personnel to relief sites.  In addition to the vertical 
cargo/personnel transfer capabilities, HSV has the ability to launch/recover small 
craft or unmanned vehicles up to 13-tons underway, and transfer as much as 11-
tons of cargo from the flight deck to adjacent ships or pier-side utilizing the 
shipboard crane.155  These options allow for better on-load/off-load management 
of equipment, supplies and personnel essential to the rapid establishment of the 
physical network.  HSV has a cargo capacity of 680 tons (comparable to 17 C-17 
_____________________ 






155. Harold Kennedy, “Navy’s High Speed Vessel Aids Relief Effort,” NationalDefenseMagazine, 
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/issues/2005/Nov/Navys_High.htm. 
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aircraft) and a draft of approximately 12 feet (comparable to a Cyclone-class 
patrol craft).156  This platform meets the requirements to store, transport, provide 
and sustain construction equipment, personnel, and supplies to establish facilities, 
as well as routes and modes of transportation.  A score of 90% was given because 
the platforms transportation assets do not allow for maximum flow of equipment 
and supplies from the sea (scenario has the GFS initially anchored).  Once pier 
side this score would improve to 100%. 
AS: score of 60%.  Submarine tenders are able to provide civil-military 
engineering support to the HA/DR operation through the use of diversified 
facilities and cargo capacity.  A helicopter platform is available; however it is not 
possible to embark aviation assets onboard, making it difficult to transport 
equipment and supplies without being pier-side or having a helicopter available 
ashore or on another vessel.  Even with the amount of storage space available, the 
lack of transportation assets affected the overall scoring of the AS. 
LHD/FFG: score of 95%.  A LHD has the capability to transport 3 LCACs and 
multiple combinations of fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft. (for example 42 
CH-45E Sea Knights can be accommodated).  The aviation detachment for this 
thesis is 12 CH-46E Sea Knights and 9 CH-53E Super Stallion.  The Super 
Stallion has a personnel capacity of 55 and external cargo capacity of 36,000 
pounds.157  In addition to the air assets onboard the LHD, an FFG is able to 
embark two SH-60B Seahawk helicopters. A frigate does not provide adequate 
cargo space; however the LHD has 125,000 cubic foot cargo capability and an 
additional 20,000 square foot for vehicle storage.  The civil-engineering materials 
and equipment requirements can be stored and transported onboard, as well as 
_____________________ 
156. Bobby Northnagle, “Swift Delivery Showcases Versatility,” Navy.mil, 
http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=24698. 








additional HA/DR cargo.  This combination makes it possible to accomplish all 
the measures set forth by the physical networking attribute.  The LHD and FFG 
platforms are able to establish and sustain facilities, as well as provide and 
maintain routes and modes of transportation utilizing the embarked assets. 
HSV/RORO: score of 95%.  As stated before, the HSV is capable of fulfilling 
the physical network attribute.  For example, the 1ST LT HARRY L MARTIN, is 
capable of providing 168,547 square feet of cargo space in addition to the HSV.  
Although this platform is unable to embark aircraft, there is a helicopter platform 
available for vertical cargo/personnel transport.  As with the HSV, the RORO is 
able to provide civil-military engineering support to conduct HA/DR 
operations.158  This combination received a score of 95% because the extra 
capacity that the RORO brings however, the RORO does not have the necessary 
transportation assets.  Again the scenario starts at sea, but once the platforms can 
go pier-side this number will increase to 100%. 
Attribute Summary: The LHD/FFG and HSV/RORO alternatives scored equally 
will for this attribute because both alternatives have enough cargo space to carry 
the materials needed for the civil engineering attribute. 
 
2.3.5 Other Services:  Other services are non-material support activities provided 
by service personnel and the logistics community that are essential to force 
support. 
Overall Weight:  5 
Other Services encompasses so many other aspects of the HA/DR mission; 
however, most overlap (are covered by) other sections of this study, to include 
medical and communications. 
Scoring Criteria: There is one sub-attribute to consider when examining the 
Other Services attribute.  The main consideration while scoring the Civil 
Engineering attribute is the platform’s ability to store supplies to support 
_____________________ 
158. GlobalSecurity.org, “TAK 3015 1st Lt Harry L. Martin, Maritime Pre-positioning Force 
(Enhanced) MPF(E),” http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/tak-3015-specs.htm. 
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construction efforts ashore.  The following are the sub-attribute considerations 
when scoring this attribute: 
2.3.5.1  Nonmaterial support activities provided by service 
personnel and the logistics community that are essential 
to force support: GFS shall be responsible for providing 
personnel, equipment and supplies as necessary for HA/DR 
efforts not previously outlined here.  The GFS platform 
should be able to provide basic communications, 
administration support and medical capability to the HA/DR 
mission. 
CG: Score of 80%.  It possesses the capability to lend communications, and 
administration support during an HA/DR mission. The CG does not have the 
capability of embarking the number of medical personnel and equipment required 
to adequately support a disaster relief effort. 
LPD: Score of 85% due to the ability of the ship and crew to lend 
communications and administration support to the HA/DR mission as well as her 
ability to embark medical personnel and equipment. 
HSV: Score of 85% due to the ability of the ship and crew to lend 
communications and administration support to the HA/DR mission as well as her 
ability to embark medical personnel and equipment. 
AS: Score of 90% due to the ability to lend communication and administration 
support to the mission as well as her inherent medical facilities and expertise. 
LHD/FFG: Score of 80% due to the capability of the ship and her crew to lend 
communications and administration support during an HA/DR mission. Again the 
FFG lends little advantage in this combination over the LPD. 
HSV/RORO: Score of 85% due to the HSV’s ability of the ship and her crew to 
lend communications and administration support to the HA/DR mission as well as 
her ability to embark medical personnel and equipment. The RORO adds little 
value to this attribute in this combination. 
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2.4 Communications:  This function identifies the need to provide and maintain the 
continuous flow of information in the HA/DR disaster scenario.   
 The following is a brief overview of the communication capabilities of the 
platforms evaluated for FNA.  These communication characteristics and 
capabilities provide the foundation for which each platform was graded in the 
context of the specific HA/DR scenario. 
 
 
Figure 57:  LHD and LPD-17 Communication Capabilities 
 
LHDs and LPDs have the most robust communication suites of any amphibious 
ships currently in use.  The communication equipment on these platforms (Figure 57) 
provides them the capability to receive and transmit information via the various mediums 





Figure 58:  CG and FFG Communication Capabilities 
 
 CGs have the most robust communication suite of any surface combatant.  
Comparable to the LHD and LPD-17, the communication equipment on this platform 
provides it the capability to receive and transmit information via the various mediums 
and spectrums, thus providing key decision-makers with accurate and timely situational 
awareness. 
 FFGs have an adequate communication suite, but the lack of satellite 
communication equipment limits its effectiveness as a command and control platform 
during a HA/DR response effort.  Another drawback regarding the FFG is its limited 




Figure 59:  AS and HSV Communication Capabilities 
 
The AS and HSV have adequate, but limited communication suites based on their 
minimal satellite communication capabilities and overall lack of SHF or data links 
(Figure 59).  These platforms can effectively serve in a HA/DR command and control 
role, however these communication limitations could become a significant issue to 
decision-makers should the disaster be located in regions of the world with limited or 




Figure 60:  RORO Communication Capabilities 
 
MPF(E) ships have an adequate, but extremely limited communication suite 
(Figure 60) based on its lack of HF, EHF, and SHF communication equipment and data 
links.  Although the "Bandwidth Efficient Satellite Transport" (BEST) system provides 
the RORO with secure and non-secure voice, data, and imagery connectivity, access is 
still dependent on system availability, bandwidth allocation, and geographic location. 
It should be noted that each of the platforms evaluated provide some varying 
degree of communication proficiency, but these capabilities are focused in a command 
and control role.  None of the platforms evaluated have an embedded capability to deploy 
or project communication and networking technologies into a disaster area.  The ideal 
deployable disaster relief communications system should 1) be easily scalable to meet 
growing needs during the relief effort, rapidly extending its reach to any geographical 
location, 2) offer user-friendly configurations, 3) enable management and maintenance, 
4) provide a small footprint for ease of transportation, 5) support any mix of voice, data 
and video applications, and 6) require minimal power.  Without this ability of first 
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responders to communicate the moment they arrive on scene, they cannot effectively 
assess options, develop response plans, or coordinate relief efforts. 
 
2.4.1 Access Services – These services provide the foundation for all 
Department of Defense communication assets in order to provide the required 
connectivity and promote the timely free flow of information.  Access services are 
comprised of three specific Global Information Grid (GIG) Services: Defense 
Information Systems Network Interface (DISN), Standardized Tactical Entry 
Point (STEP), and Department of Defense Teleport. 
Overall Weight: 9 
The capability of a platform to provide access to services, thus enabling 
information flow between first responders and decision-makers is essential. 
Grading Criteria: Grading was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
establish and maintain connectivity to these three services.  The evaluation itself 
was primarily based on existing communication assets provided onboard each 
individual platform.  The following sub-attributes were considered: 
2.4.1.1 Defense Information Systems Network Interface (DISN): 
Department of Defense’s worldwide enterprise-level 
telecommunications infrastructure providing end-to-end 
information transfer for supporting military operations.  It 
provides GIG network services to Department of Defense 
installations and deployed forces.  Those services include 
voice, data, and video. 
2.4.1.1.1 Utilize the DISN:  GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to utilize the DISN to support exchange of 
voice, data, imagery, and video from strategic to 
tactical levels, at all echelons, when deployed. 
2.4.1.1.2 Provide and Maintain Communications: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to obtain, relay, and 
distribute data and information by any means including 
 196
establishing communication links with service, joint, 
interagency, intra-agency, and coalition forces. 
2.4.1.1.3 Transmit and Receive Information: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to send and receive 
information between units and/or higher formations or 
commands to build the overall picture. 
2.4.1.1.4 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.1.1.5 Manage Means of Communicating Information: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to direct, establish, 
or control the instruments used in sending or receiving 
information and to use various communication networks 
and modes for obtaining or sending information. 
2.4.1.2 Standardized Tactical Entry Point (STEP): The primary 
interface point between the sustaining base and deployed 
forces.  The STEP program enhances the ability of the DISN to 
respond to the needs of the joint force.  STEP provides 
predefined (tailored) support packages on a predefined 
timeline.  This support is extended via common user transports 
and includes voice, data, and video services. 
2.4.1.2.1 Utilize the DISN: GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to utilize the DISN to support exchange of 
voice, data, imagery, and video from strategic to 
tactical levels, at all echelons, when deployed. 
2.4.1.2.2 Provide and Maintain Communications: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
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2.4.1.2.3 Transmit and Receive Information: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to send and receive 
information between units and/or higher formations or 
commands to build the overall picture. 
2.4.1.2.4 Manage Means of Communicating Information: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to direct, establish, 
or control the instruments used in sending or receiving 
information and to use various communication networks 
and modes for obtaining or sending information. 
2.4.1.3 Department of Defense Teleport: Provides commercial and 
military satellite access at selected STEP sites to improve 
DISN service access to the deployed joint force. 
2.4.1.3.1 Provide Radio Communications: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to provide HF/UHF/VHF and 
SATCOM radio communications support. 
2.4.1.3.2 Provide and Maintain Communications: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.1.3.3 Transmit and Receive Information: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to send and receive 
information between units and/or higher formations or 
commands to build the overall picture. 
2.4.1.3.4 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.1.3.5 Manage Means of Communicating Information: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to direct, establish, 
or control the instruments used in sending or receiving 
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information and to use various communication networks 
and modes for obtaining or sending information. 
CG: A score of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to fully establish and 
maintain connectivity to all three GIG services. 
LPD-17: A score of 100% is based on the ability of a LPD-17 to fully establish 
and maintain connectivity to all three GIG services. 
HSV: A score of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to fully establish and 
maintain connectivity to all three GIG services. 
AS: A score of 100% is based on the ability of an AS to fully establish and 
maintain connectivity to all three GIG services. 
LHD/FFG: A score of 100% is based on the ability of the LHD and FFG to fully 
establish and maintain connectivity to all three GIG services.  Pairing the FFG 
with the LHD provides no real communications benefit with regard to these three 
services. 
HSV/RORO: A score of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to fully establish 
and maintain connectivity to all three GIG services.  Pairing the HSV with the 
MPF(E) provides no real communications benefit with regard to these three 
services. 
Attribute Summary: All of the platforms, either individually or as paired, were 
capable of meeting the requirements of this attribute. 
 
2.4.2 Voice Services – These services are the primary means of garnering an 
overall situational awareness in an HA/DR environment and thus provide first 
responders with the capability to most effectively and efficiently employ and 
distribute essential personnel and resources.  Non-voice communications can 
become an important requirement (narrowband, wideband and broadband data 
applications), dependent on the nature of the disaster, however, the need for voice 
communications will always be a major requirement.  Voice communications 
includes the Defense Switched Network (DSN), Mobile, and Tactical Voice. 
Overall Weight: 7 
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The capability of a platform to provide voice communication services between 
first responders and decision-makers in an austere environment is very important. 
Grading Criteria: Grading was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
establish, employ, and maintain connectivity over these three types of voice 
circuits (I.E. DSN-STU-III/STE; Mobile-Iridium, Tactical-NAVY RED).  The 
evaluation itself was primarily based on existing communication assets provided 
onboard each individual platform. 
CG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to establish, maintain, and 
employ voice communications, as required, utilizing all three-voice 
communication services. 
LPD-17: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a LPD-17 to establish, 
maintain, and employ voice communications, as required, utilizing all three-voice 
communication services. 
HSV: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to establish, maintain, 
and employ voice communications, as required, utilizing all three-voice 
communication services. 
AS: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of an AS to establish, maintain, and 
employ voice communications, as required, utilizing all three voice 
communication services. 
LHD/FFG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a LHD to establish, 
maintain, and employ voice communications, as required, utilizing all three-voice 
communication services.  Pairing the FFG with the LHD provides no real 
communications benefit with regard to these voice services. 
HSV/RORO: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to establish, 
maintain, and employ voice communications, as required, utilizing all three-voice 
communication services.  Pairing the HSV with the MPF(E) provides no real 
communications benefit with regard to these voice services. 
2.4.2.1 Defense Switched Network (DSN): A standard unclassified 
voice network supporting Department of Defense. 
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2.4.2.1.1 Provide Telephone Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide communication 
connectivity between operational forces and the Naval 
Telecommunications System and Defense 
Communications System, as required.  This includes 
installing, operating, and maintaining network control 
facilities, system control facilities, message centers, 
radio links, and tactical switchboard/telephone systems. 
2.4.2.1.2 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.2.1.3 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
2.4.2.2 Defense Red Switched Network (DRSN): A classified voice 
network supporting Department of Defense. 
2.4.2.2.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.2.2.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
2.4.2.3 Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services: Commercial, portable 
satellite systems that are capable of voice and data transmission. 
2.4.2.3.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
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information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.2.3.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
2.4.2.4 Tactical Voice: Military specific switching system capable of 
operating in austere areas. 
2.4.2.4.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.2.4.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
Attribute Summary:  All of the platforms, either individually or as paired, were 
capable of meeting the requirements of this attribute. 
 
2.4.3 Data Services – These services are focused on networks that distribute a 
broad range of data and/or information (ranging from tactical, classified, to 
unclassified).  Data Services are comprised of the Joint Data Network (JDN), 
Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET), SECRET Internet 
Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET), Wide-Area Network (WAN)/ Local-Area 
Network (LAN), and Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
(JWICS). 
Overall Weight: 7 
The capability of a platform to establish and maintain data network services 
between first responders and decision-makers in an austere environment is very 
important.  The availability of these data networks enables widespread 
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dissemination of critical information, thereby permitting first responders and 
decision-makers to react more efficiently and effectively. 
Grading Criteria: Grading was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
establish and maintain connectivity over these data networks.  The evaluation 
itself was primarily based on whether each individual platform had the capability 
(i.e. necessary equipment) and personnel required to operate these data networks. 
2.4.3.1 Joint Data Network (JDN): A compilation of sub-networks 
that are comprised of a wide variety of data systems that carry 
a broad range of tactical information on tactical digital 
information links (TADL) within a theater in support of joint 
and multinational war fighting. 
2.4.3.1.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.3.1.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
2.4.3.2 Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
(NIPRNET): A computer network for unclassified, but 
sensitive information supporting Department of Defense. 
2.4.3.2.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide information 
through the use of external communications systems. 
2.4.3.2.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
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2.4.3.3 SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET): A 
computer network for classified information (up to SECRET) 
supporting Department of Defense. 
2.4.3.3.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.3.3.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
2.4.3.4 Coalition/Multinational Wide-Area Network (WAN): A 
computer network supporting the combined/multinational 
operations that may be unclassified or classified. 
2.4.3.4.1 Provide Wide Area Networks (WAN)/Local Area 
Networks (LAN) Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical WAN and 
LAN data communications networks to support 
information exchange, collaboration, and resource 
sharing in a particular agency, facility, center, cell, or 
geographic location. 
2.4.3.4.2 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.3.4.3 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
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2.4.3.5 Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System 
(JWICS): A computer network for classified information, 
including SCI, supporting Department of Defense 
2.4.3.5.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.3.5.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
CG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to establish, maintain, and 
employ all of these data networks to facilitate the dissemination of information in 
support of HA/DR response efforts.  The following sub-attributes were 
considered: 
LPD-17: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a LPD-17 to establish, 
maintain, and employ all of these data networks to facilitate the dissemination of 
information in support of HA/DR response efforts. 
HSV: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to establish, maintain, 
and employ all of these data networks to facilitate the dissemination of 
information in support of HA/DR response efforts. 
AS: A grade of 80% is based on the ability of a HSV to establish, maintain, and 
employ some of these data networks to facilitate the dissemination of information 
in support of HA/DR response efforts.  The data services limitations regarding the 
AS involve its reduced satellite communication capability (INMARSAT 
dependent) and, less significantly, its lack of JWICS. 
LHD/FFG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a LHD to establish, 
maintain, and employ all of these data networks to facilitate the dissemination of 
information in support of HA/DR response efforts.  Pairing the FFG with the 
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LHD provides no real communications benefit with regard to these data services 
considering the FFGs limited satellite communication capability. 
HSV/RORO: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to establish, 
maintain, and employ all of these data networks to facilitate the dissemination of 
information in support of HA/DR response efforts.  Pairing the HSV with the 
MPF(E) provides no real communications benefit with regard to these data 
services considering both platforms rely solely upon commercially leased satellite 
communication architecture for these services. 
Attribute Summary: All of the platforms, with the exception of the AS, were 
capable of meeting the requirements of this attribute.  The reliance on access to 
satellite communication networks is an important consideration for this attribute.  
Simply having the equipment and personnel onboard does not necessarily mean 
that a platform will have the capability to obtain and/or disseminate information 
on these networks.  Having dedicated satellite lease time and bandwidth could 
significantly impact the overall success or failure of a HA/DR response effort. 
 
2.4.4 Applications – These are software programs and networks designed to 
handle specific types of information and provide operators with certain 
capabilities.  These applications included Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS), Defense Message System (DMS), and Defense Collaboration Tool Suite 
(DCTS). 
Overall Weight: 7 
The availability of these application services during a HA/DR response effort 
supports the dissemination of critical information (i.e. via DMS), thereby 
permitting decision-makers located outside of the operational area to react more 
efficiently and effectively to support on-scene relief efforts. 
Grading Criteria: Grading was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
maintain and employ these applications.  The evaluation itself was primarily 
based on whether each individual platform had the capability (i.e. necessary 
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equipment) and personnel required to operate these specific application tools.  
The following sub-attributes were considered: 
2.4.4.1 Global Command and Control System (GCCS): A suite of 
software applications and hardware designed for planning, 
execution, C2 of forces, data, information and multi-discipline 
intelligence processing. 
2.4.4.1.1 Utilize the Global Command and Control System 
(GCCS): GFS shall have the capability and capacity to 
utilize GCCS in order to provide a fused and shared 
picture of the operational area, together with the 
essential planning and assessment tools required by 
combatant commanders and their subordinate 
commanders. 
2.4.4.1.2 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.4.2 Defense Message System (DMS): A multilevel secure system 
for transmission of record message traffic in support of 
Department of Defense. 
2.4.4.2.1 Provide Electronic Message Communications: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to utilize DMS so 
that secure, timely, reliable writer-to-reader messaging 
service is available across strategic and deployed 
environments. 
2.4.4.2.2 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
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2.4.4.3 Defense Collaboration Tool Suite (DCTS): A Department of 
Defense tool suite for interoperable collaboration.  DCTS 
provides combatant commands, Services, and agencies with an 
interoperable, real time asynchronous collaboration capability 
that includes voice and video conferencing, document and 
application sharing, instant messaging, virtual meeting, and 
whiteboard capability in support of Department of Defense 
planning. 
2.4.4.3.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
CG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to maintain and operate all 
of these application tools in support of HA/DR response efforts. 
LPD-17: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a LPD-17 to maintain and 
operate all of these application tools in support of HA/DR response efforts. 
HSV: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to maintain and operate 
all of these application tools in support of HA/DR response efforts. 
AS: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of an AS to maintain and operate all 
of these application tools in support of HA/DR response efforts. 
LHD/FFG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a LHD to maintain and 
operate all of these application tools in support of HA/DR response efforts.  
Pairing the FFG with the LHD provides no real communications benefit, other 
than redundancy, with regard to these application services.  Individually, the FFG 
would score a grade of 100% because it possesses all of these application tools. 
HSV/RORO: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to maintain and 
operate all of these application tools in support of HA/DR response efforts.  
Pairing the HSV with the MPF(E) provides no real communications benefit with 
regard to these application services because of the MPF(E)’s limited 
communication suite. 
 208
Attribute Summary: All of the platforms, either individually or as paired, were 
capable of meeting the requirements of this attribute. 
 
2.4.5 Video Services – These services provide the capability to transmit and 
receive video communication signals to and from the operational area.  The 
importance of these video services, particularly Video Teleconferencing (VTC), 
cannot be understated.  In its simplest form video services would include 
commercial news feeds, but it can also include classified or unclassified Video 
Teleconferencing (VTC). 
Overall Weight: 6 
The capability of a platform to establish, maintain and employ these video 
services in coordinating and supporting the overall HA/DR response efforts is 
important.  The availability of these video services during a HA/DR response 
effort enhances communication between first responders and decision-makers.  
These services enable decision-makers and specialists (i.e. area, medical, 
infrastructure) located outside of the disaster area to provide real-time support to 
supplement the on-scene relief effort. 
Grading Criteria: Grading was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
establish, maintain, and employ these video transmissions.  The evaluation itself 
was primarily based on whether each individual platform had the capability (i.e. 
necessary equipment) and personnel required to receive, transmit, and operate 
these video services as required.  The following sub-attributes were considered: 
2.4.5.1 Defense Video Teleconferencing (VTC) System (Global): A 
classified, closed video network capable of voice, image, and 
data exchange supporting C2 functions of Department of 
Defense. 
2.4.5.1.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
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2.4.5.1.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
2.4.5.2 SCI-Level VTC: A classified, closed video network capable of 
voice, image, and data exchange supporting intelligence, and 
C2 functions of Department of Defense. 
2.4.5.2.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.5.2.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
2.4.5.3 Commercial News Feed: Commercial news feeds may be 
rebroadcast over Department of Defense communications 
system or received via a commercially leased terminal. 
2.4.5.3.1 Provide External Communications: GFS shall have 
the capability and capacity to provide tactical 
information through the use of external 
communications systems. 
2.4.5.3.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall have the 
capability and capacity to ensure controlled nets (voice 
and data) carry information appropriate to their 
function. 
CG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to maintain and operate all 
of these video services in support of HA/DR response efforts.  This platform is 
capable of employing VTC and receiving commercial news feeds. 
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LPD-17: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to maintain and 
operate all of these video services in support of HA/DR response efforts.  This 
platform is capable of employing VTC and receiving commercial news feeds. 
HSV: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to maintain and operate 
all of these video services in support of HA/DR response efforts.  This platform is 
capable of employing VTC and receiving commercial news feeds. 
AS: A grade of 30% is based on the lack of VTC capability for the AS.  This 
platform is only capable of receiving commercial news feeds. 
LHD/FFG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to maintain and 
operate all of these video services in support of HA/DR response efforts.  This 
platform is capable of employing VTC and receiving commercial news feeds.  
Pairing the FFG with the LHD provides no real communications benefit, other 
than redundancy, with regard to these video services.  Individually, the FFG 
would score a grade of 100% because it also possesses all of these video services. 
HSV/RORO:  A grade of 100% is based on the ability of an HSV/RORO 
combination to maintain and operate all of these video services in support of 
HA/DR response efforts.  This platform is capable of employing VTC and 
receiving commercial news feeds.  Pairing the HSV with the MPF(E) provides no 
real communications benefit with regard to these video services because the 
MPF(E) does not have a VTC capability. 
Attribute Summary: All of the platforms, with the exception of the AS, were 
capable of meeting the requirements of this attribute.  The lack of VTC equipment 
onboard the AS could be overcome by utilizing an IP-based video communication 
tool, however, it will not provide a medium for classified discussions.  This 
attribute also has a strong reliance on access to satellite communication networks.  
Here again, simply having the equipment and personnel onboard does not equate 
to a platform having the capability to communicate using these video services.  
Having dedicated satellite lease time and bandwidth could improve the overall 
effectiveness of the relief operation by enabling relief entities to coordinate and 
collaborate over these video services. 
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2.4.6 Satellite Communication Services - Satellite-based communication 
services have become the backbone of many critical operations and disaster 
recovery plans.  Satellites are the best and most reliable communication platform 
in these situations because fiber and terrestrial wireless networks can be disrupted 
by tsunamis, earthquakes, and hurricanes.  Satellite communications are highly 
survivable (physical survivability and robustness) and independent of terrestrial 
infrastructure.  They provide interoperability between disparate systems and 
networks, broadcast services over very wide areas, provide mobile wideband and 
narrow-band communications, and perform most effectively when terrestrial 
infrastructure is damaged, destroyed, or overloaded.  Simply put, satellites 
provide individuals with an instant communication infrastructure.  Satellite 
Communication Services is comprised of Wideband Services, Protected and 
Survivable Services, and Narrowband and Mobile Services. The satellite 




Figure 61:  Platform Satellite Communication Capabilities 
 
Overall Weight: 8 
The capability of a platform to provide access to these satellite services enables 
information flow between first responders and decision-makers, regardless of 
location or proximity of participants. 
Grading Criteria: Grading was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
establish and maintain connectivity over these satellite networks.  The evaluation 
itself was primarily based on the number and types of existing satellite 
communication assets available onboard each individual platform. The following 
sub-attributes were considered: 
2.4.6.1 Wideband Services: Provide high-capacity and broadcast 
communications coverage to meet increasing demands for 
information from military-owned and commercially leased 
satellite systems. 
2.4.6.1.1 Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS): 
Provides a GIG transmission backbone of high capacity 
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C2, intelligence and multi-channel communications 
service for the CCDRs, Services, and agencies. 
2.4.6.1.1.1 Provide External Communications: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to 
provide tactical information through the use 
of external communications systems. 
2.4.6.1.1.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to ensure 
controlled nets (voice and data) carry 
information appropriate to their function. 
2.4.6.1.2 Global Broadcast Service (GBS): Provides a wide 
range of video and/or data services on a broadcast-only 
basis to widely dispersed elements. 
2.4.6.1.2.1 Provide External Communications: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to 
provide tactical information through the use 
of external communications systems. 
2.4.6.1.2.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to ensure 
controlled nets (voice and data) carry 
information appropriate to their function. 
2.4.6.2 Protected and Survivable Services: Provide anti-jam, 
nuclear-survivable and LPD, intercept, and exploitation of 
communications capabilities including polar coverage are 
provided by military-owned and operated systems. 
2.4.6.2.1 Milstar: Supports strategic and tactical missions 
through secure global communications that are jam-
resistant and survivable.  Milstar is the core Department 
of Defense C2 communications system for US strategic 
and tactical combat forces in hostile environments. 
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2.4.6.2.1.1 Provide External Communications: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to 
provide tactical information through the use 
of external communications systems. 
2.4.6.2.1.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to ensure 
controlled nets (voice and data) carry 
information appropriate to their function. 
2.4.6.3 Narrowband and Mobile Services: Provide phone and data 
transfer capability for netted, mobile, hand-held, paging, and 
low speed broadcast. 
2.4.6.3.1 Ultrahigh Frequency Follow-on (UFO) and Fleet 
Satellite Communications (FLTSATCOM): Provide 
low-cost user terminals that are small and lightweight, 
and can be used while on the move, under adverse 
weather conditions and in dense foliage. 
2.4.6.3.1.1 Provide External Communications: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to 
provide tactical information through the use 
of external communications systems. 
2.4.6.3.1.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to ensure 
controlled nets (voice and data) carry 
information appropriate to their function. 
2.4.6.3.2 International Maritime Satellite (INMARSAT): 
Provides bulk use and pay-per-use alternatives that 
support information transfer requirements during both 
normal operations and periods of contingency or crisis. 
2.4.6.3.2.1 Provide External Communications: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to 
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provide tactical information through the use 
of external communications systems. 
2.4.6.3.2.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to ensure 
controlled nets (voice and data) carry 
information appropriate to their function. 
2.4.6.3.3 Iridium: Provides secure and non-secure voice and 
data services to Department of Defense tactical and 
non-tactical users. 
2.4.6.3.3.1 Provide External Communications: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to 
provide tactical information through the use 
of external communications systems. 
2.4.6.3.3.2 Control Communication Nets: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to ensure 
controlled nets (voice and data) carry 
information appropriate to their function. 
CG: A grade of 90% is based on the ability of a CG to establish, maintain, and 
employ all three types of satellite communication services.  This platform’s 
satellite communication suite is comparable to that possessed by the LHD in 
terms of overall capability, with its only diminishing characteristic being the lack 
of access to the Commercial Wideband Satellite Program (provides JWICS, 
SIPRNET, NIPRNET, VTC, POTS, and message traffic at a rate of 1.544-2.048 
Mbps). 
LPD-17: A grade of 85% is based on the ability of a LPD-17 to establish, 
maintain, and employ all three types of satellite communication services.  This 
platform’s satellite communication suite is comparable to that possessed by the 
LHD and CG in terms of overall capability, with its only diminishing 
characteristic being the lack of access to the Global Broadcast Service (provides 
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UAV video, weather/intelligence imagery, and Fox/CNN News) and INMARSAT 
B. 
HSV: A grade of 80% is based on the lack of satellite communication equipment 
and redundancy onboard HSV to establish, maintain, and employ all available 
satellite communication services.  The HSV’s dependence upon commercial 
INMARSAT, UHF SATCOM, mobile and a leased dual KU band antenna system 
for its satellite connectivity makes it a less attractive option with regards to this 
attribute. 
AS: A grade of 45% is based on the limited satellite communication capability 
provided by the AS.   This platform would be heavily dependent upon UHF 
SATCOM, INMARSAT, and mobile satellite communication in supporting 
HA/DR relief operations communication requirements.  The lack of modern 
satellite communication technology and redundancy associated with this 
platforms’ existing communication capability were major considerations in 
determining its low grade. 
LHD/FFG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a LHD to establish, 
maintain, and employ all three types of satellite communication services.  The 
LHD’s robust satellite communication suite, which includes EHF, SHF, UHF 
SATCOM, INMARSAT, and GBS, clearly makes it the ideal platform with 
regards to this particular attribute.  Pairing the FFG with the LHD provides no 
real communications benefit because of the FFGs limited satellite communication 
capability (INMARSAT and mobile). 
HSV/RORO: A grade of 80% is based on the lack of satellite communication 
equipment and redundancy onboard HSV to establish, maintain, and employ all 
available satellite communication services, as required.  The HSV’s dependence 
upon commercial INMARSAT, UHF SATCOM, mobile, and a leased dual KU 
band antenna system for its satellite connectivity makes it a less attractive option 
with regards to this attribute.  Pairing the MPF(E) with the HSV provides no real 
communications benefit because of the MPF(E)s limited satellite communication 
capability (reliant upon BEST for its satellite services). 
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Attribute Summary: The LHD has the most robust satellite communication suite 
of all platforms evaluated.  The CG, LPD-17, and HSV had comparable satellite 
communication capabilities; the five to ten percent variance was largely a factor 
of the LHD being able to provide redundant connectivity or services.  The poor 
evaluation for the AS regarding this trait is simply a result of the platform’s lack 
of satellite communication additions or upgrades (likely considered unnecessary 
based on its mission as a submarine tender). 
 
2.4.7 Communication Security – This security ensures the availability, 
integrity, identification, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation of 
friendly communication systems while denying adversaries access to the same 
communication systems. It also incorporates those actions taken to protect, 
monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department 
of Defense communication systems and networks.  Communication Security is 
comprised of Physical Security, Personnel Security, and Operational Security. 
Overall Weight: 5 
Communication security measures protect the information, communication 
equipment, and personnel from ever-present probes and threats.  Although the 
potential threat may be perceived as low for platforms operating in an austere 
environment, the numerous distractions and chaotic nature following a disaster 
could provide an ideal opportunity for determined adversaries to attack a 
platform’s communication architecture. 
Grading Criteria: Grading was focused on evaluating the ability of a platform to 
establish, maintain, and employ appropriate communication security measures as 
required while operating in an austere environment.  This evaluation was 
primarily based on whether each individual platform had the capability (i.e. 
necessary equipment), directives, and personnel required to enact and enforce 
these security requirements.  The following sub-attributes were considered: 
2.4.7.1 Physical Security: Security with regards to the 
communications system components and facilities. 
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2.4.7.2 Personnel Security: Security with regards to individuals 
authorized access to the communications system. 
2.4.7.3 Operational Security: Procedures and techniques protecting 
operational employment of the communications system 
components. 
2.4.7.3.1 Information Assurance: Measures that protect and 
defend information and information systems by 
ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, 
confidentiality, and non-repudiation.  This includes 
providing for restoration of information systems by 
incorporating protection, detection, and reaction 
capabilities. 
2.4.7.3.1.1  Provide Information Security: GFS shall 
have the capability and capacity to ensure 
the security of information and the 
communications system through 
information protection, intrusion/attack 
detection and effect isolation, and incident 
response to restore information and system 
security. 
2.4.7.3.1.2 Provide Communications Security: GFS 
shall have the capability and capacity to 
protect communication systems from 
exploitation, disruption, or destruction is 
of highest priority. 
2.4.7.3.2 Computer Network Defense (CND): Actions taken to 
protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to 
unauthorized activity within Department of Defense 
information systems and computer networks.  CND also 
involves the employment of intelligence, 
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counterintelligence, law enforcement and other military 
capabilities to defend Department of Defense 
information and computer networks. 
2.4.7.3.2.1 Sustainable: GFS shall have the capability 
and capacity to provide continuous support 
during any type and length of operation.  
This requires economical design and 
employment of the communications system 
without sacrificing operational capability or 
survivability. 
2.4.7.3.2.2 Shared: GFS shall have the capability and 
capacity to allow for the mutual use of 
information services or capabilities between 
operational area entities.  This ability may 
cross functional or organizational 
boundaries. 
CG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a CG to establish, maintain, and 
employ appropriate communication security measures that protect the physical 
communication spaces and equipment, personnel, and daily operations of the 
platform. 
LPD-17: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a LPD-17 to establish, 
maintain, and employ appropriate communication security measures that protect 
the physical communication spaces and equipment, personnel, and daily 
operations of the platform. 
HSV: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV to establish, maintain, 
and employ appropriate communication security measures that protect the 
physical communication spaces and equipment, personnel, and daily operations of 
the platform. 
AS: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of an AS to establish, maintain, and 
employ appropriate communication security measures that protect the physical 
 220
communication spaces and equipment, personnel, and daily operations of the 
platform. 
LHD/FFG: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of the LHD and the FFG to 
establish, maintain, and employ appropriate communication security measures 
that protect the physical communication spaces and equipment, personnel, and 
daily operations of these platforms.  Pairing the FFG with the LHD provides no 
real benefit with regard to these communication security requirements. 
HSV/RORO: A grade of 100% is based on the ability of a HSV and the MPF(E) 
to establish, maintain, and employ appropriate communication security measures 
that protect the physical communication spaces and equipment, personnel, and 
daily operations of these platforms.  Pairing the HSV with the MPF(E) provides 
no real benefit with regard to these communication security requirements. 
Attribute Summary: All of the platforms, both individually and as paired, were 
capable of meeting the security requirements of this attribute based on existing 
doctrinal, personnel, and physical Department of Defense or Department of the 
Navy communication security certifications, qualifications, or mandates. 
 
c. Platform Performance Calculations 
  Figure 62 details the results that we tabulated for the HA/DR mission with 
Excel.  The results are broken down by function and then further broken down by 
attributes.  Each platform was scored and then the value score was calculated using the 
weights that were given.   
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Figure 62:  HA/DR Total Value Calculations and Results 
 
3. Summary 
Incorporating our scenario-based weighting into each platform’s attribute score 
gave us a total weighted score for each system alternative.  The following list denotes the 
outcomes of current capability platforms and their ability, shown in terms of a percentage 
out of 100, to carry out the HA/DR mission in the previously described scenario: 
 
Overall   CG LPD-17 AS HSV LHD/FFG HSV/RORO 
Performance   59% 87% 75% 78% 94% 82% 
Figure 63:  Platform Alternatives Results for HA/DR 
 










For the HA/DR mission, the most important function was communications, 
followed by the logistics and infrastructure components (the Logistic and Infrastructure 
functions have some the same characteristics).  The LHD/FFG combination scored higher 
than other alternatives because the LHD has a strong communication suite and are thus 
able to provide adequate command and control support for HA/DR operations.  The LHD 
has sufficient cargo space to carry the necessary HA/DR supplies and equipment, in 
addition to possessing the embarked assets to transport those supplies ashore.  The FFG 
adds to the HA/DR mission by bringing some command-and-control capability, as well 
as additional assets to support transportation requirements. 
 
E. INTERAGENCY & NGO COORDINATION 
 
1. Scenario Overview 
 The purpose of this scenario was to provide a realistic context by which to 
evaluate GFS system alternatives within the specific mission area of utilizing NGO 
support.  The scope of the scenario was limited to “testing” GFS-only capabilities. We 
accomplished this by using the scenario to determine relative importance of GFS 
attributes (weighting) and developing critical measures of effectiveness, thereby 
effectively evaluating overall system performance each alternative in this mission of 
NGO & Interagency Coordination. 
 We focused our scenario on healthcare, specifically the HIV/AIDS epidemic 
endemic to the population of West Africa.   Our reasons for selecting this scenario were 
twofold:  the availability of data relative to other NGO & Interagency related issues, and 
its pertinence to regional stability.  Information pertaining to the HIV/AIDS issue was 
more readily available and credible than we discovered with other needs of the region. 
For example, AIDS rates are easier to identify and measure than the effects on human 
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populations by the erosion of lands caused by poor management of the forest industry.  In 
addition, the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate remains a direct threat to regional stability:  One 
article cites “the growing number of orphans left by HIV/AIDS, who could gravitate 
toward criminal activities and accelerate destabilization in the region.”159 
 In addition, we chose a logistically challenging scenario, understanding that in the 
current state of relations between military and civilian agencies, several of their shared 
endeavors fail to achieve coordination beyond the transportation and supply of those 
agencies.   With this in mind, we presented an extreme case of logistical support for three 
NGO detachments, semi-equally separated throughout the entire Gulf of Guinea region, 
with one each in Liberia, Cameroon, and Angola.  Though we intended the geographic 
spacing to push the logistics envelope, this decision did not add an artificial element to 
our scenario:  all three countries possess AIDS epidemics, with Cameroon accounting for 
one of the highest in the region (see Appendix A). 
 Our scenario presented a plausible method in measuring the value of each asset’s 
performance of each attribute. Scoring the vessels’ values against attributes within each 
mid-level mission, we had to consider what impact the scenario had on those missions in 
order to understand their impacts on the value scoring within each attribute.  In essence, 
we factored in the importance of our attributes not by applying the scenario directly to 
them, but to their parent mid-level missions, and then weighting those missions to factor 
into our total value score for each platform alternative.    
 
a. Scenario Context 
  The scenario is projected through the year 2012 and is portrayed as 
follows:  The GFS is commencing her maiden deployment to the Gulf of Guinea Area of 
Operations (AO).  She is intending to conduct multinational exercises with partner 
nations in the region.  One of the primary mission areas of GFS, Interagency/NGO 
integration, is being conducted by a NGO, Project Hope. GFS is supporting Project Hope 
_____________________ 
159. Booz Allen Hamilton, The Greater Gulf of Guinea Simulation: Maintaining Sufficient Stability to 




in combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic through prevention, care, treatment, and support in 
three countries; Liberia, Cameroon, Angola. GFS’ unique capabilities enable her to 
deliver, house, and support Project Hope in their mission. 
   
b. Key Assumptions  
  The following assumptions were made, and would impact how our 
scenario evolved, and how it would impact the scores of each of the GFS alternatives 
within it: 
 
 The governments of Liberia, Cameroon, and Angola are accepting GFS 
and NGO support; therefore, no restriction of port usage or movement 
exists through their waters. 
 There is no direct threat to the security and safety of NGO personnel and 
equipment during their initial deployment in each country. 
 Each NGO detachment to each country has the same number of personnel 
(50) and equipment in conducting their mission. 
 GFS will not provide security to personnel associated to the NGO while 
ashore. 
 Only supporting NGOs that is inherent to GFS, not others that maybe 
working in the region. GFS will only provide minimal support ashore to 
each detachment. 
 If using a helicopter or LCAC asset, the vessel utilizing these assets will 
be 3 nautical miles offshore. 
 The duration of logistical support to the NGO is 6-months.  
 Because of the amount of cargo/vehicles that a NGO wants or usually 
takes with them to the desired country, an LHD’s capability for 
cargo/vehicle space is considered the maximum allowed. 
 NGO personnel and their equipment will be on-loaded in Rota, Spain.  
 Once the NGO personnel and equipment are delivered to their respective 
country, they will be self sufficient in fulfilling their own logistical needs 
to conduct their mission.  
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 GFS will only provide the initial and final transportation of personnel, 
equipment, and supplies.  
 
c. NGO Phases of Operation Applied to Scenario Context   
  Some NGOs, such as Project Hope, describe their missions in terms of 
phases.  These phases include such elements as planning, organization, and methods of 
administering aid once ashore. 
  
   1)  Solicitation/Planning for NGO Involvement (Phase 1):  Project 
Hope proposes the need for a 5-year plan with 18-month, 12-month, 6-month, 3- month 
and 30 day preplanning meetings prior to execution of the agreed mission. Countries, 
training themes, mission elements should be laid out 12-18 months ahead of time in order 
to allow planners to flesh out details, build teams, gather equipment, tools, etc. Each 
country needs a detailed pre-deployment situation assessment 12-18 months out to 
determine exactly what the customer (Host Country) wants. Addressing the needs - and to 
what extent that can be accomplished - are based on what the Department of Defense and 
NGO(s) can provide. In our case, our platform alternative is what the Navy would 
provide; in the case of the NGOs, they would provide a Capacity Building Team (CBT). 
  Education about the epidemic takes “center stage,” and is provided 
by one type of CBT – a Health Professional Education team - to address the needs of 
physician, nurse, ancillary health workers, local health clinics, health officials on 
prevention, treatment.  In addition, they provide health education materials to educate 
indigenous population, mothers, teens, fathers, and village elders. 
   For a short-term visit to Gulf of Guinea (6 months), Project Hope 
can be expected to provide the following services:  
 
 HIV and AIDs nursing educators (educated in contraception, disease, 
prevention) 
 Infectious disease physicians 
 Infectious disease nurses 
 HIV/AIDS counselor trainer 
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 Rapid ELISA tests for HIV detection 
 Universal precaution kits, gloves, sharps containers, laminated “how to” 
signage for kits 
 Contraceptive devices, condoms 
 
Such methods to addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemics in Liberia, Cameroon and Angola 
would obviously impact scoring criteria within our attributes. 
 
  2) Transportation/Sea Basing of NGO (Phase II): The requirements 
for equipment/supplies needed for the CBTs have been previously identified and 
assembled at the port of embarkation, Rota, Spain. The platforms of consideration would 
on-load the necessary equipment/supplies; limited to the ship’s physical capacity or the 
pre-determined amount of equipment/supplies.  The three Project Hope CBTs will 
embark the vessel and sail to their respective mission areas. Once all equipment/supplies 
are loaded, the platform will deploy. 
 
  3) Deployment of NGO (Phase III):  The ports of Monrovia, 
Liberia; Douala, Cameroon; and Luanda, Angola will be used to off-load all equipment 
and supplies for the CBT. After the initial setup for Project Hope’s CBT, minimal GFS 
personnel will be on hand for the facilitation of communication between GFS and Project 
Hope personnel. 
 
  4) Withdrawal of NGO (Phase IV):  Withdrawal is undertaken 
when Project Hope has deemed its mission accomplished or commencement of hostile 
action is imminent which threatens the livelihood of NGO/GFS personnel. Should Project 
Hope’s mission extend beyond 6-months, the Combat Commander will assume 
responsibility of the CBT. GFS/Project Hope personnel will de-erect all structures that 
were built; goal is to leave the place of interest as the day Project Hope arrived. All 
equipment/supplies will be loaded in their respective ports. Should hostile action arise in 
an accelerated or unexpected manner, at the very minimum, the evacuation of personnel 
will be the only priority via an air asset. The platform will transport Project Hope’s 
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personnel and equipment back to the port of embarkation, Rota, Spain. Once unloaded, 
the mission will be complete. 
 
d. Scenario Characteristics 
  To identify a gap, we had to quantify current capability in terms of what 
we wanted to measure, as well as quantify what the NGOs demanded of our ship 
alternatives.  The current capabilities are summarized in the following paragraphs, 
calculations and figures. 
 
  Port Information:  
 
Monrovia; Draft: 30ft at berth160 
Douala; Draft: 27.88ft at berth161 
Luanda; Draft: 31ft at berth162 
 
 Asset Capabilities/Aviation/Amphibious Complement:  
 
RORO Container: Cargo Ship (AKR); 1st LT Harry L. Martin163 
Speed, knots: 18    Complement: 23 plus 100 marines 
Range, n miles: 17,000 at 17kts   Draft: 36.1 
Dimensions, feet: 754.3 x 106    Cargo Capacity: 168,547sq ft. Vehicle 
735 TEU 
 
CG Ticonderoga Class 164 
Speed, knots: 30+    Complement: 358 
Range, n miles: 6,000 at 20 kt   Draft: 33 ft 
_____________________ 
160. OT Africa Line, “Liberia,” http://www.otal.com/liberia/index.htm. 
161. OT Africa Line, “Cameroon,” http://www.otal.com/cameroon/index.htm. 
162.  OT Africa Line, “Angola,” http://www.otal.com/angola/index.htm. 
163. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 916. 
164. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 877. 
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Dimensions, feet: 567 x 55    Cargo Capacity: None 
 
LPD San Antonio Class165 
Speed, knots: 22    Complement: 360 plus 24 spare 
Range, n miles:     Draft: 23 ft 
Dimensions, feet: 683.7 x 104.7    Cargo Capacity: 24,000 sq ft; vehicles 
        34,000 cu ft, cargo 
      Lift: 720-800 troops 
 
LHD Wasp Class166 
Speed, knots: 22    Complement: 1,123 
Range, n miles: 9,500 at 20 kt    Draft: 27 ft 
Dimensions: 788 x 140.1    Cargo Capacity: 20,000 sq ft vehicles 
        125,000 cu ft, cargo 
      Lift: 1,800 troops 
 
FFG Oliver Hazard Perry Class167 
Speed, knots: 29    Complement: 200 
Range, n miles: 4,500 at 20kt    Draft, feet: 24.5  
Dimensions, feet: 453 x 45    Cargo Capacity: None 
 
AS Emory S Land Class: Submarine Tender168 
Speed, knots: 20    Complement: 1,363(AS39); 1,341(AS40) 
Range, n miles: 10,000 at 12kt   Draft, feet: 28.5  
Dimensions, feet: 643.8 x 85   Cargo Capacity: None 
 
HSV High Speed Logistics Support Vessel (Swift)169 
_____________________ 
165. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 900. 
166. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 896. 
167. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 866. 
168. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 907. 
169. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007),  913. 
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Speed, knots: 48(light); 38(full load)  Complement: 42 
Range, n miles: 2,400 at 35 kt   Draft, feet: 11 ft (FAS) 
Dimensions, feet: 321.5 x 87.3    Cargo Capacity: 22,000 sq ft w/ 250 personnel 
        350 short tons (PP slide) 
 
LCAC Landing Craft Air Cushion170 
Speed, knots: 40; loaded 25   Complement: 5 
Range, n miles: 300 at 35 kt   Draft, feet: 2.9 
Dimensions, feet: 88 LOA x 47   Cargo Capacity: 23 troops or 60-75 tons 
      Throughput, tons/hr: 307 
 
SH-60B Seahawk171 
Speed, knots: 145; loaded: 110   Range, n miles: 450 
Cargo Capacity, tons: 3 (cargo hook)  Throughput, tons/hr: 62.5 
            2 (internal)  
 
CH-46E Sea Knight172 
Speed, knots: 137; loaded: 110   Range, n miles: 180 
Cargo Capacity, tons: 1.3(net) 4.5(sling)  Throughput, tons/hr: 93.8  
 
CH-53 E Super Stallion173 
Speed, knots: 150; loaded: 110   Range, n miles: 480 
Cargo Capacity, tons: 16   Throughput, tons/hr: 333.6  
 
  The following chart depicts each platform’s capability in carrying cargo 
and vehicles; it also displays the ability of each platform to pull into the above-mentioned 
ports of the scenario, with platform draft and port depth comprising the criteria. 
_____________________ 
170. Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 11, Systems Engineering and Analysis Total Ship Systems 
Engineering (master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 194. 
171. Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 11, Systems Engineering and Analysis Total Ship Systems 
Engineering (master’s thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 203. 
172. Stephen Saunders, ed., Jane’s Fighting Ships 2006-2007 (UK: Cambridge University Press, 
2007), 890. 
173. Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 11, Systems Engineering and Analysis Total Ship Systems 




Figure 64:  Vessel Cargo Capacities 
 
  The chart below represents how much cargo/vehicle space is allotted per 
NGO detachment (I.E. total platform capacity divided by three). 
 
 




  Transit Distance:174  
 
  Rota, Spain to Monrovia Liberia: 2,151nm 
                        Monrovia, Liberia to Douala, Cameroon: 1,271nm 
  Douala, Cameroon to Luanda, Angola: 937nm   
           Luanda, Angola to Rota, Spain: 3,851nm 
          Total Transit Distance: 8,210nm 
  
 Travel Time: Based on each platform’s transit speed, the following charts 
indicate the total travel time and time between each port; starting and ending in Rota, 
Spain. 
 
Figure 66:  Vessel Speeds 
 
Time Distance  Time between Ports (days)  Arrival Day; Transit Speed 
CG   Max Speed Transit Speed    
Rota Monrovia 2.99 6.40  Monrovia 6.40 
Monrovia Douala 1.77 3.78  Douala 11.18 
Doula Luanda 1.30 2.79  Luanda 14.97 
Luanda Rota 5.35 11.46  Rota 27.43 
       
LPD       
Rota Monrovia 3.59 6.40  Monrovia 6.40 
_____________________ 
174. SeaRates.com, “Sea Rates,” http://www.searates.com/container/shippingline/. 
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Monrovia Douala 2.12 3.78  Douala 11.18 
Doula Luanda 1.56 2.79  Luanda 14.97 
Luanda Rota 6.42 11.46  Rota 27.43 
       
HSV       
Rota Monrovia 1.87 2.36  Monrovia 2.36 
Monrovia Douala 1.10 1.39  Douala 4.75 
Doula Luanda 0.81 1.03  Luanda 6.78 
Luanda Rota 3.34 4.22  Rota 12.00 
       
RORO       
Rota Monrovia 4.98 6.40  Monrovia 6.40 
Monrovia Douala 2.94 3.78  Douala 11.18 
Doula Luanda 2.17 2.79  Luanda 14.97 
Luanda Rota 8.91 11.46  Rota 27.43 
       
FFG       
Rota Monrovia 3.09 6.40  Monrovia 6.40 
Monrovia Douala 1.83 3.78  Douala 11.18 
Doula Luanda 1.35 2.79  Luanda 14.97 
Luanda Rota 5.53 11.46  Rota 27.43 
       
LHD       
Rota Monrovia 4.07 6.40  Monrovia 6.40 
Monrovia Douala 2.41 3.78  Douala 11.18 
Doula Luanda 1.77 2.79  Luanda 14.97 
Luanda Rota 7.29 11.46  Rota 27.43 
       
AS       
Rota Monrovia 4.48 7.47  Monrovia 7.47 
Monrovia Douala 2.65 4.41  Douala 12.88 
Doula Luanda 1.95 3.25  Luanda 17.14 
Luanda Rota 8.02 13.37  Rota 31.51 




  Throughput Rate Calculations175: 
 
 LCAC:  Based on a distance of 3 nm, the throughput of the LCAC going 
from the supply ship to the location of debarkation, close to the port 
destination is (60 tons)*(25 nm/hr)/(3 nm) = 500 tons/hr.  This value does 
not take into account the time to load, unload, and return to the supply ship 
to begin a new run. Taking into account the return trip to the supply ship, 
the throughput is (60 tons)/[(3 nm/25 nm/hr)+(3 nm /40 nm/hr)] =307 
tons/hr. 
 SH-60B: External load; 3 tons, 3 tons/[3 nm/110 nm/hr)+(3 nm / 145 
nm/hr)]= 62.5 tons/hr.   
 CH-46E: External load; 4.5 tons, 16/[3 nm/110 nm/hr)+(3 nm / 145 
nm/hr)]= 93.8 tons/hr 
 CH-53E: External load; 16 tons, 16/[3 nm/110 nm/hr)+(3 nm / 145 
nm/hr)]= 333.6 tons/hr 
 
 The following chart depicts the results of our computations: 
 
 
Figure 68:  Connector Throughput 
 
  The next chart combines the total connector throughput capabilities to 
each platform. We based the number of helicopters and LCACs a platform could carry on 
the individual platform’s capability to inherently support those assets: 
_____________________ 
175. Systems Engineering Analysis Cohort 11, Systems Engineering and Analysis Total Ship Systems 
Engineering (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007), 195. 
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Figure 69:  Total Throughput per Platform Alternative 
 
  Cargo Calculation Assumptions: 
 
 1 TEU: 1,360 FT3; 20 ft container dimensions: 20’ x 8’ x 8.5’176 
 1 Ton = 40 FT3 177 
 # of Vehicles a vessel can carry: 1 vehicle = size of a Chevrolet Suburban 
(2006) =  235.2ft2 with 2ft of space added to each side of vehicle.178 
 
Based upon the above calculations, the chart below summarizes each platforms ability to 
carry cargo in tons and number of vehicles (Chevrolet Surburban size 2006 GMT800) 
 
 
Figure 70:  NGO Tonnage Conversions 
 
   
_____________________ 
176 Emase, [cited September, 2007]; http://www.emase.co.uk/data/cont.html 
177 Sizes, [cited September, 2007]; Available from http: //www.sizes.com/units/ton.htm 
178 Wikipedia, [cited September, 2007]; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chevy_Suburban 
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  NGO “Success” Metrics: 
 
   Project Hope has its own measure of success metrics. They follow: 
 
 Safe return of all volunteers (VOLS) 
 Conduct of mission within budget 
 No accidents or serious injury of VOLS 
 
Other measures of success could not be determined from our contact with Project Hope.  
 
f. Desired End-State 
 It is hoped the efforts of Project Hope, via GFS, enhances health of the 
population by reducing the HIV/AIDS prevalence rate, which in turn will foster increased 
stability to the host country.  
 
2. Weighting and Grading of NGO & Interagency Coordination 
Attributes 
 
a. Overview of Approach 
 For the Inter-Agency / NGO Coordination mission, the scenario 
influenced our grading of ship performance.  The attributes which supported the mid 
level missions were each given an “attribute weight,” which attempted to give a value of 
the relative importance of each attribute (attribute weight) within the mid-level mission it 
supported.  Scenario impact on our attributes was factored via the mid-level functions 
themselves, with weights assigned to each mid-level mission (scenario weight) according 
to their importance in the scenario.  For example, the 2nd Embassy mission was weighted 
low, as our HIV/AIDS scenario did not demand that an embassy be relocated.  Each 
platform alternative (ship or combination of ships) was then graded (scored) based on its 
ability to fulfill the criteria of each attribute, with the weights and scores within each 
attribute, and for each ship, culminating in a total value score derived out of the 
supported mid-level missions and their scenario weights.   
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b. Attribute Outcomes 
 The following is an evaluation of each of the attributes and their weights, 
which ultimately lead to determining the best ship alternative for accomplishing this 
mission. 
 
3.1       2nd Embassy:  The ability to provide the means for State Department, and 
other governmental and non governmental agencies inherent to GFS to 
conduct administrative and diplomatic aspects of their missions in addition 
to serving as actual U.S. Embassy in case of an emergency evacuation of 
land based embassy. 
Scenario Weight: 2 
By having the ability to act as a 2nd Embassy, the platform(s) will have the 
ability to act in accordance with the inter-agency and NGO coordination 
goals emphasized in our strategic guidance.  We recognized the 
importance of this, but the coordination aspect of this function was 
considered a relatively low priority simply due to the fact that 
coordination between NGOs, State Department, and the military at sea 
still remains in a state of infancy, and our project (as stated earlier in the 
FAA), simply did not find the resources available to prescribe 
improvements to interagency coordination aboard ship.  Regarding the 
need to actually function as a second embassy, we would have ranked it 
more highly in the event of working in an austere environment where 
embassies ceased to work.  Such is not the case in Cameroon, Angola, or 
Liberia – and we elected not to add such a circumstance into our scenario.  
Within the realm of our scenario, this function ranks relatively low due to 
our scenario’s focus on healthcare, and on the assumption that working 
embassies will exist in each country in 2012. 
 
3.1.1   Coordination Center:  GFS will have the capability of 
coordinating Inter-Agency/NGO efforts with DEPARTMENT OF 
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DEFENSE efforts. This coordination center will have the proper 
command and control features to facilitate communication between 
parties of interest; each specific to its host nation. (Make due with 
space available) 
 Attribute Weight: 5  
The reason why Coordination Center is weighted a 5 is due to the 
fact that while it is important to have the ability and capacity to 
conduct coordination efforts, the frequency and sophistication of 
necessary equipment is not that high.   
Value Score Criteria:  The basis of the criteria is each alternatives 
communications suite and availability of spaces to conduct 
meetings and planning events.  The scores across the board are 
high due to the fact that the sophistication of communication 
equipment is low.  Although the space available for planning and 
meeting is low on some alternatives as compared to others, it is 
assumed the each platform will make do with the space available 
to accommodate the necessary meetings and planning events.  It is 
often inconvenient to utilize spaces such as the mess decks and 
wardroom for meetings.  However, necessity requires meetings to 
be held,  those spaces would be used accordingly. 
CG:  Grade of 90%. Superb communications suite (SHF, EHF, 
TV-DTS, UHF), but lacks in the extra space needed to 
accommodate all the additional personnel.  There only limited 
spaces where people can conduct meetings and planning 
conferences. 
LPD:  Grade of 95%. Superb communications suite (SHF, EHF, 
TV-DTS, UHF) for the tasks required, has the extra space needed 
to accommodate all the additional personnel, but not as much 
space as the LHD.  
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HSV:  Grade of 90%.  The HSV harbors the necessary 
communications equipment to complete the required tasks. But its 
communications suite is not to the level of a CG or LPD.  The 
HSV does not have SHF capabilities, although it does have 
INMARSAT.  Additionally, its adaptability will allow it host a 
number of the additional personnel required. 
AS:  Grade of 90%.  The AS was not designed for a significant 
communication suite.  It has the same communications equipment 
as the HSV.  The ability of the AS to accommodate the space 
requirements offset the lack of a complex communication suite. 
LHD/FFG:  Grade of 100%.  The combined communications 
suites in addition to the space on the LHD to accommodate the 
additional personnel give it the max score. 
HSV/RORO:  Grade of 90%.  The RORO doesn’t bring anything 
to the table when it comes to communications. It only has 
INMARSAT.  The HSV / RORO combination will rely on the 
HSV’s ability to communicate therefore, the combination receives 
the same score as the HSV alone. 
 
3.1.2 Communicate Information:  To send and receive internal and 
external data.  This activity includes obtaining, relaying, and 
distributing data and information by any means including 
establishing communication links with service, joint, interagency, 
intra-agency, and coalition forces.  Information can include the 
mission, courses of action, air-tasking orders, operational plans and 
orders, intelligence, environmental conditions, friendly troop/unit 
status and location, relaying I&W information, and other reports. 
Attribute Weight: 7 
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Without the ability to communicate, NGO and Interagency efforts 
with military assets are limited to within line-of-sight, severely 
impacting operations ashore. 
 Value Score Criteria:  While the focus of 3.1.1 was on the overall 
communications suite, this attribute graded each alternative on 
specifics of the communication suite, taking into account data 
links, and the ability to communicate more tactical information. 
CG:  Grade of 100%.  The CG has the communications suite 
capability to host all the communication needs of a DESRON staff; 
therefore it is fully capable to host the needs of any 2nd embassy 
organization or department.  Additionally, it has secure EHF 
communications in case it is necessary to conduct secure 
communications.  The CG’s communications suite is robust 
enough to handle any necessary communications.  
LPD:  Grade of 85%.  While the LPD communication suite is 
sufficient, it is not up to par with the CG or LHD therefore 
relegating it to third in the rankings.  The LPD has the major 
communications gear SHF, UHF.  However, it lacks in the tactical 
communications area. It does not have SINCGARS, BFEM.  
Therefore, the CG and LHD, which have those assets, score higher. 
HSV:  Grade of 80%.  The HSV does not have the tactical data 
links (Link 11, Link 16), that the CG, FFG, LHD, LPD have.  It 
was not designed for those tactical purposes.   
AS:  Grade of 75%.  As a submarine tender it is not designed or 
equipped with the necessary tactical communication suites 
LHD/FFG:  Grade of 100%.  The combined communications 
suites in addition to the space on the LHD designed to 
accommodate a contingency such as the kind that would be 
employed when acting as a 2nd embassy   contribute to the grade of 
100%.  LHD’s are frequently utilized as command centers when 
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operating in an ESG, therefore the capability of being used as a 2nd 
embassy  is not far strung. 
HSV/RORO:  Grade of 80%.  The HSV does not have the 
tactical data links (Link 11, Link 16), that the CG, FFG, LHD 
have.  The RORO brings nothing to the table, in terms of 
communications. 
 
3.2   Storage of US Agency/NGO equipment:  The ability to transport the 
equipment and supplies necessary to conduct the stated mission from the 
point of on load to the final destination. 
Scenario Weight: 9 
 
3.2.1 Storage:  GFS will have adequate space and secure storage 
facilities onboard a ship or shore for the purposes of transporting 
cargo.  
Attribute Weight: 10  
The primary mission of the GFS in this scenario is to carry 
supplies to the region in support of the NGOs; therefore, the ability 
to store cargo is weighted a 10 (the highest score allowable).   
Value Score Criteria: The criteria for measuring storage was the 
capacity for each alternative to store cargo.  Cargo is broken down 
into two categories: Vehicles and Non-Vehicles (called cargo).  
Both the ability to carry vehicles and carry cargo was weighted 
differently.  We thought it was more important to carry cargo than 
it was to carry vehicles.  Space for vehicles is measured in square 
feet, and space for cargo is measured in cubic feet.  The scores are 
based off the amount of space of each alternative compared the 
amount of space on the alternative with the largest capacity for 
carrying either vehicles (LHD) or cargo (LPD).  The amount of 
space available on the RORO was considered excessive.  
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Therefore, the space available on the LHD (for cargo) and LPD 
(for vehicles) provided the same utility and gave us a more 
reasonable capacity number to base our alternatives.   
CG:  Grade of 0%.  The CG has negligible capacity to carry any 
cargo (vehicles or general cargo).  In our study we allotted the CG 
two helicopters, therefore eliminating any cargo capacity that 
would have existed by utilizing the helicopter hangers. 
LPD:  Grade of 53%. With a vehicle capacity of 24,000 ft3 it has 
the largest amount of space for vehicles.  But, its capacity to carry 
cargo is significantly less than that of an LHD.   
HSV:  Grade of 40%. The HSV performs well in capacity to 
carry vehicles with 22,000 ft2 of deck space, compared to the 
LPD’s 24,000ft2.  However, just as the LPD falls short in the cargo 
capacity element, so does the HSV. 
AS:  Grade of 30%.  Of all the alternatives (CG excluded) the AS 
scores the least because of its inability to carry vehicles at all.   
LHD/FFG:  Grade of 100%.  Although the LHD does not have 
the largest capacity of the alternatives, it has the same utility of the 
largest capacity.  Therefore, the LHD/FFG combination received 
the score of 100%   
HSV/RORO:  Grade of 100%.  By far it has the most cargo 
capacity of the alternatives, with the capacities of nearly 1,000,000 
ft3 of space for cargo and 127,000 ft2 for vehicles.   
 
3.3  Sustaining US Agency/NGO personnel:  The ability to support the 
embarked personnel with adequate quality of life necessities while 
underway to their ultimate destination. 
  Scenario Weight: 5 
Although the GFS’ mission is to support NGOs, we decided it was more 
important to have the ability to store and transport cargo, than to sustain 
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personnel.  Supporting personnel received a weight of 5 for that reason.  It 
is important but not mission critical.  Sustaining personnel was broken 
down into two categories Messing and Berthing.  Each was weighted the 
same.   
 
3.3.1   Messing:  GFS will have the capability to provide messing to the 
involved personnel onboard a ship/platform or shore facility. This 
includes the capability to properly store, prepare, distribute, and 
dispose food and liquid. 
Attribute Weight: 7  
Personnel require sustenance to function. 
Value Score Criteria:  The criteria used to determine the score for 
each alternative was the inherent ability of each asset to feed the 
additional personnel without affecting the needs of the crew.  This 
seems trivial as all alternatives should be able to feed everyone on 
board. However, the HSV has special needs that have to be taken 
into account when adding additional riders. 
CG:  Grade of 100%. The asset has to the ability to feed all 
additional NGO personnel onboard. 
LPD:  Grade of 100%.  . The asset has to the ability to feed all 
additional NGO personnel onboard.   
HSV:  Grade of 100%. The asset has to the ability to feed all 
additional NGO personnel onboard.  However, the HSV can only 
supply 100 passengers A-rations for 10 days.  In the context of the 
scenario, the passengers will not be embarked in excess of ten 
days.  Therefore, the 10-day A-ration limitation will not be 
reached.  
AS:  Grade of 100%.  The asset has to the ability to feed all 
additional NGO personnel onboard.   
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LHD/FFG:  Grade of 100%.  The asset has to the ability to feed 
all additional NGO personnel onboard.   
HSV/RORO:  Grade of 100%.  The asset has to the ability to 
feed all additional NGO personnel onboard.   
 
3.3.2 Berthing:  This includes the needed facilities for rest, sleep, and 
sanitation. 
Attribute Weight: 7  
Berthing received an attribute weight of 7 because, while it is 
important to have the ability to carry personnel to the region, the 
mission would not fail if only supplies were brought via GFS, with 
the personnel airlifted into theater.   
Value Score Criteria:  We scored the ships based the ability of 
the platform or combination of platforms to berth the 150 people in 
our scenario.  If the alternative could not accommodate all 150 
people, the platform was graded on the percentage of 150 people it 
could carry. 
CG:  Grade of 10%.  The CG is not designed to carry very many 
additional passengers.  Therefore, we assumed the most riders the 
CG could carry (without leaving crew members behind) was 15.  
15 is 10% of 150.   
LPD:  Grade of 100%.  With the ability to house nearly 800 
Marines, the LPD was easily able to house our 150 people.   
HSV:  Grade of 50%.  The HSV has the capacity to carry 75 
passengers in temporary racks.   
AS:  Grade of 75%.  The AS has the capacity to carry an 
additional 100 passengers.   
LHD/FFG:  Grade of 100%.  Just as the LPD has the capacity to 
house Marines, so does the LHD.  The LHD’s ability to 
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accommodate over 1,000 Marines makes up for the fact that the 
FFG only has the ability to house about 10-15 personnel. 
HSV/RORO:  Grade of 100%.  While the HSV can only 
accommodate an additional 75 passengers, the RORO has the 
ability to house 100 persons.     
 
3.4   Logistic support for US Agency/NGO personnel and equipment:  The 
ability to provide the necessary support in order to establish and sustain 
operations for NGOs that are based ashore.  
Scenario Weight: 10 
The fundamental purpose of utilizing GFS for Interagencies and NGOs is 
transporting personnel, equipment, and supplies to the designated country. 
Many Gulf of Guinea nations do not possess a robust transportation 
infrastructure. By affording the capability to on-load, transport, and off-
load equipment, personnel and supplies to virtually any country in the 
Gulf of Guinea region, allows NGOs that could not previously conduct 
their missions due to traditional transportation constraints in a logistical 
barren region. It also allows the NGO the potential to bring more supplies, 
personnel, and equipment to the region since many of the analyzed vessels 
have the capacity to carry an enormous amount of cargo or vehicles 
compared to traditional means of transporting goods to the Gulf of Guinea 
region.  
 
3.4.1    Transportation:  To distribute logistics support in the form of 
material support services by employing transportation services.  
Also GFS needs to move material or personnel by carrier via small 
boat, or aircraft when available.  This task includes technical 
operations, moving, and evacuation of cargo, personnel, and 
equipment.  At aerial and seaports of debarkation, responsibilities 
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of transportation support include off-load, operational control of 
beaches and management of the throughput. 
Attribute Weight: 10 
Safe, reliable, and ample cargo/vehicle capacity:  affording this 
capability to any potential NGO would be a great asset for them to 
utilize in conducting their mission. This is especially critical in 
regions where the NGOs cannot conduct their mission due to 
logistical constraints that are inherent in my developing nations. 
By allowing the capability to transport cargo to any ocean 
bordering nation, gives NGOs a greater reach to conduct their 
mission. 
3.4.1.1 Conduct LCAC Operations:  GFS will have the 
capability to operate LCACs to include the launch, 
recovery, loading, and unloading of LCACs from the GFS 
to shore. 
Sub-Attribute Weight: 5 
If a vessel cannot physically pull into port due to draft 
constraints, poor harbor infrastructure or other harbor 
restrictions due to man or nature; the next optimal method 
to off-load/on-load cargo/personnel is utilizing an LCAC. 
LCACs have the capability to off-load/on-load great 
amount of cargo/personnel without going pier-side or the 
need to have a port. 
Value Scoring Criteria: Number of LCACs each carry. 
Since the LHD can carry the most number of LCACs, all 
other vessels were graded against the LHD.  Of the vessels 
that could carry cargo, all of them could pull into port; no 
need to use LCAC assets to on-load/off-load cargo. The 
vessels that could not carry cargo, this attribute does not 
apply to them either.  
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All Vessels:  Grade of N/A. 
3.4.1.2 Provide Vertical Replenishment:  To conduct 
vertical replenishment in support of operating forces 
by providing refrigerated stores, dry provisions, 
spares, general stores, fleet freight, mail, personnel, 
and other items. 
     Sub-Attribute Weight: 3 
This is the least desirable method of off-loading/on-
loading cargo. Helicopter assets have the lowest 
cargo carrying capability in tonnage. Cargo must 
also be configured to allow helicopters to carry the 
cargo thus adding another logistical constraint.  Yet, 
helicopters allow the ability to off-load/on-load 
cargo and personnel should a vessel not be able to 
go pier-side or if there is a need to go inshore that is 
beyond the capability of a LCAC. 
Value Scoring Criteria: If a vessel does not have 
LCAC or cannot off-load/on-load cargo at the pier, 
using a helicopter is the last viable option. 
Since most of the vessels can off-load their own 
cargo in port, this particular attribute was N/A 
except; 
CG: Grade of 50%.  The CG is only capable of 
transporting personnel. With the exception of very 
limited external load capability on the SH-60, the 
CG has no inherent cargo carrying capacity. Should 
there be any personnel to drop-off/pick-up, the CG 
would use a helicopter. 
HSV/RORO: Grade of 40%. The amount of cargo 
the helicopter is transferring is based upon the 
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amount an LHD can carry and subtracting that 
amount from what the HSV can carry. 1,041 tons -
116 tons = 925 tons. This tonnage is carried on the 
RORO. We then can determine cargo-carrying 
throughput of the helicopter and take that into 
account of 6 useful hours the helicopter is available 
per day. 925 tons/ 62 tons/hr = 14.92 hrs; time it 
took for the one helicopter to carry the cargo. 
6/14.92 is 40%. Another assumption is the ship that 
goes pier-side takes a maximum of 1 day to off-
load/on-load cargo.  
3.4.1.3 Provide In-port Replenishment:  To conduct 
replenishment in-port in support of operating forces 
by providing refrigerated stores, dry provisions, 
repair/spare parts, general stores, fleet freight, mail, 
personnel, and other items. 
Sub-Attribute Weight: 7 
Off-loading/loading cargo and equipment pier-side 
is the best way to facilitate the movement off cargo 
off/on a vessel. Moving cargo by the vessel’s 
inherent or port’s cranes and moving vehicles on/off 
ship by a ramp is much more efficient than utilizing 
LCAC or helicopter assets.  
Value Scoring Criteria: If the vessel can pull into 
all three ports, that vessel scored 100%. 
CG: Grade of N/A; CG does not have any cargo to 
off-load/on-load. Therefore, there is no necessity to 
go pier-side. 
HSV: Grade of 100%; HSV can go pier-side in all 
three ports. 
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LPD: Grade of 100%; LPD can go pier-side in all 
three ports. 
AS: Grade of 67%; AS can go pier-side 2 of 3 
ports. 
LHD/FFG: Grade of 100%; LHD/FFG both can 
go pier-side in all three ports. 
HSV/RORO: Grade of 100%; RORO cannot go 
pier-side into any of the three ports, but the HSV 
can go into all three ports. Any cargo from the 
RORO must be transferred by a helicopter to either 
the HSV or final unloading destination. 
 
3.5 Minimize Militaristic Perception:  The ability of GFS to minimize the 
public perception of a military intrusion of their nation’s sovereignty, or 
perception of a use of force.  In some cases, remaining off the coast – vice 
entering port - may provide the best alternative to achieving this end.  In 
others, where a brief visit into port by GFS proves more efficient for the 
mission or is simply desired by the host-government, measures exist to 
minimize the inherent perception affiliated with ship presence:  1) avoid 
intimidating force postures, and 2) mitigate a military appearance. The 
reduction of military equipment and weapons while operating ashore 
should be achieved to the maximum extent possible.  Social and political 
sensitivity of the region, as well as the non-militaristic nature of several 
partnering NGOs and IOs, dictate this attribute. 
Scenario Weight:  5 
Minimizing militaristic perception is based largely on a characteristic 
mentioned in our Strategic Guidance, and described by Naval Forces 
Europe as the desired result of an attribute of their APS: minimizing 
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footprint ashore.179  Suspicion about the use of military assets for GFS by 
potential host-countries remains a large hurdle to coordinating interactions 
with them.  By fulfilling this attribute, we hope to influence expanded 
partnerships with non-military agencies and organizations, and to improve 
West African nations’ willingness to interact with GFS in cooperative 
engagements. 
 
3.5.1 Force Posture:  GFS will have the capability to change and adapt 
force-presence posture to host country culture and sensitivities, as 
well as facilitate a proper inter-agency/NGO working climate. 
Attribute Weight:  2 
Force-posture aboard a platform is transparent unless an observer 
is within very-close proximity.  
Value Scoring Criteria: Equally weighted criteria of 1) No visible 
(topside) appearance of armed sentries, and 2) Ability of platform 
to avoid force protection drills topside.  A deficiency in either of 
these would result in a score of -.5 for that particular criteria, 
whereas met criteria would result in a score of +.5.  The total score 
achievable (both criteria met), is 1.0 (or 100%). 
CG: Grade of 50% due to inability to avoid armed sentry 
presence (-.5), and ability to avoid topside drills while in port 
(+.5). 
LPD: Grade of 50% due to inability to avoid armed sentry 
presence (-.5), and ability to avoid topside drills while in port 
(+.5). 
HSV: Grade of 50% due to inability to avoid armed sentry 
presence (-.5), and ability to avoid topside drills while in port 
(+.5). 
_____________________ 
179. Africa Partnership Station, “Africa Partnership Station: An Initiative to Promote Maritime Safety 
and Security,” Naval Forces Europe and U.S. Sixth Fleet, http://www.c6f.navy.mil/APS/About/. 
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AS:  Grade of 50% due to inability to avoid armed sentry 
presence (-.5), and ability to avoid topside drills while in port 
(+.5). 
LHD/FFG:  Grade of 50% due to inability to avoid armed sentry 
 presence (-.5), and ability to avoid topside drills while in 
port (+.5). 
HSV/RORO: Grade of 50% due to inability to avoid armed 
sentry  presence (-.5), and ability to avoid topside drills while in 
port  (+.5). 
 
3.5.2 Military Appearance:  GFS shall avoid the physical appearance 
of a military platform. 
Attribute Weight:  6 
Ship alternatives may form a visual impression to observers at 
greater distances, thereby influencing the impressions of a port 
city’s entire population (vice an individual observer on a pier). 
Value Scoring Criteria: Equally weighted criteria of 1) Grey Hull 
Color (HC) (Grey = 0, Non-Grey = 1), 2) Visual Presence of Large 
Weapons (LW) (LW = 0, No LW = 1), and 3) Warship Shape (SH) 
(SH = 0, Non-SH = 1).  For SH, Talbot-Booth classifications of B2 
bows (curved and raking, or sharp rakes) and heavy “military” 
masts, were used to determine what comprised a warship shape. In 
cases where ship platforms could not enter port due to draft 
limitations, connector platforms (LCAC, SH-60) were graded in 
their place using the same criteria, but with the following 
modifications:  HC became Grey Hull/Fuselage color, WS 
comprised of “any shape which might be readily correlated with a 
military platform,” and a factor of 5/6 was applied to the overall 
value score on account of their smaller size. 
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CG: Grade of 28% based on SH-60 connector sent into port in 
lieu of CG due to draft restrictions; grey fuselage color (HC = 0), 
no large weapons (LW = 1), readily identifiable military helicopter 
shape (SH = 0); factor of 5/6 applied due to small size. 
LPD: Grade of 33% due to grey hull (HC = 0), no large weapons 
(LW = 1), and raked bow and heavy mast (SH = 0).  
HSV: Grade of 66% due to grey hull (HC = 0), no large weapons 
(LW = 1), and raked bow but no heavy mast (SH = 1).  
AS: Grade of 66% due to grey hull (HC = 0), no large 
weapons.(LW = 1), and no raked bow and no heavy mast (SH = 1). 
LHD/FFG:  Grade of 17% due to grey hulls of both, warship 
shapes of both, and large weapons on the FFG but not on the LHD. 
HSV/RORO: Grade of 66%  based on HSV sent into port in lieu 
of RORO due to draft restrictions.  Of note, the RORO scored a 
100% due to black hull, no topside weapons, and lack of a heavy 
mast, but was unable to enter two of the three ports in our scenario. 
 Attribute Summary:  We considered this attribute important due 
to its impact in fostering a cooperative spirit with West African 
nations and with NGOs, by calming their suspicions about GFS 
having militaristic motives.  Out of our “current capability” assets, 
it was no surprise to us that the traditional grey-hull response to 
shaping and stability operations – namely, an ESG component 
represented by our LHD/FFG alternative – achieved a low score in 
its ability to minimize its “footprint” in port.  The greatest surprise 
was the impact of our scenario on the score of the RORO/HSV 
package:  though the RORO seemed the epitome of this attribute 
due to its commercial (non-military) appearance (score of 100%), 
this strength had to be neglected as a scoring factor due to its 
inability to enter port in our scenario. 
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c. Platform Performance Calculations  
  The chart below summarizes our analysis on how each platform fared for 
each attribute for the NGO scenario. 
 
            CG HSV LPD AS LHD/FFG HSV/RORO




Weight             
                                
3.1 2nd Embassy: 2                   
  3.1.1 Coordination Center:  5   0.03 90% 90% 95% 90% 100% 90% 
  3.1.2 Communicate Information:   7   0.04 100%80% 85% 75% 100% 80% 
Total Value Score   96% 84% 89% 77% 100% 84% 
Total Scenario Value   6% 5% 6% 5% 6% 5% 
                                
3.2 Storage of US Agency/NGO equipment: 9                   
  3.2.1 Storage:    10     0% 40% 53% 19% 94% 100% 
    3.2.1.1 Cargo: 9 0.19 0% 11% 27% 30% 100% 100% 
    3.2.1.2 Vehicles: 5 0.10 0% 92% 100% 0% 83% 100% 
Total Value Score   0% 40% 53% 19% 94% 100% 
Total Scenario Value   0% 12% 15% 6% 27% 29% 
                       4                   
3.3 Sustaining US Agency/NGO personnel (150): 5                   
  3.3.1 Messing: 10   0.09 100%100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
  3.3.2 Berthing:   7   0.07 10% 50% 100% 75% 100% 100% 
Total Value Score   63% 79% 100% 90% 100% 100% 
Total Scenario Value   10% 13% 16% 14% 16% 16% 
                                     
3.4 Logistic support for US Agency/NGO personnel 10                   
  3.4.1 Transportation: 10     50% 100% 100% 67% 100% 82% 
    3.4.1.1 Conduct LCAC Operations: 5 0.11 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
    3.4.1.2 Provide Vertical Replenishment: 3 0.06 50% N/A N/A N/A N/A 40% 
    3.4.1.3 Provide In-port Replenishment: 7 0.15 N/A 100% 100% 67% 100% 100% 
Total Value Score   50% 100% 100% 67% 100% 82% 
Total Scenario Value   16% 32% 32% 22% 32% 26% 
                                
3.5  Minimize militaristic perception: 5                   
  3.5.1 Force Posture: 2   0.04 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 
  3.5.2 Appearance 6     28% 66% 33% 66% 17% 66% 
    3.5.2.1 Ship (Higher = less militaristic) 6 0.05 N/A 66% 33% 66% 17% 66% 
    3.5.2.2 Helicopter 5 0.04 28% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
    3.5.2.3 LCAC 5 0.04 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Attribute score   28% 66% 33% 66% 17% 66% 
Total Value Score   21% 62% 37% 62% 25% 62% 
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Total Scenario Value   3% 10% 6% 10% 4% 10% 
                                
         1.00 36% 72% 76% 57% 86% 87% 
                
       Overall   CG HSV LPD AS LHD/FFG HSV/RORO
      Performance   36% 72% 76% 57% 86% 87% 
Figure 71:  NGO/Interagency Total Value Calculations and Results 
  
d. Summary of Results 
 Incorporating our scenario-based weighting into each platform’s attribute 
score gave us a total weighted score (total value score) for each system alternative.  The 
following list denotes the outcomes of current capability platforms and their ability, 
shown in terms of a percentage out of 100, to carry out the Inter-Agency and NGO 
mission in the previously described scenario: 
Overall   CG HSV LPD AS LHD/FFG HSV/RORO
Performance   35% 71% 76% 56% 86% 87% 
Figure 72:  Platform Alternative's Results in NGO/Interagency Mission 
 









 While a RORO is not usually considered a major player in standard 
peacetime naval deployments, the combination of a RORO with a HSV receives the 
highest score of any of the alternatives for this particular scenario.  The large cargo 
capability of the RORO, combined with the transporting characteristics of the HSV, 
ultimately gave it the highest score.  The inclusion of the HSV allows the combination to 
score well in a number of categorizes that the RORO alone would not have. 
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 Interestingly, the RORO / HSV combination is similar in nature to a GFS 
concept ship currently in the early stages of investigation by NAVSEA.180  Essentially, in 
order to do a NGO support mission, a GFS will need a great deal of transporting 
capability.  Unfortunately, having that transporting ability, usually results in poor speed 
and maneuverability, key capabilities for doing other GFS related missions.  By 
combining the best cargo-carrying ship in the Navy with one of the fastest ships in the 




180. Mark Campbell, conversation with SEA-12 regarding NAVSEA RORO/HSV combination, 
November 5, 2007. 
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F.  GROUP OUTCOME:  THE “BEST” ALTERNATIVES 
 
1. Bringing our FNA Results Together  
Combining the total value scores of each mission team’s FNA studies resulted in 
the following matrix: 
 
 
Figure 73:  FNA Platform Performance Results, per Mission 
 
From this, cumulative scores can be quickly examined.  For instance, one might note that 
the AS held the lowest score in two of three mission areas, or that the CG held the lowest 
cumulative score, thereby negating both as GFS alternatives.  But this cursory glance 
fails to consider other factors, like the importance of conducting all mission areas, or the 
importance of conducting one over another, or certain risks.  The CG, after all, tied for 
second place in Peacetime Engagement.  In addition, general scoring trends – such as 
how most alternatives failed to achieve as high a score in an NGO/Interagency 
Coordination role as they did in Peacetime Engagement missions – may be gleaned from 
this matrix; however, cumulative scores and grading trends provide only a cursory glance 
at what this matrix can provide.  Circumstances under which our decision needed to be 
made had to be considered, as well.  This matrix was a starting point in determining our 
“best” alternative for GFS, and lead to further analysis.   
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2. Decision Theory Approach 
 Utilizing elements of decision theory, we hoped to attain more genuine answers in 
our quest to determine the “best” GFS alternative out of “current capability,” and also to 
identify the true gap between that capability and our desired end-state.  Indeed, our 
matrix could readily be called a decision evaluation matrix.   
 Blanchard and Fabrycky state that “a particular decision can result in one of 
several outcomes, depending on which of several future events occurs.”181 Our 
“decision” consisted of which platform to select as our best alternative out of “current 
capability,” and the geo-political environment of the Gulf of Guinea in 2012 comprised 
our “future event.”  The latter variable might also be described in terms of how important 
each mission area would be in 2012, considering that the environment drives them.   
 Three decision situations may be utilized to guide a decision-maker: those made 
“under assumed certainty, risk, and uncertainty.”182  In our problem statement, we 
originally predicated our selection of the year 2012 in an effort to minimize decisions 
under uncertainty, realizing that the potentially volatile geo-political nature of West 
Africa might be impossible to predict twenty years out.  This did not mean, however, that 
we were naïve to the fact that much can change in a country – or a region – in the space 
of five years.  For this reason, we threw-out assumed certainty as a decision guide.  In 
addition, though we had hoped to minimize uncertainty with our selection of a short, five 
year timeframe, we still decided to test it due to the realization already stated:  that a lot 
can change quickly in a region with a history of instability.  We also elected to examine 
making decisions under assumed risk; in other words, that we might be able to make fair 
predictions on the environment of the Gulf of Guinea in our timeframe, and thus make 
decisions based on those predictions. 
 
_____________________ 
181. Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis 4th Ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2006), 182. 
182. Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis 4th Ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2006), 182. 
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3. Decision Making Under Assumed Risk  
 “Decision making under risk occurs when the decision maker does not suppress 
acknowledged ignorance about the future but makes it explicit through the assignment of 
probabilities.”183  This decision making model seemed to fit our situation perfectly, as we 
believed that we had attained enough knowledge via our country studies to make a sound 
prediction on the regional environment given a short, five year time-frame; yet, we also 
acknowledged our short-comings in being able to gauge exact probabilities which might 
impact any weights we assigned to mission areas – largely due to the changing nature of 
the region, but also due to examinations of current practice and guidance with regards to 
GFS employment . 
 We assessed decision-making under assumed risk as most appropriate to our 
study, primarily due to the scope of our timeframe and our accumulated knowledge of the 
region.  Though five years was enough time for the regional geo-political situation to 
change in individual nations, we did not deem it likely that the regional situation would 
change to the extent that we would be completely uncertain.  A military coup in one 
country, for example, might be considered likely given the region’s history of instability, 
and might prevent a cooperative partnership for security and stabilization between GFS 
and that nation’s navy; however, it would likely not prohibit such interaction elsewhere in 
the region.  Our assessment was based on historical trends:  though civil war and coup 
d’etats are no stranger to West Africa, they tend to occur without affecting the region as a 
whole.  Such was the case with the armed conflict inside the Democratic Republic of 
Congo’s borders in the late Nineties, as “Angolan, Zimbabwean, and Namibian troops 
intervened on behalf of the D.R.C.”184 against Rwandan troops; though the conflict 
permeated borders, it did not collapse the entire Gulf of Guinea region.  Realizing that 
geo-political environments also change due to other, less volatile factors, such as public 
perception and non-hostile shifts in government views, we believed that five years still 
remained a relatively near-term – and predictable – timeframe. 
_____________________ 
183. Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis 4th Ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2006), 185. 
184. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
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 Within this context of assumed risk, we believed that half of the mission needs 
would occur within the Peacetime Engagement realm, and the other half in the 
humanitarian realms of HA/DR and NGO/Interagency Coordination.  Of the 
humanitarian mission areas, we assessed that 20% of future interaction would occur in 
the short-term crisis response of HA/DR, and 30% within the sustained, long-term 
humanitarian response of NGO/Interagency Coordination.  This disparate weighting of 
mission areas marked a significant break in our process, as we had considered them of 
equal weight to this point.  More simply, however, it represented a necessary step within 
decision making under assumed risk:  the assignment of probabilities.  
 Our mission weights were generated based on our current knowledge of the 
region and current trends in GFS pilot employment, and the likelihood of GFS being 
called upon to fulfill regional needs within those areas.  Greater emphasis on Peacetime 
Engagement, and less on each individual humanitarian mission developed out of our 
realization that to equally weight two humanitarian missions as compared to the military-
to-military aspect of shaping and stability operations might be skewed.  Indeed, NGOs 
and Interagency entities provide crisis response, and might conceivably comprise a first 
response to crises calling upon GFS’s HA/DR capabilities.  In essence, why weight two 
humanitarian missions against one military-to-military mission?  We had no reason to 
maintain that theme, as current pilot programs and the training they administer, have 
largely been military-to-military endeavors.  On the other hand, to ignore the emphasis 
placed within our strategic guidance on humanitarian assistance and NGO/Interagency 
coordination would not be correct, either.  Indeed, some might argue that the term 
“shaping and stability” – the operational context under which GFS falls - implies equal 
weights to military, and non-military emphases, respectively.   For this reason, we 
deferred to a 50/50 split between the humanitarian role (to include the long term role of 
NGOs and non-military agencies within it) of GFS, and its mission to train and 
supplement foreign navies and coast guards in peacetime engagement.  Within the 
humanitarian realm, we assigned greater weight to the Interagency/NGO mission (30%) 
due to the recognition that there is an NGO/Interagency presence inherent to the HA/DR 
mission (20%).  
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 With our weighted mission values, based on a predicted future environment, we 
then could attain expected values of ship performance by factoring their total value scores 
with these mission weights.  For example, the HSV scored .91 in Peacetime Engagement 
(I.E. fulfilled 91% of its attributes in Peacetime Engagement), .79 in HA/DR, and .72 in 
NGO/Interagency Coordination.  The following equation provides the HSV’s Expected 




EVP results for the other platforms are illustrated below: 
 
 
Figure 74:  Overall performance of platforms under assumed risk 
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From the bar chart, our superior platform for GFS out of current inventory is the 
LHD/FFG combination, as it attained an EVP high-score of .93.  The LPD, HSV, and 
HSV/RORO alternatives followed, in that order, closely grouped between EVPs of .83 
and .85.  The CG and AS fell out as our least desirable alternatives with regards to 
performance, with the former’s high Peacetime Engagement scores capitulating to the 
low scores it achieved in HA/DR and NGO/Interagency Coordination.  Figure 75 




Figure 75: Ranking of Platforms if Making Decisions Under Risk 
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 Beyond a simple order of ranking, additional insights may be gleaned from our 
bar chart, including those found within general scoring trends and platform groupings. 
 Scoring trends were generally high, with the lowest alternative achieving a total 
value score of .68:  in other words, our lowest scoring ship was predicted to be able to 
fulfill well over 2/3 of the desired GFS performance end-state of 100% mission 
accomplishment.  In the Navy’s surface community, officers commonly (and informally) 
refer to the “80% solution” as their mark of performance success; in analytical terms, this 
would be described as setting our aspiration criteria at 80%, for which four of our 
platforms exceed it by at least 5%.  Some might question such high marks for ships not 
specifically designed for the task at hand, fulfilling the non-traditional missions of GFS.   
In response, perhaps the real answer may be gleaned from our attributes and their related 
criteria, and how they were scored.  We found that in many cases, most or all of our 
platforms greatly exceeded some of the capabilities required of a GFS, often because the 
requirements were not great.  In the communication attributes of each mission area, for 
example, most ships ranked very highly because (with the exception of communications 
ashore in an austere environment) the communications needed for interoperability with 
West African ports, navies and coast guards remained simple – almost all current 
capability ship alternatives met it (or scored very well).  As long as they met the 
requirement fully, they achieved a score of 100%, regardless of if their relative overall 
communications capabilities:  though the LPD’s communication capability greatly 
exceeds that of an HSV in the realm of progressive technology, both get the job done and 
meet the requirements as set forth by our communication attribute’s criteria.  This high 
scoring trend may also give evidence to the multi-use characteristic of ships in current 
inventory as well-suited for GFS missions. 
 Ships grouped closely by score deserved a second-look before quick assessments 
on performance could be made.  In the high-scoring group of the number two, three and 
four ships (LPD, HSV/RORO, HSV), we had to consider that they might have been too 
closely scored to declare any outright “winners.”  For example, one might conclude from 
the small performance difference of .02 between the single HSV alternative and the 
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combination package of the HSV and RORO, that the RORO simply does not add a lot in 
performance that can not already be handled by the smaller, faster vessel on its own.  On 
the other hand, that 2% of value-added performance may become vitally important to a 
particular facet of the GFS mission given a possible event:  perhaps it is the cargo piece 
that becomes suddenly important in the event of a natural disaster.  In the case of the low-
scoring group (CG/AS), before writing them off as unacceptable GFS alternatives, we 
had to consider that the CG performed Peacetime engagement exceptionally well, tying 
with the LPD.  Should the Peacetime engagement mission become more important, or 
should technologies become available to improve its performance in the humanitarian 
missions, the CG might redeem itself as a viable alternative.  Of course, the best method 
by which to resolve such questions is to conduct several repeating analyses, so as to 
normalize our results and determine a standard error by which to assess if rankings in 
these groups are viable; unfortunately, our FNA provided one set of data points, and we 
simply had to accept the total value scores – and their resulting EVPs (as close as their 
groupings might be) – as accurate.  In addition, these groupings highlighted the need to 
consider risk and its impact on our results, before concluding our FNA. 
 
4. Decision Making Under Uncertainty  
Understanding that one might argue the Gulf of Guinea in 2012 is utterly 
unpredictable, citing the history of civil wars and lack of existing maritime security this 
far into the 21st century, we decided to test how our conclusions might vary from those 
under assumed risk.  Indeed, we realize that the probabilities that we assigned with 
assumed risk were largely subjective in nature, and some engineers – or even combatant 
commanders – might prefer a decision making system based on uncertainty, due to the 
lack of any “hard” data supportive of predicting an operating environment five years out 
in the region.  In such a case, decision making under uncertainty is called for.   
Two rules for decisions under those of uncertainty depend on the nature of the 
decision maker themselves:  the maximum-minimum (maxi-min) rule represents the most 
pessimistic outlook for the future, while the maximum-maximum (maxi-max) rule 
represents the most optimistic.  Indeed, as humans, decision-making is often made on 
how optimistic or pessimistic we are.  Just as their names suggest, the maxi-min rule 
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“will lead to the alternative that assures the best of the worst possible outcomes,”185 and 
the maxi-max rule “will choose the best of the best possible outcomes.”186  In terms of 
GFS, the “outlook for the future” relates to a regional commander’s outlook – or “gut 
feel” - for the future operating environment of his or her region, realizing that we cannot 
predict that future with any certainty.   This regional future-state directly impacts which 
of each of the three mission areas will take priority, or will be weighted more heavily.  
However, in this sense of mission priority, we must think of this in terms of the lowest 
(pessimistic view) or highest (optimistic view) scores from the three missions for each 
ship, rather than by mission weight.   
Our analyses of decision making by pessimistic and optimistic commanders may 
better highlight this approach. 
A pessimist would say that our guess on what mission will be most important will 
most likely be completely inaccurate, and that we should therefore assume a “worst 
case,” selecting the worst scores from out of the three mission areas for each ship, and 
using those values as our baseline from which to choose our best GFS alternative 
platform.  Out of these “worst case” value scores, we selected our vessel based on the 
best of those scores (see Figure 76). 
_____________________ 
185. Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis 4th Ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2006), 189. 
186. Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis 4th Ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2006), 189. 
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Figure 76:  Scores When Making Decisions Under Uncertainty (Pessimist) 
 
In this case, our LHD/FFG combination broke out as our best GFS platform selection.  
Considering the worst case – that a regional commander guessed the wrong mission 
predominance and operating environment  in the Gulf of Guinea in 2012 – this selection 
did not prove too poor of a choice, with an 86% capability in this worst case.  The “down 
side” to this decision making would be that our commander would have missed the 
opportunity to achieve a slightly higher capability (87%) with the HSV/RORO 
combination. 
An entirely optimistic commander would base his or her decision, in the absence 
of certainty, on the hope that the future-state of the region will dictate that the mission 
with the highest priority will be the one had the highest score under it – and the platform 
alternative that achieved that score.  Optimists like this might base their outlook on a 
belief in divine intervention, a hunch, or a gamble on the hope for “the best case.”  
Therefore, for this scenario, we selected our vessel based on the best of the best scores 
(see Figure 77). 
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Figure 77:  Scores When Making Decisions Under Uncertainty (Optimist) 
 
In this case, two alternatives tied as the best: the LHD/FFG combination and the CG, 
both for their exceptional performance in the Peacetime Engagement Mission.  If the Gulf 
of Guinea shaped up into a predominantly military-to-military Peacetime Engagement 
environment, either of these choices would prove ideal.  The obvious down-side to this 
decision making is if the decision maker’s outlook is wrong: in the case of the CG and a 
predominant NGO/Interagency Coordination mission, our regional commander might not 
attain the next promotion he or she had been hoping for due to their overly optimistic 
disposition. 
 The previous two examples demonstrate the extremes of human disposition, but in 
reality, most people fit somewhere in between.  One means by which to address the 
proper decisions under uncertainty, given the particular nature of the decision maker, 
involves the Hurwicz Rule:  “an index of relative optimism and pessimism.”187  Applying 
this rule to our payoff matrix yielded the following results: 
_____________________ 
187. Benjamin S. Blanchard and Wolter J. Fabrycky, Systems Engineering and Analysis 4th Ed. 
(Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson, Prentice Hall, 2006), 190. 
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Figure 78:  Making Decisions Using Under Uncertainty - Hurwicz Rule 
  
Here, an alpha value (α) represents the index of optimism - or what our decision maker 
regards as his or her level of optimism or pessimism - with α = 0 indicating complete 
pessimism, α = 1 indicating complete optimism.  If a regional commander indicated that 
they were slightly more pessimistic than optimistic, telling the analyst that “I tend to be a 
‘glass half-empty’ kind of guy, but just slightly,” then we might logically determine that 
α = .4.  Applying this value to our Hurwicz rule reveals that this particular commander 
would still consider the LHD/FFG combination as our best alternative, but at his 
particular alpha value, the LPD begins to “edge-out” the HSV/RORO as his second 
choice (whereas a more pessimistic commander (α < .3) would prefer the HSV/RORO) 
based on their changing scores as alpha values change.  The order of ranking for ship 
alternatives remained relatively unaffected by the decision maker’s disposition – or alpha 
value – with two exceptions:  the HSV/RORO (dropping from 2nd to 5th as optimism 
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increased), and the CG (rising on a steep slope from dead-last to a tie for first as 
optimism increased).  Obviously, the optimism or pessimism of a regional commander 
will have an impact on their decisions for GFS alternatives when those decisions are 
made under uncertainty. 
 Decision making under uncertainty hardly proved ideal in our study.  Though the 
analysis of our purely pessimistic decision-maker yielded results with a relatively low 
“down-side,” the shortcomings revealed by the analysis of our purely optimistic decision-
maker demonstrated a more dramatic difference between good and poor choices.  In 
addition, both methods over-simplified the art of decision-making:  most people – and 
most likely all people in positions of command - are neither purely pessimistic nor 
optimistic.  Our Hurwicz Rule offered a more realistic method by which to determine 
best alternatives in an uncertain environment.  Unfortunately for all three of these 
methods, all are based purely on subjective evaluation.     
 
5. Summary  
 The majority of GFS alternatives maintained a similar order of ranking between 
decisions made under risk, and those under uncertainty, with minor changes and 
fluctuations:  the LHD/FFG combination remained number one in performance, the AS 
continued to fall out toward the bottom, and everything else fell somewhere in between 
with the only dramatic change occurring with the CG in an uncertain environment.  As 
we believed we had sufficient appreciation for the region’s future within the next five 
years, we elected to continue through our JCIDS process with our FNA results from our 
analysis of decision-making under assumed risk. 
 
G.  FACTORING COST 
 Unfortunately, best alternatives fail to transition from paper to the fleet 
without considering the dampening (and real world) effect of cost. Maintaining 
focus on determining the “most effective” GFS system alternative, we filtered our 
list of ranked ships through the element of cost.   
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1. Overview of Approach 
 Cost is complex.  Determining what costs best represent what a decision maker 
will pay for GFS depends on several variables:  how long one intends to pay for the 
vessel (life-cycle costs), who pays for the use of the vessel, what phase of the lifecycle 
the vessel is in, which factors from within that phase (or phases) one may elect to use in 
their analysis, and whether to base these figures off of one particular ship or an entire 
class of ship.   
  
a. Time 
  We assumed a 6-month operating period for which to measure our 
costs, basing this on our presumed 6-month on-station time. We believed that 
longer periods could simply be extrapolated, and costs for such cases would 
remain proportional. 
 
b. Cost and the Decision-Maker 
  Regarding who pays for GFS, we chose to view cost from a macro level in 
terms of “cost to the Navy.”  Realizing that this broke from our regional commander 
viewpoint in our decision process for attaining the best performing alternatives, we made 
a logical assumption that even when estimated at the combatant/regional commander or 
fleet commander level, costs would remain fairly proportional to those incurred by the 
Navy.  Another reason for this choice was the inability to break-out some long-term 
maintenance costs - such as major overhauls - from some of our ships: a factor that the 
Navy must account for, but which fleet commanders most likely will not.   
 
c. Life Cycle Phase 
  From the three primary types of ship lifecycle costs - Research and 
Development (R & D), production, and operation and sustainment (O & S) – we focused 
solely on O & S costs.  Since our FNA alternatives were from current inventory, we 
considered R & D and production costs of minimal importance.  We realized this could 
change as a result of our FSA, should new construction of lead-ship or follow-ship GFS 
platforms become an alternative, thus requiring us to factor more life cycle cost elements. 
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d. Cost Elements 
  In its estimation of O & S costs for naval vessels, the Navy Visibility and 
Management of Operating and Support Costs (VAMOSC) management information 
system includes four elements: 
 
 Element 1.0 Direct Unit Cost:  the cost most readily associated with 
deployment costs; includes fuel consumption, personnel manning, and 
services.   
 Element 2.0 Maintenance - Intermediate: labor and material costs by 
ship’s force and commercial suppliers in the day-to-day maintenance of 
the ship. 
 Element 3.0 Maintenance and Modernization - Depot: Scheduled and non-
scheduled depot level work, and major overhauls.  Sometimes thought of 
as “long term” or “major” maintenance.  Usually scheduled between 
deployments, and often involves yard work. 
 Element 4.0 Other Operating and Support: training, publications, and 
technical services. 
 
Of these, direct unit costs dwarf the others, but the depot level maintenance costs remain 
significant (see Appendix D for exact costs).  We debated factoring in the latter costs, as 
a GFS usually would not incur them while deployed (except in the case of a major 
accident), and deployment costs were what we hoped to assess; however, our inability to 
readily access element 4.0 costs for MSC ships while understanding they were included 
in O & S costs provided by MSC, influenced us to include them for all ships.  
  We followed a similar construct in determining what constituted O & S 
costs for our helicopter connectors, and employed VAMOSC data to assess these costs, 
as well.  Though broken into seven cost elements, their contents were similar to those 
provided for ships (see Appendix D for exact costs and individual element break-downs).  
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Unfortunately, VAMOSC does not possess data for our waterborne LCAC connectors,188 
so we assumed minimal cost-added to their mother-ships’ O & S Costs; we also believed 
it a safe assumption that waterborne RHIB connecters would provide minimal additional 
cost.   
 
e. The Choice Between Individual Ship and Class of Ship 
  We believed that we could attain cost data more reflective of a GFS 
deployment by extracting information about ships that had operated in a similar 
environment to what we envisioned in the Gulf of Guinea.   We considered the standard 
Mediterranean deployment the closest in resemblance, realizing that the frequent port 
calls (indicative of a Mediterranean deployment) more closely resembled the frequent 
port visits of a GFS in the Gulf of Guinea than any other regional deployment.  This 
desire drove us to concentrate on individual ships, as cost data from class type would 
skew our data with averages from non-deployed ships, and from deployed ships with few 
port visits.  We found “perfect fits” for our CG, LHD/FFG, and AS alternatives; however 
for the LPD, we had to interpolate data since she had never deployed.  For the HSV and 
RORO, cost data were driven by factors not based on Mediterranean deployments, but by 
the fact that they are the only vessels within their specific class of ship. 
 
2. Cost Data Analysis 
We converted VAMOSC and MSC data into usable, total O & S costs for each of 
our GFS alternatives.  How we did so is best described in terms of ships for which 
comprehensive VAMOSC data was available (USN grey-hulled ships), ships for which 
data had to be extracted elsewhere (MSC ships), and connectors embarked on those ships.   
 
a. USN Grey Hulls 
 Three specific ships (USS Iwo Jima, USS Nicholas, USS Philippine Sea) 
that completed a Mediterranean deployment in FY 2006 were selected to calculate the 
average cost for a 6-month deployment. The remaining two ships were utilized due to 
_____________________ 
188. Virginie Collin-Banerji, e-mail message to LT Kathryn Ottersberg (SEA-12), November 1, 2007. 
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homeport location (USS EMORY S LAND) and only ship in class (USS SAN 
ANTONIO).  It should be noted that the USS SAN ANTONIO was commissioned in 
2006, so calculations were based on 273 days of service vice 365 days.  The annual cost 
for each ship was divided by the number of days in service for the given year; for 
example, the USS IWO JIMA was in service for 365 days and had a total annual cost of 
approximately $97.8 million, or $264,900 per day.  This daily cost was multiplied by 180 
to provide a 6-month deployment cost of $47.7 million. 
 
b. MSC 
  VAMOSC data for MSC ships proved insufficient, with maintenance and 
other costs missing or incomplete (See Appendix D).  MSC provided O & S costs based 
on a daily rate for the RORO, assessing it as $81,155 per day.189 Mr. Keith Bauer, 
Program Manager for MSC’s Prepositioning Program, based the HSV’s daily O & S cost 
on a recently completed market survey, stating “our estimate for the ship, which includes 
all costs like crew, fuel, port, M&R, [and] overhead is approximately $69,000 per 
day.”190  Multiplying these daily costs by 180 days, we computed 6-month on-station 
costs of $12.4 million for the HSV, and $27.0 million for the HSV/RORO alternatives. 
 
c. Connectors 
 The total cost of each aircraft for a standard 6-month deployment was 
calculated utilizing information provided from the VAMOSC database.  The values given 
in the database are based on the fleet-wide total number of specified aircraft and the total 
number of flying hours for that aircraft; for example, there were 194 CH-46E helicopters 
that flew 53,862 hours in FY 2006.  The average annual flying hours per aircraft is 251, 
or 21 flying hours per month.  The annual cost for the CH-46E is approximately $619.7 
million, or $2.9 million per aircraft, and finally $11,500 per aircraft flying hour.  The 
average cost for a 6-month deployment per helicopter is $1.4 million dollars, calculated 
_____________________ 
189. Keith Bauer, MSC PM3, phone conversation to LCDR John Montonye (SEA-12), November 14, 
2007. 
190. Keith Bauer, MSC PM3, phone conversation to LCDR John Montonye (SEA-12), November 14, 
2007. 
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by multiplying the average cost per flying hour ($11,500) by the average flying hours per 
month (21) for a monthly cost of $241,600, which was then multiplied by 6. 
 
d. Summary of O & S Cost per Vessel 
  Total O & S costs for all six of our alternatives were computed by adding 
ships costs to those of the connectors they employed.  The cruiser, for example, carries 
two SH-60Bs (other ship connector complements provided in Figure 33); therefore, we 
simply multiplied SH-60B O & S costs by a factor of two, and added it to the cruiser’s 
VAMOSC O & S cost to result in a total cost for that particular GFS alternative.  Figure 
79 summarizes our results: 
 
Figure 79:  Total O & S costs for GFS Alternatives 
 
3. Cost-Benefit Analysis  
 From the results outlined Figure 79, one notices that the high performance of the 
LHD/FFG combination comes with a price - as do all of the GFS alternatives.  With our 
best performance and least costly results, we utilized a decision criterion known as cost-
effectiveness (cost-benefit) to maximize performance (I. E. effectiveness) while reducing 
cost.  
 To help make the decision, our performance and cost were plotted against each 
other to produce Figure 80. 
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Figure 80:  Cost-Effective plot of alternatives 
 
 There are a few ways to use this plot for analysis in decision-making theory.  The 
first is to determine dominance.  When a platform has an alternative that is at least as 
effective and has less cost, then it is said to “dominate” and be cost-effective.  The easiest 
way to visualize this is overlay a northwest quadrant with the vertex on the alternative (as 
in Figure 81)191  If any other alternative lies within this quadrant, it has a competitor that 
performs better and for less cost.  In this example, there is no reason to ever choose the 
AS because it is dominated by the HSV, HSV/RORO, LPD, and CG.  Using this method, 
it is apparent that the alternatives which are not cost-effective are the AS, CG, and 
HSV/RORO. 
_____________________ 
191. Daniel H. Wagner, W. Charles Mylander, and  Thomas J. Sanders, ed., Naval Operations 
Analysis, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 43. 
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Figure 81:  Cost-Benefit Determining Dominance 
 
Another method to aid the decision maker is to determine the most effective 
option, given a specific budget.  If there was a maximum budget dictated, a line can be 
drawn on the x-axis to eliminate alternatives.  In the Figure 82 example, a cost budget of 
$25 million would imply that the best option is a LPD.  Conversely, one could determine 
the least cost incurred to meet a given effectiveness requirement.192  In the Figure 83 
example, an acceptable performance threshold of .85 produces a minimum cost of $22 
million from the LPD. 
_____________________ 
192. Daniel H. Wagner, W. Charles Mylander, and  Thomas J. Sanders, ed., Naval Operations 
Analysis, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 44. 
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Figure 82:  Cost benefit- Determining best performance given a budget 
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Figure 83:  Cost benefit- Determining cost given a minimum performance 
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The last way to utilize the plot for decision-making is by examining the cost-
effective actions (determined earlier) in terms of the efficiency frontier.  Figure 84 shows 
the concave envelope (the lowest concave function graph which lies on or above the set 
of alternatives) with a theoretical alternative (Platform X).  There are no dominate 
alternatives in the northwest quadrant but it does fall below the efficiency frontier.   
Assume that Platform X has a performance score of .90 and a cost of $85 million.  
This produces a rise in performance from the LPD of .02 (.90-.88 = .02) with an 
associated rise in cost of $63 million (85-22 = 63).   Now take the increase from LPD to 
LHD/FFG as an increase in performance of .05 (.93-.88 = .05) and an increase in cost of 
$80 million (102-22 = 80).  The slope is less from LPD to Platform X than the one from 
the LPD to the LHD/FFG (.02/63 vice .05/80).  Here, a greater slope is desirable, as it 
indicates greater performance value per dollar; therefore, in this example one may 
conclude that the increase in performance per increase in cost is worse with Platform X.  
A decision maker with a theoretical budget of $90 million may try to acquire the 
additional $12 million to use the LHD/FFG option; thereby reaching the efficiency 
frontier.193 
_____________________ 
193. Daniel H. Wagner, W. Charles Mylander, and  Thomas J. Sanders, ed., Naval Operations 
Analysis, 3rd ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1999), 44. 
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Figure 84:  Cost benefit - the efficiency frontier 
 
 Although there are no alternatives that fall into this situation, there is a corollary 
to the efficiency frontier.  Often referred to as the “knee in the curve”, this is the point 
where the decision maker gets the most “bang for the buck”.  Referring to Figure 85, this 
knee lies in the vicinity of the HSV and LPD alternatives. 
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Figure 85:  Cost benefit- Knee in the curve 
 
 There are multiple ways to analyze the performance and cost of the six platforms.  
Given that we assumed no budget or performance minimum to develop a threshold, the 
best theories to use were the dominance and the knee in the curve.  Using the numbers 
generated by our FNA, we determined the HSV, LPD, and LHD/FFG platforms as cost-
effective choices for GFS in the Gulf of Guinea.  Within those, the two options that are 
the best are the HSV and LPD, as they fall within the “knee.” 
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Figure 86:  Top Platform Alternatives to GFS from Current Capability 
 
 One final note to reiterate is that the performance values are subjective in nature 
and specific to performing a single mission at a time (the assumptions we used).  
Hypothetically, the HSV/RORO alternative could have increased performance when 
performing multiple, simultaneous missions in the Gulf of Guinea.  This would move the 
performance up (creating a new efficiency frontier).  Indeed, this may become quite 
possible given the adaptable features of an MPF(E) RORO. 
 
H. WHAT IS THE GAP? 
 
 Though some studies do conclude with FNA, we maintained our desire to look 
beyond the most effective GFS platforms from current inventory.  We hoped to explore 
improvements to those platforms, or to incorporate new assets or concepts to fulfilling the 
role of GFS.  With that in mind, the outcomes of which ships finished “at the top” 
remained only one tangible result of FNA.  Another was what would enable us to explore 
future concepts:  “the gap.” 
 The “grass roots” of the gap between current capability and desired capability lies 
within our attributes, and is performance based.  Deficiencies in value scores quantify 
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that gap.  An example is the gap of 34% by the AS within the attribute of [minimizing 
military] appearance.  Such gaps prove useful when trying to find remedies that may 
result in improved performance.  Painting the AS black, for example, would completely 
close this particular gap, resulting in a platform value score of 100% for that attribute.  
Indeed, these attribute gaps contain potential as tools in identifying particular solutions to 
improving performance. 
 On a macro level, we had to consider that we were seeking the most effective 
solution (cost and performance) – not a system based solely on a couple of attributes.  
Therefore, we identified a second type of gap, though closely knitted to those identified 
in the attributes:  a cost-benefit gap.   A quick look at our cost-benefit chart, for example, 
reveals a cost-benefit gap with the AS, HSV/RORO, and CG alternatives:  they each fall 
below our cost-effective line.  The solution to this cost lies in two factors, and may best 
be summed by the questions that should be asked:  “How can I move the CG up (in 
performance) and/or to the left (in decreasing cost)?”  In essence, this provides a macro 
view of the gap, but to close it, we must seek specific means by which to improve cost 
and/or performance. 
 
I. RISK ANALYSIS 
 Looking beyond the results of the best and most cost-effective GFS alternatives 
from of current capability, choosing the platform to perform GFS encompasses one final 
aspect: risk management.  There are inherent risks associated with any decision, course of 
action, or assumption.  Many chose to merely avoid addressing risk, but in the case of 
GFS, risks cannot be ignored due to the size of the endeavor, the changing nature of 
international relations, and a direct correlation to worldwide security.194   With the 
dynamic future of Department of Defense missions, funding, and regional partnerships in 
Africa, risk management is essential. 
 
_____________________ 
194. Harold Kerzner, Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling ,and 
Controlling  (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 709. 
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1. Context 
 In the context of a traditional “project,” risk management remains a continual 
process executed throughout the life cycle and is not merely an act of identifying risk; it 
is a process used to reduce the surprises that may cause problems in the future.  There are 
four steps in risk management process: 195 
 
 Risk Planning.  Developing and documenting risk strategy, handling plans, 
and monitoring changing risks. 
 Risk Assessment.  Identifying and analyzing the likelihoods and impacts of 
risk within the project. 
 Risk Handling.  Identifying, selecting, and implementing strategies to set 
risk at an acceptable level; determining who is responsible, cost, and 
schedule specifics. 
 Risk Monitoring.  Systematically tracking and evaluating the risk handling 
decisions made using established metrics, then updating the strategies. 
 
Figure 87:  The steps in Risk Management196 
 
However, in the context of this study, the only areas addressed are risk assessment and 
risk handling.  The CBA User’s Guide points out that in a Quick Turn CBA, “being a 
loyal subordinate, you will deliver a product one time.  But, you will probably be uneasy 
_____________________ 
195. Harold Kerzner, Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling ,and 
Controlling  (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 718-720. 
196. Louis Simpleman, Paul McMahon, Bill Bahnmaier, Ken Evans, Jim Lloyd,  Risk Management 
Guide for Department of Defense Acquisition, Fifth Edition (version 2.0) (Fort Belvoir: Defense 
Acquisition University, June 2003), 7. 
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about it… [You must] communicate the risk of the assessment - that is, where it might be 
wrong and what the consequences might be.”197   
 
2. Risk Defined 
 “Risk is a measure of the probability and consequence of not achieving a defined 
project goal”.198  More simply expressed in Figure 88, Risk = f(likelihood, impact).  
Risks are future events that contain variability or uncertainty (with undesirable outcomes) 
and are caused by some hazard, event, or decision.  Knowing what those hazards are (and 
preemptively planning for them) can greatly reduce risk.  We elected to accomplish such 
risk reduction by being proactive rather than reactive, and by identifying the high-risk 
assumptions in this study.   
 
Figure 88:  Depiction of risk categories199 
 
3. Risk Assessment 
 Our first step in assessing risk associated with GFS consisted of identifying 
potential issues.  This phase focused on answering the question, “What IF something 
happens?”  There are many types of risk that fall into categories such as cost, funding, 
_____________________ 
197. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff. Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) 
User’s Guide (Version 2), Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (JCS J-8), 
(Washington, DC: GPO, 2006).  
198. Harold Kerzner, Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling ,and 
Controlling (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 709. 
199. Harold Kerzner, Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling ,and 
Controlling (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 710. 
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management, political, production, and schedule (there are also technical and engineering 
risks, but are much less applicable in this study).200  In order to identify potential risks, 
there are objective and subjective sources which to extract information.  They include, 
but are not limited to: 
 
 Assumption analysis 
 Brainstorming  
 Decision drivers 
 Expert judgment 
 Lessons learned 
 Cost analysis 
 Life cycle cost analysis 
 
 Recognizing these sources, we looked at our project from beginning to end, trying 
to identify anything that might change, hinder, or affect our analysis (focusing mainly on 
assumptions, brainstorming, and expert judgment).  Based largely on our country studies 
and our collective operational experience, we determined the following “what if?” topics 
as our primary risk concerns: 
  
 Support from Leadership:  What if the U.S. Government and/or U.S. Navy 
leadership fails to support the GFS concept or deployment of GFS 
platforms to troubled parts of the globe? 
 Geopolitical Relations (GFS – Gulf of Guinea):  Fluctuating relationships 
with Gulf of Guinea countries. What if not all the countries in the Gulf of 
Guinea region are willing to participate in GFS due to an unfavorable 
relationship with the United States, or if the goals of GFS are not in-line 
with host countries goals? 
_____________________ 
200. Harold Kerzner, Project Management: A Systems Approach to Planning, Scheduling ,and 
Controlling (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2006), 722-724. 
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 Relations with NGOs:  What if the naval/military and civilian NGO 
personnel, administration practices, and general outlooks do not 
effectively mesh (sailors and civilians fail to work together in a united 
front)? 
 Interagency Relationships:  GFS is envisioned as a joint and/or 
interagency operation.  What if traditional service boundaries and/or 
bureaucratic barriers prevent efficient cooperation? 
 Relations Between Host Nation and NGOs:  Many NGOs often operate 
without concern for political sensitivities, focusing on the human plights 
of populations – even if those populations comprise rebel camps.  What if 
their efforts threaten the GFS mission? 
 Relations Between Host Nation and Inter-agencies:  What if interagency 
efforts threaten enhanced relations with host governments? 
 Peer Competition:  What if a peer competitor’s influence in the region 
surpasses the U.S. influence and the peer competitor’s priorities oppose 
that of the U.S.? 
 Operational Availability:  What if the operational availability of USN and 
USNS assets preclude use of the desired platform for the GFS mission for 
any number of reasons (FRP, number of desired class of platform limited 
in number, platforms called to respond to other operational requirements)? 
 Funding:  What if Congressional and Department of Defense funding cuts 
limit the ability of GFS to perform the missions set forth? 
 Increase in Threat Level:  What if the threat level in the area of operations 
(AO) increases? 
 Collateral Damage:  What if GFS actions result in friendly fire or 
collateral damage (should violent elements in the waters of host-countries 
demand the use of force)?  
 Multi-Tasking: Risk of more than one simultaneous mission.  GFS is in 
port; therefore it can not perform missions at sea. 
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Our second step was to analyze the previously identified risks in terms of their 
likelihood of occurrence, and resulting consequences.  Such analysis can be based on, but 
is not limited to:201 
 
 Analysis of plans and related documents 
 Comparisons with similar systems 
 Experience and interviewing 
 Relevant lessens learned studies 
 Specialist and expert judgments 
 
The object here is to determine, “If [blank] happened, then the consequence would be 
[blank].”   For example, in the case of our Operational Availability “what if,” where 
operational demands elsewhere, or lack of inventory limit our alternatives for providing 
GFS platforms on station, THEN we might be forced to accept less than ideal platforms – 
or even delay or cancel GFS deployments.  Consequences of other “what ifs” are 
included in the Risk Summary of Appendix E. 
 After this is completed, the probability and impact of the risks can be combined 
and categorized into risk ratings (low, medium, and high) and prioritized.  This helps the 
decision makers to focus resources and attention to the greatest risk.  A group of Subject 
Matter Experts, familiar with each risk area, is best qualified to determine risk ratings.202  
Figure 89 depicts our ratings: 
_____________________ 
201. Louis Simpleman, Paul McMahon, Bill Bahnmaier, Ken Evans, Jim Lloyd,  Risk Management 
Guide for Department of Defense Acquisition, Fifth Edition (version 2.0) (Fort Belvoir: Defense 
Acquisition University, June 2003), 17. 
202. Louis Simpleman, Paul McMahon, Bill Bahnmaier, Ken Evans, Jim Lloyd,  Risk Management 
Guide for Department of Defense Acquisition, Fifth Edition (version 2.0) (Fort Belvoir: Defense 
Acquisition University, June 2003), 18. 
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Figure 89:  GFS Risk Matrix 
 
What to assign as our red, green and yellow areas remained largely subjective, and rightly 
so:  “programs should tailor the scales and the risk rating blocks to match their unique 
risk management requirements.”203  Here, we can see that risks related to funding, 
_____________________ 
203. Louis Simpleman, Paul McMahon, Bill Bahnmaier, Ken Evans, Jim Lloyd,  Risk Management 
Guide for Department of Defense Acquisition, Fifth Edition (version 2.0) (Fort Belvoir: Defense 
Acquisition University, June 2003), 19. 
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operational availability, and fluctuating geopolitical relations demand the greatest 
attention, as they are the highest risk - comprised of greater likelihood and/or impact.  
Relations between the Navy and NGOs remained a low risk, while all others fell out 
somewhere in between low and high. 
 
4. Risk Handling 
 We utilized risk handling to decide the method of reducing our identified risks, or 
to simply acknowledge their existence.  The latter case recognizes that although all risks 
cannot be effectively reduced, they must at least be recognized by the decision maker as 
potential problems.  The four ways to handle risk include:  
 
 Control.  Reducing or mitigating the risk by either lowering the probability or 
the impact of the occurrence. 
 Avoid.  Changing the concept, requirement, or specification by eliminating the 
source of a high risk and replace with a lower risk.  
 Assume.  Acknowledging the existence of a risk and make a conscious 
decision to accept that risk. 
 Transfer.  Re-allocating risk from one part of a system to another (risk 
sharing). 
 
Therefore, in the case of our Operational Availability example, to mitigate the risk of not 
having our primary platform of choice available, we might best handle that situation by 
simply preparing a list of alternative platforms, platform modifications, and/or CONOPS, 
and implementing those contingencies.  For example, should the MPF-E versions of MSC 
RORO ships become unavailable due to sealift requirements in another ocean, perhaps 
another pre-positioning ship could be utilized, or perhaps a couple of the Maritime 
Administration’s (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF) ships could be activated to 
supplement current inventory.  Means by which to handle other risks are included in the 




 Our risk analysis did not shape or influence our rankings of GFS alternatives out 
of current inventory; rather, it served as a reminder that all decisions must be made with 
risks considered.  Doing so leads to contingency actions to mitigate the risks involved 
with GFS in a variable environment.  See Appendix E for a summary of our analysis. 
 
K. SUMMARY 
 We believed that we achieved three primary results from our FNA:  a solution set 
of platforms from which to select GFS alternatives out of our fleet as it stands today, a 
gap - or gauge - by which to propose possible changes and innovations for future GFS 
concepts and platforms, as well as a set of contingency actions for GFS should our Navy 
encounter risks inherent to shaping and stability operations in the Gulf of Guinea.  Our 
list of cost-effective ships certainly may provide a regional commander with the tools 
necessary to decide what platform he or she desires to serve as GFS in their area of 
operations – we must bear in mind that this tool emanates out of current capability.  
Indeed, many JCIDS studies end at this point, as the primary stakeholder or tasking 
authority may consider these results final.  We also identified a gap, which was our 
original intention when we commenced FNA.  This latter result would enable our next 
step in the JCIDS process:  FSA.  Finally, we considered the risks that might jeopardize 
GFS deployments, and developed a set actions we deemed plausible to maintain a 
persistent “force for good” in the Gulf of Guinea. 
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VI. FUNCTIONAL SOLUTION ANALYSIS 
 To recapture the purpose of FSA: “It is a joint assessment of potential DOTMLPF 
and policy approaches to solving, or at least mitigating, one or more of the capability 
gaps identified in the FNA.”204  To close the gaps of our FNA, we focused on four 
possible solutions: 1) the development of a new GFS class of ship, 2) applying doctrine, 
materiel, and personnel (DMP) changes to the platforms evaluated in FNA to improve 
their performance, 3) investigating possible solutions to improving cost for those 
alternatives, and 4) considering mission gaps in our scenarios and offering 
recommendations for future improvement. 
 
A. NAVSEA PROPOSED NEW-CONSTRUCTION, GFS CLASS OF SHIPS 
 One method of closing the performance gap may lie in the construction of a new 
class of ship specifically tailored to the characteristics demanded by our attributes.  
Designing such a vessel remains beyond the scope of this study, but this subject may 
provide an excellent opportunity for follow-on studies for future SEA curriculums in 
tandem with other curriculums or agencies involved in naval architecture.  However, we 
did obtain the opportunity to evaluate a future-concept notional design on a much more 
limited scale through our fortunate interaction with the NAVSEA 05D1/NACT GFS 
Team (Mr. Mark Campbell and Mr. John Krempasky). 
 
1. Background 
 The NAVSEA 05D1 GFS Team applied their own JCIDS approach to the subject 
of GFS.  As their task lied in developing a possible future-concept class of vessel for 
GFS, their study naturally focused more heavily on the FSA, and to a smaller extent on 
the FAA and FNA.  As our study focused more heavily on the FAA and FNA, we hoped 
that working together might provide for a more complete JCIDS study.  Though earlier 
coordination might have provided a means to tailor their ship solutions to our regional 
_____________________ 
204.  U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (CJCSM 3170.01C) (Washington, DC: May 2007): A-14. 
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attributes, resulting in a truly integrated and comprehensive study, we did take advantage 
of constructive interaction between both studies with the limited time we had.   
 Meeting in Monterey in November of 2007, we were amazed at some of the 
similarities both groups shared in attempting to define GFS, determine the needs and 
missions, and in identifying pilot programs.  Their identification of mission sets was 
strikingly similar to what we had determined as our missions:  Training/Support (Theater 
Security Cooperation), Humanitarian, and GWOT-Related Kinetic missions.  Clearly, 
they recognized the importance of a military-to-military, as well as a humanitarian 
element to GFS.  Of course, our studies did not completely mirror each other.  Their 
study derived several lessons from the USCGC Gentian’s employment as a “Caribbean 
Support Tender” from 1999 to 2006 – a program that preceded and influenced the GFS 
concept – while our study had not considered that particular “pilot” in great detail.  Mr. 
Campbell and Mr. Krempasky also emphasized that GFS, in their opinion, would be 
optimized if composed of (at minimum) two vessels:  a “GFS Station Ship” and a GFS 
“Patrol Boat.”205   
 
2. Approach 
 Using the notional specs of what they envisioned for their future-concept “GFS 
Station Ship,” we evaluated it using a “quick look” application of our FNA’s weighting 
and scoring techniques.  Since the concept-ship is notional, much of the data required in 
our FNA simply was not available, or was too generic to substitute directly into our 
calculations.  In such cases, we used an analogous approach to compare what we were 
trying to measure with a known quantity from a similar vessel, or we interpolated based 
on the data we had. We also consulted cargo and vehicle capacity specs, as well as ship 
schematics produced and provided by the Center for Innovation in Ship Design (CISD), 
which is proposing design alternatives under the guidance of the NAVSEA 05D1 GFS 
Team. Of importance here is a recognition that with notional specs - vice more solid 
specs from completed designs or existing assets - the conclusions drawn from our method 
of determining a ship’s performance as a GFS in the Gulf of Guinea is not necessarily a 
_____________________ 
205. Mark A. Campbell and John H. Krempasky (NAVSEA 05D1), Ship and Craft Concepts to 
Support “Global Fleet Station,” (powerpoint presentation given on November 6, 2007). 
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reflection of what the ship may be capable of when it reaches operational status.  In 
addition, our evaluation, given the time constraints we faced when conducting it, were 
not as detailed as that conducted for our alternatives in FNA.  With this in mind, we were 
interested to see how NAVSEA’s future-concept ship might fare, given a “quick look” 
application of our weighting and scoring methods.  
 
3. Notional Specs 
 The specs outlined in the following paragraphs were provided by Mr. Mark 
Campbell, of the NAVSEA 05D1 GFS Team.   
 
GFS “Station Ship” – Notional Requirements 
 
Guiding Note:  Please note that all the specifications given here 
are only notional, as the analytical study to precisely identify ship 
mission requirements is an ongoing FY08 task. 
 
Overall Ship Characteristics:  
 
Cost:  Low cost is a paramount concern.  Ship will be built to 
commercial standards. 
 
Size:  As a first-order approximation, we envision a ship size of 
5,000 to 10,000 tons.  It is anticipated that this will suffice to 
meet all the required missions, but some growth may be 
necessary.  Note that since the GFS station ship is intended to be 
a “distributed” asset, a larger number of smaller vessels may be 
advantageous.  
 
Draft:   
 15 ft or less.  Important because many ports that the 
GFS ship will need to reach have limited depths.   
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 Beaching capability would be a plus.   
 Capability to unload cargo at small/austere ports a 
definite requirement.  
 
Speed:  In this case, speed is neither essential nor particularly 
desirable.  Accordingly, a notional top speed of 15 knots is 
specified, but this is subject to possible modest increase or  
decrease as operational requirements become better defined.  
 
Endurance/Range:  6-12 month deployments, slowly moving in 
a given region, periodic visits to small/austere ports.  Minimum 
5,000 nm un-refueled range.  
 
Fuels:  Station ship to have ability to operate on a variety of 
locally-available diesel fuels. Some support of local navies and 
coast guards using mogas. 
 
Stability:  Commercial rather than USN stability standards if 
possible.   
 
Operating Environment:  Mainly coastal areas in hot/tropical 
climates.  
 
Appearance:  Unthreatening, non-military appearance.  
 
Simplicity:  Similarity/common systems to vessels operated by 
developing world countries would be beneficial. Limit use of 
classified systems, or restrict such systems to certain small areas, 




 Minimal requirement of Level 1 Class 1 (pad, hangar, 
full maintenance and fueling) for one H-60 class 
helicopter.  
 Support for a number of UAVs. 
 
Craft Support: 
 Full support (fueling/maintenance) of ~ 4-8 patrol boats, 
(~ 50 ft to 150 ft size) (TBD).  Smaller boats (11m-
RHIBs) would be carried on board and deployed 
through cranes, well decks, etc.  Larger craft would be 
supported by the GFS Station Ship.  
 If GFS Station ship cannot be beached, a cargo 
connector to the beach may be necessary.  
 
Crew: 
 Accommodations for a base operating crew in the 30-50 
range. 
 Assume either entirely USN, or USN + foreign trainee 
crew (estimate foreign complement as 33%-50% of total 
crew, based on USCG Gentian experience).  NOTE: 
crew accommodations will be based on USN berthing 
standards, not on MSC CIVMAR standards. 
 Will often have State Department or Non-Governmental 
Organization personnel on board, thus several VIP 
cabins will likely be needed.  




 1-4 gun mounts (7.62mm to 30mm) for self-defense; 
stabilized mounts are preferred (the USN-standard 
currently is the Mk 49 ROSAM, carrying up to 12.7mm, 
but GFS may require larger/heavier capability.) 
 No CIC or equivalent capability required. The GFS 
station ship is NOT a combatant vessel!! 
 
Communications:  
Limited Communications suite – on the notional scale of the US 
Army Logistics Support Vessel, *NOT* a DDG or equivalent. 
 
Modules: (Critical undetermined issue: Trade/offs between 
inherent capability and modular capability – TBD). 
 
1) Capability to carry a number (TBD) of TEU or FEU modular 
mission packages with power and hotel services for the modules 
(Note these are NOT LCS mission packages). Likely more 
efficient to have enhanced power and hotel services be inherent 
in the ship (with built in inputs and outputs to modules) than in 
additional modules.  
 
2) Some additional number of standard cargo ISO modules, or 
space for cargo for humanitarian relief, TBD.  
 
Inherent OR Modular capabilities: 
 Additional 20-100 mission personnel. 
 Extensive medical facilities.  (For notional planning 
purposes:  2 operating room / 8-10 bed facility(s). 
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 Substantial freshwater generation capacity (including at 
anchor in shallow/turbid coastal waters) and means of 
getting it ashore (for humanitarian relief).   
 Briefing rooms/classrooms. 
 Small boat simulator.  
 
What NOT to Include:  
 High speed neither required nor desired. 
 Absolutely no need for signature reduction. 
 No CONREP delivery equipment.  
 
 The following depiction of one GFS design proposal was provided by Mr. Simon 
“Matt” Howard of CISD, and with the concurrence of the NAVSEA 05D1 GFS Team.  
Please note that it is a notional idea of a design concept, and is subject to change. 
 
 
Figure 90:  One Design Alternative for "GFS Station Ship"206 
_____________________ 
206. Simon Howard, Center for Innovation in Ship Design - Naval Surface Warfare Center, “Global 




4. Attribute Outcomes 
 The following are general descriptions of how NAVSEA’s notional GFS ship 
performed with regard to the attributes considered in our FNA.  Weights assigned to 
attributes and mid-level functions in our FNA were not altered.  Specific scores are 
provided in Figure 91, Figure 92 and Figure 93. 
 
a. Peacetime Engagement 
 
  1.0 Peacetime Engagements: NAVSEA’s ship will not have a CIC; 
limited command/control and communications, but should have similar capabilities as 
that of an AS. Therefore, the ability for the NAVSEA ship to provide RMSA or C3 
resulted in a relatively low score. 
 
  1.1 Expanded Maritime Interception Operations: The NAVSEA vessel 
scores very high in this attribute since the ship will have the capability to carry 4-8 
RHIB-like boats, and the necessary equipment and storage space to support these small 
boats. We assumed that it will possess an armory, as its specs include crew-served gun-
mounts and associated ammunition.  NAVSEA’s vessel will also have a very capable and 
extensive medical facility, effectively addressing that aspect of our EMIO mission. 
 
  1.2 Maritime Security Operations and Cooperation (MSOC). 
NAVSEA’s vessel is geared toward coastal operations; appears to be well suited for river 
support operations and fishery enforcement. In addition, the ship seems to be well armed 
for self protection; not so much in active pursuit of an enemy combatant or smuggler due 
to its relatively low speed of 15kts. 
 
  1.4 Foreign Navy Capability Building: NAVSEA’s vessel seems well 
suited for foreign navy integration and interaction, as it will be constructed with an 
emphasis of embedding foreign personnel to conduct GFS PE/training missions.   
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  Figure 91 summarizes the results for performance in the HA/DR mission, 
and details the scores in each attribute. 
 
 





  2.1 Infrastructure: In terms of resource and physical networks, 
NAVSEA’s vessel seems well suited to provide these functions in a HA/DR scenario; 
especially if a natural disaster affected transportation infrastructure nodes such as harbors 
or airports.  NAVSEA’s vessel has the potential to beach ashore in the absence of port 
facilities – a characteristic which may prove valuable in an austere HA/DR environment. 
  
  2.2 Medical Assistance: NAVSEA’s vessel will have the inherent 
capability of providing medical services, in addition to a potential modular capability, 
thus increasing their overall medical capabilities.  
 
  2.3 Logistics:  NAVSEA’s vessel provides a great way to conduct 
logistical operations in a HA/DR scenario. It does not need any ports to deliver and 
provide HA/DR services, as it can beach itself without damage to the ship.  If the vessel 
does pull into port, its small draft will enable it to enter most West African ports. The 
vessel will also have inherent cargo moving equipment for a pier-side off-load. 
 
  2.4 Communications: NAVSEA’s vessel will probably have the most 
basic communications equipment, comparable to that of a Submarine Tender. It will 




  Figure 92 summarizes the results for performance in the HA/DR mission, 
and details the scores in each attribute. 
 
 
Figure 92:  HA/DR Mission Total Value Calculations and Results (“GFS Station Ship”) 
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c. Inter-Agency/NGO Coordination 
  3.1 2nd Embassy: NAVSEA’s vessel will most likely have enough 
communications gear and meeting/coordination spaces to adequately conduct the 
IA/NGO missions. IA/NGO missions will most likely utilize open-source/non-secure 
types of communications which the vessel will be equipped with. 
 
  3.2 Storage:  First we considered the displacement of NAVSEA’s 
notional vessel (5,000-10,000 tons), and contemplated correlating its relative 
displacement to that of an LHD to gauge its cargo capacity.  Recognizing this as an 
excessively rough means by which to figure capacity, we sought more solid data.  The 
Center for Innovation in Ship Design’s concept ship for NAVSEA provides for 144,452 
ft3 of cargo space; 20,000ft3 greater than an LHD has. The ship also has room for 
approximately three 5 ton vehicles and four HMMWVs207, or ten HMMVWs, or ten 
Suburbans.208  In both respects, this particular version of NAVSEA’s notional ship 
performed this function extremely well.  
 
  3.4 Logistics: NAVSEA’s vessel rates very high in this attribute area. The 
shallow draft and the potential to beach the craft allows this vessel a great off-load/on-
load capability in virtually any type of logistic situation in the Gulf of Guinea region. In 
addition, it will also have the capability to conduct helicopter operations utilizing an 
embarked aircraft.  
 
  3.5 Minimize Militaristic Perception: NAVSEA’s vessel is also very 
specific in building this vessel as non-militaristic as possible and constructing it to 
commercial standards vice military standards. Force posture will be minimized, providing 
just enough for self-protection at all in-port threat levels.  We assumed a non-grey hull, 
and we deciphered the lack of a heavy “military” mast from CISD’s rendering; therefore, 
_____________________ 
207. Simon Howard, Center for Innovation in Ship Design - Naval Surface Warfare Center, “Global 
Fleet Station CSID Concept,” (powerpoint presentation given on November 29, 2007). 
208. Simon Howard, e-mail to LCDR John Montonye, November 29, 2007. 
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NAVSEA’s vessel achieved a maximum score for the appearance portion of this 
attribute. 
 
  Figure 93 summarizes the results for performance in the NGO & 
Interagency mission, and details the scores in each attribute. 
 




5.  Results 
 Based on NAVSEA’s notional idea for a ship specifically constructed for GFS, as 
well as our assumptions and methods of analysis, the results in Figure 94 demonstrate 
how that ship would perform in our three mission areas. 
 
Figure 94:  Mission Results (“GFS Station Ship”) 
       
 
 Calculating our expected value in performance (EVP) from these scores, and 
considering the weights of each mission area, EVP = 85% for NAVSEA’s notional GFS 
Station Ship alternative.  The purpose of the following figure (Figure 95) is twofold.  The 
first is to depict its performance, and the second is to highlight the ambiguous nature of 
its costs.   
 
 
Figure 95:  Performance and Unknown Cost of "GFS Station Ship" 
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a. Performance  
   GFS Station Ship’s performance, as compared to our “current capability” 
alternatives, tied with the HSV/RORO combination for third highest in performance, and 
outperformed one of our top cost-effective platforms – the HSV.   
  One interpretation might be one of surprise:  that the Station Ship – a ship 
specifically designed for GFS missions – did not rate first among our alternatives.  We 
believed that such a translation, however, should be tempered by three considerations: 1) 
the NAVSEA GFS team envisions their Station Ship as only one piece of a complete 
GFS package, 2) the excess multi-purpose capability provided by the two grey-hulled 
amphibious options that outperformed it, as well as the risks and opportunity costs 
associated with such excess, and 3) differences between both groups’ focus that 
influenced outcomes. 
 
   1) Adding the Second Element of the NAVSEA Team’s GFS 
   Returning to the performance aspect of the NAVSEA team’s 
notional concept, we then considered that it did not only include the “Station Ship,” but 
also factored in a “GFS Patrol Craft.”    When factoring in a patrol craft, its presence 
improved scoring in the following Peacetime Engagement attributes: 
 
 1.2.2 Ordnance on Target:  score raised from 80% to 100% 
 1.2.3 Protection of SLOCs:  score raised from 50% to 100% 
 1.2.4 Riverine Operations: score raised from 90% to 100% 
 
Other attributes and mission areas were not considered to be altered by the addition of 
this asset.  Of particular note, it did not alter the communications attributes across our 
mission sets - an attribute set that the Station Ship scored relatively low in.  These 
improvements resulted in a Peacetime Engagement total value score of 87.7% for the 




Figure 96:  Mission Results (“GFS Station Ship & Patrol Craft”) 
 
   Calculating our expected value in performance from these scores, 
and considering the weights of each mission area, EVP = 87% for NAVSEA’s notional 
GFS Station Ship and Patrol Craft combination.  Despite this improved performance, the 
NAVSEA notional combination package still ranked 1% lower in expected performance 
value than the LPD. 
 
   2) Another Look at the Top Performers 
   One might argue that the LPD and LHD outperformed the 
NAVSEA GFS Team’s proposals simply out of their immense capacities for supplies, 
personnel, connector transportation, and multi-mission orientation.  In addition, even if 
more capable of meeting the shaping and stability needs of the Gulf of Guinea, one might 
question the likelihood of pulling a national asset (LHD) out of the Navy’s FRP, or of 
denying the Marine Corps one of their coveted transportation and sea-basing assets.  This 
latter point was addressed by our Operational Risk assessment, which recommended 
“preparing a list of alternative platforms” (see Appendix E).  In this case, the notional 
GFS Station Ship & Patrol Craft option would top the list for performance capability. 
 
   3) Differences of Opinion 
   One primary difference in emphasis between our group’s study and 
that of Mr. Campbell and Mr. Krempasky dealt with the role of GFS in military-to-
military cooperation.  Our Peacetime Engagement focused on an active engagement by 
GFS in the security issues facing Gulf of Guinea nations, in large part due to a lack of 
naval capability on the part of several of those nations.  The NAVSEA GFS Team 
focused on military-to-military cooperation in terms of training those nations’ forces to 
confront their respective security challenges.  This difference contributed to a large 
disparity between communications capability of their proposed vessel, and the capability 
 305
demanded by our communications attributes.  Obviously, if we concurred with their 
emphasis on training vice active-engagement, their vessel would have achieved a better 
EVP.   
 
b. Cost 
  Figure 95 is also intended to highlight a consideration sure to garner 
interest with regard to developing and operating a new class of ship:  unknown cost.   
  The GFS Team stressed the point that their ship must be inexpensive to 
build and operate.  On the latter point, they emphasized the importance of simple systems 
and modularity as key to low operating costs:  “CHEAP and FLEXIBLE is crucial!”209  
Indeed, as we advocated factoring cost to all decision alternatives in our FNA, O&S costs 
are what regional/combatant commanders care about.  With a new ship, however, R&D 
and production costs will be of great concern to the Navy.  Understanding that the 
NAVSEA GFS Team intends to propose measures to reduce such costs, we believed that 
to attempt cost predictions - in order to determine cost-effectiveness of NAVSEA’s ship - 
to be beyond the scope of this study. 
  
B. APPLYING DMP SOLUTIONS TO FNA PLATFORMS 
 Out of the DOTMLPF construct, we applied the doctrine, materiel and personnel 
(or DMP) portions to the platform alternatives from our FNA.  In our opinion, 
organization, training, leadership, and facilities aspects of the process held no substantive 
value in producing changes to effect improvements in performance of these assets.  We 
looked at all platforms, and attempted to focus on changes that might effect the most 
noticeable increase to their total value performance scores in each mission area.  In 
keeping with the FSA criteria to be “feasible with respect to policy, sustainment, 
personnel limitations, and technological risk,”210 we also considered changes that might – 
even if not delivering noticeable impact in overall performance – be simple to change. 
_____________________ 
209. Mark A. Campbell and John H. Krempasky (NAVSEA 05D1), Ship and Craft Concepts to 
Support “Global Fleet Station,” (powerpoint presentation given on November 6, 2007). 
210. U.S. Office of the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System (CJCSM 3170.01C) (Washington, DC: May 2007): A-14. 
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1. Solutions per Platform, per Mission 
 
a. CG 
  The CG offered a basic, but not surprising insight into the CRUDES 
category of current capability: “not much room for change.” 
 
 Peacetime Engagement: No Change.  The CG scored the highest in this 
mission area without applying any improvements. The cruiser is designed 
and built for conducting PE missions and would not benefit from any 
changes to its DOTMLPF. 
 Interagency and NGO Coordination: No Change. CRUDES sailors 
often boast that their ships “are built for war.”  This credit is validated 
with the CG, as its spaces are full of combat systems dedicated to war-
fighting, and leaving little in terms of space to lend for materiel changes in 
support of Interagency & NGO missions.  In addition, we did not consider 
doctrinal changes viable, as these are coveted national assets in the Navy’s 
FRP.  Applying any DOTMLPF solutions to this platform would not be 
cost-effective or feasible. 
 HA/DR: No Change.  Same reasons as provided for Interagency and 
NGO Coordination mission.  
 
b. HSV 
  We were able to improve the HSV’s performance significantly in the 
humanitarian missions through application of DMP: 
 
 Peacetime Engagement: Original Score: 91%.  In order to bring the 
overall effectiveness up for this platform, we increased the ship’s 
capabilities to conduct C3/RMSA operations. Such combat effective 
improvements would include: improved military satellite communication 
suites, improved surface search radar, Link 11/16 capability, AIS, a more 
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dedicated and robust CIC space with SIPRNET access.211  (Materiel) New 
Score: 93% 
 Interagency and NGO Coordination: Original Score: 72%.  One way 
to improve this score is to make the same materiel changes described 
above. The enhanced communications are needed to properly manage and 
coordinate NGO activities. Another possible improvement lies in the 
effective loading management of NGO cargo and vehicle capacity. 
(Materiel) New Score: 88%. 
 HA/DR: Original Score: 79%. The HSV’s internal spaces must be 
modified to increase the medical capacity and facilities of this platform. 
Such modifications would include support for medical staff to conduct 
major medical procedures. The HSV would need several operating rooms 
and tables, and hospital beds. The vessel’s cargo deck can also be loaded 
with pre-fabricated medical modules that would tie-in to existing auxiliary 
services.  These medical modules would increase the medical capacity and 
facilities of the HSV by providing operating tables and hospital beds for 
medical staff to work from. (Materiel, Personnel) New Score: 88%.  
 
c. LPD-17 
  The LPD, considered one of our top alternatives for cost-effectiveness, 
and ranking second only to the LHD, did not have a lot of room for improvement, 
although we were able to propose some ideas that would provide improvements of some 
significance in the mission of Interagency and NGO Coordination mission: 
 
 Peacetime Engagement: Original Score: 96%.  Embarking Navy SH-60 
aviation assets - more suited to the maritime tactical element than the 
troop transport and heavy lift capabilities of the USMC assets - would 
increase performance in the air tasks expected within the Peacetime 
Engagement realm.  (Doctrine, Materiel, Personnel) New score: 98%.  
_____________________ 
211. Tactical Bulletin GWOT-06-02 Afloat Forward Staging Base for Maritime Security Operations 
From LSD and LPD Class Ships, March 2006. 
 308
 Interagency and NGO Coordination: Original Score: 76%.  By 
optimizing the carrying requirements for NGO missions, the ship will be 
able to properly balance vehicles or cargo for the various organizations. 
(Doctrine) New Score: 83%. 
 HA/DR: Original Score: 87%.  Upgrading medical capabilities in a 
similar manner to that of the materiel changes proposed for the HSV will 
improve performance.  Manning the ship with civilian mariners for jobs 
not tactical in nature may optimize manning, and free space for extra 




  The AS stood to gain the most, performance-wise, out of our proposed 
DMP changes: 
 
 Peacetime Engagement: Original Score: 72%.  Adding C3 gear similar 
to that of a CG will significantly improve the ability for the AS to conduct 
RSMA and Command/Control missions, key functions for Peacetime 
Engagement. Replacing motor-whaleboats with RHIBS, along with the 
associated support/storage capabilities to support the RHIBS, will lift 
EMIO and Counter-Piracy performance. Adding operating tables and 
hospital beds will improve the medical component of this mission. 
Perhaps of greatest importance, and “easiest” to effect, would be the 
removal of stanchions around the helicopter pad, thereby making the AS 
capable of limited helicopter support. (Materiel)  New Score: 93%. 
 Interagency and NGO Coordination: Original Score: 57%. Adding C3 
gear similar to that of a CG will significantly improve the ability for the 
AS to conduct NGO operations. Improving vehicle and cargo capacity, 
perhaps by modifying repair and storage spaces formerly consumed by 
submarine-tender duties, will help. (Doctrine, Materiel)  New Score: 
68%. 
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 HA/DR: Original Score: 72%. Modify internal spaces of AS to provide 
the necessary room to help facilitate resource/physical networks and 
support the personnel directly involved with the HA/DR missions (FAOs, 
Seabees, physicians, etc.). This might mean reducing manning of rates not 
inherently important to operations ashore. Adding C3 gear to the level of 
the HSV capabilities is viable, and desirable (Materiel, Personnel)  New 
Score: 87%. 
 
e. LHD/FFG  
  We only considered modifying LHD, as the FFG is comparable to the CG 
in its war-time focus, and scored very highly in the Peacetime Engagement mission, 
leaving little to gain from DMP changes. 
 
 Peacetime Engagement: No Change.   
 Interagency and NGO Coordination: Original Score: No Change.   
 HA/DR: Original Score:  Old Score 92%.  Making Navy personnel 
experienced in civil engineering, construction and other HA/DR pertinent 
fields (along with associated equipment) a standard complement to the 
ship’s crew would improve performance in this area. (Material, Personnel) 
New Score: 94% 
 
f. HSV/RORO  
  New scores took into account the previous mentioned changes to the HSV; 
any changes mentioned in this paragraph are only to the RORO, and the scores reflect the 
changes with both. 
 
 Peacetime Engagement: Original Score: 85%.  We proposed adding 
crew served weapons with a security detachment on board, so the RORO 
had the capability to better conduct its own force protection. (Materiel) 
New Score: 92%. 
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 NGO: Original Score: 90%.  Optimally balancing or reducing the 
amount of cargo/vehicles the RORO carries will reduce its draft, making it 
capable of entering more ports, thus permitting it to off-load and on-load 
equipment and supplies directly to the pier. (Doctrine) New Score: 91%. 
 HA/DR: Original Score: 82%.  By utilizing the RORO to carry the 
equipment and supplies in support of medical support and logistic 
services, the HSV will be freed to transport personnel and equipment 
ashore.  C3 gear can be modified to work cohesively with the HSV. 
(Material, Doctrine) New Score: 92%.  
 
2. Overall DMP Results 
 The following paragraphs and figures summarize our results.  
 
 From Figure 97, one can discern a marked increase in the AS platforms 
performance – some of this attributable to a very simple modification to their flight deck.  
 
 
Figure 97:  Comparisons of Pre and Post-DMP Scores* 
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 Figure 98 provides a visual representation of each platform’s cost-effectiveness, 
following proposed DMP changes (Editor’s Note: LPD PE(N) score should reflect a .98 
score – this does not effect the overall new EVP of 92%).  
 
 
Figure 98:  Focused Snapshot on Performance Improvement via DMP 
 
Understanding that cost was not factored into the proposed changes, the increases in 
performance do bolster the HSV/RORO alternative’s viability as a cost-effective option 
as it passes the “bend in the knee” of cost-effectiveness.  The AS undergoes the greatest 
increase in performance through simple modifications, overtaking the CG, as well as the 
HSV (without modifications).  In this evaluation, the LHD/FFG combination is still the 
highest performing platform, even though its overall EVP score did not change. 
 
3. Key Takeaway:  Some Common Threads Between Mission Attributes 
 Identifying some commonalities between performance deficiencies in all three 
GFS missions, we concluded that future DOTMLPF address of the following subject 
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areas may help the Navy close the performance gap with its current inventory of vessels 
in the GFS role for the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
a. Communications. 
  Communication is common to all three mission areas. Indeed, the means 
to interact with personnel and assets beyond the immediate range via electronic means 
(voice, data, video) remains inherently important to any maritime operation. Though most 
of our current-capability platforms performed well in the communication attributes, the 
AS platform’s relatively low score, along with the conclusions drawn from our NAVSEA 
interaction, highlight the need for a certain level of C3 capability in any platform we 
might propose.  Apparently, that “line” appears somewhere above what the 
communications suite of an AS offers. 
 
b. Connector Assets. 
  Helicopter and LCAC assets were also considered important to all three 
mission areas, with helicopters of paramount importance (note the dramatic performance 
increase for the AS after introducing a simple modification to their flight deck). A 
platform with the ability to inherently operate (and ideally house) helicopters provides a 
multitude of services from tactical (EMIO, Counter Piracy) for Peacetime Engagement, 
to logistical (medical, cargo, and personnel transfer) for HA/DR and Interagency & NGO 
Coordination. LCAC assets were not considered for the PE mission areas, but afforded a 
“heavy lift” connector capability which proved valuable to the NGO and HA/DR mission 
areas. LCACs provide a unique capability by allowing the transportation of personnel, 
equipment, and supplies to any of the Gulf of Guinea nations from the platform, whether 
into port or directly to shore. This latter point is especially crucial in situations where, for 
example, a natural disaster has eliminated previous harbor/port infrastructures or the area 
of operation is nowhere near a transportation node. 
 
c. Cargo Capacity and Personnel Support. 
  All mission areas considered space for equipment/supplies, cargo/vehicle 
room, and the ability to carry and support the right people to conduct their respective 
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mission areas. In the Interagency & NGO Coordination and HA/DR realms, particularly, 
greater space affords increased flexibility and impact, as many of their efforts require 
primarily logistical support from GFS.   Said simply, the more relief supplies the platform 
can bring, the more GFS can treat the affected people and sustain a longer relief 
operation. The ability to carry and sustain the right people for the mission is also a key 
attribute in conducting GFS tasks. GFS’s value to the region increases when it can yield 
an optimal mix of personnel and equipment.  
 
C. CLOSING THE COST GAP 
 Closing the performance gap only addresses the vertical component of our 
analysis of cost effectiveness.  Indeed, DOTMLPF can be applied to closing the 
horizontal component:  cost.  As the core of our study relied heavily on the performance 
base of our attributes, however, so did our FSA – perhaps naturally so.  With that said, 
we identified two methods – one doctrine related, and the other personnel related – of 
reducing cost.  Both emanate from practices employed by MSC. 
 
1. Maintenance 
 Condition based maintenance – a maintenance philosophy predicated on detection 
of maintenance needs followed by actual maintenance, rather than on periodic 
maintenance – promises to reduce maintenance costs, if employed.  Such maintenance 
has been advocated for the DD(X) program: 
 
[Condition based maintenance] is expected to reduce non-corrective type 
maintenance and significantly reduce corrective maintenance induced by 
the planned maintenance system.  In addition, routine maintenance … is 
projected to be reduced by increased equipment reliability and a strategy 




212. U.S. General Accounting Office, Navy Options Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce 
Total Ownership Costs (GAO-03-520) (Washington, DC: June 2003): 44. 
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Such a strategy contains direct cost benefits with its reduction in corrective maintenance 
requirements.  Additional cost benefits may evolve more indirectly as a consequence of 
this strategy:  maintaining station for longer periods of time as its needs to enter port due 
to corrective maintenance requirements dwindle, or mitigating the need for engineers and 
technicians who conduct the preventive maintenance (a personnel cost factor).   
 
2. Civilian Manning 
 Personnel costs are the single greatest element in the operating costs of a vessel at 
sea (see Appendix D); therefore, they logically filter as one of the primary areas in which 
to search for cost-saving solutions.  Manning GFS platforms with civilian mariners 
affords one such option.   
 
Use of Merchant Marines or Military Sealift Command personnel 
generally results in a smaller crew because these organizations employ 
more experienced seamen, have reduced watch-standing requirements, and 
use a different maintenance and training philosophy.213 
 
Though we did not find the actual cost per person, we recognized that reduced manning 
by Navy sailors also equates to reduced costs.  In a review of analysis regarding 
personnel-cost considerations with the JCC(X) Command Ship Program, the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) cited the following: 
 
The analysis found that using a mix of military and civilian personnel 
rather than all military personnel would reduce personnel costs by nearly a 
third, saving 2.3 billion for four ships over a 40-year service life.214 
 
Such a proposal to man with civilian mariners, or a mix of civilian and military mariners 
has obvious implications regarding selection of a GFS platform, as it would effectively 
_____________________ 
213. U.S. General Accounting Office, Navy Options Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce 
Total Ownership Costs (GAO-03-520) (Washington, DC: June 2003): 13. 
214. U.S. General Accounting Office, Navy Options Needed to Optimize Ship Crew Size and Reduce 
Total Ownership Costs (GAO-03-520) (Washington, DC: June 2003): 17. 
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eliminate all CRUDES options, and possibly those options out of the Amphibious 
category.  Though not the first time it has been considered, using civilian mariners aboard 
traditional grey-hull platforms, if implemented, would mark a major paradigm shift in the 
realm of doctrine and personnel.  It would, however, reduce cost. 
 
D. SCENARIO GAPS  
 To this point, our FSA offers possible solutions to closing performance and cost 
gaps in the traditional sense, but we also took the liberty of applying solutions to another 
type of gap:  the missions and functions that “fell through” our study as a result of our 
stove-piped scenarios.  Two of these include interaction with coalition partners (aside 
from host nations), and with the U.S. Coast Guard. In the case of the latter, missions and 
issues not thoroughly covered within our Peacetime Engagement scenario are addressed.  
Our “solutions” consist of a set of considerations and recommendations, which follow. 
 
1. Coalition Support in GFS Operations 
An important aspect not examined thoroughly within the scope of this study is the 
role of coalition forces in the deployment of a GFS.  A GFS comprised of U.S. and 
coalition forces would be a valuable tool for Combatant Commanders (COCOM) based 
on its speed, flexibility, agility, and scalability to effectively respond to a variety of 
maritime safety and security requirements or regional crises.  This combined capability 
has importance for COCOMs because small regional crises have the potential to erupt 
into large-scale humanitarian crises, border conflicts, pandemics, or interrupt the flow of 
vital resources to the U.S. or its allies.  Integration of coalition partners into the GFS 
operational framework would clearly enhance the ability of U.S. forces to respond, not 
only to these regional crises, but more importantly provide an avenue in which to more 
effectively shape the hearts and minds of foreign governments and their populations 
around the world.  Coalition forces, in particular, bring several unique advantages that the 
U.S. could and should consider in employing GFS, and include the sharing of operational 
expenses for GFS missions, providing a larger resource pool from which to match 
specific expertise and proficiency in meeting regional training requirements, leveraging 
existing relationships to garner regional awareness and influence, and a means to further 
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develop and enhance global maritime partnerships throughout the world.  By leveraging 
the capabilities and existing relationships that coalition partners might possess within a 
specified region, a coalition GFS will be able to more able to effectively operate with and 
train regional forces, and thus significantly contribute to the region’s collective security 
and prosperity. 
 There are coordination and planning issues, however, which must be considered 
prior to deploying coalition forces under the GFS umbrella.  A combined GFS force 
could encounter resentment or ill-will towards particular coalition partners based on that 
particular nation’s participation as a colonial power over countries within a specified 
region (an issue particularly applicable to the Gulf of Guinea).  This lingering animosity 
or resentment between coalition partners and their former colonies could undermine or 
even restrict the overall success of these GFS missions.  Therefore, planners must ensure 
(and be aware of) that any such impediments are harmoniously mitigated or resolved, 
prior to deploying a combined GFS force. 
 
2. Military-to-Military Missions, and Interaction with the U.S. Coast 
Guard 
 Of the passel of issues that the authors of this study encountered over the course 
of our research and analysis, three topics in particular warrant further discussion in regard 
to the Peacetime Engagement mission area.  The first of these are the legal aspects of 
GFS operations, for which we reference a paper by CAPT Mark Rosen, JAGC, USN (ret) 
of the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA).  Legality has direct implications for the second 
topic – United States Coast Guard participation in Global Fleet Station, and finally, there 
are specific challenges to Regional Maritime Situational Awareness that we feel must be 
addressed. 
 
a. Legal Issues 
  In his paper, Legal Issues Associated with Green Water Craft Overseas 
Operations, Captain Rosen proceeds from the notion that a forward-deployed Global 
Fleet Station “would provide indigenous support to Green Water Craft (GWC) vessels 
and serve as a launching pad for foreign operations.”  Among those operations, CAPT 
 317
Rosen addresses the legal aspects of Counter-piracy, EMIO, and International Training, 
all of which run congruent to our study.  He scrutinizes each of the possible Global Fleet 
Station missions and identifies any relevant legal guidance, authority, or historical 
precedents. 
  We recommend a thorough consideration of Captain Rosen’s paper, but 
for the sake of example we will discuss a couple of the major missions.  In the first of 
these, Counter-piracy, it is the 1982 Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention that 
“acknowledges the right of warships to exercise the right to visit and, if appropriate 
circumstances are present, arrest vessels engaged in piracy or the slave trade.”  In this 
case, “there is no need for any new agreements [or] any host nation permissions or 
authorizations.”  Captain Rosen provides an excellent summary of the legal status and 
operational issues associated with different missions in Figure 99 below. 
 
 
Figure 99:  Operational Mission Evaluation Summary215 
_____________________ 
215. Title 10 or Title 22 refers to the United States Code.  Mark Rosen, “Legal Issues Associated with 
Green Water Craft Overseas Operations,” Center for Naval Analysis, Aug 2007: 24.   
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 He continues: 
 
Indeed, if the USN were to embark duly authorized law enforcement 
personnel from regional navies aboard GWC vessels, USN craft could 
serve as a law enforcement platform for their actions in much the same 
way that the Navy currently supports the U.S. Coast Guard in counter-
drug operations.216 Such enhanced type of enforcement would require 
coordination with the applicable coastal states and policy support from 
U.S. authorities.217 
 
This recommendation has critical implications for cooperation with host nations as well 
as the incorporation of the United States Coast Guard into GFS.  Global Expanded 
Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) or Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)218 
boardings are legally predicated on everything from consent of the ship’s master to the 
Regional Enforcement Effort under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.  The point is that 
although DOD is not explicitly prohibited from helping a coastal state enforce its laws, it 
is only through the negotiation and subsequent enforcement of multilateral or bilateral 
agreements that a platform such as the GFS can truly be effective.   
  Nigerian Military Officer and Naval Postgraduate School student Ibrahim 
Sani recommends that “all participants get involved in the planning [for GFS]” and we, 
as GFS participants, should “try as much as possible to show that [we] are rendering 
support to the littoral navies to carry out their constitutional roles.”219  Although we’ve 
_____________________ 
216. The current process for Navy/USCG operations is for the USN commanding officer to hoist the 
USCG pennant in the midst of a counter-drug operation and then cede control of the law enforcement 
aspect to the embarked USCG law enforcement detachment.  Article 92.1 of the LOS Convention states 
that ships may not change flags during a voyage nor display the flag of more than one sovereign state.  The 
GWC or GFS could avoid these limitations by allowing host nation enforcement authorities to conduct their 
operation from properly flagged boarding craft or helicopters. 
217. Mark Rosen, “Legal Issues Associated with Green Water Craft Overseas Operations,” Center for 
Naval Analysis, Aug 2007: 13. 
218. The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global initiative aimed at stopping shipments of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide, announced 
by President Bush May 31, 2003.  It has been endorsed by many countries and is sustained through bilateral 
agreements with the United States.  http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/proliferation/#statement. 
219. Ibrahim Sani, conversation with the authors, October 17, 2007. 
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reflected this in our Peacetime Engagement scenario, it’s clear that one of the first places 
to start looking for legal rationale to support GFS operations is the constitutional 
authority within the host nations themselves.  To that end we received some excellent 
input from CAPT Frank Ponds, Senior Naval Advisor to the Department of State (DOS): 
 
The role of the DOS is to engage the countries in question to assist DOD 
in determining the needs of the countries.  This is often done through the 
embassies; through regional maritime security [MARSEC] initiatives and 
through the IMO [International Maritime Organization].  DOS is 
responsible under the National Strategy for Maritime Security to reach out 
to foreign countries and encourage them to embrace regional and 
international initiatives that will produce sound MARSEC principles and 
practices.220 
 
  The State Department’s role is unquestionably essential to the GFS 
mission in laying the foundation for tailored operations and training.  Indeed, from CAPT 
Ponds’ comments, there are certain capacities for which DOS is uniquely equipped to 
lead the way – at least diplomatically – in GFS operations.  We hear echoes of this call 
for indigenous planning and support in an assumption of Captain Rosen’s analysis, albeit 
from a maritime perspective: 
 
A small ashore Naval Support Activity may need to be established to act 
as a permanent liaison to the local population and as a logistics 
coordinator and engagement planner in those locales like West Africa or 
Southeast Asia where there is no U.S. presence nearby.  This activity 
could consist of a single liaison officer or one that is supported by a 
handful of host nation employees and/or enlisted personnel.221 
 
In the same vein, one of Ibrahim Sani’s staunchest recommendations was for the 
designation of a single point of contact in Nigeria with whom to communicate and from 
_____________________ 
220. CAPT Fernandez (Frank) Ponds, Senior Naval Advisor, Dept. of State, email to the authors June 
6, 2007. 
221. Mark Rosen, “Legal Issues Associated with Green Water Craft Overseas Operations,” Center for 
Naval Analysis, Aug 2007: 5. 
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which to coordinate any and all interactions with the GFS.  Clearly, there is a recurrent 
emphasis on - and need for - indigenous focal points that transcend the current functions 
of host nation embassies.  He further advocates regional focal points:  ones that 
“represent the entire region for easy coordination, [with] the various sub units of that 
focal point deployed along the regional coast.”222  Indeed, such regional centers for 
coordination, with dispersed assets at key points along the coast of the Gulf of Guinea, 
would greatly enhance missions such as MDA, and would also help facilitate 
coordination in security affairs between the West African nations.  These platforms might 
be U.S., coalition, or West African partner assets; but certainly, such a proposal would 
encourage a multi-platform alternative. 
   One critical function of a host nation’s focal point would be the 
identification of (and even campaigning for) funding sources available to a nation, a 
recommendation strongly espoused by Mr. Jeremy Cairl of the USCG’s International 
Affairs division.223  We contacted Mr. Cairl, who is responsible for training support to 
Europe and Africa, to further understand the complexities of USCG international training 
teams assigned to GFS.  Funding for international training can originate from a handful 
of sources, from the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program224 to 
the Secretary of Defense’s Combatant Commanders Initiative Fund, which is authorized 
for use on joint exercises and military education and training to personnel of foreign 
countries. Notwithstanding considerable regulations upon material assistance, creativity 
may often be the key in securing funding for on-station training in countries with little to 
no history of cooperation with the U.S. 
 
_____________________ 
222 E-mail exchange between LCDR John Montonye and Captain Brian Hans (SEA-12), and COL 
Ibrahim Sani (Nigerian Army), 6 December, 2007. 
223 Jeremy Cairl, telephone conversation with the authors, October 30, 2007. 
224. The IMET program is a low cost, key funding component of U.S. security assistance that 
provides training on a grant basis to students from allied and friendly nations.  Authority for the IMET 
program is found pursuant to Chapter 5, part II, Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) 1961.  Funding is 
appropriated from the International Affairs budget of the Department of State.   U.S. Department of 
Defense, “IMET,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, http://www.dsca.osd.mil/Default.htm 
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b. Training 
  Not surprisingly, there is a specific process that the USCG must follow to 
respond to requests for use of the USCG's international training competencies.  With its 
origin in the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), the process consists of a 
detailed review of the requestor’s needs, identification of funding sources, followed by a 
lengthy approval process for the curriculum and funding as well as development of a 
tailored training plan.  Furthermore, USCG trainers are deployed as trainers only and 
cannot add to the operational contingent of a crew.  The pros and cons of the division of 
operational and training expertise will not be discussed here. 
  However, narrowing down the ideal GFS training missions was a topic of 
some debate.  That is, the merging of US maritime training capabilities with the particular 
needs of the GoG countries was not going to be seamless.  We decided that a good 
starting point would be the training mission profiles of current and past GFS pilot 
programs.  After reviewing an inbox full of documentation on each of those deployments, 
we compiled a list of training topics, but repeatedly found references to “Mil-to-Mil” 
training.  We contacted the operations officer of the USS Ft McHenry, on her way to the 
GoG as the first Africa Partnership Station (APS), to discern what sort of activities and 
training topics were included under Mil-to-Mil training, as well as those responsible for 
the training.  Mil-to-Mil has been used as a catch-all for ship rider training, seamanship 
and navigation, small arms, and even USMC martial arts training.225  Figure 100 contains 
a comprehensive, but not exhaustive list of training topics and their respectively matched 
GoG country needs. 
 
_____________________ 
225. Gejuan Sweat, e-mail message to the authors, October 16, 2007. 
 322
 
Figure 100: Regional Needs and Core U.S. Training Competencies 
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 Note that all USCG training courses are established and currently in execution, 
whereas the Navy’s NECC Expeditionary Training Command (ETC) is relatively new 
and has yet to participate in GFS pilot programs.226  Both are vast improvements over the 
USN’s conventional method of bringing international students to CONUS for training.227 
 While the USCG is a vital partner in international training, it’s in the Navy’s 
interest to develop a core set of exportable international training competencies that 
complement those of the USCG.  Naval Expeditionary Combat Command’s recent stand-
up of ETC228 is a confident step in the right direction.  While it may be more expensive 
for the USCG to conduct international training on its own (vice aboard GFS), it is even 
more cost-effective for those solutions to come from within the Navy. 
 
c. Fisheries and EEZ Protection 
  As a possible training competency, one topic that came up frequently in 
the Gulf of Guinea country studies was that of fisheries regime enforcement or in larger 
terms, protection of exclusive economic zones (EEZ).229  Identified as one of the primary 
country needs in Angola, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sao Tome and 
Principe, fisheries protection is an attribute that received a low weight in our scenario but 
is no less important as a fulcrum for leveraging regional collaboration.  We presumed that 
a “plug-and-play” international training team from the experts in fisheries enforcement – 
the United States Coast Guard – could be seamlessly incorporated into a GFS 
deployment.  After all, other than enforcement of driftnet regulations, DOD is not 
_____________________ 
226. U.S. Coast Guard, “International Mobile Training & Education Catalog,”  
http://www.uscg.mil/tcyorktown/international/itd/index.shtm 
227. U.S. Department of the Navy, “International Training Center (NITC),” Naval Education and 
Training Security Assistance Field Activity (NETSAFA),  https://www.netsafa.navy.mil/about.asp. 
228. Emily Zamora, “NECC Establishes Expeditionary Training Command,” Navy.mil (April 16, 
2007), http://www.news.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=28905. 
229. The EEZ extends no more than 200nm from the maritime baseline of a country. The EEZ is only 
under the jurisdiction of the coastal state in matters relating to all resource and/or economic-related activity. 
A nation has control of all economic resources within its EEZ (but cannot regulate or prohibit passage or 
loitering above, on or under the surface - innocent or belligerent).  Julia Voelker McQuaid et al., “Building 
a Maritime Safety and Security Force in the Gulf of Guinea,” Center for Naval Analysis, June 2007: 11. 
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involved in fisheries enforcement, pollution control, or other EEZ control issues.230  To 
learn more we instinctively turned to the USCG authority on the subject – LCDR Chris 
Barrows (Chief, Fisheries & Marine Protected Species Law Enforcement at USCG 
Headquarters) – and received somewhat of a wakeup call: 
 
First, there is a need for a viable fisheries management regime in place 
with clearly identified elements that necessitate fisheries enforcement - in 
other words, there needs to be something to train to.  From a US 
Government perspective, assistance in the creation and/or validation of a 
fisheries management regime of relevance to a developing state falls under 
the purview of DOS and/or NOAA rather than the USCG.  Once a 
management and legal regime is in place that can be enforced, specific 
fisheries enforcement training needs to be tailored to support the regime as 
well as be implemented in such a way as to ensure continued development 
and existence after the departure of a country team.  A "train the trainer" 
concept is an important end state to achieve for this phase.  In this regard, 
there is not necessarily a one size fits all approach to fisheries enforcement 
that will be applicable across several nations on a continent.  Take the US 
model for instance.  There are eight regional fishery management councils 
that each create their own semblance of regulations and requirements to 
manage fisheries in their geographic area of responsibility.  Each of the 
councils has several fishery management plans that each have their own 
prohibitions and requirements for enforcement.  Each region and regional 
fishery management plan requires a unique understanding and expertise 
for fisheries enforcement to be effective.  That being said, there are 
elements of each fishery boarding which are common to any boarding at 
sea - force protection, embarkation, general vessel knowledge, general 
safety gear knowledge, use of force policy, defensive tactics, ship handing 
and outboard engine maintenance, and to some degree - potentially even 
gear identification.  These are competencies that potentially the USCG can 
assist with exportable international training to help developing nations 
grow their fisheries enforcement capabilities. 
Additionally, the USCG's Fisheries Enforcement program does not 
organically have in its tool bag exportable international fisheries 
enforcement training teams - thus, support for the GFS concept outside of 
the CG's formal international training structure is currently unavailable.  
The USCG's mission is to enforce domestic living marine resource laws 
on US domestic vessels and foreign fishing vessels.  The USCG's focus on 
the foreign fishing vessel/IUU [illegal, unregulated and unreported] threat 
_____________________ 
230. Mark Rosen, “Legal Issues Associated with Green Water Craft Overseas Operations,” Center for 
Naval Analysis, Aug 2007: 19. 
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is primarily organized to protect the US EEZ from illegal fishing by 
foreign fishing vessels as well as selective IUU fishing activities of 
particular interest to the US on the high seas (most effort in this arena is 
directed at North Pacific large scale high seas driftnet enforcement).231 
 
  International EEZ protection and fisheries regime enforcement now falls 
into an area of operations that offers tremendous opportunities for positive impacts in the 
global maritime arena.  CAPT Rosen summarized it best: 
 
The fact that DOD has not been traditionally involved in these types of 
activities [fisheries] does not preclude GFS/GWC units from engaging in 
these types of activities with coastal states in the future. As is the case 
with counter-drug matters, the direct participation of DOD personnel in 
any apprehension or arrest of violators who would be prosecuted by the 
foreign coastal state would require policy clearance from the Secretary of 
Defense and, perhaps, the Secretary of State. […] it seems rather clear that 
GWC could engage in joint patrols, conduct limited types of detection and 
monitoring operations in collaboration with coastal navies or coast guards, 
and provide certain types of training. And, even though this type of 
activity may be moving out of the Navy’s normal “comfort zone,” this 
type of collaborative activity should be given close attention because this 
activity is much more likely than any of the collaborative activities 
discussed in this paper to have a positive impact on the security and 
economy of the host nation and endear the GWC to the local 
inhabitants.232 
 
d. Regional Maritime Situational Awareness 
  Another fundamental capability of GFS that necessitates collaboration 
with USCG, DOS, and host nations is Regional Maritime Situational Awareness 
(RMSA), or Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) as it is popularly called.  DOS “works 
closely with DoD to develop mechanisms by which we can improve maritime domain 
awareness…simply put the authority and ability to share information and intelligence that 
presents a clear picture of the maritime environment for countries to react and respond 
_____________________ 
231. Christopher Barrows (USCG HQ), e-mail to Capt. Brian Hans (SEA-12) on October  23, 2007. 
232. Mark Rosen, “Legal Issues Associated with Green Water Craft Overseas Operations,” Center for 
Naval Analysis, Aug 2007: 20. 
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to.  It could be as simple as contact management or complex as intelligence gathering and 
sharing.233  Where the Coast Guard is concerned, Secretary of the Navy Donald C. 
Winter tells us of “the value of the Automatic Identification System in terms of safety, 
information exchange, and navigation assistance.  In many ways, AIS is an extension of 
what has already been done with airspace, conferring benefits to all participating nations. 
With Maritime Domain Awareness, we are seeing more and more nations willing to 
cooperate, sharing information that is in the interest of all who participate in this global 
tracking system.”234  However, when it comes to something as specific as data sharing, 
LCDR Brent West of the National Reconnaissance Office warns us of a common, yet 
easily avoidable obstacle: 
 
There are literally a hundred different [data] fusion engines being used by 
different organizations around the world....everyone seem to have their 
own special fusion engine, and most people don't want to have to learn 
how to use a new one.  So it's a challenge to improve MDA when people 
are requiring information to be tailored and formatted specifically for 
them.  I believe there could be enhanced communication, collaboration, 
and overall better MDA if the means of data sharing improved.  We need 
to create new methods of providing information in common standards so 
that anyone, anywhere, can access the data.  It's not about creating a new 
fusion engine, but rather it's all about fusing as much data as possible in 
whatever fusion engine the many different people are using.  I have seen 
first-hand how using multiple sources of data has improved the MDA 
picture.235 
 
As an attribute, RMSA was inherently difficult to quantify and evaluate, however it’s the 
one for which we were able to create a simulation – at least in terms of monitoring and 
detection.  There are literally thousands of different networks, relationships, 
organizations, communications, sensors, and data management systems that contribute to 
Regional Maritime Situational Awareness and it is best left as an overarching concept to 
_____________________ 
233. CAPT Fernandez  “Frank” Ponds, Senior Naval Advisor, email to the authors June 6, 2007. 
234. Donald C. Winter, Current Strategy Forum (CSF) Keynote Speech, June 12, 2007, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/people/secnav/winter/070612_current_strategy_forum.pdf. 
235. Brent West, email message to the authors, November 20, 2007. 
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be included in system design rather than a specification to design to.  That is what we 
have striven for in our study. 
 
E. FSA SUMMARY 
 When we started our studies, we conceived the idea that our systems process 
would lead us to a single, detailed, and concise solution to the challenge of determining 
what GFS should be. As our FSA has illustrated, however, our solutions are as complex 
as the issues GFS is intended to address.  Our top solutions emanate out of our FNA, as 
applying DMP to them did not affect their relative ranking as the most effective 
alternatives for GFS:  the HSV and the LPD-17.  However, the AS stands as the “most 
improved” platform via helicopter-connector and communication changes, and in this 
case, DMP did affect relative standing, and highlighted how its application might make 
some ships suitable system alternatives for GFS.  If we were to extend our timeline to the 
year 2028, however, and assume that FRP requirements steal our LHD/FFG package, 
then the NAVSEA GFS Team’s Station Ship might produce the most desirable 
alternative – pending life-cycle costs, of course.  In addition, not all solutions are 
materiel, doctrine, or personnel related; some just deserve attention, like coalition and 
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VII. IN SUMMARY 
A. RECAPTURING THE PROCESS 
 In applying a systems approach to GFS, SEA-12 confronted what many might 
consider a non-engineering subject.  Frustrated at first by this seemingly grey area where 
an engineering method collides with the socio-economic-political and policy related 
realm of shaping and stability, as well as by the lack of a specific system requirement, we 
“took charge” by determining that requirement in the forms of a definition and a problem 
statement – both of which were gleaned out of a broad literature research effort.  These 
two key items not only served to provide boundaries to our study, but were in fact our 
first personal “stamp” on the GFS concept.   
 We selected the JCIDS model as our approach method, due to its wide use within 
the Department of Defense, and due to phases within it that are reflective of systems 
engineering fundamentals.  
 We selected a particular region – the Gulf of Guinea – in order to scope our 
project, but even more importantly, we did so out of the desire to propose a system 
alternative that would truly make an impact not only for the U.S., but for the nations and 
people whom we hoped to interact with in the name of stability.  We wanted GFS to be 
recognized throughout the region as “a force for good,” just as the CNO had stated.  
Taking the “user” into account, this desire added another dimension to our JCIDS 
process: Value Engineering. 
 Through more detailed research into our Strategic Guidance, we came to 
understand the reasoning behind what we had initially conceived as grandiose discussion 
about this thing called Global fleet Station; indeed, it provided us with specific detail that 
we could later apply as requirements for GFS.  In addition, it validated our definition and 
problem statement for us. 
 In FAA, we identified the needs of the Gulf of Guinea through more literature 
research.  We attacked the stability issues in the region with a three-pronged, mission 
oriented attack, breaking the cohort into three teams:  Peacetime Engagement, HA/DR, 
and Interagency & NGO Coordination.  These teams addressed issues in the region 
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functional, mission, and capability hierarchies within their own respective missions, 
while the Interagency & NGO team acted dually as our Country Team, checking the 
viability and validity of the mission teams’ hierarchies to the region, while providing the 
value base that we desired.  Out of these hierarchies, we determined specific capabilities 
GFS should have to address the issues identified.  We called these specific capabilities 
attributes, and they were our means of deriving quantitative and/or subjective measures 
by which to determine system alternatives.  Our attributes provided the key to passing 
from the qualitative world of regional stability, into the quantitative world of engineering 
and analysis. 
 In FNA, we identified the gaps between what our attributes called for, and what 
the “current capability” of our fleet provides.  We first determined what current capability 
consisted of by deciding that it would be a seaborne platform – or ship – and then 
selecting six ship alternatives via a Nominal Group Technique, including two composed 
of multiple ships.  We applied regionally pertinent scenarios for each mission team as a 
means of offering a realistic context by which to evaluate GFS system alternatives, and 
determine how well they performed in meeting our set of attributes in those scenario 
environments.  We recognized that this “stove-piped” scenario did have scenario “gaps” 
of its own, and we addressed them through sensitivity analysis in some cases, as well 
implementing horizontal quality assurance practices across all the mission areas.  Out of 
these scenarios, we were able to determine performance “total value scores” for each 
ship, in each mission.  Applying a decision matrix for “decisions made under assumed 
risk,” we were able to determine relative “expected value performance” scores for each of 
our alternatives as a GFS in the Gulf of Guinea.  We then “filtered” these outcomes 
through the mitigating factor of cost, thereby determining our most cost-effective 
alternatives:  the LPD-17 and HAS alternatives.  We also applied risk analysis, and 
provided contingency actions for a host of possible risks of deploying a GFS to the Gulf 
of Guinea. 
 In our FSA, we evaluated two primary approaches to “closing the gap” identified 
in FNA, by analysis of a future-concept design by the NAVSEA GFS Team, and by 
applying conceivable doctrine, materiel, and personnel changes to our current-capability 
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platforms.  NAVSEA’s notional GFS Station Ship performed well, and when combined 
with a PC, it ranked just below the LPD in performance.  However, we were unable to 
apply any cost analysis to it, and also recognized that our expected values for 
performance with this vessel were based on notional, and sometimes very general data; 
therefore, we recognize that our evaluation of this vessel was rough.  Applying DMP to 
our FNA “champions,” we determined viable methods to increase performance on almost 
all platforms; however, their relative ranks in performance did not change.  We also 
considered possible means by which to close the cost-gap, by exploring personnel and 
maintenance methods used by MSC.  Finally, we addressed means in which to close our 
“scenario gaps,” exploring possibilities in coalition and Coast Guard integration and 
interaction. 
 
B. PROJECT RESULTS 
 
1. The Process:  FAA’s “Process Model,” and “Real World” Application 
of Our FNA 
  One major result of our project was the process itself.  In FAA, we 
identified a process by which regional commanders can utilize a “global ‘process model’” 
of mission, functional and capability hierarchies applicable worldwide, and apply 
regional studies to determining which mid-level functions, missions and capabilities 
apply.  Out of this set of regionally applicable mid-level hierarchies, the attributes may be 
determined, and various platform alternatives tested against them using comprehensive 
scenarios to determine what assets to engage in regional shaping and stability operations.   
 In addition, we considered different types of decision making, and also analyzed 
different weights to our mission areas, understanding that not all COCOMs may consider 
our three mission areas as relatively important as we did to our specific region of focus.  
Interested in if the outcomes might change significantly, we applied what we gauged as 
Commander, Naval Forces Europe’s emphasis on mission importance to our process in 
FNA, and were surprised to find that the results for cost-effective platforms out of our list 
of current alternatives did not change, with the LPD and HSV still leading.  Though not 
applying CNE’s specific outlook to our study throughout (this was our study), we did 
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enjoy the opportunity to apply a facet of our process to “their” decision-making (See 
Appendix F). 
 
2. Cost-Effective Alternatives from Current Inventory: LPD and HSV 
 Perhaps the most tangible result of our study was an affirmation of the HSV as a 
cost-effective GFS alternative.  Though we had considered fleet commander’s pilot 
programs as ad hoc, the platform employed in the past and proposed for the future by 
both SOUTHCOM and CNE, respectively, achieved on of our top ranks in performance 
and cost.  The LPD-17 was our most cost-effective choice from current inventory. 
 Of course, the subjective nature of our study must be considered before 
extraordinary weight is placed into these findings.  Not conducive to simulation, our 
project relegated most scoring to subjective measures.  We were unable to approach any 
normalized results or to conduct regression analysis since we could not repeat our scoring 
without simulation tools – or other groups – to repeat our efforts.  The subjective nature 
of our study relegated us to a one-time result, without a standard error or deviation; 
therefore, our results are understandably … subjective.   
 
3. NAVSEA Concept Ship Performed Well; Unable to Predict Cost 
 Limited time to interact with NAVSEA, the notional nature of their conceptual 
GFS ship, and some disagreements on attribute scores and weights between SEA-12 and 
the NAVSEA Team must be considered - in addition to the concerns listed in the 
preceding paragraph – before considerable weight is applied to our assessment of their 
proposal.  With that said, it did perform admirably, performing in the vicinity of our most 
cost-effective alternatives, and if the FRP were to dictate that an LPD were not an option, 
we envision their ship as a top-rate alternative.  We were unable to apply cost measures 
to this platform. 
 
4. Effect on Alternatives’ Ranks by DMP; Important Attributes 
Identified 
 With one exception, applying DMP to our current alternatives had little effect on 
their relative rankings; however, DMP modifications did influence moderate to major 
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performance increases for most of the vessels.  The best example was that of the AS:  if 
stanchions are removed from the flight deck to re-certify it, and changes are made to its 
communications suite, its performance increases dramatically.  Its new helicopter 
capability fulfills several attributes, and makes the AS a viable GFS asset with some 
relatively “simple” changes.  In addition, we identified three attribute areas shared by all 
mission areas, which can greatly influence how a vessel performs as a GFS in the Gulf of 
Guinea:  1) Communications, 2) Connector Assets, and 3) Cargo Capacity and Personnel 
Support.  
 
C. ONE FINAL RESULT 
 Perhaps the greatest value of this project is the knowledge that we effectively 
applied a systems process to a broad topic dealing with people, governments, and 
geography – and determined results that may receive application toward peace and 
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APPENDIX A: COUNTRY STUDY 
A. AN ANALYSIS OF LIBERIA 
 
1. Geography236 
Total Area: 111,369 sq. km. (43,000 sq. mi.). Slightly larger than Ohio. 
Ports:  Monrovia, Buchanan, Greenville, and Harper 
Coastal Features:  579 km (359.77 mi.) Mangrove swamps populate the 
coastal region 
Climate: Tropical climate, hot and humid.  
Major Cities: Monrovia, Buchanan, Gbarnga, Kakata, Harbel. 
 
 Liberia’s flat coastal region rises to a tropical rainforest in 
the interior.  Liberia is home to 40% of West Africa’s 
rainforest.237  Deforestation is a major environmental issue 
in country. Despite having four major ports, only Monrovia 




GDP (2006):   $902.9 million 
GDP growth rate (2006): 7.8% 
GDP per Capita (2006) $900 
Natural Resources: Iron ore, timber, diamonds, gold, hydropower 
_____________________ 
       236. The World Fact book, “Liberia,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
237. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Liberia,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm. 
238. OT Africa Line, “Liberia,” http://www.otal.com/liberia/index.htm. 
       239. The World Fact book, “Liberia,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
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Agriculture (2002): 76.9% of GDP, Products: coffee, cocoa, sugarcane, rice, 
cassava, palm oil, bananas, plantains, citrus, pineapple, 
sweet potatoes, corn, and vegetables. 
Industry (2002):  5.4% of GDP 
Services (2002):  17.8% of GDP 
Trade (2004): Exports: rubber, timber, iron, diamonds, cocoa, coffee 
Major Markets:   Germany, Poland, U.S., Greece 
Imports:   fuels, chemicals, machinery, transportation equipment, 
manufactured goods; foodstuffs 
Major Suppliers: South Korea, Singapore, Japan, China 
 
 Liberia’s economy is still in shambles after the civil war.   Prior to it, Liberia was 
a premier iron ore mining and natural rubber producing country.  However, UN sanctions 
banning timber and diamond exports reduced an always shrinking economy even more.  
Those sanctions have just recently been lifted.  Timber exports have not returned to large 
scale results, and the diamond sanction was lifted in April 2007.  Therefore, diamond 
exports are in the beginning phases. With a new relatively stable political situation 
(enforced by the UN) foreign investors are returning to Liberia. Economic activity should 
increase greatly within the next few years.  Liberia’s main form of income currently in 
due to its’ maritime shipping registry, it has the second largest maritime registry in the 
world.  It brings in 15 million dollars annually.240  A leading contributor to economic 
struggles is the 80% unemployment rate.241 
 
_____________________ 
240. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Liberia,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm. 




Government Type: Republic, lead by president elected for a six year term. The 
president is head of state, head of government, and 
commander in chief of armed forces. 
Structure: Consists of a President, 30 seat Senate, 64 member House 
of Representatives, and Supreme Court  
U.S. Relations: U.S. - Liberia relations are strong and close.  
 
Liberia’s foreign relations have been troubled as expected, as the country has 
gone through civil war.  However, Liberia now has good diplomatic relations with the 
United States, Cuba, China, and Libya. Liberia is an active member of all major 
international alliances; UN, ECOWAS, AU.  The United States in the biggest monetary 
contributor to the reconstruction of Liberia contributing over 1 Billion dollars already, 
with more than 200 million committed for 2007 and 2008.243 
 
4. Social244 
Religion: 40% Christian, 20% Muslim, 40% Other 
Population: 3,195,931 (2007) 
Literacy rate (2000): 57.5%   
Health: Infant mortality rate (2007) 14.9%, Life expectancy (2007) 
40 years, AIDS rate 5.9% (2003) 
Work Force: Agriculture 70%, Industry 15%, Services 2% 
 
Liberia is an English speaking, primarily Christian nation.  It was founded by free 
African Americans and freed slaves in 1820. They settled in what is now Monrovia 
(named after former United States president James Monroe).  Liberia is in the process of 
_____________________ 
       242. The World Fact book, “Liberia,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
243. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Liberia,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6618.htm. 
       244. The World Fact book, “Liberia,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
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recovering from a 14 year civil war which destroyed many of Liberia’s businesses, 
dismantled the infrastructure, and crippled economic stability and viability.  Prior to the 
civil war Liberia was a country steeped in American customs and values; especially 
politically.  Its’ government and constitution was based on the United States. This would 
prove costly, as in the United States only the elite had voting rights.  They monopolized 
political power in the country.  This would last until 1980 when an indigenous person 
Master Sergeant Samuel K. Doe, seized power in a coup d’etat.  His rise to power would 
be the catalyst to the 14 year civil war that has left Liberia in a state of disrepair.   
 
5. Transnational Issues 
 The majority of transnational issues facing Liberia stem from the number of 
people displaced during their civil war.  There are Liberian refugees living in a number of 
neighboring states.  Economic futility has limited much transnational interaction.  As a 
result of limited transnational interaction, the numbers of transnational issues are few.  
Stability within the country is being backed and solidified by a large contingent of UN 
peacekeeping forces, who have been in country since 2003.  Although, peace has been 
declared since 2003, it has not stopped subversive persons and groups from planning 
means to unseat the current government.  In July 2007, the government of Liberia 
charged two men with treason.  The government is charging former Acting Speaker of 
the National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTLA), George Koukou and the retired 
Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) General Charles Julu with “without any color of right or 
legal justification and with wicked and criminal mind, connived, conspired with some 
unknown persons to subvert and overthrow the legitimate government of Madam Ellen 
Johnson Sirleaf.”245 The charges demonstrate the thin line in which the current 
government operates.   
 Cote d’Ivoire accuses Liberia of supporting Ivorian rebels, a statement Liberia 
denies.   Cote d’Ivoirian refugees are taking shelter in Liberia.   
 
_____________________ 
245.  D. Webster Cassell and Charles Yates, “Liberia: Julu, Koukou Charged,” The Inquirer, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/200707240874.html. 
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6. Needs Summary 
 Total Infrastructure rebuilding (roadways, water, electricity) 
 Education 
 Employment Opportunities 
 Political Stability 
 
B. AN ANALYSIS OF COTE D’IVOIRE 
 
1. Geography246 
Total Area: 322,500 sq. km. (124,500 sq. mi.); slightly larger than New 
Mexico. 
Ports:    Abidjan, Aboisso, Dabou, San-Pedro 
Coastal Features:  515 km (320 mi.) of coastline; Coast has heavy surf and no 
natural harbors. 
Climate: Tropical; hot and humid in SW, hot and dry in N, warm and 
dry on Eastern Coast; rainy seasons May – June& August – 
September 
Major Cities: Yamoussoukro, Abidjan, Bouake, Daloa, Gagnoa, 
Korhogo, Man, San Pedro 
  
Cote d’Ivoire is subject to flooding during the rainy season.  The port of Abidjan 
is the largest port between Casablanca and Cape Town, and prior to governmental 
instability it was the most modern and one of the busiest in West Africa.  Recently, 
efforts have been made to regain lost shipping.  Although Yamoussoukro is the official 
capital, Abidjan is the economic capital and de facto political capital.    
 
_____________________ 




GDP (2006):  $17.19 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006): 1.2% 
GDP per Capita (2006) $1,600 
Natural Resources: Offshore petroleum, natural gas, diamonds, manganese, 
iron ore, cobalt, bauxite, copper, gold, nickel, tantalum, 
silica sand, clay, cocoa, coffee, palm oil, timber, 
hydropower. 
Agriculture (2006): 27% of GDP, Products: cocoa, coffee, timber, rubber, corn, 
rice, tropical foods. 
Industry (2006): 18.5% of GDP 
Services (2006): 54.5% of GDP 
Trade (2004): Exports: cocoa, coffee, timber, rubber, cotton, palm oil, 
pineapples, bananas, fish. 
Major Markets:   U.S., France, Germany, Netherlands 
Imports:   Consumer goods, basic food stuffs (rice, wheat), capital 
goods 
Major Suppliers: France, Nigeria, China 
 
As it is most Gulf of Guinea nations Cote d’Ivoire is blessed a vast supply of 
natural resources. Additionally, similar to most Gulf of Guinea nations they are not adept 
at making the most of the abundance of natural resources that are in country.  Cote 
d’Ivoire’s economy is based on agriculture, and backed by foreign investments (primarily 
by France).  Nearly 70% of the population is involved in agriculture.248  Cote d’Ivoire’s 
economy is at a standstill at 1.2% due to political instability, corruption, and an enormous 
_____________________ 
       247. The World Fact book, “Cote D’Ivoire,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
248. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Cote d’Ivoire,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm. 
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international debt.  Rising issues in the economy include money laundering, financing 
terrorism, as Hezbollah is present in country and conducting fundraising activities.249   
 
3. Political250 
Government Type: Republic, lead by president elected for a five year term. 
The president is head of state and commander in chief of 
armed forces. Prime Minister is head of government. 
Structure: Consists of a President, Prime Minister, 225 member 
National Assembly, and Supreme Court (4 chambers- 
Judicial, Audit, Constitutional, and Administrative) 
U.S. Relations: U.S.-Cameroonian relations have been friendly and close. 
Although recently the relationship has been strained due the 
Section 508 restrictions placed on non-humanitarian aid. 
 
Cote d’Ivoire political structure is weak and prone to coups and upheaval, since 
1999 every political change has been met with extreme violence.  This is demonstrated 
by the 1999 coup, 2001 failed coup, and subsequent 2002 rebellion.  The 2002 rebellion 
led to the country dividing into two regions; the west, led by militant rebel groups and the 
east, established government.  It was not until March 2007 after five years of failed 
discussions, reunification attempts and unfulfilled accords and peace attempts, that the 
Ouagadougou Peace Accord was signed.  Major parts of the Ouagadougou Peace Accord 
are to reunify the country and for former rebels and government forces to merge.  Cote 
d’Ivoire in recent years has had strained relations with the United States as governmental 
upheaval has caused not only U.S. but other countries to have restraint when dealing with 
Cote d’Ivoire.   Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) are also under tough scrutiny 
_____________________ 
249. U.S. Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and 
Law Enforcement Affairs, International Narcotics Control Strategy 
Report, Volume II Money Laundering and Financial Crimes (Washington, 
DC: GPO, 2007). 
 
       250. The World Fact book, “Cote D’Ivoire,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
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in the country.  The are numerous restrictions in place to regulate NGOs, as a recent trend 




Religion: 35% - 40% Muslim, 25% - 35% Christian, 10% - 20% 
Indigenous 
Population: 18,013,409 (2007) more than 60 ethnic groups 
Literacy rate: 51%  
Health: Infant mortality rate (2007) 8.7%, Life expectancy (2007) 
49 years, AIDS rate 7% (2003) 
Work Force: 68% Agriculture  
 
Cote d’Ivoire is a small, French speaking, primarily Muslim country, in which 
political instability has severely limited its progress from third world nation to emerging 
country.  A solid infrastructure lends to the beginning of a country progressing upwards. 
Although the literacy rate is 51%, the school system is good in relation to regional 
standards.252  Cote d’Ivoire has a solid infrastructure as it relates to telecommunications 
and roadways.  There are over 8000 miles of paved roads in country.253  The 
telecommunication infrastructure is solid albeit vastly under used. 
 
5. Transnational Issues and Comments 
 Political unrest has caused a great deal of damage to the economic system in 
country.  This has led to an increased problem with money laundering and smuggling of 
goods across the country’s borders.  As the new regime takes control laws are being put 
in place to curb money laundering activities, however it will take some time to regain the 
_____________________ 
       251. The World Fact book, “Cote D’Ivoire,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
252. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Cote d’Ivoire,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm. 
253. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Cote d’Ivoire,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm. 
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ability to enforce such laws.  A unique issue to Cote d’Ivoire is the ability of terrorist 
organizations to finance their activities.  There are laws in place to control money 
laundering for crimes involving arms trade, drug trafficking, and fraud.  However, money 
laundering in relation to financing terrorists is not illegal.     
Cote de Ivoire has a fledgling military.  Its’ Armed Forces consists of an army, 
navy, air force, gendarmerie, and specialized forces.   Its’ Navy is a pure brown water 
navy with severely degraded boats.   The air force consists of a transport/utility aircraft, 
two utility helicopters, and one attack helicopter.  There are a total of 21,000 members of 
the armed forces.254  There are currently UN peacekeeping forces in country to maintain 
the cease-fire line within the country. The cease-fire line is a result of the 2002 failed 
coup by Movement of Cote de Ivoire.  Western parts of the country are basis for military 
rebel groups Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great West (MPIGO) and the Movement 
for Justice and Peace (MJP) along with the MPCI. 
 As most African nation suffer with the AIDS epidemic, so does Cote d’Ivoire.  
Although the stated AIDS rate is 7%, the number has been estimated as high as 10%.255  
Urban areas are hardest hit with the epidemic, the percentage of persons with HIV/AIDS 
doubles as compared to rural areas.   
 
6. Needs Summary 
 Medical (HIV/AIDS, Malaria) 
 Political stability 
 Training and upgrades to brown water Navy 
 
_____________________ 
254. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Cote d’Ivoire,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm. 
255. World Health Organization, “Cote d’Ivoire,” http://www.who.int/hiv/HIVCP_CIV.pdf.1 
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C. AN ANALYSIS OF GHANA 
 
1. Geography256 
Total Area: 238,538 sq. km. (92,100 sq. mi.); about the size of Illinois 
and Indiana combined. 
Ports:  Takoradi, Tema 
Coastal Features:  539 km (334.92 mi.) of coastline; Western Coast: sandy 
beaches and lagoon; Central Coast: rocky beaches, littoral 
sand barriers, and lagoons; East Coast: sandy beaches, 
Volta River delta 
Climate: Tropical, two rainy seasons (May – June in the South and 
August – September in the North) 
Major Cities: Accra, Kumasi, Tema, Sekondi-Takoradi 
 
 Ghana is home to Lake Volta, the largest man-made lake in the world. 257 The 
Akosombo Dam is located on Lake Volta.   It accounts for 60% of Ghana’s power.258  
However, due to a recent drought, Lake Volta’s hydropower capacity and output has been 
dropping significantly. In the 1980’s the dam accounted for 100% of Ghana’s power. 259 
This loss of power production has had a significant effect on the economy.  Economic 
growth has slowed from 6.5% to 4% - 5%.260 
 
_____________________ 
       256.  The World Fact book, “Ghana,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
257. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Ghana,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2860.htm 
258. Michael M. Phillips, “How Ghana’s Economic Turnaround Is Threatened,” Wall Street Journal 
(2007): A5. 
259. Michael M. Phillips, “How Ghana’s Economic Turnaround Is Threatened,” Wall Street Journal 
(2007): A5. 




GDP (2006):  $10.1 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006): 6% 
GDP per Capita (2006): $2,700 
Natural Resources: Gold timber, industrial diamonds, bauxite, manganese, fish, 
rubber, hydropower (decreasing rapidly), silver, salt, 
limestone 
Agriculture (2006): 37.3% of GDP, Products: cocoa, rice, coffee, cassava 
(tapioca), peanuts, corn, shea nuts, bananas; timber 
Industry (2006): 25.3% of GDP 
Services (2006): 37.5% of GDP 
Trade (2004): Exports: gold, cocoa, timber, tuna, bauxite, aluminum, 
manganese ore, diamonds 
Major Markets:   Netherlands, U.K., U.S., Spain, Belgium, France 
Imports:   food stuffs (rice, wheat), machinery, petroleum 
Major Suppliers: Nigeria, China, U.K., Belgium, U.S., Brazil, South Africa, 
France 
 
 Ghana is an emerging African country with an abundance of natural resources.  
Its’ economic sector relies heavily on foreign investments.  More recently, a prolonged 
dry spell, has (and is) setting their economy back.  Vast amounts of hydroelectric power 
are produced by the Akosombo Dam at Lake Volta reservoir.  However, with 
significantly decreased water levels (41 feet below high water mark) 4 of 6 turbines have 
been shut down as the water doesn’t reach high enough to run them.262  Power is being 
rationed and forcing companies to find other means to power factories, etc.   
 
_____________________ 
       261.  The World Fact book, “Ghana,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 




Government Type: Democracy, lead by president elected for a four year term 
(max 2 terms). The president is head of state, head of 
government, and commander in chief of armed forces. 
Structure: Consists of a President, 25 member Council of State, 230 
member Parliament, and Supreme Court (members 
nominated by President and approved by Parliament) 
U.S. Relations: U.S. - Ghana relations are strong and close. 
 
National government is young but fairly stable. In 2001, power changed hands 
democratically and without violence for the first time in the 50 year independence of 
Ghana.  Ghana is a player in foreign relations. Ghana is a member of the United Nations, 
World Trade Organization, African Union, and the Economic Community of West 
African Nations.  Extremely active [sent troops] in UN peacekeeping missions 
throughout West Africa.  Ghana appears to be very receptive to US military aid in 
training, especially in the security and drug enforcement arenas.  Ghana’s Armed Forces 
(Army, Navy, Air Force) are among the better trained African military forces.  This is 
demonstrated in the participation with various UN peacekeeping forces.                        
 
4. Social264 
Religion: Christian 68.8%, Muslim 15.9% 
Population: 22,931,299 (2007) 
Literacy rate (2000): 57.9%   
Health: Infant mortality rate (2007) 5.3%, Life expectancy (2007) 
59 years, AIDS rate 3.9% (2003) 
_____________________ 
       263. The World Fact book, “Ghana,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
       264. The World Fact book, “Ghana,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
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Work Force: Agriculture and fishing 47.9%, Industry and transport 
16.2%, Sales and clerical 19.3%, Services 5.9%, 
Professional 8.9%, Other 1.8%.   
 
It is a majority Christian country, with a heavy focus on education.  The literacy 
rate is nearly 77%, 20th out 53 countries in Africa.265 The majority of its people are in 
farming / agriculture related jobs. As it is in most African nation major health concerns 
includes: HIV/AIDS, Malaria (on the decrease). The Ministry of health is attempting to 
make strides in improving public health.  NGO’s such as USAID are also working 
heavily to provide assistance. However, Ghana is cracking down on NGO’s in country as 
many are corrupt.     
 
5. Transnational Issues 
 Ghana is in the midst of a continuous reconstruction and rebuilding effort.  The 
U.S. has contributed over 50 million dollars in 2005 to aid in the efforts.  The U.S. has 
partnered with Ghana in facilitating close relations in terms of educational, scientific, and 
military.  Ghana is one of the participating countries of the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance program.  This partnership has the U.S aiding 
Ghanaian forces, in peace operations and humanitarian relief efforts.  A number of U.S. 
companies are investing and operating in country.  These partnerships are furthermore 
strengthening economic and social ties with the U.S.  With the continuing aid and support 
from the U.S. both economically and militarily, Ghana’s future appears to be bright. 
The most detrimental issue to Ghana is the return of refugees who fled to Cote 
d’Ivoire during the civil war.  They are now returning to Ghana, in an effort to flee to 
strife that is rampant Cote d’Ivoire.   
 
6. Needs Summary 
 Medical (HIV/AIDS, Malaria) 
 Better use of natural resources 
_____________________ 
265. Encarta Encyclopedia, “Ghana,” http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761570799_3/Ghana.html. 
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 Improving telecommunications 
 School facilities 
 
D. AN ANALYSIS OF TOGO 
 
1. Geography266 
Total Area: 56,785 sq. km.; slightly smaller than West Virginia. 
Major Cities/Capital:  Lome, 850,000 
Ports: Kpeme, Lome 
Coastal Features: 56 km 
Climate: tropical; hot, humid in south; semiarid in north 
 
Port Info: The port offers two piers the major one being 1720-m long with a 950m 
back-up structure eastwards. The maximum water drought is 14m. There are two quays:  
1: Measures 366,5 m in length by 72 m in width with 4 berths for conventional ships and 
has a total capacity of more than 400 000 tons. 2: Measures 250 m in length and 140 m in 
width. It can accommodate vessels of 11, 000 to 15, 000 DWT (RORO).267 
 
2. Economy268 
GDP (2004):   $2.1 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006 est.): 2% 
Per capita (2006 est.):  $1,700 
Natural Resources:  phosphates, limestone, marble, arable land 
Agriculture: Coffee, cocoa, cotton… 
 
_____________________ 
266. Bureau of African Affairs, “Togo,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78762.htm. 
267. Seaport Homestead, “Port of Lome, Togo,”  http://seaport.homestead.com/files/lome.html 
268. The World Fact book, “Togo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
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Trade (2006 est.)269: Exports $868.4 million: re-exports, cotton, phosphates, 
coffee, cocoa   
Imports $1.208 billion:  machinery and equipment, foodstuff, petroleum products  
Major Markets:   Ghana, France, Cote d’Ivoire, Germany, Nigeria, Canada, 
China, Benin 
 
A majority of Togo’s economy is based on subsistence agriculture. Food and cash 
crop production employs the majority of the labor force and accounts about 42% of GDP. 
They have achieved self-sufficiency in food crops. In terms of natural resources, 
phosphate is their #1 export. Total trade to the U.S. is $16million.  It is a member of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), African Economic and 
Monetary Union (UEMOA), and West African Development Bank (BOAD). 
 Togo has turned to the International Monetary Fun (IMF), Paris Club, Africa 
Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank for economic reform and debt relief.  
 
3. Political270 
Government Type: Republic 
Structure: President (chief of state); Prime Minister (head of 
government); legislative-National Assembly; Judicial-
Supreme Court   
U.S. Relations: Togo is pro-western, market-oriented, and has good 
relations with the US. 
 
 Regarding the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), it is not eligible 
due to political pluralism and rule of law.  The Peace Corps is actively involved in 
promoting HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention here. 
 
_____________________ 
269. The World Fact book, “Togo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 




Religion (2004): Animist 33%, Christian 47%, Muslim 13.7%, other 6.1% 
Population (2007 est.):  5,701,579 
Literacy rate (2004): 60.9% 
Health (2007 est.): Life expectancy 57.8 years 
 HIV/AIDS Prevalence (2003 est.): 4.1% 
 HIV/AIDS, people living with (2003 est.): 110,000 
Major Diseases: Malaria, Yellow Fever, hepatitis A, typhoid fever. 
Work Force (1998): agriculture 65%, industry 5%, services 30%. 
 
5. Transnational Issues272 
 In 2001, Benin claimed Togo moved boundary monuments – a joint commission 
continues to resurvey the boundary; in 2006, 14,000 Togolese refugees remained in 
Benin and Ghana out of the 40,000 who fled there in 2005.  It is a transit hub for Nigerian 
heroin and cocaine traffickers.   
 
6. Comments 
 Corruption and poor public administration inhibit domestic and foreign 
investment. The government is unable to provide to its citizens in terms of education, 
health, sanitation, and other basics services. Togo mainly relies on NGO’s to combat 
health problems; HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis, and cholera. Water and electricity are 
not reliable which in turn hamper economic growth. 
 Togo is a country of origin, transit, and destination for trafficking person; women 
and children. The human rights situation in the country improved; however, serious 
human rights problems continued, including the inability of citizens to change their 
government; beatings and abuse of detainees; government impunity; harsh prison 
conditions; arbitrary and secret arrests and detention; lengthy pretrial detention; executive 
_____________________ 
271. The World Fact book, “Togo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
272. The World Fact book, “Togo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/to.html. 
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control of the judiciary; frequent infringement of citizens' privacy rights; restrictions on 
the press, including closing media outlets; restrictions on freedom of assembly and 
movement; harassment of human rights workers; female genital mutilation (FGM) and 
violence against women; discrimination against women and ethnic minorities; trafficking 
in persons, especially children; child labor; and lack of worker's rights in export 
processing zones (EPZ)273. 
 
7. Needs Summary 
 Counter-drug trafficking efforts 
 Improve HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention 
 Improve governance; improve government to support/provide to its 
people. 
 Improve basic infrastructure. 
 
E. AN ANALYSIS OF BENIN 
 
1. Geography274 
Total Area: 112,620 sq. km.; slightly smaller than Pennsylvania. 
Major Cities/Capital:  Porto-Novo (295,000); Cotonou (2 
million); political/economic 
Ports: Cotonou 
Coastal Features: 112 km 
Climate: tropical; hot, humid in south; semiarid in north 
 
 Port Info: The port of Cotonou is a deep water port. It has 8 berthing stations 
divided into 4 berths of 155m for conventional vessels, 2 classical berths of 180m for 
_____________________ 
273. Bureau of African Affairs, “Togo,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78762.htm. 
274. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Benin,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6761.htm. 
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conventional vessels and 1 berth of 220m for container vessels and 1 berth at the end of 
the commercial quay to take roll on, roll off vessel.275 
 
2. Economy276 
GDP (2006 est.): $8.989 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006 est.): 4% 
Per capita (2006 est.): $1,100 
Natural Resources: oil, limestone, marble, timber 
Agriculture: Corn, sorghum, cassava… 
Trade (2006 est.)277: Exports $485 million: cotton, oil, palm products, cocoa.   
 Imports $726 million: foodstuff, tobacco, petroleum 
products, energy, and capital goods. 
Major Markets:   Nigeria, France, China, Italy, Brazil, Libya, Indonesia, 
U.K., Cote d’Ivoire 
 
The majority of Benin’s economy is based on subsistence agriculture. Cotton 
production accounts about 40% of the GDP and 80% of total exports. Oil and fishing 
provides the rest of the exports. Benin relies on foreign investment to spur growth and 
fuel economic expansion.  It is a member of ECOWAS, UEMOA, and BOAD.  Benin has 
turned to the International Monetary Fun (IMF), Paris Club, Africa Development Bank 
(ADB) and World Bank for economic reform and debt relief, specifically under the 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative. 
 
3. Political278 
Government Type: Republic, under multiparty democratic rule 
_____________________ 
275. OT Africa Line, “Benin,” http://www.otal.com/benin/. 
276. The World Fact book, “Benin,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bn.html. 
277. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Benin,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6761.htm. 
278. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Benin,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6761.htm. 
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Structure: President (chief of state); legislative-Unicameral; Judicial-
Constitutional Court   
U.S. Relations: Benin has excellent relations with the U.S.  
 
 Eligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), Benin hopes to 
increase trade and stimulate growth through U.S. investment in their country.  The 
primary involvement in Benin with the U.S. is through the efforts of USAID programs. 
USAID efforts have been promoting HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention, family health, 
education and governance.279  Benin is involved in a $308 million Millennium Challenge 
Compact (MCC) to increase investment and private sector activity.  The U.S. Peace Corp 
is active in Benin, promoting health, education and small enterprise development. 
 
4. Social280 
Religion (2004): Animist 50%, Christian 30%, Muslim 20% 
Population (2005 est.): 7.86 million 
Literacy rate (2004): 34.7% 
Health (2003 est.)281: Life expectancy 53.4 years 
 HIV/AIDS Prevalence (2003 est.): 1.9% 
 HIV/AIDS, people living with (2003 est.): 68,000 
 Major Diseases: Malaria, Yellow Fever, hepatitis A, 
typhoid fever  
 
5. Transnational Issues282 
 Rival gangs clash between Nigeria and Benin, along the border.  Benin is a transit 
hub for Nigerian heroin and cocaine traffickers; money laundering is also prevalent.  
_____________________ 
279. U.S. Agency International Development, “USAID – Benin,” 
280. The World Fact book, “Benin,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
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The bulk of the U.S. effort in support of consolidating democracy in Benin is 
focused on long-term human resource development through U.S. Agency for 
International Development programs. Their efforts focus on  primary education, family 
health (including family planning), women's and children's health, and combating 
sexually transmitted diseases, especially the spread of HIV.  
USAID's Democracy and Governance program also emphasizes encouraging 
greater civil society involvement in national decision making; strengthening mechanisms 
to promote transparency and accountability; improving the environment for decentralized 
private and local initiatives; and enhancing the electoral system and the national 
legislature. 
The government of Benin generally respects the human rights of its citizens; 
however, some problems have been recorded. The occasional use of excessive police 
force and vigilante violence resulted in deaths. Impunity, harsh prison conditions, 
arbitrary arrest and detention with prolonged pre-trial detention, and judicial corruption 
are cited. Women are sometimes victims of violence and societal discrimination, and 
female genital mutilation (FGM) is common. There also are reports of trafficking and 
abuse of children, forced labor and child labor.  
Despite these issues, Benin is on track for encouraging increased freedom of press 
and strengthening of civil society institutions to further reinforce the country's democratic 
foundations.  Market-oriented economic policies have been implemented since 1991, and 
there is broad political consensus for these policies.283 
 
7. Needs Summary 
 Counter-drug trafficking efforts 
 Counter-money laundering efforts. 
 Improve HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention 
_____________________ 
283. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Benin,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6761.htm. 
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 Improve governance; improve government to support/provide to its 
people. 
 Improve basic infrastructure. 
 
F. AN ANALYSIS OF NIGERIA 
 
1. Geography284 
Total Area: 923.8 thousand sq. km.; size of CA, NV, and AZ 
Major Cities/Capital:  Abuja-Capital (452,000); Kano 
(9.3million); Lagos (9.01million) 
Ports: Calabar, Lagos, Port Harcourt 
Coastal Features: 853 km 
Climate: equatorial in south; tropical in center; arid in north 
  
 Port Information:285 
Lagos is the principle port of Nigeria situated on the Gulf of Guinea. The port is 
split into three main sections: Lagos, Apapa and Tin Can Island. Apapa is Nigeria's 
largest port and contains a number of wharfs. Maximum capacity of the terminal is 
22,000 TEU and served by 6 designated container berths with a quay length of 950 
meters. There is 6,400m2 of covered storage space. Tin Can is a self contained port 
entered through Badagry Creek via a 200m wide channel which has been dredged to 
8.5m. Tin Can provides 11 berths including seven break-bulk general cargo berths, one 
dry bulk cargo berth and two dedicated RORO berths (numbers 9 and 10). Total length 
over the quays is over 2000 meters and has a maximum draught of 10 meters - up to 13 
vessels can be accommodated at a time. Berth No 9 has special RORO ramps to work the 
RORO vessels. There are five transit sheds and three warehouses offering a covered 
_____________________ 
284. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Nigeria,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm. 
285. Nigerian Ports Authority, “Port Installations,” http://www.nigerian-
ports.net/normal/operations/installations.html. 
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storage area of 54,000m2 and an open storage area of 125,000m2. There are also 5 
vehicle parks - each able to accommodate 6000 cars at a time. 
Port Harcourt: This is a natural port, and maintains the status of being the third 
largest in the country. The port has an extensive range of handling equipment and 
provides a maximum draught of 7.6 meters. The port houses a main quay of 1,390 meters 
long- 13 berths a dockyard with 5 mooring berths and tanker buoys 
Calabar port: 4 berths for general cargo handling, storage capacity of 40,000tones, 
max draught of 8 meters. 
 
2. Economy286 
GDP (2006 est.): $191.4 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006 est.): 5.3% 
Per capita (2006 est.): $1,500 
Natural Resources: petroleum, natural gas, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, 
limestone, lead, zinc 
Agriculture: cocoa, palm oil, yams, cassava, sorghum, millet, corn… 
Trade (2005)287: Exports $59 billion: petroleum, cocoa, rubber 
Imports $25 billion: machinery, chemical, transport equipment, manufactured 
goods, food; live animals  
Major Markets:   China, U.S., U.K. 
 
 The majority of Nigeria’s economy is based on oil. This provides about 20% of 
their GDP, 95% of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65% of budgetary revenue. 5th 
largest exporter of oil to the U.S; 40% of exported oil goes to the U.S. Yet, poor 
corporate relations with indigenous communities, vandalism of oil infrastructure, 
ecological damage, and security problems in the Niger-delta region hamper growth and 
reliability of Nigeria’s oil throughput. 
_____________________ 
286. The World Fact book, “Nigeria,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni. 
287. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Nigeria,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm. 
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Its agricultural sector is not keeping up with the demand of population growth due 
to mismanagement, inconsistent/poor policies and lack of basic infrastructure. 
Agriculture still accounts for 41% of their GDP and provides employment to 2/3 of its 
labor force. Nigeria is the largest trading partner with the U.S. Total two-way trade is 
valued around $30.8billion. The U.S. is also the largest foreign investor in the country. 
It is a member of ECOWAS, UEMOA, and AFDB, Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and many others.  Nigeria has turned to the IMF and the 
Paris Club for debt relief and fiscal policy assistance. Nigeria has been one of the 
highlights of the Gulf of Guinea nations to significantly reduce their external debt from 
36% of GDP in 2004 to less than 4% of GDP by 2007. 
 
3. Political288 
Government Type: Federal Republic 
Structure: President (chief of state); legislative-bicameral National 
Assembly; Judicial-Supreme Court   
U.S. Relations: Excellent, since 1999. Share the same foreign policy goals. 
 
 Nigeria is eligible for the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) – a 
program of “Investing in People,” a top U.S. foreign assistance priority.  Major initiatives 
are in play focusing on education, health, and governance. On health related issues, 
attention is focused on malaria/polio treatment and eradication, prevention/awareness of 
HIV/AIDS, and family planning. 
On education issues, Nigeria is bolstering efforts to improve teacher capacity, 
student achievement and community participation. 
On governance issues, efforts are in place to develop inclusive, transparent, and 
effective institutions of democratic governance. This is accomplished by instituting the 
basic mechanics of a working government; holding official accountable for their actions 
_____________________ 




(free and fair elections); strengthening the capacity and transparency of law enforcement 
agencies.  A majority of U.S. endeavors in the country are led by USAID. 
 
4. Social289 
Religion: Muslim 50%, Christian 40%, animist 10% 
Population (2007 est.):  135,031,164 
Literacy rate (2003 est.):  68% 
Health (2007 est.): Life expectancy 47.44years 
 HIV/AIDS Prevalence (2003 est.): 5.4% HIV/AIDS  
 People living with HIV/AIDS (2003 est.): 3.6million 
 Major Diseases: Malaria, Yellow Fever, Hepatitis A, 
Typhoid Fever  
Work Force (1999 est.):  agriculture: 70%, industry: 10%, services: 20% 
 
5. Transnational Issues290 
 The Joint Border Commission with Cameroon resolved boundary differences, 
ceding the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon. There still is a maritime boundary dispute 
between Cameroon, Nigeria, and Equatorial Guinea.  
 It is a major transit hub for heroin and cocaine traffickers bound for Europe, East 
Asian and North American markets.  Money laundering is a significant problem. 
 
6. Comments 
 Nigeria is the most populous country in Africa. Its oil reserves play a huge role in 
its growing economy; still, half of its population lives in poverty with a myriad of 
problems that form a common theme throughout the Gulf of Guinea region - corruption, 
unemployment, illiteracy, poor health, and challenges to its government in addressing 
these issues adequately.  Also, there are many vigilante groups in the Nigeria Delta 
_____________________ 
289. The World Fact book, “Nigeria,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni. 
290. The World Fact book, “Nigeria,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
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region who target oil infrastructure, either for their own personal gain or for political 
animosities. 
 
7. Needs Summary 
 Secure the Niger Delta region from militant attacks. 
 Counter drug trafficking 
 Counter money laundering 
 Assist in improving governance, health, education, financial 
issues/policies. 
 
G. AN ANALYSIS OF CAMEROON 
 
1. Geography291 
Total Area: 184,000 square miles (Slightly larger than California) 
Ports: Douala, Limbe and Kribi 
Douala is the countries major port, also acting as major point of entry for the 
central African region.292 
Coastal Features: 402 kilometer coastline 
Terrain: Northern plains, central and western highlands, southern 
and coastal tropical forest. 
Climate: Northern plains, the Sahel region- semiarid and hot (7-
month dry season); central and western highlands are 
slightly cooler with a shorter dry season; southern tropical 
forest are warm (4-month dry season); coastal tropical 
forests are warm and humid year around. 
 
_____________________ 
291. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Cameroon,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26431.htm 




The port of Douala is located on the River Wouri, with 11 cargo berths, 16 deep 
water berths, and two IHI gantry cranes (40 ton capacity), which make it a very attractive 
re-supply port for GFS operations in the region.293  Though the Port of Douala is 
considered the major port of entry for the central African region, it is one of the most 
inefficient ports in Africa.  Delays average 3 days for containers to clear customs.  In 
2000, the government privatized the port’s administration with the hopes of improving 
efficiency.294  Cameroon has a number of environmental issues to include waterborne 




GDP (2006): $16.37 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006):  4.1% 
Per Capita Income (2006):  $2,400 
Natural Resources: Oil, timber, hydroelectric power, natural gas, cobalt, nickel 
Agriculture (2006): 45.2% of GDP, Products: timber, coffee, tea, bananas, 
coca, rubber, palm oil, pineapples, cotton. 
Industry (2006): 16.1% of GDP 
Services (2006): 38.7% of GDP 
Trade (2002): Exports $1.8 billion: crude oil, timber and finished wood 
products, cotton cocoa, aluminum and aluminum products, 
coffee, rubber, bananas. 
Major Markets:   European Union, CEMAC, China, U.S., Nigeria 
_____________________ 
293. OT Africa Lines, “Cameroon,” http://www.otal.com/cameroon/index.htm. 
294. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, “Cameroon,” 
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2001/2001_NTE_Report/asset_upload
_file209_6557.pdf. 
295. The World Fact book, “Cameroon,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html. 
296. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Cameroon,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/26431.htm. 
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Imports:   crude oil, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, aluminum oxide, 
rubber, foodstuffs, and grains, agricultural inputs, 
lubricants, used clothing. 
Major Partners: France, Nigeria, Italy, U.S., Germany, Belgium, Japan 
 
Cameroon’s economy has enjoyed five years of four-five percent annual growth.  
The government has liberalized trade restrictions, foreign investment, as well as port and 
customs administration.  Economic reform measures suggested by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank have also helped to stabilize the currency and 
legitimacy of the country in the international arena.  It is important to note that Cameroon 
is a member of the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) 
which also includes the countries of Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, and Republic of Congo.  CEMAC allows free trade between member countries 
(although not completely implemented), a common currency, and a common central 
bank.  International oil and cocoa prices have a significant impact on the economy.297 
 
3. Political298 
Government Type: Republic, strong central government, led by a president. 
 The President is chief of state, with a one time seven year 
term.  The Prime Minister is head of government. 
Structure: There are four major political parties in the political 
system.  The Legislature meets three times a year, 
consisting of 180 members.  The creation of a Senate was 
called for under the last revision of the countries 
constitution in 1996; however it is still not completely 
implemented.  The executive branch controls the judicial 
branch. 
_____________________ 
297. The World Fact book, “Cameroon,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cm.html. 
298. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Cameroon,” U.S. Department of State, 
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U.S. Relations: U.S.-Cameroonian relations are close, although they have 
been tested by concerns over human rights abuses and the 
pace of political and economic liberalization. 
 
 Elections have had a history of irregularities, which have resulted in the President 
winning re-election by large majorities.  The last election in 2004 was supervised by the 
National Elections Observatory (NEO), an elections watchdog agency created by the 
legislature, as well as a number of diplomatic missions.  The results did show some 
irregularities, however nothing serious was found that would have changed the election 
results.  Although censorship was abolished in 1996, the government still has seized 
privately owned newspapers for writing articles in opposition to the President.  Radio and 
television are all state owned organizations, although since 2000, when privatization was 
legalized, not a single license has been authorized by the government.  The official 
languages of the country are both English and French, with a number of local dialects 
being used in the rural portions of the country. 
 
4. Social299 
Religion: Indigenous beliefs 25%, Christian 53%, Islam 22% 
Population: 18,060,382 (2006) composed of 250 ethnic groups 
Literacy rate: 75% 
Health: Infant mortality rate (2007) 6.6%, Life expectancy (2007) 
52.86 years, AIDS (2003) 560,000 people infected, 6.9% of 
population. 
 Infectious diseases: food or waterborne diseases: bacterial 
diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever vector borne 
diseases: malaria and yellow fever are high risks in some 
locations water contact disease: schistosomiasis 
Work Force: Agriculture 70%, Industry and commerce 13% 
 
_____________________ 
299. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Cameroon,” U.S. Department of State, 
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There is significant poverty in the country despite the government’s significant oil 
revenues; 30% of the population is unemployed and 48% of the population lives below 
the poverty line.  The risk of major infectious disease is very high and avian flew has 
been identified among birds in the country. 
 
5. Transnational Issues300 
The Joint Border Commission with Nigeria reviewed the 2002 ICJ ruling on the 
entire boundary and bilaterally resolved differences, including the agreement which 
immediately cedes sovereignty of the Bakassi Peninsula to Cameroon with a phase-out of 
Nigerian control within two years while resolving repatriation issues.  The 
implementation of the ICJ ruling on the Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime 
boundary in the Gulf of Guinea is pending due to imprecisely defined coordinates and a 
sovereignty dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the 
mouth of the Ntem River; only Nigeria and Cameroon have heeded the Lake Chad 
Commission's admonition to ratify the delimitation treaty, which also includes the Chad-
Niger and Niger-Nigeria boundaries. 
There is a significant refugee population with 39,303 refugees from Chad, 9,711 
from Nigeria, 13,000 from Central African Republic, and an additional 10,000 refugees 
from Central Africa.  These refugees contribute greatly to the unemployed and poverty 
stricken population.  The government of Cameroon has not established an effective 




The country of Cameroon has incredible potential to evolve from third world 
status to a modern society.  This can only be achieved through greater transparency of the 
government and a dramatic reduction in corruption within the government and its 
agencies which control most of the public works, and media outlets.  Very little of the 
_____________________ 
300. The World Fact book, “Cameroon,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
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country’s wealth from oil has been translated into developing the country’s infrastructure 
and the daily wellbeing of the population at large. 
 
7. Needs Summary 
 Coordination to resolve Gulf of Guinea boarder disputes. 
 Train with Coast Guard of Cameroon and neighboring countries to protect      
waters and avoid future disputes. 
 Medical treatment and prevention training for common diseases and 
AIDS. 
 Coordinated use of government revenues to support public works 
programs to build and revitalize infrastructure. 
 
H. AN ANALYSIS OF EQUATORIAL GUINEA 
 
1. Geography301 
Total Area: 28,050 square kilometers 
Ports: Luba, and Malabo 
Coastal Features: 296 Kilometers of coastline 
Terrain: Coastal plains, hilly inland, mostly tropical rain forest 
Climate: Tropical; hot and humid year around 
 
The port of Luba has undergone extensive renovations in the past couple of years 
and hopes to become the major port for oil transportation for the West African region.  
Light deforestation has occurred in Equatorial Guinea, the smallest country in Africa; 
however this was mostly in an effort to create more agricultural land, than for harvesting 
the lumber.  Rich oil reserves were found off the coast in the late 1990’s.  Unfortunately 
_____________________ 
301. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Equatorial Guinea,” U.S. Department of State, 
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GDP (2005): $7.64 billion 
GDP growth rate (2005):  18.6% 
Per Capita Income (2005):  $50,200304 
Natural Resources: Oil, natural gas, timber, gold, manganese, and uranium 
Agriculture (2006): 2.8% of GDP, Products: timber, coffee, bananas, coca, 
palm oil, rice, yams, cassava, manioc, and livestock 
Industry (2006): 92.6% of GDP 
Services (2006): 4.5% of GDP 
Trade (2002): Exports $8.961 billion: hydrocarbons, timber.  Trade 
Partners:  China, U.S., Spain, Canada, France, Great 
Britain, Cameroon, Norway 
Imports:   Heavy equipment for oil related use. 
 
Oil and gas production is the foundation of the Equatorial Guinean economy.  The 
economy has seen double digit growth since 2000 and was as high as 66% in 2001.  The 
per capita income has increased dramatically, yet there is 30% unemployment.  Steps in 
recent years by the government to allow and promote investment into previously 
government controlled sectors of the economy has increased job creation, development 
projects, and an overall liberalized economy.  Unfortunately, there remains a significant 
amount of government oversight, and government officials are known to be especially 
corrupt.  The government has openly asked for U.S. investment in the country and 
_____________________ 
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desperately needs assistance in managing its oil wealth to develop the country’s old 
infrastructure and create meaningful social programs. 
 
3. Political305 
Government Type: Republic, strong central government, led by president. 
Structure: The ruling party since 1987 has been the Partido 
Democratico de Guinea Equatorial; however there are 
numerous other minor parties which formed after the ban 
on opposition parties was lifted in the early 1990’s.  There 
are Executive, Legislative, and Judicial branches of 
government.  The Legislative branch is composed of a 100 
member parliament. 
U.S. Relations: U.S.-Equatorial Guinea relations are favorable, although 
there have been concerns over human rights abuses, 
corruption, and human trafficking.  However, Equatorial 
Guinea is building a consulate in Houston, Texas to help it 
be closer to the U.S. oil companies which dominate the 
private investment in the country. 
 
 Since the first freely contested elections in 1995, President Obiang has won every 
election with most opposition parties and international watchdog agencies considering 
most invalid due to massive fraud.  Elections for the parliament have seen similar results 
with the Presidents party winning landslide victories and controlling 98 of 100 seats.  
Despite a clearly corrupt election process, under President Obiang, schools have 








Religion: Predominantly Roman Catholic, pagan practices 
Population: 551,201 (2007) composed of 6 ethnic groups 
Literacy rate: 85.7% 
Health: Infant mortality rate (2007) 8.7%, Life expectancy (2007) 
49.5 years, AIDS (2001) 5900 people infected, 3.9% of 
population.  Infectious diseases: food or waterborne 
diseases: bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever 
vector borne disease: malaria 
Work Force: Agriculture 2.8%, Industry and commerce 97.1% 
 
 The risk of infectious disease is very high.  Equatorial Guinea is a transit and 
destination country for trafficking in persons.  Most men work in the industrial sector, 
while children are often used as house servants or street vendors, and women and girls 
are generally exploited through prostitution.307 
 
5. Transnational Issues308 
 The Joint Border Commission reviewed the 2002, ICJ ruling on an equidistance 
settlement of the Cameroon-Equatorial Guinea-Nigeria maritime boundary in the Gulf of 
Guinea, but a dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Cameroon over an island at the 
mouth of the Ntem River and imprecisely defined maritime coordinates in the ICJ 
decision delay final delimitation; UN urges Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to resolve the 
sovereignty dispute over Gabon-occupied Mbane and lesser islands and to create a 
maritime boundary in the hydrocarbon-rich Corisco Bay. 
 
_____________________ 
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6. Comments  
The country of Equatorial Guinea has the best potential of any country in the 
region to modernize and greatly improve its infrastructure and the life of its people, 
through the prosperity of its oil reserves and outside investment in the country.  However, 
this will be difficult to fully realize without greater transparency of the government and a 
dramatic reduction in corruption with the government and its agencies. 
 
7. Needs Summary 
 Work with neighboring countries of Gabon, Nigeria, and Cameroon to 
settle boundary issues 
 Infrastructure revitalization issues:  Coordinate and administer the 
execution of oil revenue to build needed facilities. 
 Unit training with the police and government officials, focused on 
changing culture of corruption 
 
I. AN ANALYSIS OF GABON 
 
1. Geography309 
Total Area: 103,347 square miles 
Ports: Gamba, Libreville, Lucinda, Owendo, Port-Gentil 
Coastal Features: 885 kilometers of coastline 
Terrain: Narrow coastal plain; hilly, heavily forested interior (about 
80% forested); some savanna regions in east and south 
Climate: Hot and humid all year with two rainy and two dry seasons 
 
 The ports of Libreville and Port-Gentil are the only ports which can be used by 
merchant traffic.  Port-Gentil is an oil terminal and has modern facilities.  Gabon has 
some environmental issues, namely poaching and deforestation.  Fortunately, because of 
_____________________ 
309. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Gabon,” U.S. Department of State, 
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GDP (2006): $7.052 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006):  2.8% 
Per Capita Income (2006):  $7,100 
Natural Resources: Petroleum (43% of GDP), timber, manganese, uranium 
Agriculture (2006): 5.9% of GDP, Products: coffee, coca, rubber, pineapples, 
sugar 
Industry (2006): 59.7% of GDP 
Services (2006): 25% of GDP 
Trade (2002): Exports $6.677 billion: petroleum, wood, manganese. 
Major Markets:   United States (53%), China (8.5%), France (7.4%) 
Imports:   Construction equipment, machinery, food, automobiles, 
manufactured goods. 
Major Partners: France (43%), U.S. (6.3%), U.K. (5.8%) Netherlands (4%) 
 
Gabon receives 65% of its revenue from oil, of which it exports 81%.  
Unfortunately, the profits from this lucrative resource have been poorly spent over the 
years, resulting in a country deep in debt to the Central Bank and under scrutiny from the 
IMF.  Oil reserves seem to be on the decline as oil production has declined rapidly over 
the years from Gabon’s peak production year of 1997; however there has been little 
planning or resource management for the future after oil.  There are only a few private 
investors in Gabon, while the majority of the businesses are government controlled.  The 
World Bank and IMF have worked with the government to privatize more of the 
industries it controls as well as improving worker wages and employment. 
_____________________ 
310. The World Fact book, “Gabon,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
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Government Type: Republic, strong central government, led by president. 
President is chief of state, with a re-electable seven year term.  The 
Prime Minister is head of government. 
Structure: There are a number of political parties, but one holds the most 
seats in the legislature and the Presidency, Parti Democratique 
Gabonais (PDG).  There is an Executive, Legislative, and Judicial 
branch.  The Legislative branch is made up of a 91-member Senate 
and a120-member National Assembly. 
U.S. Relations: U.S.-Gabonese relations are excellent; the last visit by the 
President of Gabon to Washington was in 2004.  The U.S. military 
interacts with the Gabonese military through an International 
Military Education and Training program. 
 
 Despite election irregularities in the past six presidential and legislative elections, 
Gabon has made steady progress towards privatization of business, and formerly 
government run entities such as the press.  The U.S. imports the majority of Gabon’s 
export oil and exports heavy construction equipment, aircraft, and machinery to Gabon.  
Considerable private U.S. capital has been invested in Gabon since before its 
independence in 1960.  The official language of Gabon is French, Fang, Myene, Bateke, 
Bapounou/Eschira, and Bndjabi are also spoken. 
 
4. Social313 
Religion: Christian 55-75%, Islam (less than 1%), Animist 
Population: 1,454867 (2007) composed of 7 ethnic groups 
Literacy rate: 63% 
_____________________ 
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Health: Infant mortality rate (2007) 5.4%, Life expectancy (2007) 
54 years, AIDS (2003) 48,000 people infected, 8.1% of 
population.  Infectious diseases:  food or waterborne 
diseases: bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever, 
vector borne disease: malaria314 
Work Force: Agriculture 52%, Industry and commerce 16%, services 
and government 33% 
 
 Gabon is one of the least populated countries in Africa and labor shortages are the 
major impediment to economic growth.  AIDS is prevalent in 8.1%, and there is a low 
infant birthrate, and a relatively high infant mortality rate.  Due to its low population and 
relatively large land mass, Gabon has not disturbed the majority of its rain forests and 
remains rich in natural resources other than oil. 
 
5. Transnational Issues315 
There is currently an issue that has been a point of conflict for some time between 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon to resolve the sovereignty dispute over Gabon-occupied 
Mbane Island and lesser islands and to establish a maritime boundary in hydrocarbon-rich 
Corisco Bay. 
Gabon does not have a significant number of refugees from neighboring 
countries.  Only a small number of refugees from the Republic of Congo (7,298) reside in 
Gabon as of 2006. 
 
6. Comments 
 The country of Gabon is one of the more prosperous and stable countries in 
Africa.  Although political conditions could improve, a small population, abundant 
natural resources, and considerable foreign support have shaped Gabon positively. 
_____________________ 
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7. Needs Summary 
 Coordination to resolve sovereignty dispute with Equatorial Guinea. 
 Train with Coast Guard of Gabon to protect oil transportation 
 Medical treatment and prevention training for common disease and AIDS. 
 
J. AN ANALYSIS OF REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 
 
1. Geography316 
Total Area: 342,000 square miles (slightly larger than New Mexico) 
Major Cities/Capital: Brazzaville, Pointe-Noire, Dolisie 
Ports: Brazzaville, Djeno, Impfondo, Ouesso, Oyo, Pointe-
Noire317 
Coastal Features: 105 miles of coastline318; coastal plains. 
Climate: Tropical 
 
The Congo River forms the southeastern border of the country, and is the 
thoroughfare upon which Brazzaville lies.  Pointe-Noire, an Atlantic seaport, “is the main 
commercial centre [sic] of the country,”319 and has a rail connection to Brazzaville. 
 
2. Economy320 
DP (2006): $5.093 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006):  6% 
Per capita (2006): $1400 321 
_____________________ 
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Natural Resources: Petroleum, wood, potash, lead, zinc, uranium, phosphates, 
natural gas, hydropower. 
Agriculture: Manioc, sugar, rice, corn, peanuts, vegetables, coffee, 
cocoa, forest products.  Less than 2% of land cultivated. 
Trade (2006): Exports $5.996 billion: petroleum (89%), lumber, plywood, 
sugar, cocoa, coffee, diamonds. 
 Imports $1.964 billion:  capital equipment, construction 
materials, foodstuffs. 
Major Markets:322   Export: US 38.1%, China 33.3%, Taiwan 10.2%, South 
Korea 6.2% (2006). 
 Import: France 23.5%, China 13.1%, US 7.5%, India 6.9%, 
Italy 5.6%, Belgium 5.1% (2006) 
 
Though its traditional oil production on land is expected to wane in the next 15 
years, the Republic of the Congo is pursuing offshore permits as part of a Production 
Sharing Agreement with the Democratic Republic of Congo.  The country has made 
several economic during the recent years of peace, garnering favorable approval from the 
IMF.  In 1997, their government “ratified a bilateral investment treaty [with the U.S.] 
designed to facilitate and protect foreign investment … [however] high costs of labor, 
energy, raw materials, and transportation; a restrictive labor code; low productivity and 
high production costs; and a deteriorating transportation infrastructure have been among 
the factors discouraging investment.”323 
 
                                                             
321. The World Fact book, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
322. The World Fact book, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
323. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
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3. Political324 
Government Type: Republic 
Structure: Executive:  president 
 Legislative: Senate and National Assembly 
U.S. Relations: Relations between the United States and President Denis 
Sassou-Nguesso are strong, positive, and cooperative. 
 
 Though not a Cold War battleground, strong Marxist-Leninist language used by 
its government during that period, as well as spurious periods of conflict for political 
power, made relations with the Republic of the Congo difficult for many years.  
However, since the first progress toward democratization in 1991, especially since the 
relatively prolonged peace since 2003 (when the last rebel group signed a peace accord), 
and due to the political and economic reforms made by their president, genuine efforts 
are being made by its government toward stability. 
 
4. Social325 
Religion: Christian 50%, Animist 48%, Muslim 2% 
Population: 3,800,610; Kongo 48%, Sangha 20%, M'Bochi 12%, Teke 
17%, Europeans and other 3% 
Literacy rate (2003): 83.8% 
Health: Infant mortality rate 8.3%, Life expectancy 53.3 years 
 AIDS 4.9% (2003 est.) adult population 
 
 “Estimates for this country explicitly take into account the effects of excess 
mortality due to AIDS; this can result in lower life expectancy, higher infant mortality 
_____________________ 
324. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
325. The World Fact book, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
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and death rates, lower population and growth rates, and changes in the distribution of 
population by age and sex than would otherwise be expected (July 2007 est.)”326 
 
5. Transnational Issues 
 Refugees, both from the Democratic Republic of Congo (over 56,000) and 
Rwanda (over 6,000), as well as from within its own borders (over 48,000), present the 
country with a large human-management challenge.327  
 
6. Comments 
The Republic of the Congo’s strength lies in its willingness to reform 
economically and politically; yet it faces the great challenges of sustaining their future 
economy, fighting disease, and providing for displaced people.  Their pursuit of 
alternatives in their oil production is a step in the right direction, as they seek to offset 
any future economic declines.  Other options for prosperity and stability may lie in an 
improved (currently under-utilized) agriculture economy.  The relatively prolonged peace 
there is encouraging.   
 
Their maritime environment seems to center around future oil prospects, vice 
fishing.  Though the catch has risen significantly over the past 30 years, “most fishing is 
carried on along the coast for local consumption.”328  Unlike most of its neighbors who 
side with international convention, the Republic of the Congo claims territorial seas to 
200 miles.  “The navy consists mainly of riverine craft but acquisition of offshore patrol 
vessels to protect offshore resources is a possibility.”329 
 
7. Needs Summary 
_____________________ 
326. The World Fact book, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
327. The World Fact book, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
328. Encyclopedia of the Nations: Africa, “Congo, Republic of the (ROC),” 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/Africa/Congo-Republic-of-the-ROC.html. 
329. Jane’s Fighting Ships, “Administration, Congo-Brazzaville,” http://www4.janes.com. 
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 Offshore exploration 
 Agricultural capital, investments 
 Economic reform and management 
 Build transportation infrastructure 
 Naval material 
 Improved healthcare 
 Refugee management 
 
K. AN ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 
 
1. Geography330 
Total Area: 905,063 square miles (about the size of the U.S. east of the 
Mississippi) 
Major Cities/Capital: Kinshasa 
Ports: Banana, Matadi 
Coastal Features: 23 miles of coastline331, tropical rainforest near coastline, 
Congo River and Delta. 
Climate: Equatorial 
 
The Congo River and its delta region comprise the primary maritime domain for 
the Democratic Republic of Congo.  A small stretch of coastline marks a limited 
geographic border with the Gulf of Guinea.  The port town of Banana (and associated oil 
terminal) is the closest access to the coast, located just inside the mouth of the Congo 
River.  Matadi marks the furthest point on the Congo navigable by seagoing ships332, is a 
_____________________ 
330. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
331. The World Fact book, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
332. Urbain Ureel, “(Belgian) Congo River Shipping at the End 19th and Beginning 20th Century,” 
Urbain’s Nautical Page, http://users.pandora.be/urbiehome/Congoship.html. 
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railhead for transportation further inland, and is considered the country’s chief sea-
port,333 located 92 miles upriver.  The navigable depth to Banana is around 5 m.334  
 
2. Economy335 
GDP (2003): $5.6 billion 
GDP growth rate (2005):  6% 
Per capita (2005): $120 
Natural Resources: Copper, cobalt, diamonds, gold … petroleum, wood. 
Agriculture: Coffee, rubber … 
Trade (2002): Exports $1.04 billion: diamonds, cobalt, coffee, petroleum.  
Imports $1.216 billion:  consumer goods, capital 
equipment, refined petroleum. 
Major Markets:    European Union, Japan, South Africa, U.S. 
 
“Sparsely populated in relation to its area, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
is home to a vast potential of natural resources and mineral wealth. Nevertheless, the 
D.R.C. is one of the poorest countries in the world … [a] result of years of 
mismanagement, corruption, and war.”336   
Agriculture may be the hardest hit of all the markets, as former President 
Mobutu’s nationalization of international agricultural capital within the country’s borders 
in the early 1970s “had a disastrous effect on production.”337  They have never really 
recovered, as conflict and instability in the country’s interior - as well as a focus on more 
lucrative cash crops and mining – have thwarted any major increases in production and 
use of land.  Over half of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s land is farmable, yet only 
_____________________ 
333. Wikipedia, “Matadi,” http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matadi. 
334. Wikipedia, “Banana, Democratic Republic of Congo,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Banana%2C_Congo. 
335. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
336. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
337. WashingtonPost.com, “International Spotlight: Democratic Republic of Congo, Food for 
Thought,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/congo/food.html. 
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1 to 2 percent is currently farmed (2001 est.).338  One of the greatest hurdles to effective 
agriculture is a lack of transportation infrastructure – in other words, the ability to 
transfer produce from farm to market.  In essence, a resource for sustainment of the 
nation’s people, as well as a source of revenue via export, is grossly under-utilized. 
The Washington Post cites two other resources as potential means for increased 
revenue in the Democratic Republic of Congo:  fishing and timber.  It is estimated that 
the country has the potential to increase fish production (both fresh and saltwater) from 
200,000 tons per year to over 700,000 tons339, yet the population continues to import the 
majority of their fish.  In addition, the Democratic Republic of Congo’s rain forests offer 




Government Type: Republic, highly centralized 
Structure: President, Prime Minister, and a legislature comprised of 
500 seats, representing 169 electoral districts.  
U.S. Relations: The United States remains a partner with the D.R.C. … and 
facilitated the signing of a tripartite agreement on regional 
security in the Great Lakes region between the D.R.C., 
Rwanda, and Uganda in October 2004 
 
 Formerly known as Belgian Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo endured 
numerous seizures of power, political experimentations, conflict and violence since its 
independence was granted in 1960.  The most common conflict has stemmed from 
_____________________ 
338. WashingtonPost.com, “International Spotlight: Democratic Republic of Congo, Food for 
Thought,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/congo/food.html. 
339. WashingtonPost.com, “International Spotlight: Democratic Republic of Congo, Food for 
Thought,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/congo/food.html. 
340. WashingtonPost.com, “International Spotlight: Democratic Republic of Congo, Food for 
Thought,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/congo/food.html. 
341. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
 379
outside interventions – sometimes at the request of inside forces seeking to gain power, 
such as Laurent Desire Kabila’s coup-d’etat in 1996, backed by Rwandan troops.  Such 
instability exacted a large human toll:  “between August 1998 and April 2004 (when the 
bulk of the fighting occurred) 3.8 million people died in the DRC.”342 
 Kabila’s son, Joseph Kabila, succeeded his father as the President of the 
Democratic republic of Congo, and implemented measures for conflict resolution, 
democratization, and economic revitalization. Under his rule, foreign factions within the 
country’s borders signed the Pretoria Accord in 2003, which called for the withdrawal of 
all foreign troops; though foreign militias continue to operate in the eastern portion of the 
country, all official state armies honored their governments’ treaty.   In 2006, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo held its first democratic elections, monitored by its own 
Independent Electoral Commission.  Kabila won with 58% of the vote for President; in 
addition, “voters … also chose from among 9,709 legislative candidates to fill 500 seats 
in the National Assembly, representing 169 electoral districts.”343  In addition, he 
extended authority to the opposition, with “four vice presidents represent[ing] the former 
government, former rebel groups, and the political opposition.”344  Kabila’s economic 




Religion (2004): Roman Catholic 50%, Protestant 20%, Muslim 10% … 
Population (2004): 58 million composed more than 200 ethnic groups 
Literacy rate (2004): 65.5% 
Health (2004): Infant mortality rate 9.5%, Life expectancy 49 years 
_____________________ 
342. Global Security.org, “Congo Civil War,” 
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/congo.htm. 
343. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
344. The World Fact book, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
345. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
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 AIDS 4.2% adult population346 
 
“According to estimates made in 2000, 41.7% of the population has no schooling,  
42.2% has primary schooling, 15.4% has secondary schooling, and 0.7% has university 
schooling.”347 
 
5. Transnational Issues 
 Most issues occur in the far eastern portion of the country, often as a consequence 
of problems in neighboring Rwanda.  There is a large refugee concern, particularly 
following the genocide which occurred in Rwanda.  Also, Rwandan militias and rebel 
groups remain a constant nuisance, even though Rwanda’s army pulled out of country 
following the Pretoria Accord.  Such rogue entities – both internal and external – directly 
threaten stabilization of the Democratic Republic of Congo’s interior. 
 
6. Comments 
The Democratic Republic of Congo represents just the type of region in which 
goodwill and engagement may prevent future political tensions and regional instability.  
Perhaps of foremost importance is the political reform toward democratization taking 
place there today – as well as its vulnerability to traditional internal and transnational 
threats lingering within and just outside of its borders.  Unlike the Democratic Republic 
of Congo’s neighboring states, oil is not the prime source of revenue, making its 
economic issues unique within the region.  Its lands and waters promise hope in the form 
of expanded agriculture, fishing, and timber ventures, both for internal stability and 
international trade.  Perhaps the following quote regarding agriculture best conveys the 
challenge for the entire country:  “Government faces a mammoth task in making both the 
people of DRC and foreign investors regain confidence in agriculture as a viable 
_____________________ 
346. The World Fact book, “Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html. 
347. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Democratic Republic of the Congo,” U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2823.htm. 
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economic activity.”348  Without an improved transportation system, or with a breach of 
its recent political calm, all hope for this nation could be lost yet again, thus insuring 
instability in this microcosm of the Gulf of Guinea region.  Due both to its current 
progress toward a stable government and economy, and also due to its fragility at such an 
early stage, the Democratic Republic of Congo deserves the type of assistance that GFS 
may offer … soon. 
From a maritime perspective, its small coastline might cause some to forego any 
sincere analysis of how improvements to its maritime governance might benefit the 
country; however, their coastline entitles them to exclusive rights to the economic use of 
4,600 square miles of ocean.  If significant mineral deposits or fisheries were discovered 
here, it might afford some revenue for their population.  In addition, maritime regime 
implementation and enforcement may need to be bolstered:  “The 2002 edition of Jane's 
Sentinel described the Navy as being 'in a state of near total disarray' and stated that it did 
not conduct any training or have operating procedures.”349 The Democratic Republic of 
Congo has been party to maritime treaties, however, as country representatives “signed a 
communiqué for a six-point action plan aimed at improving maritime security in the Gulf 
of Guinea at a US-led conference in Cotonou, Benin on 15 November 2006.”350 
  
7. Needs Summary 
 Border security 
 Agricultural capital, investments 
 Exploration of offshore oil prospects 
_____________________ 
348. WashingtonPost.com, “International Spotlight: Democratic Republic of Congo, Food for 
Thought,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-adv/specialsales/spotlight/congo/food.html. 
349. Wikipedia, “Military of the Democratic Republic of Congo,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_of_the_Democratic_Republic_of_the_Congo#Congolese_Navy. 
350. Denise Hammick,  “African countries sign U.S.-led plan for better security in the Gulf of 








 Exploration of fishing prospects 
 Timber capital, investments 
 Maritime regime building 
 Enforcement of EEZ 
 Security of its people (particularly in the East) 
 Transportation infrastructure building 
 
L. AN ANALYSIS OF ANGOLA 
 
1. Geography351 
Total Area: 1,246,700 square miles (about twice the size of Texas) 
Major Cities/Capital: Luanda, Huambo, Benguela 
Ports: Cabinda, Soyo, Luanda, Lobito, Benguela, Namibe 
Coastal Features: 994 miles of coastline352; narrow dry coastal strip from 
Luanda to Namibia; tropical rainforest elsewhere along the 
coast, including the enclave of Cabinda. 
Climate: Tropical 
 
The primary ports are Luanda, Lobito, Malongo and Namibe.  To provide a 
picture of port capacity, Luanda – the country’s second busiest port – has four terminals, 
a pier-side depth of 9.5 m, and faces congestion problems (see picture below), sometimes 
requiring ships to delay for 21 days.353  Lobito is the country’s other “deepwater 
seaport.”  Malongo, Soyo and Namibe are listed as “small” or “very small.”354 
 
_____________________ 
351. U.S. Department of State, “Background Note: Angola,” 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm. 
352. The World Fact book, “Angola,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 
353. OT Africa Line, “Luanda Port Information,” http://www.otal.com/angola/index.htm#luanda. 
354. World Port Source, “Countries: Angola,” http://www.worldportsource.com/ports/AGO.php. 
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2. Economy355 
GDP (2006): $53.9 billion 
GDP growth rate (2006):  15.3% 
Per capita (2006): $3,399 
Natural Resources: Petroleum, diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, bauxite, 
uranium, gold, granite, copper, feldspar. 
Agriculture: Bananas, sugarcane, coffee, sisal, corn, cotton, manioc, 
tobacco, vegetables, plantains; livestock; forest products; 
fisheries products. 
Trade (2006): Exports $30.3 billion: petroleum (95%), diamonds (4.6%), 
coffee … 
 Imports $9 billion:  machinery, electrical equipment, 
vehicles and spare parts, medicines, foods, textiles. 
Major Markets:   Portugal, U.S., South Africa, China, Brazil. 
 
The economy in Angola is booming, largely due to its offshore oil revenue 
(second only to Nigeria); however, reformation to address economic issues born out of 27 
years of civil war on land is slow.  Though once a major economic force, agriculture 
suffered as a consequence of landmines placed in the countryside, and “the country now 
imports about half of its food.”356  Angola’s second highest grossing industry, diamond 
mining, is plagued by illegal sales from small-scale prospectors, though the government 
“is making an increased effort to register [them],”357 and corporate ownership is 
increasing.  According to the IMF, more than $4 billion worth of oil receipts remain 
unaccounted for from their treasury for a six-year period.358  
_____________________ 
355. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Angola,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm. 
356. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Angola,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm. 
357. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Angola,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm. 





Government Type: Republic 
Structure: Executive:  elected president, appointed prime minister 
 Legislative: elected National Assembly 
U.S. Relations: The United States established formal diplomatic relations 
with the Government of Angola in 1993.  Before 1989, 
U.S.-Angolan relations were defined by the Cold War.  In 
May 2004, President Dos Santos met with President Bush 
during an official visit to Washington. 
 
 Gaining independence from Portugal in 1975, Angola didn’t emerge from its 
status as a hot-bed for Cold War conflict until “a U.S.-brokered agreement resulted in 
withdrawal of foreign troops in 1989 and led to the Bicesse Accord in 1991, which 
spelled out an electoral process for a democratic Angola under the supervision of the 
United Nations.”360  This process went into effect in 1992, with the first democratic 
elections.  Jose Eduardo dos Santos, a leader within the Popular Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) which was backed by the Soviets during the Cold War, 
won.  By 1994, hostilities between old Cold War factions ceased.  President dos Santos 
retains much authority from his executive office, and has postponed the next presidential 
election until 2009. 
 Internal revolt remains a threat to Angolan governance in an enclave known as 
Cabinda – a region which accounts for a large percentage of Angolan oil, but which is 
also physically separated from the mainland by the Democratic Republic of Congo.  The 
most notable opposition to the Angolan government here is the Front for the Liberation of 
the Enclave of Cabinda (FLEC); however, their resistance has waned since a 
_____________________ 
359. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Angola,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm. 
360. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Angola,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm. 
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Memorandum of Understanding was signed in 2006, and many of their members have 
assimilated into the Angolan Army.  Still, there is an active element to FLEC.   
 
4. Social361 
Religion (1998): Indigenous beliefs 47%, Roman Catholic 38%, Protestant 
15%  
Population (2007): 12,263,596 million, composed mostly of three primary 
ethnic groups 
Literacy rate (2001): 67.4% 
Health: Infant mortality rate 18.4%, Life expectancy 37.6 years 
 AIDS 3.9% adult population 
 
 Angola “ranks in the bottom 10% of most socio-economic indicators … [and was] 
ranked 161 out of 177 countries on the 2006 UN Development Program’s Human 
Development Index.”362 
 
5. Transnational Issues 
Over 13,000 refugees from the Democratic republic of Congo remained in 
country as of 2006.  A lingering effect of the long civil war in Angola includes the 61,700 
(2006 est.) internationally displaced persons (IDPs).363  Angola is also utilized by drug 
smugglers as a staging point for cocaine shipments to Europe.  In addition, due to the 
underlying animosity of Cabindans toward Angola, DR. J. Peter Pham has hinted that the 
remaining active FLEC revolutionaries in this enclave might be just the kind of group to 
conspire with international terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda, to further their 
cause:  “If Osama bin laden is serious about waging economic war against the United 
States … and if his minions heed his advice about hitting one of America’s vital arteries, 
_____________________ 
361. The World Fact book, “Angola,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 
362. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Angola,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm. 
363. The World Fact book, “Angola,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 
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Angola possesses the economic power to afford stability, but concerns about its 
government, as well as the great disparity between the wealth of the nation and the poor 
social conditions of its people, present a difficult socio-political environment in which to 
engage.  An 18% infant mortality rate is one example of such disparity.  Indeed, the 
disparity between the social and economic spectrums may be due in part to the short 
period of peace in which they have been able to merge; they may simply need more time.   
The political realm remains intriguing:  President dos Santos’s delay of 
presidential elections until 2009 raises suspicion regarding the democratic legitimacy of 
its governmental charters; however, he has been engaged with the U.S., and has extended 
political goodwill across “party” lines to members of former Cold War enemies by 
including them in the National Assembly.  Further reform will benefit the nation:  
“Angola will need to implement government reforms and to reduce corruption … [in 
order] to fully take advantage of its rich national resources - gold, diamonds, extensive 
forests, Atlantic fisheries, and large oil deposits.”365   
The maritime environment of Angola is large, and they are taking advantage of 
their exclusive rights to 200 miles with their offshore oil drilling.  Their Navy, the 
People's Navy of Angola (Marinha de Guerra Popular de Angola - MGPA), is the 
smallest component of their armed forces, with a strength of 1,500 to 2,000 
servicemen366 and comprised of “a fleet of about fifty vessels that [include] guided-
missile fast patrol boats, torpedo boats, inland water and coastal patrol vessels, mine 
_____________________ 
364. Peter J. Pham, “Cabinda: The “Forgotten Conflict” America Can’t Afford to Forget,” World 
Defense Review, http://worlddefensereview.com/pham070507.shtml. 
365. The World Fact book, “Angola,” U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ao.html. 
366. Institute for Security Studies, “Angola: Security Information,” 
http://www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/Angola/SecInfo. 
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warfare craft, and amphibious landing craft.”367  Their mission in peacetime may extend 
beyond security.  In 1985, the MPGA took over fisheries enforcement from their coast 
guard “to provide more effective enforcement of fishing regulations.”368  There are 
indications that Angolan armed forces are involved in reconstruction efforts, as well.  
Proficiency and vessel maintenance were described as “problematic” in 1989, but this 
information is dated.  Indeed, the vast ocean expanse within their EEZ may require more 
material and personnel needs than their small force currently possesses. 
Relations with Angola are warm enough for interaction; indeed, the U.S. economy 
is directly tied to those relations as they are a major producer of our own nation’s oil 
needs.  The U.S. has already taken action to assist with economic reform, providing “$2.2 
million to work on land tenure, economic policy, and the financial sector.”369  Further 
engagement may help in their government’s continuing evolution from a war-torn nation 
to a well-rounded political, social, and economic force of stability in the Gulf of Guinea 
region.   
  
7. Needs Summary 
 Offshore oil protection 
 Agricultural capital, investments 
 Economic reform and management 
 Improved healthcare 
 Naval maintenance 
 Naval equipment/vessels 
 Refugee management 
 stop drug-smuggling 
 Enforce fisheries  
 
_____________________ 
367. Photius Coutsoukis, “Angola Navy,” 
http://www.photius.com/countries/angola/national_security/angola_national_security_navy.html. 
368. Photius Coutsoukis, “Angola Navy,” 
http://www.photius.com/countries/angola/national_security/angola_national_security_navy.html. 
369. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Angola,” U.S. Department of State, 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/6619.htm. 
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M. AN ANALYSIS OF SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE 
 
1. Geography370 
Total Area: 1,001 sq. km.; one-third size of Rhode Island 
Major Cities/Capital:  Sao Tome 
Ports: Cotonou 
Coastal Features: 209 km 
Climate: tropical; hot, humid; one rainy season 
Port Information:  No deep water harbors.371 
 
2. Economy372 
GDP (205 est.): $ 71.38million 
GDP growth rate (2006 est.):  4.4% 
Per capita (2005 est.): $424 
Natural Resources: Agricultural products, fish, oil 
Agriculture: Cocoa, coconuts, copra, palm kernels, cinnamon… 
Trade (2006 est.): Exports $9.773 million: cocoa copra, palm kernels  
 Imports $48.87 million:  food, fuel, machinery and 
electrical equipment  
Major Markets:   Portugal, Netherlands, Spain, Germany, China 
 
Majority of Sao Tome and Principe economy is based on cocoa which accounts 
for 95% of total exports. Domestic food production is inadequate, so the country imports 
some of its food. 
 Sao Tome and Nigeria have reached an agreement on joint exploration for oil in 
the waters claimed by both countries.  
_____________________ 
370. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Sao Tome and Principe,” U.S. Department of 
State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5434.htm. 
371. Sao Tomé e Príncipe, "Paradise islands on the equator - heaven for individualists," 
http://www.sao-tome.com/englisch/index.htm. 
372. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Sao Tome and Principe,” U.S. Department of 
State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5434.htm. 
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 Togo has turned to the IMF, Africa Development Bank (ADB) and World Bank 
for economic reform and debt relief, specifically under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Initiative and Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program. 
 
3. Political373 
Government Type: Republic 
Structure: President and Prime Minister; legislative-national 
assembly; Judicial-supreme court 




Religion (2001): Catholic 70.3%, none 19.4%Evangelical 3.4%, New  
    Apostolic 2% 
Population (2007 est.):  199,570 
Literacy rate (2004): 84.9% 
Health (2003 est.): Life expectancy 66.03 years 
 HIV/AIDS Prevalence: N/A 
 HIV/AIDS, people living with: N/A 
 Major Diseases: hepatitis A and typhoid fever  
_____________________ 
373. Bureau of African Affairs, “Background Note: Sao Tome and Principe,” U.S. Department of 
State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5434.htm. 
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APPENDIX B: FNA PLATFORM SELECTION PROPOSALS 
Platforms highlighted in red signify SEA-12’s selections for evaluation in FNA. 
 
The following summaries are the notes taken during the selection process, and highlight 
the key considerations given to each proposal. 
 
CVN 
Pros  Cons 
Comms Suite 
Air Wing 
Time on Station 
Medical capability 
Draft 
National Asset  
 





Time on Station  
O-6 




Lack of storage 
National Asset 
Lack of storage capacity 
Lack of extra berthing 
Minimal off load capability 
Draft (?) 
 
















Water making capacity 
2A has helos 
Comm Suite 
Not 2A’s no helos 
Draft 
Time on station 
National Asset 
Cargo capability 











On Station Time 
Can’t support VBSS/MIO 
Transit Speed 
National Asset 
Limited in number 
Draft 
 






LCUs (well deck) 
Transit Speed 
 
Still really new (bugs) 
Draft 




Same as LHD Old (going away) 
Draft 















Small boat ops 








Figure 109:  AS "Pros & Cons" 
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Off load capability 
Civilian crew 
Off load capability 
On station time 









Figure 110:  RORO "Pros & Cons" 
 
Hospital Ship (HS) 
Pro’s Cons 
Floating hospital 




On-load off/load capability 
Only have 2 
No helos 
Draft 
Cannot get stuff ashore 
 
Figure 111:  HS "Pros & Cons" 
 






Transitioned to USCG (?) 









Cross trained crews 
 
Program challenges (?) 
Funding cuts 
Ready to go in 2012 (?) 
Time on station 









Helo pad  
Classroom Space 
Might not be available in 2012 
No organic helo 
Limited cross Atlantic cargo 
Figure 114:  HSV "Pros & Cons" 
 
USCG (Cutter or Tender) 
Pro’s Cons 
Experience  
Similar to HN navies 
Not perceived as warship 
Self Defense 
Not DoN (however, some question whether 
this is a “con”) 
Figure 115:  USCG "Pros & Cons" 
 
USCG & RORO 
Pro’s Cons 
Non-warship perception 




No impact on USN fleet 
 
Figure 116:  USCG & RORO Combination "Pros & Cons" 
 
HSV & RORO 
Pro’s Cons 
HSV can go where RORO can’t 
Adaptable 
Cargo space on RORO 
 
Figure 117:  HSV & RORO Combination "Pros & Cons" 
 
FFG & LHD/LHA 
Pro’s Cons 
Two USN assets 




Figure 118:  FFG & LHD/LHA Combination "Pros & Cons" 
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No USN (however, some question whether 
this is a “con”) 
Interoperability 
Size of HS, and lack of connectors 
Figure 119:  HS and USCG Combination "Pros & Cons" 
 
LCS & HSV 
Pro’s  Cons 
Speed/Maneuverability 
Arming 
Both shallow draft 
#’s of hulls available 
LCS mod’s available 
Similar capabilities 
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APPENDIX C: SIMULATION DETAILS 
Peacetime Engagement – System Evaluation Scenario and Simulation Plan: 
Petroleum Infrastructure Security in the Gulf Of Guinea and Niger Delta 
 
A. SYSTEM EVALUATION SCENARIO OVERVIEW  
 The purpose of this scenario is to provide a realistic context by which to evaluate 
GFS system alternatives within the specific mission area of Peacetime Engagement.  For 
this reason, the scope of the scenario is limited to “testing” GFS-only capabilities and not 
those of partner agencies or nations; although it is assumed that the Interagency & NGO 
Coordination role is intrinsic and will be fulfilled to some extent.  Neither does this 
scenario delve into the mission area of Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief, although 
it may be a probable consequence of violent action in the Area of Operations (AO).  
Evaluation of GFS system alternatives is accomplished by first using the scenario to 
determine relative importance of GFS attributes, then developing appropriate measures 
of effectiveness for those attributes, and finally using the scenario as a basis for 
modeling, simulation and analysis in order to evaluate the performance of system 
alternatives (i.e. different platforms). 
 
B. CONTEXT   
 The scenario is projected to be relevant through the year 2012 and is as follows:  
The GFS is midway through her second deployment to the Gulf of Guinea (GoG) Area of 
Operations (AO).  She has been conducting multinational exercises with partner nations 
in the region, and is currently training with a Nigerian Navy vessel in the littoral region 
of the Niger Delta.  Training topics may include small ship and engine maintenance, 
security of offshore and inshore petroleum infrastructure, conduct of EMIO and Counter 
Piracy Operations, fisheries protection, or border dispute resolution.  
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C. THREAT   
The threat level has increased in the AO due to recent actions of the Movement for the 
Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).  A small MEND militia has boarded a 
Nigerian Shell Oil platform 25 Nautical Miles off the Niger Delta near Bonny Island and 
stolen hundreds of barrels of petroleum with a small coastal tanker (200-300 ft) and a 
swarm of 5 fast boats with small arms and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs).  The militia 
has also kidnapped 3 of the Shell workers.  It is uncertain whether the hostages are 
onboard the pirate tanker or one or more of the fast boats.   
 
1. RED (MEND) Objectives   
 Red objectives are to force the powerful foreign oil companies from the Niger 
Delta Region. They also wish to end military rule, return Nigeria to a democratic civilian 
government, and the creation of new states in ethnic minority areas. These local terrorist 
organizations wish to increase local control and the share of money made from oil and 
natural resources. 
 For the purposes of this scenario, the MEND militia aims to transport the 
bunkered oil to another port and sell it on the black market, while the hostages are 
covertly exchanged back to Shell for a ransom.  It is assumed that the fast boats mean to 
either escort the tanker or ferry the hostages to a covert location. 
 
2. RED Phases  
 COLLECT: Intelligence, surveillance, monitoring, and planning through 
local informants.  
 SEIZE: Militants will then conduct high speed approach of oil platform or 
facility, board, and control platform.  
 TRANSFER: Once onboard the platform, oil bunkering and/or kidnapping 
of foreign oil workers is initiated.  
 ESCAPE: These activities are usually followed by ransom for exchange of 
workers and sale of bunkered oil on the black market. 
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3. RED Key Tasks in Support of Their Objectives 
 The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has used 
kidnapped foreign oil workers as a prime ransom tool against oil companies such as 
Shell.  Well-armed militants take hostages from Delta oil platforms and demand 
excessive ransoms be paid to them for the safe return of the foreign workers.  MEND 
militants have successfully cut the flow of oil by nearly 20% following these attacks. 
 Oil bunkering, an illegal activity where militarized youth groups tap into oil 
pipelines, has been occurring frequently since the late 1990s. This activity in conjunction 
with MEND bombings usually target key points in oil pipelines and facilities in the Delta 
to maximize disruption and cost to foreign oil companies. 
 
4. RED Targets  
 Red targets include oil platforms, foreign oil workers, oil infrastructure, oil 
companies. 
 
5. RED Capabilities   
 MEND militia can be expected to be armed with fully automatic machine guns on 
high speed boats while personnel routinely carry sub-machine guns.  There are 
approximately 8 militants to each fast boat, and an unknown number on the small tanker.  
Militants also employ rocket propelled grenades and may deploy explosive devices on the 
oil platform.  The following data is from the Terrorism Knowledge Base maintained by 
the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.375 
_____________________ 









Movement for the Emancipation of 
the Niger Delta (MEND)  UNK 
Ijaw people of 
the Niger Delta YES  YES YES 
YES; limited to 
local informants NIGER DELTA 
Iduwini Youths (AKA Ijaw Youth 
Movement) UNK Iduwini/Ijaw 
NO; limited to 
kidnapping of oil 
employees 
YES YES YES; limited to local informants 
SOUTHERN 
NIGER DELTA 
Movement for Development and 
Democracy (MDD) 
More than 3,000 
members VARIOUS UNK YES YES UNK 
Cameroon, Chad, 
Nigeria, Libya 
Figure 121:  Threat Organizations in Nigeria 
 
D. KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
 
1. The Nigerian Government  
 The Government of Nigeria is a Federal Republic which has had excellent 
relations with the U.S. since 1999, sharing many of the same foreign policy goals.  
United States interest in Nigeria is great, as it is the 5th largest supplier of American oil 
and we are heavily invested in their oil infrastructure (40% of Nigerian oil exports go to 
the US).  Yet, poor corporate relations with indigenous communities, vandalism of oil 
infrastructure, ecological damage, and security problems in the Niger Delta region 
hamper growth and reliability of Nigeria’s oil throughput.376   
 
a. The Nigerian Navy  
  Reports at the time of this study indicate that Nigeria’s naval forces are 
operating in disrepair with little to no materiel reserves and are repeatedly overpowered 
by militant forces.  Furthermore, their warships are inadequately suited to operations in 
the Delta region.377 
 
_____________________ 
376U.S. Department of State, Nigeria Profile, Bureau of African Affairs (June 2007), 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm. 
377 Kingley Omonobi, “Why We Suffer Casualties in N-Delta, By Naval Chief,” Vanguard (Oct 4, 
2007), http://allafrica.com/stories/printable/200710040219.html. 
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b. GFS Presence 
  It is our assumption that the Nigerian Government, acting through the 
Minister of Defense, welcomes the cooperative role of GFS and has extended an 
invitation to train and operate with the Nigerian Navy in territorial waters.  Where the 
capabilities of host nation navies stop, GFS is tasked by AFRICOM to lead the ensuing 
operation in support of the Nigerian Navy’s constitutional role.  Nigerian naval officers 
may be present during the operation for training purposes.  For more rationale, refer to 
section V-B. 
 
2. The Region 
 The Niger River Delta is 20,000 square miles in size, and most of the 3,000 miles 
of aboveground pipelines crisscrossing the Delta are 30 years old and built to lower 
standards than modern pipes. 
 
 a. The Bonny River  
  The Bonny River is representative of critical traffic ways throughout the 
region.  In 2005, 25% of all Nigerian-bound vessels trafficked the Bonny River; carrying 
28% of total tonnage.  The Port of Onne, midway between Port Harcourt and the sea on 
the Bonny River, handled 40% of this vessel traffic.378  
 
 b. Port Harcourt  
  Port Harcourt is a natural port, and maintains the status of being the third 
largest in the country.  The port has an extensive range of handling equipment and 
provides a maximum draught of 7.6 meters.  The port houses a main quay of 1,390 
meters long – 13 berths, a dockyard with 5 mooring berths and tanker buoys.379 
 
_____________________ 
378 Nigerian Ports Authority, Port Statistics, http://www.nigerian-
ports.net/normal/tools/statistics.html. 
379 Nigerian Ports Authority, Port Harcourt, http://www.nigerian-
ports.net/normal/ports/portharcourt.html. 
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3. Regional Economic and Political Organizations  
 Regional economic and political organizations do not oppose the US military 
presence or operations in host nations.  Such organizations include the Community of 
Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Economic Community of Central African States 
(CEEAC/ECCAS), and Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). 
 
4. The United Nations (UN)  
The UN does not oppose the US military presence in or operations with host nations. 
 
5. Terrorist Organization Status  
 Refer to section C-5.  Assume that intelligence preparation of the battle space has 
reported a LOW terror-threat condition.   
 
6. Closest Regional Base 
 The nearest regional base is located in Djibouti, and friendly states in the region 
provide any necessary over-flight permissions. 
 
7. Riverine Operations   
 Any emphasis on the need for riverine forces should be interpreted as a 
recommendation only.  For the purposes of this scenario, it should be assumed that the 
Nigerian riverine capability is the most appropriate response.  Alternatively, we 
considered that the implications of U.S. Riverine Forces supported by GFS are beyond 
the scope of our study.  Whether or not it is directly supported by GFS, riverine units will 
require coordination from GFS during counter piracy operations, assuming her draft is 
too deep to enter the smaller Delta tributaries.  However, use of U.S. riverine forces may 
imply an escalation in conflict level beyond the scope of GFS regional objectives. 
 
8. Air Threat  
 No threats exist to air lines of communication (ALOCs) leading into, but not 
within, the area of operation. 
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9. NEO Contingencies  
 The scale of this scenario will not require non-combatant evacuation (NEO). 
 
E. PARTNERS   
 Indirect approaches to conflict call for a concerted effort to empower, enable, and 
leverage DoD’s interagency and multinational strategic partners, rather than relying on 
direct and unilateral military confrontation by US joint forces.  In order to achieve its 
objective by working with and through strategic partners, DoD must help build and 
continually monitor the capacity of those partners.  
 
1. Non-DoD Agencies of the U.S. Government.   
 While GFS may include a Department of State or other non-DoD agency capacity 
on-board, for the purposes of this scenario, it is assumed that no direct assistance is 
available. 
 
2. Nigerian Government, Military, and Police Forces   
 If this study is to truly measure U.S. capabilities between system alternatives, we 
cannot rely on host nation forces.  Therefore, for the purposes of this scenario, it is 
assumed that while a coordination role will be in effect, negligible assistance will be 
provided by the Nigerian government other than explicit cooperation (see Part IV: Key 
Assumptions).   
 
3. Coalition Partners  
 For the purposes of this scenario and estimation of BLUE force capability, 
assume no coalition involvement (see above). 
 
4. IGOs   
 TBD; see above. 
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5. NGOs  
 In this case, we must emphasize the importance of working with NGOs that share 
the objective (and/or understand the importance) of regional stability, and not of 
jeopardizing it by working (perhaps unwittingly) into the plans of rebel forces due to a 
disregard for other considerations (political, “big picture,” etc.).  TBD; see above. 
 
F. STRATEGIC CONCEPT IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 
1. Broad Goals 
 Create a safe and secure environment  
 Foster economic stability, particularly the assurance of critical resource 
revenues to responsible national authorities  
 Address basic infrastructure and humanitarian needs of the people 
 Monitor for and decrease illegal trafficking 
 Train host nation governments, military, and police forces to improve their 
own security operations. 
  
2. Military Tasks  
 Establish strategic communication  
 secure and protect critical oil infrastructure  
 provide for stability and enable civil authority  
 employ ISR towards interdiction of “bunkered” oil and contraband 
shipments  
 conduct Foreign Intelligence Operations  
 train host nation forces to protect infrastructure and to conduct Maritime 
Security Operations  
 conduct counterterrorism operations. 
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G. BLUE (GFS) COMPONENTS OF THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT 
  
1. Approach  
 Ideally all military tasks would be accomplished in fulfillment of the broad goals 
outlined in Section VII above.  However, GFS is envisioned as a short-term, small-scale 
solution to persistent problems.  In support of its role in Shaping and Stability operations 
in the Gulf of Guinea, GFS is tasked to employ its organic capabilities against an act of 
militant piracy in Nigeria. 
 
2. BLUE Objectives  
 Deter illegal activity in the AO by intercepting, neutralizing, detaining, 
and transferring MEND militants to the Nigerian government.   
 Promote regional relationships by acting as a command, control, and 
coordination (C3) hub and Regional Maritime Situational Awareness 
(RMSA) node for the recovery and return of hostages and bunkered oil to 
appropriate custody.   
 Continue training of foreign navies in support of regional GFS objectives. 
 
3. BLUE Phases  
 TRAINING the Nigerian Navy in any number of capability areas.   
 COORDINATE intelligence, surveillance, monitoring, and planning 
capabilities.  2) PURSUIT.  It is not yet determined whether the fast boats 
escort the tanker or separate and flea into the Delta region.   
 INTERCEPT the tanker.  The tanker may steam upriver towards Port 
Harcourt or East/West along the coast to another port.   
 ENGAGE and neutralize the tanker; engage the fast boats only if 
necessary for force protection.   
 DETAIN  RED crew members.   
 TRANSFER detainees, hostages and recovered oil, and any wounded.  
Refuel and rotate personnel if necessary.   
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 RESUME normal operations (complete post-engagement actions and carry 
out standing orders). 
 
4. BLUE Key Tasks  
 As a potential member of the 1,000 ship navy, GFS must coordinate her 
efforts with regional partners.   
 GFS will also serve as the C3 unit for the security of the oil platform. 
EOD may be needed to neutralize any explosives.  As the lead C3 unit, 
GFS must decide whether to take down the tanker with a non-compliant 
VBSS team or the proven SEAL team. Either team can be fast-roped onto 
the platform from a helicopter detachment or be delivered via small boat 
(RHIB, SURC).   
 Additionally, GFS will be prepared to conduct SUW against MEND small 
boats in the area.  
 
5. BLUE Targets  
 Targets include oil platform, MEND tanker, MEND fast boats. 
 
6. BLUE Capabilities  
 The preceding scenario is used as a context by which to determine important 
attributes of GFS.  For a complete list of attributes see the Functional Needs Analysis.  
The attributes will be the focus of the modeling, simulation, and analysis effort. 
 
H. ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS 
 Beyond the “base case” of section III, alternative scenarios include those outlined 
in the Interagency & NGO Coordination and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
scenarios. 
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I. MODELING AND SIMULATION EFFORT  
 
1. Overview 
 The purpose of the modeling and simulation effort is to evaluate the performance 
of GFS system alternatives (i.e. different platforms) in a given operational scenario.  The 
scenario was first used to determine the relative importance of GFS attributes – for which 
we developed appropriate value scoring criteria – and finally to model and thereby 
simulate the operational environment. 
 
2. Context 
 See accompanying documentation on the System Evaluation Scenario. 
 
3. Value Scoring Criteria (VSC)  
 Peacetime Engagement attributes are listed with their scenario weight in 
parentheses and a brief summary of associated VSC.  For more detailed descriptions of 




Figure 122: Recapture of P.E. Weights and Scores for Simulation 
 
4. Modeling and Simulation Environment   
 For the Peacetime Engagement Modeling and Simulation environment we utilized 
Naval Simulation System-21 (NSS-21).  Many of the platforms utilized were inherent to 
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the system with all parameters previously defined.  Several of the platforms and weapons 
systems however were not inherent to the system.  To overcome this we created these 
platforms and utilized the data on the actual platforms to determine the parameters of the 
simulation platforms.  This data was taken from Jane’s High-Speed Marine Transport, 
Jane’s Fighting Ships, the U.S. Navy website, briefs provided by the HSV-2 Swift crew, 
and information from Sailors who had served aboard these ships.  Below is a spreadsheet 
showing the parameters that were entered into the simulation for each platform or system. 
 
Simulation Information Entered 
   
Platform Attribute Specifications 
RPG Field of View Width 360 degrees 
 Max Range 500m 
 Min Range 0m 
 Weapon Signature Altitude 10 feet 
 Weapon Signature Duration 30 sec 
 ID Weapon Type Other 
 Blast Radius 5m 
 Lethality Type Normal 
 Fly Out Speed 280 m/s 
 Perceived Intercept Point Launch 
 Reliability 0.5 
 Terrain LOS Restrictions TRUE 
 Target Medium Surface 
Small Fast Craft Comms Detectability TRUE 
 Number of Personnel Onboard 9 
 Detectable Signatures Simple Optical Signature 
  Simple RCS 
  Simple SIGINT 
 Evasion Duration 30 min 
 Evasion Speed 25 knots 
 Asset ID Ship - Swarm Craft 
 Tactical Response Speed 25 knots 
 Transit Speed 10 knots 
 Sensors Mk1 eyeball 
 Damage Effects Speed TRUE 
 Damage Correlation Coefficient 0.5 
 Re-Fire Delay 30 sec 
 Max Weapons in Flight 3 
HSV Weapons Selection Best Time 
 Fuel Burn Profile Burn Profile Altitude Key 0
 Number Of Personnel Onboard 107 
 Data Processing Module Default Fusion 
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 Detectable Signatures Optical Vul 
  Radar Vul 
  Infrared Vul 
  Passive Acoustic Vul 
  Active Acoustic Vul 
 Asset Height 66 feet 
 Evasion Speed 45 knots 
 Tactical Response Speed 45 knots 
 Transit Speed 15 knots 
 Radar Lowlite TV 
 Weapon Systems MK96 (25mm and 40mm) 
  Snake eyes 
RORO (1stLT Harry L. Martin) Number of Personnel 50 
 Data Processing Module Default Fusion 
 Detectable Signatures Simple RCS 
  Simple Optical Signature 
 Asset Height 25 feet 
 Tactical Response Speed 17 knots 
 Transit Speed 17 knots 
 Sensors Weather Radar 
  Radar Warning Receiver 
 Weapons None 
AS Emory S Land Fuel Burn Profile Burn Profile Altitude Key 0
 Number of Personnel 1363 
 Data Processing Module Default Fusion 
 Detectable Signatures Optical Vul 
  Infrared Vul 
  Radar Vul 
  Passive Acoustic Vul 
  Active Acoustic Vul 
 Asset Height 96 feet 
 Evasion Speed 20 knots 
 Tactical Response Speed 20 knots 
 Transit Speed 12 knots 
 Sensors MK 15 Srch/Trk 
  SPS-10 
 Weapons 4 50 cal 
MK96 (25mm and 40mm) Max Weapons in Flight 200 rds 
 Blast Radius 5 meters 
 Max Range 6800 meters 
 Max Angle 45 deg 
 Lethality Type Normal 
 Terrain LOS Restrictions TRUE 
Snake eyes Max Weapons in Flight 200 rds 
 Blast Radius 5 meters 
 Max Range 6800 meters 
 Max Angle 45 deg 
 Lethality Type Normal 
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 Terrain LOS Restrictions TRUE 
50 cal Max Weapons in Flight 200 rds 
 Blast Radium 0 
 Max Range 1500 
 Max Angle 45 deg 
 Lethality Type Normal 
 Terrain LOS Restrictions TRUE 
LPD-17 San Antonio Fuel Burn Profile Burn Profile Altitude Key 0
 Personnel 360 
 Data Processing Module Default Fusion 
 Detectable Signatures Optical Vul 
  Infrared Vul 
  Radar Vul 
  Passive Acoustic Vul 
  Active Acoustic Vul 
 Asset Height 96 feet 
 Evasion Speed 22 knots 
 Tactical Response Speed 22 knots 
 Transit Speed 10 knots 
 Weapons MK 46 
Oil Platform Detectable Signatures Optical Vul 
  Infrared Vul 
  Radar Vul 
 Asset Height 1700 feet 
 Icon Land_Fac 
 Operating Medium Surface 
Figure 123:  Simulation Data 
 
 Another aspect of NSS-21 is the Probability of Kill (Pk) tables and the Damage 
tables.  These tables are a requirement for the scenario to run properly, even though 
combat engagements were not the focus or purpose of our simulation.  To fill in the Pk 
and Damage tables we did not have hard data to analyze so we made assumptions about 
the accuracy of the weapons as well as the environment in which they were to be utilized 
to determine appropriate values.  For example, an RPG fired from a fast moving small 
boat is not going to be very accurate or precise.  Below is a spreadsheet of the values 
utilized; keeping in mind that no engagements occurred in our scenario due to real-world 
tactics of MEND and our simulated Rules of Engagement. 
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Pk Table Inputs 
System Pk Platform  
MK96 (25mm and 40mm) 0.3 Small Fast Craft  
Snake eyes 0.25 Small Fast Craft  
50 cal 0.2 Small Fast Craft  
RPG 0.005 CG  
 0.005 FFG  
 0.005 AS  
 0.01 HSV  
 0.01 RORO  
 0.000001 SH-60B  
 0.005 LPD  
MK45 0.8 Small Fast Craft  




Damage Table Entries 
System Linear Linear Coefficient Platform 
MK96 (25mm and 40mm) Yes 0.2 Small Fast Craft 
Snake eyes Yes 0.15 Small Fast Craft 
50 cal Yes 0.1 Small Fast Craft 
RPG Yes 0.0001 CG 
 Yes 0.0001 FFG 
 Yes 0.0001 AS 
 Yes 0.01 HSV 
 Yes 0.01 RORO 
 Yes 0.9 SH-60B 
 Yes 0.0001 LPD 
Figure 124:  Probability of Kill Table 
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 In the simulation we had several small fast craft assigned to the MEND forces.  
They proceeded from the Niger Delta to the offshore oil platform and then returned to the 
Delta to retreat up the Bonny River.   
 
 




 The following track is the route of the MEND Oil Tanker used to conduct oil 
bunkering operations (stealing oil from the oil platform).  The track shown is the full 
track the tanker would have taken if not intercepted by the GFS. 
 
 





 The following course was utilized for the GFS platforms (with the exception of 
the RORO and the LHD).  The track starts out simulating training in an operating area.  
Once the MEND forces attack the oil platform, the GFS receives a call for help and 
proceeds at maximum speed toward the oil platform.  The GFS then pursues the MEND 
Oil tanker which is subsequently boarded and stopped.   
 
 
Figure 127:  NSS Snapshot:  GFS Track 
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 In the simulation the RORO was placed in-port and was not actively involved in 




Figure 128:  NSS Snapshot:  LHD Loiter Area 
  
 
5. Key Assumptions 
  
a. Sensor Hand-off   
  The MEND tanker will be identified and classified at the oil platform, but 
no assets will be available to track it.  General speed and heading will be estimated. 
 
b. Location of Oil Platform, and MEND Fast Boat Employment   
  The location of the oil platform is about 26 nautical miles off the coast, 
near Bonny Island.  This is based on a New York Times article from June 2006: “armed 
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rebels raided an oil drilling rig 40 miles off the Nigerian coast early yesterday and 
kidnapped eight foreign oil workers in the latest of a string of violent incidents meant to 
disrupt oil production in the country's oil-rich Niger Delta region … Twenty to 30 
attackers aboard four speedboats fired shots and stormed the platform, according to 
Reuters, which cited unidentified security officials. No one was injured.”380 
 
c. Distribution of Merchant (WHITE) Traffic in AO  
  Fifteen ships are distributed throughout the region, providing an adequate 
challenge to the detection and identification capabilities of BLUE assets.  They transited 
from the open ocean to high traffic ports in the region and from the high traffic ports to 
the open ocean.  There were also several smaller WHITE vessels that randomly transited 
the region to simulate fishing vessels.   
 
d. Force Protection   
  For the purpose of the NSS simulation, we assume that Force Protection 
requirements, especially while underway, will be met.  The Force Protection attribute will 
be evaluated independent of the scenario for each system alternative. 
 
6. Modeling & Simulation Inputs & Conditions 
 Sample size: n = 70; a conservative estimate of the sample size needed to 
estimate any MOE (represented as a proportion) to within 10% with a 90% confidence 
interval:381 
 
   
2 2









380 Mouawad, Jad, “8 Foreign Workers Abducted From an Oil Rig Off Nigeria,” New York Times, 
June 3, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/03/business/worldbusiness/03oil.html. 
381 Keller, Gerald, Statistics for Management and Economics, (United States: Thomson Brooks/Cole, 
2005, 7th ed.) 386. 
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For each GFS platform, the simulation was run 70 times with a specification of less than 
5% standard deviation.  70 replications were enough to ensure that this requirement was 
met.  Mean values were reported. 
 
 RED forces:   5 MEND fast boats 
- 1 MEND tanker disguised as WHITE 
- Weaponry:  Small arms (AK-47’s and Rocket Propelled Grenades)382 
 WHITE traffic:  15 generic merchant ships 
 BLUE forces:  GFS platform as required 
 
There were 4 single-platform and 2 two-ship combinations chosen as evaluation subjects 
for GFS system alternatives.  
 
 
Figure 129:  Recapture of GFS Ship Alternatives for Simulation 
 
In order to standardize the inputs across the modeling and simulation efforts of all three 
GFS mission area teams, the following aviation and waterborne complements for the 
platforms were agreed upon: 
 
 
Figure 130:  Recapture of Connector Assets for Simulation 
 
 
7. Utility Grading Approach by Attribute 
 Refer to Functional Needs Analysis. 
 
_____________________ 
382 Wellington, Bestman, “Weapons of War in the Niger Delta,” The Jamestown Foundation: 
Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 10 (May 24, 2007), 
http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373428. 
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APPENDIX D: COST DATA 
 




 Figure 132:  VAMOSC Helicopter Costs (SEA-12 Calculations in Red) 
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 Please note, the following cost data provided by VAMOSC on MSC ships was not 
used, as their data was not complete in this instance.  We used costs provided directly 
from MSC for those ships. 
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APPENDIX E: RISK SUMMARY 
 




Figure 135:  Risk Summary 2 
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APPENDIX F: CNE AND NPS INTERACTION 
 We believe that several opportunities exist in which to “test our process,” beyond 
the realm of the borders on the Naval Postgraduate School.  The perfect opportunity for 
this may lie with the regional commander who currently holds direct influence in the 
region that we focused our study on:  Commander, Naval Forces Europe.  This may be 
the ideal situation for three reasons: 1) the ability of our process to complement changing 
dynamics of decisions to be made in fostering regional stability, 2) prior interaction 
between SEA-12 and CNE, and 3) similarities in approach to geo-political and regional 
issues by CNE to that described in this study. 
 
A. APPLYING OUR PROCESS TO NAVAL FORCES EUROPE’S PLAN 
 Over the past two years, Admiral Henry Ulrich (CNE-C6F) established a new 
maritime approach to engaging with West and Central African nations.  One of the 
outcomes is the APS – what we have considered in our study as a GFS pilot – and is 
intended to help develop the nations of this region improve maritime governance through 
an emphasis on Maritime Safety and Security training and interaction.  This latter term – 
maritime safety and security - is used often by CNE, and in our opinion, represents 
closely what we called Shaping and Stability, but with a heavier emphasis on the 
maritime and on the military-to-military aspects of Shaping and Stability.  Admiral 
Ulrich stated “APS is about a long term effort to assist our African partners in developing 
the capacity to safeguard their territorial waters and their Exclusive Economic Zones. It is 
not about dispensing aid or delivering equipment.”383 This quote marks an obvious shift 
in emphasis from what we determined as mission priority in our study, but we believe it 
also highlights the applicability of our process towards the disposition of a particular 
theater commander. 
_____________________ 
383. U.S. Navy Office of Information, “Africa Partnership Station (APS): Promoting Maritime Safety 
and Security,” Rhumb Lines, 
http://www.navy.mil/navco/speakers/currents/Africa%20Partnership%20Station%2025%20OCT%2007.pdf 
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 Applying this shift in emphasis away from the humanitarian missions, and toward 
the military-to-military role of APS, we factored this into our model, setting our 
Peacetime Engagement mission weight as a .8 (vice .5). 
 We also understand that Admiral Ulrich’s statement was not intended to neglect 
the humanitarian issues of the region, either, as APS is intended to “provide a maritime 
support platform for more than 20 humanitarian assistance projects in eight countries.”  
Therefore, we assigned a value of .1 to both our HA/DR and Interagency & NGO 
Coordination mission weights. 
 The following depicts the recommendations that we would make to CNE 
concerning ideal platforms for the APS role, out of current inventory: 
 
 
Figure 136: Cost-Effectiveness Results for CNE 
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The shift in emphasis on mission priorities did not change our results significantly, with 
the HSV and LPD alternatives topping the list of platforms we would recommend to 
CNE.  These recommendations resemble what CNE is planning on using for APS:  an 
HSV and an LSD (USS Fort McHenry).  This latter analogy, however, must be tempered 
in the knowledge that we have not conducted any quantitative and performance 
comparisons between the LPD-17 and LSD-41 classes of ships, and it is based solely on 
the knowledge that they are both amphibious ships of similar size.  In addition, the CG 
improved from an expected value performance score of 71% to 87%, and falls close to 
the “bend in the knee” for acceptable cost. 
 
B. INTERACTION BETWEEN NPS AND NAVAL FORCES EUROPE 
 
 We had two occasions in which to send SEA-12 representatives to interact with 
Navy, State Department, DoD, NGO, and host-nation representatives, both hosted by 
CNE: the GFS Planning Conference for FORT MCHENRY’s deployment in July of 
2007, as well as to a simulation in Naples.  Their observations are expanded upon in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
1. Africa Partnership Station, and Future CNE Contributions to the 
GFS Concept 
 Africa Partnership Station (APS) is CNE’s first initiative in energizing this plan, 
designed to improve MSS in the Gulf of Guinea via collaborative engagement with host 
nations.  It responds to specific African requests for assistance, is aligned with broad 
international community and U.S. objectives, and is reflective of the mission of the U.S. 
Africa Command.384  As was evidenced by the group demographics in a simulation 
conference held by CNE in November of 2007, APS promises a heavy multi-national and 
interagency characteristic to achieve maritime governance.  APS is inspired by the belief 
that effective maritime safety and security will contribute to development, economic 
_____________________ 
384. U.S. Naval Forces Europe-U.S. Sixth Fleet, “Africa Partnership Station: An Initiative to Promote 




prosperity, and security ashore - a belief with a strong foundation in all levels of strategic 
guidance.   
 Further actions by CNE will include mobile training teams, assistance in 
increasing maritime infrastructure and NGO initiatives. Lacking in CNE’s initiative is a 
strategic communications plan.  
 
2. CNE’s Coordination with Interagency and NGOs: Leading the Way, 
and Issues to be Resolved 
 CNE-C6F is viewed as the leading entity in the West Africa initiative. Their plans 
are well ahead of other agencies. Being in front on the leading edge of placing the GFS 
concept into practice, CNE-C6F has encountered planning issues with the non-DoD 
agencies. In its infancy, their plan -formulated to increase maritime safety and security in 
the region - is just now being introduced to various NGO’s, state department 
organizations, Enduring-Partner Nations and African Nations. As the plan becomes more 
socialized within the key organizations it will likely become more refined and better 
equipped to aid stability in the region.  
 The first step, beyond deployment of FORT MCHENRY, to realizing this goal 
was the Gulf of Guinea Regional Engagement Simulation held by CNE-C6F in Naples 
Italy, in November 2007. During this simulation CNE-C6F’s plans were presented to 
regional experts, NGO Representatives, State Department Representatives, Enduring 
Partner Nations and some representatives from the African Nations. The plans were 
heavily criticized by some NGO representatives; however, CNE was also highly praised 
for their forward thinking. By bringing the experts to the table in this type of a forum it 
allowed CNE to begin to actuate their plan with the key players, and to see the shortfalls 
as well as the strengths of their initiative. CNE-C6F’s model was received well by the 
panelists.  However, it was apparent that the panelists felt that in many ways, the timeline 
was very aggressive.  
 As of right now, the United States does not have a national policy regarding West 
African Maritime Security. What that eludes to is that fact that if we are going to move 
forward with such plans we as a nation (IE the state department), we need to put forward 
a public national policy toward the region such as the one that China has recently 
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published. So far the Navy is operating within navy line but if the intent is to go outside 
of navy lines we are going to need State Department backing and we do not currently 
have a consensus on this. There is a Navy vs. State Department perception by some 
within each group that must be overcome to realize a truly cohesive plan. 
 
3. CNE and NPS: Similarities in Quantitative Analysis 
 One other interaction included a visit by Mr. Jed Snyder, CNE C6F, who 
expressed interest in our study.  We were encouraged by some of the similarities between 
our study, and the actions being taken by Naval Forces, Europe.  One includes their 
greatly detailed level of focus on the non-traditional roles called for in the Gulf of 
Guinea, and their attempts to understand the region through interagency efforts.  Of other 
interest to us was their quantitative analysis of the GFS mission in the Gulf of Guinea, 
emphasizing “effects based” actions determined from measures and indicators (priorities, 
MOEs, strategic effects, and indicators).  We believe that a shared interest in decision-
making based on quantitative analysis, while seeking a value base of understanding 
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APPENDIX G: GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS 
(In alphabetical order) 
 
AFDB – Africa Development Bank 
AFRICOM – United States African Command 
AGOA – African Growth and Opportunity Act 
AIDS – Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
AIS – Automatic Identification System 
AO – Area of Operations 
AOC – Area of Concern 
AOR – Area of Responsibility 
APS – Africa Partnership Station 
AS – Submarine Tender 
AU – African Union 
BFEM – Battle Force Email 
BOAD – West African Development Bank 
C2 – Command and Control 
C3 – Command, Control, Coordination 
CBA – Capabilities Based Approach 
CBR – Chemical, Biological, Radiological 
CBT – Capacity Building Team 
CEMAC – Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
CENTRIX – Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System  
CG – Guided Missile Cruiser 
CMOC – Civil Military Operations Center 
CND – Computer Network Defense 
CNO – Chief of Naval Operations 
COCOM – Combatant Commander 
COIN – Counterinsurgency 
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CONOPS – Concept of Operations 
CONUS – Continental United States 
CP – Counter Piracy 
CRED – Center for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters 
CRUDES – Cruiser-Destroyer 
CUSMC – Commandant United States Marine Corps 
CVN – Carrier Vessel Nuclear 
DCTS – Defense Collaboration Tool Suite 
DDG – Guided Missile Destroyer 
DESRON – Destroyer Squadron 
DISA – Defense Information Systems Agency 
DMS – Defense Message System 
DOD – Department of Defense 
DOTMLPF – Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Material, Leadership and Education, 
Personnel and Facilities 
DR – Disaster Relief 
DRC – Democratic Republic of Congo  
DSN – Defense Switched Network 
ECOWAS – Economic Community of West African States 
EEZ – Exclusive Economic Zone 
EHF – Extremely High Frequency 
ELISA - Enzyme Linked Immunosorbent Assay 
EMIO – Extended Maritime Interdiction Operations 
EMSS – Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services 
EPZ – Export Processing Zone 
EVP – Expected Value Performance 
FAA – Functional Area Analysis 
FAO – Foreign Area Officer 
FFG – Guided Missile Frigates 
FGM – Female Genital Mutilation 
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FHA – Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
FLEC – Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda 
FLTSATCOM – Fleet Satellite Communications  
FMFM – Fleet Marine Forces Manual 
FNA – Functional Needs Analysis 
FNCB – Foreign Navy Capability Building 
FOB – Forward Operating Base 
FRP – Fleet Response Plan 
FSA – Functional Solution Analysis 
GAO – General Accounting Office 
GBS – Global Broadcast Service 
GCCS – Global Command and Control System 
GDMSS – Global Maritime Distress and Safety System  
GDP – Gross Domestic Product 
GFS – Global Fleet Station 
GIG – Global Information Grid 
GMP – Global Maritime Partnership 
GoG – Gulf of Guinea  
GWOT – Global War on Terrorism 
HA – Humanitarian Assistance 
HA/DR – Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 
HAST – Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team 
HF – High Frequency 
HIPC – Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
HIV – Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
HN – Host Nation 
HOC – Humanitarian Operations Center 
HSRT – Humanitarian, Stabilization, and Reconstruction Teams 
HSS – Health Service Support 
HSV – High Speed Vessel 
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INMARSAT – International Maritime Satellite 
ICJ – International Court of Justice  
IDC – Independent Duty Corpsman 
IDP – Internationally Displaced Persons 
IGO – International Governmental Organization 
IP – Internet Protocol 
IMB – International Maritime Bureau 
IMF – International Monetary Fund 
IO – International Organization 
ISDN – Integrated Services Digital Network 
JCA – Joint Capability Area 
JCIDS – Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System 
JDN – Joint Data Network 
JHSV – Joint High Speed Vessel 
JP – Joint Publication 
JROC – Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
JTF – Joint Task Force 
JWICS – Joint Worldwide Intelligence Network LAN – Local Area Network 
LCAC – Landing Craft Air Cushion 
LCAC – Landing Craft, Air Cushioned 
LCS – Littoral Combat Ship 
LCU – Landing Craft, Utility 
LEO – Low Earth Orbiting  
LHA – Amphibious Assault Ship 
LHD – Amphibious Assault Ship 
LMSR – Large, Medium-Speed, roll-on/roll-off  
LRC – Library Resource Center 
LPD – Amphibious Transport Docks 
LSD – Dock Landing Ship 
MARAD – Maritime Administration 
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MASCAL – Mass Casualty  
MCADS – Maritime Craft Aerial Drop 
MCC – Millennium Challenge Compact 
MCWP – Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 
MDA – Maritime Domain Awareness 
MEND – Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta 
MHC – Coastal Minehunters 
MHS – Military Health System 
MHQ – Marine Headquarters 
MILSTAR – Military Strategic Tactical Relay  
MIO – Maritime Interdiction Operations 
MJP – Movement for Justice and Peace 
MLPP – Multilevel Precedence and Preemption 
MOC – Marine Operations Concept 
MOE – Measure of Effectiveness 
MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War 
MPCI – Patriotic Movement of the Ivory Coast 
MPF (E) – Maritime Prepositioning Force-Enhanced 
MPGA – Marinha de Guerra Popular de Angola 
MPIGO – Ivoirian Popular Movement for the Great West 
MPLA – Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola 
MSC – Military Sealift Command 
MSOC – Maritime Security Operations & Cooperation 
MWB – Motor Whale Boat  
NACT – Naval Advanced Concepts and Technologies 
NAVSEA – Naval Sea Systems Command 
NBC – Nuclear, Biological, Chemical 
NCB – Non-Combatant Boarding 
NDP – Naval Doctrine Publication 
NEO – Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations 
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NFAF – Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force 
NGO – Non-Governmental Organization 
NIPRNET – Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
NOAA – National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NOC – Naval Operations Concept 
NSMS – National Strategy for Maritime Security  
NSS – National Security Strategy 
NSWG – Naval Surface Warfare Group 
NTTP – Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures 
NWDC – Naval Warfare Development Command 
NWP – Naval Warfare Publication 
O & S – Operation and Support 
OCONUS – Outside Continental United States 
OFDA – Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance 
OPCON – Operational Control 
OPEC – Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
OPNAV – Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 
PC – Patrol Craft 
PDG – Parti Democratique Gabonais 
POTS – Plain Old Telephone System 
POTUS – President of the United States 
PRGF – Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility 
PVO – Private Voluntary Organization 
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review 
R & D – Research and Development 
RCC – Regional Combatant Commanders 
RHIB – Rigid Hull Inflatable Boat 
RMSA – Regional Maritime Situational Awareness 
RORO – Roll On/Roll Off 
RRF – Ready Reserve Force 
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S/CRS – Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, U.S. State Department 
SAR – Search and Rescue 
SATCOM – Satellite Communication 
SCI – Sensitive Compartmented Information 
SEAL – Sea, Air, Land (Navy Special Forces) 
SHF – Super High Frequency 
SINCGARS - Single Channel Ground to Air Radio System 
SIPRNET – Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SLOC – Sea Lines of Communication 
SME – Subject Matter Expert 
SOF – Special Operations Forces 
SOUTHCOM – United States Southern Command 
SSO – Shaping and Stability Operations 
STEP – Standardized Tactical Entry Point 
SURC – Small Unit Riverine Craft 
TACLOG – Tactical Logistics 
TACMEMO – Tactical Memorandum 
TEU – Twenty Foot Equivalent Unit 
TSN – Thousand Ship Navy 
TV-DTS – Television Direct to Sailor 
UAV – Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
UDOP – User Defined Operational Picture 
UEMOA – African Economic and Monetary Union 
UHF – Ultra High Frequency 
UN – United Nations 
UNCLOS – United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
USAF – United States Air Force 
USAID – United States Agency for International Development 
USCG – United States Coast Guard 
USMC – United States Marine Corps 
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USN – United States Navy 
USNS – United States Naval Ship 
VAMOSC – Navy Visibility and Management of Operating and Support Costs 
VBSS – Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure 
VHF – Very High Frequency 
VTC – Video Tele-Conferencing  
WAN – Wide Area Network 
WMD – Weapons Mass Destruction 
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